Chapter 2: The Legal Position and Organizational Forms of Forensic Psychiatric Expert Examination

The practical task of forensic psychiatry, which is one of the subdivisions of psychiatry, is to give an expert evaluation, on assignment from investigatory agencies and courts, and to devise and recommend measures for the prevention of socially dangerous acts by the mentally ill. Forensic psychiatric expert examination, like forensic medical, criminal, or any other type of expert examination, aids agencies of justice in establishing the facts in a case. Forensic psychiatric expert examination is called upon to assist the investigator and the court in determining whether an individual is a criminal or a legally irresponsible, mentally ill person; whether a person sentenced to a prison term should, because of mental illness, be released before his time is served; whether the investigator and the court may pursue the interrogation of a witness or victim with mental disorders, and whether the testimony of such persons may be used as court evidence. Such an expert examination is necessary in a civil suit in deciding the question of an individual's competence.     

Reduced punishment in Israel in the case of murder: bridging the medico-legal gap

The psychiatrist's assessment of criminal responsibility of an accused in court for an act of crime has always been a matter of great difficulty. In 1997, clause 300a was incorporated into the Penal Code of Israel, thereby permitting a more lenient punishment for murder than mandatory life imprisonment. The clause includes the definition of what is meant by "severe mental disorder" and "significantly restricted capacity" by the defendant to understand the criminal nature of his or her act and to refrain from committing it. Usage of the concepts "disorder" and "significantly restricted capacity" in addressing the issue of diminished responsibility of the mentally ill is new to the Israeli legal code. The emergence and evolvement of the above concepts are presented through a historical review of the Israeli encoded law concerning mental illness, analyzed from a psychiatric perspective.     

Individualization,criminalization, or problem resolution: A factorial survey of juvenile court judges' decisions to incarcerate youthful felony offenders

Existing research on the criteria used by juvenile court judges in choosing dispositions is limited in two respects. First, the predictor variables included in most investigations have been limited either in number or in the quality of their measurement. Second, research has not focused on sentencing decisions for serious offenders. Using a factorial survey of juvenile court judges, the present study seeks to determine what factors shape disposition decisions for juvenile felony offenders. The results suggest that judges focus primarily on offense characteristics, and are influenced only marginally by the offender's social characteristics. These findings are more consistent with the view that juvenile courts are becoming “criminalized” than with the view that individualized treatment is the goal. An alternative interpretation—that judges may be problem solvers, trying to dispose of cases efficiently—also is proposed.     

Guilty but mentally ill: Reform of the insanity defense in Illinois

In 1981 Illinois joined several other states by passing a “guilty but mentally ill” statute. Passed as a response to perceived inadequacies in the existing insanity defense, the statute was intended to protect society better, to provide treatment for offenders, and to compel the offender to assume greater responsibility for his or her criminal acts. This study, based on court data and responses to a survey of state prosectors, suggests that the statute has not been successful in reaching its major objectives. GBMI offenders often may be placed on probation, infrequently receive treatment when institutionalized, and may use the plea to absolve themselves of responsibility for their acts.     

The precarious practice of forensic psychiatric risk assessments

The development of forensic psychiatric risk assessments is discussed from a clinical point of view using the example of Sweden. A central task in forensic psychiatry has traditionally been to identify dangerous, mentally disordered subjects considered to be prone to commit violent acts. Over time, “dangerousness” has been reworded into “risk”. Nevertheless, such assessments have generally been based on the psychiatric factors characterising the individual patient, while group interaction, situational factors, or social and cultural circumstances, such as the availability of alcohol and drugs, have been largely overlooked. That risk assessments have a focused on people with a diagnosis of “mental disorder” and been used as grounds for coercive measures and integrity violations has somehow been accepted as a matter of course in the public and political debate. Even the basic question whether offenders with a mental disorder are really more prone to criminal recidivism than other offenders seems to have been treated light-handedly and dealt with merely by epidemiological comparisons between groups of persons with broad ranges of psychosocial vulnerability and the general population. Legal texts, instructions and guidelines from the authorities in charge are often vague and general, while actors in the judicial system seem to put their trust in psychiatric opinions. The exchange of professional opinions, general public expectations, and judicial decision processes poses a huge risk for misunderstandings based on divergent expectations and uses of terminology.     

Judicial Reform and Rationalization: The Diffusion of Court Reform Policies Among the American States

Explaining the diffusion of judicial reform policies among the American states is an elusive task. Are such policies simply part of the larger policy process revealed in the comparative state policy literature? Or b court reform a policy arena unto itself, responding to factors uniquely legal or professional in nature? Our inquiry begins with Max Weber's sociology of law from which we adopt his concept of rationalization as a schema of policy development. According to Weber, the “rationalization” of legal institutions would accompany the advancement of capitalism in modernizing nations. Thus, we might expect specific judicial reform policies expressly aimed at rationalizing the structure and process of state court systems to be closely associated with each other and with commonly accepted indicators of economic development among the states. As part of our investigation, we relate court reforms to broader policy innovations among the states, drawing on earlier “diffusion of innovations” research. Our data indicate a strong connection between judicial reform and more general patterns of innovation diffusion among the states, but provide only modest support for Weber's assertions about the rationalization of legal systems under advancing capitalism. Three of the selected reforms cluster together and are largely explainable by indicators of economic development. Two other reforms do not fit this pattern, and their “behavior” requires additional discussion and research. Thus, the diffusion of judicial reform policy is partly accounted for by factors found in explanations of general policy innovations across states, but other, as yet unidentified, factors apparently influence certain aspects of judicial reform. The connection between Max Weber's legal sociology and policy development among the American states might at first blush seem remote or tenuous. However, this article attempts to use Weber's insights into modern legal systems to (1) examine a specific area of state policy making–judicial reform–and (2) establish a connection between policy development in the court reform area and the larger literature on general policy innovation in the American states. This inquiry is inspired by the lack of theoretical integration apparent in the literature on court reform, on the one hand, and the absence of empirical analyses connecting court reform data with “diffusion of innovation” policy studies, on the other.     

Injustice in Robes: Iniquity and Judicial Accountability*

The paper addresses the question of judges' moral responsibility in an unjust society. How is the “moral” judge to reconcile his perception of justice with a malevolent law? Upon what grounds might judges, and perhaps other public officials, be held morally responsible for their acts or omissions? Does a positivist approach yield a more satisfactory resolution than a natural law or Dworkinian analysis? Could inclusive positivism offer any clues as to how this quandary might be judiciously resolved?     

司法精神病学鉴定后的处理情况调查

目的为了维护社会安全和依法保障精神病人的合法权益，需要正确处理精神病违法者。实际上，人们对司法精神病学鉴定后的处理情况知之甚少。因此，进行此项调查研究。方法采用邮寄调查问卷的方式对四川省52个县市的183例精神病违法者进行调查。结果在处置精神病违法者的机关中，公安局占73．08％，法院占26．72％。有责任能力组中有2．22％被无罪释放；无责任能力组中有2．10％被判刑；部分责任能力组中有13．95％被无罪释放。结论公安局是处理精神病违法者的主要机构。存在不适当处置情况，尤其对部分责任能力者的处理更复杂、更困难。     

What is Left of the Law and Society Paradigm after Critique? Revisiting Gordon's “Critical Legal Histories”

For more than twenty‐five years, Robert Gordon's “Critical Legal Histories” has been savored by legal historians as one of the most incisive explanations available of what legal history can and should be. Gordon's essay, however, is of significance to the course of sociolegal studies in general. This commentary offers an appreciation, and a critique, of “Critical Legal Histories.” It explores Gordon's articulation of the central themes of critical legal studies, in particular his corrosion of functionalism and embrace of the indeterminacy thesis, and assesses the consequences for sociolegal and legal‐historical analysis of the resultant stress on the contingency and complexity of social life.     

Chapter 22: Reactive States

Reactive or psychogenic states are temporary and reversible disorders of mental activity arising as a reaction to mental trauma, which, relevant to forensic psychiatry, may be an experience associated with the offender's crime, his imprisonment, or the conditions of the investigation.     

JUVENILITY AND PUNISHMENT: SENTENCING JUVENILES IN ADULT CRIMINAL COURT*

The study outlined in this article addressed a key limitation of prior research on the punishment of juveniles transferred to adult court by employing propensity score matching techniques to create more comparable samples of juvenile and young adult offenders. Using recent data from the Maryland State Commission on Criminal Sentencing Policy, it tested competing theoretical propositions about the salience of juvenile status in adult court. Findings indicate that even after rigorous statistical matching procedures, juvenile offenders are punished more severely than their young adult counterparts. We found no evidence that this “juvenile penalty” is exacerbated by an offender's race or gender, but it does vary starkly across offense type and mode of transfer, being driven primarily by drug crimes and discretionary waivers. The import of these findings is discussed as they relate to the future of juvenile justice policy regarding the continued use of juvenile transfer to adult court.     

The Evolution of Balanced and Restorative Justice

Maloney, Armstrong, and Romig presented a portrait of “Joey,” who was the exemplar of what was wrong with the juvenile justice system, in 1988 when they published The Balanced Approach in this Journal. In response, they reimagined a juvenile justice system predicated on balancing three fundamental goals—protection of community, accountability to victims, and development of competencies to prepare juvenile court‐involved youth for productive roles in their communities. The authors examine the evolution of balanced and restorative justice and re‐imagine how Joey's life may have been different at critical junctures of his juvenile court involvement.     

Alf Ross on the Nature of Law

In his work, On Law and Justice, Alf Ross sought to explain law in scientific/empirical terms, in terms that would require no recourse to what he called “metaphysics” or “idealism.” The result is a sort of translation of legal rules and official actions into propositions of behavior, predictions of behavior, and shared ideology. The present work raises questions about the tensions within Ross's work(s), and discusses the places where Ross's analysis seems to fall short of its ambitions. In the course of the discussion, the article considers issues relating to legal mistake, explanations of judicial behavior, and different types of normativity.     

Compatibility Between Mental Disorder and Mental Capacity: Analysis of a Particular Case of Group Sexual Homicide

Abstract: On the night of August 19, 2000, at the foot of Castel del Monte, an 8‐year‐old girl was brutally murdered. The perpetrators were identified as five young men who captured their victim and sexually abused her. The policemen found the cadaver by following “Mario,” one of the five, who had been discovered lying on the ground, near the castle. Investigation led to demonstrate that the murder was not premeditated. The only desire of the group was to sexually molest the little girl. Mario showed signs of psychiatric pathology and for that he underwent psychiatric evaluation by judicial authorities. Analysis of this case, combined with a criminological and medical‐legal perspective led to conclusions very much different from the expectations of Mario’s defense attorneys. Mario, a marginal figure and seemingly the least intelligent, played the role of group instigator, both in the initiation of sexually abusing the child, as well as in the elimination of an inconvenient witness. However, the group was able to activate Mario’s sadistic fantasies and his sexual perversions, and he ended up in a catalyzing role influencing the behavior of others and realizing what would otherwise remain only fantasies. The circularity of the group allows people like Mario, who are apparently subordinate, to influence the behavior of others. Mario was found to have a mental disorder but it was not sufficient to diminish his personal responsibility related to the crime. In fact, according to Italian judicial code, it is necessary that the motivation for the crime was psychopathological. It was for this reason that, according to Italian law, all of the members of the group were considered to be responsible for the crimes committed and were condemned.     

International Crimes and the Right to Punish

What can international courts say when criminals ask, by what right do you try me? Some authors attempt to draw a connection between humanity's responsibility to call offenders to account and the harm humanity has suffered as a consequence of the offender's crimes. Others have argued that there need not be a special connection between those calling to account and the offenders, as the right to punish offenders is a general right each and every person has. Both lines of argument are ultimately unconvincing. Instead, I argue for a modified version of the second position which proposes a democratically based theory of responsibility for punishment held by international criminal law institutions.     

Is the Process the Only Punishment?: Racial–Ethnic Disparities in Lower-Level Courts

Although misdemeanors make up the bulk of criminal cases in the United States, the majority of research on court decision-making examines felony sentencing. In contrast to felony courts, lower-level courts are characterized by higher case volumes and increased reliance on informal sanctions, which may contribute to greater racial–ethnic disparities. To assess this possibility, we examine pretrial detention and case processing outcomes for misdemeanants in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Utilizing temporal (detention time) and monetary (bond amount) measures of pretrial detention, we assess whether and to what extent there are racial–ethnic disparities in formal and informal sanctions facing misdemeanants. Results indicate that black defendants, especially black Latinx defendants, face greater informal sanctions (longer detention and higher bond amounts), are more likely to be convicted, and experience more severe formal sanctions than do white non-Latinx defendants. These findings complicate Feeley's (1979) argument about lower-level cases, revealing that black defendants are punished by both the court process and formal sanctions. In this way, “the process is the punishment” for lower-level white and nonwhite defendants, while the punishment is also the punishment for black defendants.     

The blurred vision of Lady Justice for minors with mental disorders: Records of the juvenile court in Belgium

Purpose

This study examined (1) the information present in juvenile court records in Belgium (Flanders) and (2) whether there are differences in information between records that mention a mental disorder and those that do not.

Method

The file study sample included 107 court records, and we used a Pearson's chi-square test and a t-test to analyze the information within those records.

Results

Information in juvenile court records varied considerably. This variability was evident when we compared juvenile court records with and without mention of a mental disorder. Significantly more information about school-related problems, the functioning of the minor, and the occurrence of domestic violence was included in records that mentioned a mental disorder compared with records that did not.

Conclusion

The content of the juvenile court records varied, particularly with regard to the mental health status of the minor in question. We suggest guidelines to standardize the information contained in juvenile court records.     

Religion and the Practices of Popular Constitutionalism: Sarah Gordon's The Spirit of the Law

Sarah Gordon's The Spirit of the Law: Religious Voices and the Constitution in Modern America (2010) details the advent, beginning in the 1940s, of a “new constitutional world” pertaining to the religion clauses. By focusing on case studies, Gordon's narrative history shows the emergence, maturation, and waning of a rich historical moment in which religiously motivated popular constitutionalists had a profound impact on how the Constitution was technically interpreted by the courts. Shifting perspectives from history to ethnography, the essay synthesizes Gordon's stories to yield an anatomy of “religious” popular constitutionalism as it appears in Gordon's book and conjectures at what it might look like if we left court records behind.     

Mental disorder and legal responsibility: The relevance of stages of decision making

The paper discusses the relevance of decision-making models for evaluating the impact of mental disorder on legal responsibility. A three-stage model is presented that analyzes decision making in terms of behavioral control. We argue that understanding dysfunctions in each of the three stages of decision making could provide important insights in the relation between mental disorder and legal responsibility. In particular, it is argued that generating options for action constitutes an important but largely ignored stage of the decision-making process, and that dysfunctions in this early stage might undermine the whole process of making decisions (and thus behavioral control) more strongly than dysfunctions in later stages. Lastly, we show how the presented framework could be relevant to the actual psychiatric assessment of a defendant's decision making within the context of an insanity defense.