Privatization and corruption: Patronage vs. spoils

We examine the issue of privatization of those public goods that can be provided in-house or contracted out. Such privatization appears straightforward, yet history shows otherwise. For example, the private contracting system for street cleaning in 19^th-century New York City was a failure, despite the safeguards instituted to ensure competition. The contract system was criticized for corruption, while in-house provision suffered from patronage abuses. We present two variations of the “rotten apple” theory to capture the salient features of the New York experience. The public officials and contractors were both operating under high-powered incentives, which invited opportunism. When players act strategically, the adverse effect of opportunism increases. Since the amounts of spoils can be larger than political contributions, contracting-out ends up being more costly, even though competition promotes productive efficiency. Another advantage of in-house provision is that incentives can be made low-powered by depoliticizing of the system.     

Anti‐Corruption Watchdog Accountability: The Limitations of Judicial Review's Ability to Guard the Guardians

Anti‐corruption watchdogs form an important part of integrity measures in Australia's system of government. Integrity theory places anti‐corruption watchdogs in a fourth branch of government and as a part of a national integrity system as a way of understanding how they detect and prevent corruption and promote integrity. Integrity theory claims that an important part of the oversight of watchdogs occurs through judicial review of watchdog decisions by the courts. However, it fails to recognise the unique limitations when undertaking judicial review of watchdog decisions. This article submits that it is important to recognise these limitations to properly assess the effectiveness of a national integrity system and a fourth branch of government. The article explores the unique limitations of the court's ability to hold watchdogs to account and offers suggestions for managing these limitations.     

Restraining Gulliver: Institutional reform and the strengthening of state capacity and compliance

Governance in the developing world is fraught with problems of corruption, weak institutions, and inadequate expertise among bureaucrats. Failing to enforce laws and regulations is one way in which these problems manifest themselves. In this paper, we evaluate changes across three institutions charged with oversight or administration of labor justice in Mexico. We find that both autonomy from the executive and professionalization are necessary to improve compliance with labor law over time. Our study shows that professionalization can occur in several ways, including through training, merit hiring, and introducing experienced external administrators. The implications of the study are that reforms that increase the independence and legal authority of oversight institutions should be complemented by efforts to strengthen the professionalism of bureaucrats.     

权力围猎场:腐败关系网络是如何搭建的——基于动机理论的行贿路径与腐败治理研究

当前我国法律反腐、制度反腐取得了长足进步,但腐败现象却趋向复杂化、隐蔽化和网络化,案件审理取证难,腐败治理面临新的瓶颈。基于动机理论,通过对腐败官员忏悔录的整理,围绕权力围猎场深入分析腐败双方的关系模式,构建由"规避检查的权力""行贿方式""人情文化""信任"四个维度组成的一般性腐败关系网络模型。研究发现,在权力围猎过程中,行贿者通过关系网络更容易实现对公共权力官员的围猎;在人情文化下,腐败双方的特殊利益互动过程是腐败信任关系的建立并不断强化的过程,且腐败行为主体之间的信任可实现关系网络内信任扩散、信任共享。腐败的治理,需要监管"规避检查的权力",优化权力结构和体制,明确"人情文化"与"行受贿"的法律边界。     

Inspecting the Inspectors: Overseeing Labor Inspectorates in Parliamentary Democracies

Most theories of how to control bureaucracies are derived from American experience and are tested with data from the U.S. In contrast, this article uses evidence from the 15 members of the European Union to examine oversight mechanisms through which legislators attempt to control the bureaucracy. Analysis of European data shows that "police patrol" mechanisms of oversight appear in countries with relatively little gridlock as measured by the ideological range of their governments. "Deck stacking" mechanisms appear in countries that experience greater problems with gridlock measured in the same way.     

当前农村“村官”腐败问题与对策

“村官”腐败主要表现为以权谋私的经济腐败、失职渎职的政治腐败、生活腐化的道德腐败。“村官”腐败不仅直接侵害了农民的切身利益,降低了党和政府在群众中的威信,还引发出干群矛盾甚至群体事件,严重破坏了经济社会的发展和稳定。“村官”腐败与中国转型期经济、政治、社会、文化等诸多因素的深刻变化密切相关,是一个复杂的社会系统问题。必须按照中央关于构建惩治和预防腐败体系建设的要求,把反腐倡廉建设融入农村经济建设、政治建设、文化建设、社会建设和党的建设之中,建立健全与社会主义市场经济体制相适应的融教育、制度、监督、改革、惩处于一体的农村党风廉政建设与反腐败工作新机制：一要加强教育引导,增强“村官”拒腐防变能力;二要完善制度体系,规范“村官”廉洁从政行为：三要强化监督管理,保障“村官”权力正确运行;四要加大惩处力度,增加“村官”腐败违纪成本;五要深化改革创新,消除“村官”腐败的滋生土壤。只有这样,才能从根本上全面有效地遏制“村官”腐败。     

The Loss of Governance Capacity through Corruption

Corruption manifests itself in many ways and at different levels. Corrupt behavior causes outrage to victims and those who value civil society, it impedes good government and administrative practice. The policy challenge in reducing corruption is to identify the component parts of corrupt behavior and the risk–reward profiles of offenders. This exploratory article begins this process by reporting data from 100 successfully prosecuted cases from New York City. The article analyzes data on varying degrees of corruption in service provision in New York City. The loss to the city is much more a loss of governance capacity than it is a monetary loss.     

Simulation and Managerial Decision Making:A Double‐Loop Learning Framework

Systems approaches present opportunities for public managers and policy makers to view policies and programs in a broader context. This article presents a framework to explain how simulation modeling promotes double‐loop learning in management teams by building and exploring collective mental models as well as by enhancing accuracy of the mental models. The authors discuss the types of problems that may benefit from simulation modeling and illustrate how double‐loop learning occurs in the process of dynamic hypothesis testing. Using a case from New York State's Division of Disability Determination, the article shows how simulation modeling built confidence in a management team's decision by providing the team with tools to share and examine multiple hypotheses about a declining trend in initial disability recipients in the state between 1998 and 2004.     

U.S. Prosecution of State and Local Officials for Political Corruption: Is the Bureaucracy Out of Control in a High-Stakes Operation Involving the Constitutional System?

Perhaps the most serious and disabling federal intrusion ofrecent years into the independent political status of stateand local governments has been actions by the U.S. governmentto prosecute elected state and local officials and their closeassociates for local political corruption. In 1986 U.S. Attorneysin New York, Boston, District of Columbia, Pennsylvania, andelsewhere pursued such investigations and prosecutions withunusual vigor. These activities have a recent genesis—since1974—and they are basically unauthorized, in importantrespects out of control, and overall questionable in terms ofthe federal nature of our constitutional system. These findingsare supported by data from the Public Integrity Section of theCriminal Division and the Office for U.S. Attorneys, both inthe Department of Justice, and by opinions of U.S. courts, legislativehistories of bills and statutes, and sources on criminal lawand political corruption.     

Less Government, More Secrecy: Reinvention and the Weakening of Freedom of Information Law

Many critics have suggested that worldwide efforts to reinvent government could also weaken democratic control over public institutions, but few have considered how attempts to implement the "new paradigm" in public management might affect a widely used instrument for promoting accountability: freedom of information law (FOI). FOI laws give citizens and nongovernmental organizations the right of access to government information. However, recent Canadian experience shows that reinvention can weaken FOI laws in three ways. First, attempts to reduce "nonessential" spending may cause delays in handling FOI requests and weaken mechanisms for ensuring compliance. Second, governmental functions may be transferred to private contractors and not-for-profit organizations that are not required to comply with FOI laws. Third, governments' attempts to sell information and increase FOI fees may create new economic barriers to openness. Thus, restructuring provides an opportunity for political executives, public servants, and some well-organized business interests to weaken oversight mechanisms and increase their own autonomy within the policy process.     

IMPLEMENTING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE: FROM TRADITIONAL TO NEW GENERATION JAIL OPERATIONS

The recent introduction of the New Generation, podular/direct supervision philosophy of jail architecture and inmate management dramatically changes the nature and design of the work performed by custodial staff. In particular, the new philosophy has the potential to "enrich" the job of correctional officers. Using before and after data gathered a t one institution, we address whether job enrichment is an outcome of the transition from traditional to podular/direct supervision detention facility design, and whether enrichment of the job affects employee perceptions of the work and of the organization.     

Continuity and catastrophe: business continuity management and the security of financial operations

This paper discusses business continuity management (BCM) and its role in contemporary financial institutions. BCM is a nascent disaster preparedness and recovery strategy that seeks to protect vital business operations from disruptions. The paper traces contemporary BCM back to Cold War continuity of government planning, and shows how BCM came to comprehend security as continuity of processes rather than integrity of goods. BCM is prominent in finance because it promises to mitigate operational risks, and it focuses on risks stemming from interdependencies in financial infrastructures. By engaging with two events that triggered continuity management in banks, Hurricane Sandy in New York City and the ‘Blockupy’ demonstrations in Frankfurt, the paper highlights how BCM is challenged by large-scale disasters as well as acts of public criticism.     

农村财务管理中的腐败现状及其惩防模式构建

近年来,农村财务腐败问题从反腐败“盲区”变为社会关注的焦点之一,违纪违法案件也呈现出数量由少到多、案值由小到大的发展态势,成为影响农村经济社会和谐发展的重要制约因素。当前农村财务腐败的行为表征体现为：违规操作,牟取私利;巧立名目,虚假冒领;肆意隐瞒集体资产与收入;票据使用不规范,收支管理混乱;现金管理不合理,白条列支严重等方面。究其原因,主要是主体自律与他律意识呈现“双弱”态势,村级财务管理体制不规范,监控体系不完善,对现有的农村财务腐败案件的惩处力度也不够严厉。因此,要构建以教育反腐为基础、群众反腐和社会反腐为保障,技术反腐、体改反腐、司法反腐为手段的农村财务腐败惩防体系,为农村基层党风廉政建设奠定坚实的基础。     

Corruption and marketization: Formal and informal rules in Chinese public procurement

The relationship between market liberalization and corruption has attracted scholarly attention in recent years. Conventional wisdom holds that increased economic marketization reduces corruption. China, however, provides evidence to the contrary; corruption has grown as its market‐oriented reforms progress. This paradoxical co‐development of the market and corruption begs the intriguing questions of how corruption has survived marketization and what explains the failure of government regulation. Extending the conceptual framework of institutional theory about formal and informal rules, and using public procurement in China as an example, this article shows that formal tendering rules and regulations may be modified, circumvented, or replaced by informal ones which facilitate corruption. The article identifies four corruption schemes through which procurement actors may distort competition processes and mechanisms under the guise of formal rules. Consequently, public procurement in China displays the structural outlook of market competition, but not its essential substance.     

DANGER ZONES OF CORRUPTION: HOW MANAGEMENT OF THE MINISTERIAL BUREAUCRACY AFFECTS CORRUPTION RISKS IN POLAND

This article examines the relationship between management of the ministerial bureaucracy and the risk of high‐level corruption in Poland. Four danger zones of corruption in the ministerial bureaucracy are distinguished, comprising the personalisation of appointments, the emergence of multiple dependencies, the screening capacity of the personnel system and the incentive of bureaucrats to develop a reputation of honesty and competence. Empirically, the article investigates the case of Poland from 1997 until 2007 and sets the findings in a comparative East Central European perspective. The article shows that corruption risks in the ministerial bureaucracy increased in most but not all danger zones after 2001 and, in particular, during the period of the centre‐right governments that were in office between 2005 and 2007. The increase in corruption risks is reflected in Poland's deteriorating corruption record during the same period. The conclusion discusses the findings with regard to alternative causes of corruption and the relationship between civil service professionalisation and corruption in other East Central European countries. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Privatisation of Prisoner Transfer Services in Western Australia. What Can we Learn from the Ward Case?

In 2008, Aboriginal elder Mr Ward died of heat stroke while being transported in the back of a prison van operated by private security company GSL (now G4S). This article will address the role accountability mechanisms can play in improving correctional and custodial services and whether existing oversight frameworks can provide a proper supervision and quality control of private security operators. It will focus on the key reports issued by Western Australia's Inspector of Custodial Services, the independent office to oversee the prisoner transfer system. Another central source of information will be an examination of the report and recommendations handed down by the Western Australian Coroner Alastair Hope in June 2009. The Hope Report details the numerous failings of the system which led to the Ward tragedy. Both GSL and the Western Australian state government had breached a duty of care to Mr Ward. Further, it remains highly problematical having a range of oversight bodies if elected government is able to simply ignore the subsequent advice. Parliament must therefore remain a central part of the system of political accountability.     

IS ALL CORRUPTION DYSFUNCTIONAL? PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Many anti‐corruption organisations work from the notion that both petty and grand corruption axiomatically results in negative consequences. However, few studies have asked citizens to evaluate the effects of different scales and types of corruption. This article investigates how rural people in Papua New Guinea associate dysfunctional or functional consequences to different types and scales of corruption. It draws on findings from focus groups conducted in four provinces of the country. The article finds that most examples of corruption considered by respondents were perceived as dysfunctional; however, marginalised respondents considered small‐scale corruption as functional—if the acts described benefitted marginalised people. These findings suggest that it is critical that anti‐corruption organisations understand and respond to the constraints faced by poor and marginalised people when operating in weak states. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does government funding alter nonprofit governance? Evidence from New York City nonprofit contractors

Government contracting has raised a collection of issues with respect to adequate oversight and accountability. This paper explores one avenue through which contracting agencies may achieve these tasks: through the governance practices of the contractor's board. Oversight and monitoring are a board's key responsibilities, and influencing a board's practices is one way a governmental agency can help to insure quality performance. Agencies could thus use both their selection process and their post‐contracting power to influence board practice. Using a new, rich data set on the nonprofit contractors of New York City, a series of hypotheses were tested on the relationship between government funding and board practices. Significant differences were found to exist in board practices as a function of government funding levels, differences that mark a shift of energy away from some activities (i.e., traditional board functions, such as fund‐raising) towards others (financial monitoring and advocacy). This suggests that government agencies may indeed use their contracting choices with an eye to particular governance practices. This increased emphasis on such activities appears to crowd out other activities, and is not unambiguously to the benefit of nonprofit board governance. © 2002 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

电子监察在预防腐败中的应用——基于青岛市的案例研究

电子监察是指行政监督权力的主体,利用网络信息技术再造权力运行流程,规范和监督权力行使,以实现提高行政效能和预防腐败的目标的一种手段。相对于传统的行政监察,电子监察具有独特的优势,能够丰富"预防腐败体系"的内涵和效能,越来越多地被应用于预防腐败。构建"电子监察预防腐败分析框架",要从清除腐败的权力基础、减少腐败机会、弱化腐败动机这三个方面着手,利用电子监察、电子政务等科技手段清理行政权力,消除腐败的权力基础;规范权力行使,减少腐败机会;实现权力运行公开透明,弱化腐败动机。青岛市电子监察在预防腐败方面存在着预防腐败的领域和层次不够全面、依然受到现行监察体制的制约和缺乏全面的绩效评估三方面的不足。因此,青岛市电子监察还需要拓展预防腐败的领域和层次;改进监察点设置,优化权力监督;完善廉政监察体制;构建电子监察绩效评估体系。     

(Un)principled principals, (un)principled agents: The differential effects of managerial civil service reforms on corruption in developing and OECD countries

Do management practices have similar anticorruption effects in OECD and developing countries? Despite prominent cautions against “New Zealand” reforms which enhance managerial discretion in developing countries, scholars have not assessed this question statistically. Our article addresses this gap through a conjoint experiment with 6,500 public servants in three developing countries and one OECD country. Our experiment assesses Weberian relative to managerial approaches to recruitment, job stability, and pay. We argue that in developing countries with institutionalized corruption and weak rule of law—yet not OECD countries without such features—“unprincipled” principals use managerial discretion over hiring, firing, and pay to favor “unprincipled” bureaucratic agents who engage in corruption. Our results support this argument: managerial practices are associated with greater bureaucratic corruption in our surveyed developing countries, yet have little effect in our OECD country. Alleged “best practices” in public management in OECD countries may thus be “worst practices” in developing countries.