FUNDING COMMUNITY POLICING TO REDUCE CRIME: HAVE COPS GRANTS MADE A DIFFERENCE?*

Research Summary: This research examines how funding from the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), has affected violent and property crime rates in the United States from 1995 to 1999. Drawing on six years of panel data, we examine the effects of three types of awards made by COPS to 6,100 law enforcement agencies serving more than 145 million citizens. We estimate their impact on crime reduction over time in jurisdictions receiving funding and controlling for baseline levels of crime, socioeconomic characteristics, city size, and population diversity and mobility. Our analyses suggest that COPS hiring and innovative grant programs have resulted in significant reductions in local crime rates in cities with populations greater than 10,000 for both violent and nonviolent offenses. Multivariate analysis shows that in cities with populations greater than 10,000, an increase in one dollar of hiring grant funding per resident contributed to a corresponding decline of 5.26 violent crimes and 21.63 property crimes per 100,000 residents. Similarly, an increase in one dollar of innovative grant funding per resident has contributed to a decline of 12.93 violent crimes and 45.53 property crimes per 100,000 persons. In addition, the findings suggest that COPS grants have had no significant negative effect on violent and property crime rates in cities with less than 10,000 population. Policy Implications: The findings of this study imply that COPS program funding to medium‐ and large‐size cities has been an effective force in reducing both violent and property crime. Federal government grants made directly to law enforcement agencies to hire additional officers and promote innovations may be an effective way to reduce crime on a national scale.     

MANAGING CITIZEN CALLS TO THE POLICE: THE IMPACT OF BALTIMORE'S 3‐1‐1 CALL SYSTEM*

Research Summary: Our paper explores the impact of implementing a nonemergency 3‐1‐1 call system in Baltimore, Maryland. We found a large (34.2%) reduction in 9‐1‐1 calls following the introduction of the 3‐1‐1 nonemergency call system. Many, but not all, of these calls simply migrated over to the 3‐1‐1 call system. Overall, we identified a 7.7% reduction in recorded citizen calls to the police post 3‐1‐1 intervention. This recorded reduction in citizen calls was confounded by an increase in high priority calls to the 9‐1‐1 system (27.5%), a large overall reduction in low priority calls (54.3%), and an estimated increase (perhaps 8%) in unrecorded calls to the police. We also note a small increase in response times to high priority 9‐1‐1 calls following the implementation of the 3‐1‐1 call system and virtually no change in the amount of officer time available for community policing or problem‐oriented policing activities. Policy Implications: Our findings suggest that nonemergency call systems, such as 3‐1‐1, can greatly facilitate police efforts to better handle citizen calls for police service. However, the intrinsic value of nonemergency call systems is tightly woven with a police department's willingness to change dispatch policies (especially for those calls received via the 3‐1‐1 system), reallocate patrol resources, and adopt organizational reforms to support alternative methods (apart from dispatch) for handling nonemergency calls for service.     

CORPORATE SELF‐POLICING AND THE ENVIRONMENT*

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Self‐Policing Policy (more commonly referred to as the Audit Policy) waives or reduces penalties when regulated entities voluntarily discover, disclose, and correct environmental violations. This study draws upon a rational choice model of corporate crime to determine if traditional regulatory efforts such as inspections and enforcement actions are associated with the odds of disclosing an environmental violation under the Audit Policy. A case control design is used to compare companies that self‐police to companies that do not self‐police. The event group consists of all 551 companies that disclosed at least one environmental violation under the Audit Policy between October 1, 1998 and September 30, 2000. The control group consists of a simple random sample of 551 companies that did not use the Audit Policy but were discovered to have violated at least one environmental law during the same time period as the event group. There is no evidence that inspections and enforcement increase Audit Policy use. However, the results do suggest, first, that the Audit Policy is more likely to be used by large companies than by small companies and, second, that it is likely to be used for reporting violations as opposed to more serious emissions or permit violations. In terms of public policy these findings suggest that regulatory agencies such as the EPA can do relatively little to increase the self‐policing of environmental violations.     

THE IMPACT OF ORDER‐MAINTENANCE POLICING ON NEW YORK CITY HOMICIDE AND ROBBERY RATES: 1988‐2001*

Local officials and national observers have attributed the New York City drop in violent crime during the 1990s to the aggressive enforcement of public order, but relevant research is limited and yields contrasting conclusions regarding the effects of order‐maintenance policing (OMP) on violent crime trends in New York City. The current study investigates the effects of order‐maintenance arrests on precinct‐level robbery and homicide trends in New York City with more reliable crime and arrest data, longer time series, and more extensive controls for other influences than used in prior research. We find statistically significant but small crime‐reduction effects of OMP and conclude that the impact of aggressive order enforcement on the reduction in homicide and robbery rates in New York City during the 1990s was modest at best.     

SELF‐CONTROL THEORY AND THE CONCEPT OF OPPORTUNITY: THE CASE FOR A MORE SYSTEMATIC UNION*

The purpose of this study is to advance the idea that low self‐control—one of the strongest known predictors of crime—likely has effects that are conditional on the supply of criminal opportunities. Some scholars initially interpreted the theory to make this exact prediction, but Gottfredson and Hirschi (2003) have rejected this interpretation. They have insisted that the simplistic nature of most crimes ensures that opportunities are limitless and that variation in opportunity simply reflects variation in self‐control. We trace the history of this uncertain position of opportunity in self‐control theory and argue that it should play a significant role in the theory, even if Gottfredson and Hirschi did not originally envision this. Next, we draw on routine activities theory and applications of it to individual offending to offer a theoretical statement of how opportunity should be incorporated into self‐control theory. Last, using data from a national sample of juveniles, we test the arguments that have been made. The analysis suggests that the effects of low self‐control on delinquency partially depend on the availability of criminal opportunities, as indicated by the time juveniles spend with their friends or away from the supervision of their parents.     

POLICE DISRESPECT TOWARD THE PUBLIC: AN ENCOUNTER‐BASED ANALYSIS*

We use observations of police encounters with 3,130 suspects in Indianapolis and St. Petersburg to estimate three influences on police disrespect: how suspects behave, their personal characteristics, and the location of the encounter. Logistic regression models show that suspects' behaviors were the most powerful predictors, but the suspect's sex, age, income, and degree of neighborhood disadvantage were also significant. Minority suspects experienced disrespect less often than whites (statistically significant in the hierarchical analysis controlling for degree of neighborhood disadvantage). These effects are concentrated in St. Petersburg, where the chief had made the suppression of police abuses a visible priority. The findings offer partial confirmation of Donald Black's theory of law.     

WILLINGNESS‐TO‐PAY FOR CRIME CONTROL PROGRAMS*

This paper reports on a new methodology to estimate the “cost of crime.” It is adapted from the contingent valuation method used in the environmental economics literature and is itself used to estimate the public's willingness to pay for crime control programs. In a nationally representative sample of 1,300 U.S. residents, we found that the typical household would be willing to pay between $100 and $150 per year for programs that reduced specific crimes by 10 percent in their communities. This willingness amounts, collectively, to approximately $25,000 per burglary, $70,000 per serious assault, $232,000 per armed     

COMPARING DELINQUENCY CAREERS IN COURT RECORDS AND SELF‐REPORTS*

Most knowledge about delinquency careers is derived from official records. The main aim of this paper is to compare conclusions about delinquency careers derived from court referrals with conclusions derived from self‐reports. Data are analyzed from the Seattle Social Development Project, which is a prospective longitudinal survey of 808 youths. Annual court and self‐report data were available from age 11 to age 17 for eight offenses. The prevalence of offending increased with age, in both court referrals and self‐reports. There was a sharp increase in the prevalence of court referrals between ages 12 and 13, probably because of the reluctance of the juvenile justice system to deal with very young offenders. The individual offending frequency increased with age in self‐reports, but it stayed constant in court referrals, probably because of limitations on the annual number of referrals per offender. There was significant continuity in offending in both court referrals and self‐reports, but continuity was greater in court referrals. The concentration of offending (and the importance of chronic offenders) was greater in self‐reports. An early age of onset predicted a large number of offenses in both self‐reports and court referrals. However, an early onset predicted a high rate of offending in court referrals but not in self‐reports, possibly because very young offenders who were referred to court were an extreme group. About 37% of offenders and 3% of offenses led to a court referral. The more frequent offenders were less likely to be referred to court after each offense, but most of them were referred to court sooner or later. There was a sharp increase between ages 12 and 13 in the probability of an offender and an offense leading to a court referral. It is concluded that criminal career research based on self‐reports sometimes yields different conclusions compared with research based on official records.     

SEX‐BASED DISPARITIES IN FELONY DISPOSITIONS BEFORE VERSUS AFTER SENTENCING REFORM IN OHIO*

Extending Koons‐Witt's (2002) study of whether sex‐based disparities in imprisonment likelihoods changed under sentencing guidelines in Minnesota, we examined similar models for Ohio with additional analyses of felony conviction likelihoods and sentence length for 5,472 felony defendants from twenty‐four trial courts. The main effects of a defendant's sex on imprisonment were significant during both periods (unlike the Minnesota findings), consistent with a chivalry perspective. Random coefficient models revealed that these effects were similar across the twenty‐four jurisdictions. Analyses also revealed significant postguideline reductions in sentence length disparities based on a woman's race and number of dependent children, yet increased disparities in imprisonment likelihoods postguidelines based on a woman's race and whether she was convicted on drug charges. These and other findings are discussed in the context of the Ohio legislature's implementation of a sentencing scheme that retains considerably more judicial discretion relative to Minnesota's template.     

EXPLAINING THE ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE‐DELINQUENCY RELATIONSHIP*

We use data from the National Education Longitudinal Survey to examine the relationship between academic performance and delinquency. We estimate the effects of grades in tenth grade on delinquency in twelfth grade, and then introduce controls for social bonds and self‐control (teacher‐rated effort). The findings indicate that the feedback that adolescents receive in the form of grades does not affect their delinquent behavior, that academic performance and delinquency have instead a spurious relationship. Our evidence suggests that this relationship is attributable primarily to the effects of individual differences in self‐control, not to those of social bonds.     

DO PARENTS MATTER IN CREATING SELF‐CONTROL IN THEIR CHILDREN? A GENETICALLY INFORMED TEST OF GOTTFREDSON AND HIRSCHI'S THEORY OF LOW SELF‐CONTROL*

Gottfredson and Hirschi's general theory of crime (1990) has generated an abundance of research testing the proposition that low self‐control is the main cause of crime and analogous behaviors. Less empirical work, however, has examined the factors that give rise to low self‐control. Gottfredson and Hirschi suggest that parents are the sole contributors for either fostering or thwarting low self‐control in their children, explicitly discounting the possibility that genetics may play a key role. Yet genetic research has shown that ADHD and other deficits in the frontostriatal system are highly heritable. Our research thus tests whether “parents matter” in creating low self‐control once genetic influences are taken into account. Using a sample of twin children we find that parenting measures have a weak and inconsistent effect. We address the conceptual and methodological issues associated with the failure to address genetic influences in parenting studies.