Rational Choice and Politics

The rational-choice approach brings scientific deductive methods to bear on politics. Appropriate methods are derived from physics, when actors interact probabilistically but non-rationally, and from game theory when they interact rationally. Collective action problems occur in the provision of public goods. As policies are themselves public goods, this leads to the game-theoretic analysis of voting, bureaucracy and lobbies. It is inconsistent to believe that economic actors are basically self-interested but that political actors are not. Rather, one should treat people as equally (not necessarily wholly) self-interested in each sphere. The paradoxes of social choice are then shown to have important implications for political science.     

Rational Choice and the Policy Sciences

This article discusses the possibility of applying deductively based rational choice theories as analytical tools for understanding complex policy problems. It surveys the basic assumptions, axioms and rules of interpretation on which the theory is constructed and some of its important findings. Two of its more interesting results, that of the "paradox of voting" and of the "prisoner's dilemma," are presented and applied herein.     

Rational Choice and Dysfunctional Institutions

As stated elsewhere in this issue, we cannot claim to explain an institution's origin just by the functions it serves. In part thismay be because of the cognitive limitations of those actors who are instrumental in institutional formation and institutional change. But even more clearly, it is the case that rational instrumental choice does not imply functional institutions. Just as rational choice in a prisoner's dilemma may result in inefficient policies, rational choice by actors with conflicting preferencesfor institutions may result in institutions that are suboptimal. Examples of rational choice explanations of dysfunctional institutions are provided in the area of bureaucracy, regulation, healthcare, and budgeting. I argue that the paradoxes and impossibility results of rational choice theory offer the best insights currently available into the persistent inefficiencies of the world ofpolitics.     

Professional Cities: Accredited Agencies,Government Structure,and Rational Choice

Accreditation, long used to signal quality among hospitals and universities, has been available to police, fire, and public works departments since the late 1980s. For public service departments, accreditation is a voluntary process that demands significant organizational resources without a guaranteed outcome. Why would city officials devote scarce resources to such an endeavor? Two explanations are examined. First, accreditation may be a rational response to a history of trouble or the potential for future crisis. Second, municipalities may use accreditation to build a reputation for professional administration of public services. The authors use Poisson regression to test these explanations on a new data set of midsize cities .     

对“沉默权“与中国现实选择的理性思考

沉默权制度是一个典型的舶来品。在这一制度背后 ,自然渗透着西方的人文传统和价值观念。对沉默权的价值取向和制度功能进行探索和揭示 ,将有助于增加国人对这一制度的了解和把握 ,也是我们进行法律移植必须予以考虑的问题。本文正是从这个角度进行思考 ,通过对国内有关学者的不同观点分析 ,充分论证在我国确立沉默权规则的必要性与可行性 ,并结合现实国情提出了中国沉默权规则的完整的设计思路     

高校廉洁课堂的理性分析与路径选择

打造高校廉洁课堂,加强高校廉政文化建设是中国特色社会主义廉政建设的重要组成部分,是构建廉洁高校的重要保证,是学生健康成长的重要条件。高校教师要把廉洁教育作为自己的重要使命常抓不懈,自觉把廉洁教育纳入到日常教育教学实践中,通过廉洁课堂的打造,营造鲜明的高校廉政文化,为学生的健康成长提供一个清廉和谐的校园文化环境。     

Explaining Modes of Participation: A Dynamic Test of Alternative Rational Choice Models

Rational choice accounts of political participation identify two major solutions to ‘the paradox of participation’: collective incentives and selective incentives. Prior findings regarding the viability of these solutions are seemingly inconclusive and contradictory. One important reason for this could be that the applicability of these solutions varies across participatory modes. In this article, a first attempt is made to develop a theoretical answer to the question of why this may be the case. The predictions are then tested across four different modes of participation, using longitudinal data that eliminate or reduce the biases inherent in cross‐sectional designs. The results show different types of incentives to strike with distinctly variable force across different modes of participation. Most importantly, whereas electoral modes of participation (voting and party activity) are affected by selective incentives only, the non‐electoral modes (contacting and manifestations) are the consequence of both collective and selective incentives.     

和谐世界理念与人类文明发展道路的理性抉择

作为一种现代文化理念,和谐世界理念根植于中国五千年的优秀文化,具有鲜明的中国特色,但它又超越了民族的界限和本土意识,是对当前人类文明发展现状的深刻反思和各种现实问题的自觉回应,具有鲜明的国际视野和全球意识。它也因此成为符合当今时代发展要求的新型国际文化理念,成为维护全球持久和平与共同发展的基点。相对于西方霸权思维下的各种文化理论和文明观,和谐世界理念将是人类文明未来发展道路的理性抉择。     

公共选择理论的“理性人“假设评析

"理性人"假设是公共选择理论的核心.公共选择理论的"理性人"假设,对于我们正确地审视传统政府管理理论的缺陷,构建既能够有效地解决实际问题、促进经济和社会的健康发展,又充满生机和活力的新型政府管理模式,有着重要的理论价值和现实意义.但是,"理性人"假设及以其为核心的公共选择理论也逐渐暴露一些不容忽视的局限性和片面性.因此,我们需要以对政府管理或一般的行政管理过程中的人性的多角度审视来超越"理性人"假设,并形成对以其为依据的政府管理模式的有效限制.     

The Welfare State as Rational Choice: Social Democracy in a Post-Socialist World

In this article* it is argued that rational choice analysis can help explain social democratic welfare states (SDWS). It explores the common ground between the methodological individualism of rational choice political economy and the "U-shaped curve" central to neocorporatist analysis, the idea of a curvilinear relationship between the level of corporatism in institutional arrangements and societal welfare. Central to the SDWS, it is suggested, is the reduction of information costs due to the configuration of institutional arragements in three key arenas of social action in the SDWS: the informational-cultural; the organizational-economic; and the governmental-political. These arrangements frame the choices under which rational individuals act to maintain the SDWS and the outcomes it produces. Concrete examples demonstrating the usefulness of the approach are offered in terms of explaining differences in policy choices (and therefore outcomes) between the Scandinavian countries and more laissez-faire systems such as the US. The conclusion looks at the prospects for the SDWS, asking just how the institutional arrangements central to the SDWS are being challenged by recent developments.     

缘由、启示、展望:理性选择制度主义与行为经济学的耦合分析

从新制度主义政治学与认知科学融会贯通的角度审视,理性选择制度主义与行为经济学具有联系密切的学理渊源和学科脉络,行为经济学的发展逻辑、演进脉络、学理贡献很可能为理性选择制度主义的理论调整、议题深化、方法更新提供深刻启示。行为经济学在理性、选择、制度等三个议题上的新见解,有助于理性选择制度主义从有限理性的经验应用、感性选择的行为指引、伦理取向的制度关怀等方面实现新的突破。在行为经济学影响下,理性选择制度主义在其未来发展中能够进一步缓和结构与能动的内在张力,主动吸纳行为经济学及其背后认知科学的前沿成果,深入推进政治领域尤其是政策议题的现实研究,并以认知为纽带促进新制度主义政治学的内在整合与认知转向。     

Rational Choice and Community Power Structures1

The community power debate concluded with each side believing they had won. Political theorists have generalized power, making empirical investigation very difficult; urban scholars have turned their attention to more manageable empirical problems. Rational choice advances the debate, exposing the errors of all sides and facilitating a new approach which transcends structural versus individualist methods. By separating various aspects of power in urban contexts, complementary techniques such as network analysis in a bargaining framework, semi-structured interviewing and the use of text databases permits a comprehensive investigation of agenda-setting and the mobilization of bias. The paper demonstrates the utility of this approach by comparing it to 'regime theory', the latest paradigm of urban research.     

The Limits of Rational Choice: New Institutionalism in the Test Bed of Central Banking Politics in Australia

This paper tests the explanatory capacities of different versions of new institutionalism by examining the Australian case of a general transition in central banking practice and monetary politics: namely, the increased emphasis on low inflation and central bank independence. Standard versions of rational choice institutionalism largely dominate the literature on the politics of central banking, but this approach (here termed RC1) fails to account for Australian empirics. RC1 has a tendency to establish actor preferences exogenously to the analysis; actors' motives are also assumed a priori ; actor's preferences are depicted in relatively static, ahistorical terms. And there is the tendency, even a methodological requirement, to assume relatively simple motives and preference sets among actors, in part because of the game theoretic nature of RC1 reasoning. It is possible to build a more accurate rational choice model by re-specifying and essentially updating the context, incentives and choice sets that have driven rational choice in this case. Enter RC2. However, this move subtly introduces methodological shifts and new theoretical challenges. By contrast, historical institutionalism uses an inductive methodology. Compared with deduction, it is arguably better able to deal with complexity and nuance. It also utilises a dynamic, historical approach, and specifies (dynamically) endogenous preference formation by interpretive actors. Historical institutionalism is also able to more easily incorporate a wider set of key explanatory variables and incorporate wider social aggregates. Hence, it is argued that historical institutionalism is the preferred explanatory theory and methodology in this case.