A Retreat from Pepper v Hart? A Reply to Lord Steyn

This article shows how the House of Lords has, in recent years,embarked on a retreat from its landmark decision in Pepper vHart which had relaxed the rule prohibiting courts from usingministerial statements made in Parliament for the purpose ofinterpreting statutes. This development was initiated by a lecturegiven by Lord Steyn in May 2000 and subsequently published inthis journal. The article attempts to refute the reasons advancedin support of the retreat. In addition, it sets out to showthat the alternative solution proposed by Lord Steyn createsboth conceptual and practical difficulties. As a result it arguesfor a reversal of the retreat.     

Pepper v Hart: A Footnote to Professor Vogenauer's Reply to Lord Steyn

This Note is intended to stand as a short supplement to thecompelling article by Stefan Vogenauer entitled, ‘A Retreatfrom Pepper v Hart? A Reply to Lord Steyn’ published inthe Journal at the end of 2005.¹ In his article, Professor Vogenauercalls in question the argument advanced by Lord Steyn in hisarticle in the Journal, entitled ‘Pepper v Hart: A Re-examination’.²In that article, Lord Steyn called for a retreat from the decisionof the House of Lords in Pepper v Hart³ concerning the circumstancesin which reference may be made to Hansard as an aid to statutoryconstruction and for a reinterpretation of the decision in linewith a theory that a Minister speaking in Parliament who givesan explanation of the meaning or effect of a clause in a Billshould be taken to create a binding legitimate expectation thatthe executive will apply the provision, once enacted, in thatsense. In this Note, I express my agreement with Professor Vogenauer’sargument, and seek to support it with some additional pointsunder three heads: (1) the proper interpretation of Pepper vHart and its status as authority; (2) the basis in principlefor adhering to that interpretation; and (3) conceptual difficultiesattached to Lord Steyn’s legitimate expectation thesis.     

Hart Interviewed: H.L.A. Hart in Conversation with David Sugarman

Within the English-speaking world, H.L.A. Hart (1907–1992) is regarded as the twentieth century's foremost legal philosopher. He revived the moribund discipline of jurisprudence, reorientating it so that the qualities associated with analytical philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century² were applied to the investigation of the most fundamental concepts of law and to major public issues, notably, the complex relation between law and morality. As a colleague, teacher, mentor, and author, he exercised a profound influence, an influence that extended to the 'real world' and 'real issues'. From the late 1950s onwards, he championed a new humaneness in punishment, speaking and writing for a right to abortion and against the death penalty and the prosecution of people because of their sexual preferences. His exploration of the balance between the modern welfare state and individual liberty - in particular, the legitimate use of state power to impose standards of private morality -produced an eloquent and highly influential manifesto for modern political liberalism. As Tony Honore, his close colleague at Oxford, put it,'He was the most widely read British legal philosopher of the twentieth century and his work will continue to be a focus of discussion.³     

略论重新鉴定

司法鉴定中的重新鉴定,近年来成为人们关注的热点。对于重新鉴定虽有褒者,但贬者声音更为强烈。重新鉴定是一把双刃剑,有其积极意义,也有其消极方面。正确地认识重新鉴定,充分利用其积极性,防止消极作用的出现,成为完善我国司法鉴定制度的重要课题。     

Radbruch and Hart on the Grudge Informer: A Reconsideration

Hart's defense of the separation of law and morality is partly based on his refusal to accept Radbruch's solution of the well‐known grudge informer case, in his famous article “Statutory Injustice and Suprastatutory Law.” In this paper, I present a detailed reconstruction of the “debate” between Radbruch and Hart on this case. I reach the conclusion that Hart fails to address the issue that was Radbruch's primary concern, namely the legal position of the judiciary when dealing with criminal statutes. I suggest that Hart's separation thesis cannot be upheld in the face of this concern. In my argument, Hart's mistaken understanding of the verdict of the Oberlandesgericht Bamberg that he refers to plays a crucial role.     

签名笔迹重新鉴定实务问题探究

签名笔迹鉴定是司法鉴定实务中的重点和难点问题。实践中，签名笔迹重新鉴定遇到许多鉴定失误和诸多疑难问题，有必要对此进行系统研究。通过采取实证分析的方法，从理论和程序操作的角度分析鉴定失误的原因，结合对疑难签名笔迹鉴定的种类和特点的讨论，总结同类疑难签名笔迹鉴定的方法要点和重新鉴定中的程序审查要求。     

“多头鉴定、重复鉴定”问题探析

在我国当前弊端诸现的鉴定体制下,多头鉴定、重复鉴定问题日显突出,司法鉴定有"鉴"不定的混乱局面已经使司法鉴定的公信力下降,致使案件久拖不决影响诉讼效率的实现.要根治"多头鉴定、重复鉴定"这一顽疾尚需挖其病因,对症下药,完善制度才是根本.     

应当有效遏制司法鉴定中重新鉴定的无序状态

在司法鉴定制度中重新鉴定是检验和纠正鉴定结论有效途径,由于我国司法鉴定体制及立法的不足,重新鉴定不仅没有发挥其在司法实践中应有的功能,反而成为影响公正与效率的固疾。法律中对重新鉴定相关规定的欠缺是重复鉴定现存诸多问题的根源。本文在分析了重复鉴定立法成因的基础上,对重新鉴定制度的法律完善提出了几点建议:完善鉴定决定机制,规范法官审查、采信鉴定结论的程序,健全重新鉴定的程序规定。     

H. L. A. Hart on Legal Obligation*

Abstract. The author discusses Hart's concept of legal obligation, especially his contention that there is an obligation to obey the law which is peculiarly legal, i.e., non-moral. This view is held to be mistaken. What is denied is that legal rules, merely by their being issued, offer a justification for the use of coercion to ensure compliance with them. Although moral and other social (customary) rules are considered self-justifying, that is not the case of legal rules. Any analogy between these two types of rules in justifying their implementation by force is deemed wrong.**     

Richall Holdings v Fitzwilliam: Malory v Cheshire Homes and the LRA 2002

Richall Holdings v Fitzwilliam, holds that Malory v Cheshire Homes is binding in relation to the Land Registration Act 2002. Newey J saw himself as bound by that decision because he could find no relevant distinction between the provisions of the Land Registration Act 1925, and the Land Registration Act 2002. There are however significant differences in the general system of registration that is established. In particular the different roles of section 20 LRA 1925, and section 29 LRA 2002 mean that Malory was not binding and indeed ought not to have been followed. In addition, the treatment of the priorities rules in Richall misinterprets section 29 LRA 2002. Finally, the decision by‐passes the rectification and indemnity provisions of schedules 4 and 8. The decision ought to be overruled.