Japan and the European Union: shared foreign policy interests

Background  Japan and the European Union (Reiterer (2004b) 2:33–42) are both interested in enhancing their international standing in order to overcome their perceived status as economic giants but political dwarfs. While the reasons for this endeavour as well as the inherent characteristics of the actors involved—a traditional nation state as compared to the most advanced integration structure world-wide—are quite different, both entities see themselves primarily as civilian powers (Whitman (2006) 11(1):1–15) without neglecting the need to endow themselves with a military capacity in order to be more effective and credible on a world-wide scale. The ‘EU is emerging as a key regional actor in certain global affairs, particularly in such areas as finance, trade, environment and development, and current policy is directed towards enhancing the role of the European Union in the global governance system. To this end, the European Commission is actively engaged in such issues as the global governance of trade, the protection of human rights, the promotion of democracy, strengthening of regional and global security communities, and encouraging regional integration in other parts of the world.’ (Farrel (2005) 10(4):452–453)—all areas, except the latter task, where the EU and Japan could potentially cooperate closely.Objectives  Before identifying shared foreign policy interests between the EU and Japan, I will first bring to light some of the interests the EU has in East Asia in general; secondly I will chart the major Japanese foreign policy interests which will allow me to map out areas of potential common interest and concern.Adjunct Professor for International Politics, University of Innsbruck; Minister and Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to Japan; the author expresses his own views which should not be attributed to the European Commission. The author whishes to recognize the research assistance of Ms. Sachi Claringbould.

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Shaping factors of EU–East Asia relations

Six shaping factors will determine the short-to-medium term outlook for East Asia. Two of these are geo-political flashpoints, with implications beyond the region—North Korea and China–Taiwan cross-strait relations. For both of these at least some logic of a’ solution’ will need to be worked out. Intra-regional tensions between China, the fastest growing economy in the world, and Japan, the second largest economy in the world, will need accommodation and compromise. Fourthly, the relationship between the US and China remains ambivalent, veering between strategic partnership and strategic competition. Long term stability in the region will require that the US–China relationship becomes more predictable, which will only be possible if both players define their long-term interests innovatively and in different ways. Probably the most important shaping factor for the region is the domestic political economy of China. The nexus between Chinese economic growth and its domestic political stability needs to remain in tact—without economic growth no political stability, while stability is a precondition for continued growth. These five shaping factors together will determine the scope of multi-lateral problem-solving frameworks for the region. The Kuala Lumpur first East Asia Summit has shown the determination of leaders in the region to co-ordinate, share information and exchange views. However, the decision not to go beyond the current institutional set-up and to retain ASEAN’s centrality points to a continuation of the present ‘shallow’ integration for some time to come.     

Regional energy cooperation in North East Asia: Lessons from the European Experience

The three major oil importing countries of Northeast Asia—China, Japan and South Korea—are concerned about future security of energy supplies to fuel their dynamic economic activity. Currently all three countries are highly dependent on imports of oil from the Middle East, a region with inherent political instability. Russia’s rich reserves of oil and gas in Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East offer an obvious alternative. Given the geographical proximity of Russia and its desire to increase its energy exports to Northeast Asia, there is huge potential for cooperation. So far there has been no real intra-regional cooperation and no common external policy towards Russia. Despite obvious differences between Europe and North East Asia, the European model of energy cooperation, developed over the past 50 years, offers some useful lessons.

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Domestic politics and the WHO’s International Health Regulations: Explaining the use of trade and travel barriers during disease outbreaks

During the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the World Health Organization (WHO), acting under the authority of the International Health Regulations (IHR), recommended against the imposition of trade or travel restrictions because, according to WHO, these barriers would not prevent disease spread. Why did 47 states impose barriers anyway? This article argues that states use barriers as political cover to prevent a loss of domestic political support. This logic suggests that governments anticipating high domestic political benefits for imposing barriers during an outbreak will be likely to do so. Logistic regression and duration analysis of an original dataset coding state behavior during H1N1 provide support for this argument: democracies with weak health infrastructure—those that stand to gain the most from imposing barriers during an outbreak because they are particularly vulnerable to a negative public reaction—are more likely than others to impose barriers and to do so quickly.     

德法和解历史对中日建立战略互惠关系的借鉴与思考

中国和日本是东亚地区两个重要国家,处理好中日关系符合两国人民的共同利益,对于东亚地区的和平与繁荣具有十分重要的意义。在中日建立战略互惠关系初显曙光的时候,通过比较研究汲取德法和解的经验,将使我们获得有益的启迪。人们期待中日关系能借鉴法德在欧洲和解的智慧、创造出东亚地区中日和平与合作的奇迹。在战后以来六十多年的时间里,中日和平友好与法德和解在亚欧不同地缘政治环境中也出现了明显的发展差异。法德关系经历并超越了相互憎恨的历史,走向了真正和解。法德和解奠定了欧洲合作的基石,两者伙伴关系的进一步深化则开创了从欧共体到欧盟的欧洲合作新局面。与德法和解带动欧洲国家整合的硕果相比,中日和平友好表现出了明显的滞后性和局限性。中日关系超越"战争历史"问题、国家地位身份认同问题、共同战略利益基础和政治互信问题等方面也都落后于法德和解的发展,法德和解取得了创建欧盟的硕果,中日则刚刚取得建立战略互惠关系的共识。中日矛盾的深层症结就在于没有战略合作的共识和目标,从而导致双方缺乏政治互信和在战略上相互猜疑。法德和解的经验告诉我们,推动中日战略互惠关系的发展必须构建中日战略合作的共识,在中日关系中制定并推行"和平、合作与共赢"的外交政策新理念。中日走出历史问题争论和民间对立情绪困境的出路在于中日政治家们是否有智慧搭建两国战略合作和战略互惠的目标与框架。中日需要开展面向未来的共同事业,推动地区共同体形成的过程中实现并深化两国关系的和解与合作。     

Democracy,Deception, and Entry into War

Realists propose that elected leaders that seek war but face a hesitant public may use deception to build public support for war. Leaders may secretly make provocative diplomatic or military moves to push the adversary to attack first, rallying the public behind a war effort seen as defensive, or publicly exaggerate the threat posed by the adversary. This paper develops a liberal institutionalist critique of this theory, positing that elected leaders are deterred from engaging in such deception because democratic political institutions such as political competition, a professionalized military, and the marketplace of ideas increase the likelihood that such moves will be exposed, and once exposed, deceptive politicians will suffer domestic political punishment. The paper examines the thesis that Franklin Roosevelt sought to provoke Germany and Japan to war in 1941, finding little support. It also finds that in general autocratic leaders are more likely than elected leaders to deceive.     

Evaluating Measures of Campaign Tone

Research on framing effects has demonstrated how elites can influence public opinion by the way they present and interpret political issues. However, these findings overwhelmingly stem from experimental settings that differ from how issues are typically discussed in real-world political situations. This study takes framing research to more realistic contexts by exploiting a natural experiment to examine the neglected role of political parties in framing effects. Examining the effects on public opinion of a sudden shift in how a major political party frames a salient issue, I demonstrate that parties can be powerful in shaping the policy preferences among their supporters. Yet, even strong partisans do not follow the party line uncritically. Rather, they judge the party frame according to their own beliefs about the problems surrounding the issue. Thus, party elites face the challenge of developing frames that resonate with their voters' preexisting beliefs if they want to shape policy preferences, even among their otherwise most loyal supporters. These dynamics have important implications for understanding interactions between political elites and the public.     

Cities and sustainability: Southeast Asian and European perspectives

While cities are considered to be inherently unsustainable, these urban human settlements will be where a majority of the population will be living in the next two to three decades. Among the ten largest cities in the world in terms of population sizes, three are in Southeast Asia alone and more than one in two people will be living in cities in 2025. These primate cities—Metro-Manila in the Philippines, Jakarta in Indonesia and Bangkok in Thailand—are seeing not only rapid rates of in-migration but also rapid expansion and urban sprawl. Such rapid rates of change pose growing challenges to Southeast Asian cities including smaller capital cities like Kuala Lumpur, Ho Chi Minh City and Singapore. The strongest challenge concern infrastructural provision and particularly that provided for urban transport and mobility. Urban traffic congestion is an issue that is common to most Southeast Asian cities including Singapore which has introduced relatively draconian policy measures to both contain the level of car ownership and the use of the car. A comparison with several European cities highlight where Southeast Asian cities can review their own urban transport policies. This paper focuses on the lessons that can be learnt from a comparative study of the infrastructural provision and public policies that are in place in Southeast Asian and European cities.     

Where do norms come from? Foundations of Japan's postwar pacifism

Constructivists have advanced the study of Japanese nationalsecurity policy by illuminating how normative factors shapestate behavior. At the same time, they have overemphasized therole norms and ideas play while downplaying the structural andmaterial forces that often underlie normative factors. Thisarticle seeks to reveal the political foundations of Japanesepostwar pacifism. It maintains that explanations based on normsand identities cannot be separated from discussion on materialand structural factors when it comes to the question of wherenorms come from and why they are sustained. Power and interestsmay not explain everything, but they often account for why certainnorms emerge and are sustained to influence policy. By examiningthe shifts in public opinions and the Social Democratic Party'sdefense policy, this article argues that Japan's postwar pacifismhas been possible in large part because peace was relativelyabundant in postwar Japan and that the majority of the Japanesefelt that the alliance with the United States contributed tothat effect.     

Taking the 'taken-for-grantedness' seriously: problematizing Japan's perception of Japan-South Korea relations

The existence of acrimonious relations between Japan and itsimmediate neighbour, South Korea, is a familiar theme in theliterature on the international relations of the Asia-Pacific.Public discourse in Japan treats this acrimony as the startingpoint for the formulation of diplomatic policy towards Seoul.While not suggesting that such an outlook is wrong, characterizingthe bilateral relations as ‘tough’ has become ‘taken-for-granted’.By focusing on the representation of Japanese collective identitywithin the public discourse, and treating it as a foreign policyspeech act, this article argues that taking the ‘taken-for-grantedness’seriously allows us to unpack the intersubjective structureof Japan–South Korea relations, enabling us to appreciatefully the recurring invective across the Tsushima Straits.     

The politics of IO performance: A framework

Some international organizations (IOs) are subject to constant criticism for producing poor results while others are praised for accomplishing difficult tasks despite political and resource constraints. Indeed, IO performance varies substantially over time and across tasks, and yet the international relations literature has devoted little attention to why this occurs. This article provides a framework for studying IO performance. After addressing some of the distinct challenges of conceptualizing and analyzing performance in the context of IOs, we discuss the tradeoffs of using different performance metrics—from process indicators to outcome indicators—and present a typology of factors that influence performance. Finally, we discuss research strategies for those interested in studying performance rigorously. The policy relevance of studying IO performance is clear: only if we understand why some IOs perform better than others can we begin to improve their performance in a systematic way. As many organizations come under pressure to reform, while at the same time taking on new and more complicated tasks, scholars should be actively engaged in debates surrounding IO performance and its role in effective governance at the international level.     

States as laboratories: The politics of social welfare policies in India

ABSTRACT

This article examines the role of India’s states in shaping the implementation and framing of social policy within India’s federal system. Since the 2000s, the central government has overseen a substantial expansion of social welfare policies partly through a new push toward rights-based social provision. Yet, it is India’s states that are both responsible for an increasing proportion of total public expenditure on social welfare provision as well as determining the nature and effectiveness of that provision across space. Drawing on a comparative research program across pairs of Indian states, three critical factors explaining how state-level political environments shape social policy are identified: the role of policy legacies in shaping policy frames; the role of social coalitions underpinning political party competition; and the role of political leaders in strengthening state capacity to achieve program goals.     

The public opinion–foreign policy paradox in Germany: integrating domestic and international levels of analysis conditionally

Abstract

Does public opinion influence foreign policy? International relations theory is divided on whether foreign policy outputs follow public opinion in advanced democratic countries. Using the case of cold war and post-cold war Germany, I offer an integrated realist theory of the effect of public opinion on foreign policy. I test the theory and the generalizability of the hypothesis of a public opinion–foreign policy nexus using process tracing as well as a time series analysis between the years 1973 and 2002. Using new measures, results here contradict literature on expected public opinion and policy outputs in the cold war period yet are supported after. I find that the predicted effect of public opinion on foreign policy outputs to be confounded by such factors as security threats.     

Second Face of Security Strategies: Anglo-German and Anglo-Japanese Trade Concessions During the 1930s

Great powers can pursue deliberate Trojan horse policies to transform rising and threatening states into followers and supporters rather than challengers by altering their domestic political and economic institutions. I contend that a great power can use trade concessions, rather than punishment, to enable a favorable foreign policy coalition in a target country. The intent is to strengthen the political power of state and societal elites who have a stake in deepening international ties, while opponents of such policies will be weakened politically and economically. The societal winners will then apply pressure on the government to support their preferred outward-oriented grand strategy. I term this process the second face of security since it entails a less direct and more nuanced method of creating security. I examine Britain's commercial policies toward Germany and Japan during the 1930s to better understand second-face strategies. I argue that the intent of Britain's industrial and commercial policy was to strengthen conservative business, government officials, and economic circles in banking, light industry, and finished goods, and even heavy industry in order to steer Berlin and Tokyo away from rearmament, extreme autarky, and war.     

European debates during the Libya crisis of 2011: shared identity,divergent action

The war in Libya of 2011 is generally portrayed as yet more evidence of the European Union (EU)'s inability to formulate a coordinated foreign policy. While the crisis took place in the EU's backyard, joint foreign policy action was hindered by member states' disagreements on whether or not to establish a no-fly zone in Libya. While this is true of political decision-makers, this paper investigates whether governmental decisions were reflected in similar divisions in national news media or whether references to European identity and criticism of European disunity transcended national media boundaries. Comparing a total of 6746 newspaper articles from Germany, France, the UK, Austria and the USA, the findings show that intergovernmental differences did not lead to similarly divided public spheres. Public debates in France, Germany and Austria constantly referred to a European foreign policy identity, though EU identity references were largely absent from UK newspapers.     

De-Europeanization by Default? Germany's EU Policy in Defense and Asylum

Since the end of the Cold War and unification, Germany's policy toward and within the European Union (EU) has undergone significant changes. Once a model "Europeanist," Germany has become increasingly reluctant to support the progressive implementation of key projects of European integration. Neither an instance of a planned strategic change nor a result of an inevitable adaptation to structural shifts at the systemic level, these changes in German foreign policy, incremental yet significant as they are, evade both deterministic and voluntaristic accounts of foreign policy change. Integrating insights from foreign policy analysis, integration theory, and social theory, the article develops an innovative framework for analysis that is applied to Germany's European asylum and refugee policy as well as its security and defense policy. The origins of both policy fields at the European level can be traced back to initiatives that were supported by or even originated in Germany. However, as the 1990s progressed Germany increasingly obstructed further institutionalization. While in the field of asylum and refugee policy the Amsterdam summit marks a clear turning point in Germany's position, the transformation of German policies on European security and defense proceeded rather as an incremental decrease in material support, aggravating substantive progress in the policy field more broadly. An unanticipated consequence of earlier initiatives, in both cases Germany has found it increasingly difficult to live up to the expectations it has helped to raise.     

The petroleum factor in Sino-Japanese relations: beyond energy cooperation

China and Japan used to have good energy cooperation beforeChina switched into a net oil importer in the mid-1990s, butthe recent years have witnessed an increasingly intensive competitionbetween the two countries over petroleum supplies. While manysaw such competition as inevitable with China's growing energydemands, the paper argues that the energy relationship betweenthe two countries was never separated from political and strategicconcerns, and heavily affected by the concern of ‘relativegains’, as suggested by the neorealists. Like the caseprior to the mid-1990s when the non-energy factors underpinnedthe Sino–Japanese energy cooperation, the key factorsthat prevented the two from continuing energy cooperation todayalso lay in political and strategic aspects. Being two regionalpowers in East Asia, China, and Japan need to recognize thefact that their lack of energy cooperation due to mutual politicaldistrust will not only impair their own energy security, butmay also have negative implications on regional stability.     

When governments ignore public opinion in foreign policy: Poland and the Iraq invasion

This article asks why the Government of Poland participated in the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 when a large majority of the Polish public was opposed to national involvement in Iraq. The aim is to further an understanding of the circumstances under which democratic governments ignore public opinion in their foreign policy decision-making. The article argues that a combination of three circumstances increased the willingness of the government to ignore the public. First, the Iraq issue had relatively low salience among the Polish voters, which decreased the domestic political risks of pursuing the policy. Second, the government's Iraq policy was supported by a considerable consensus among the political elite. Third, the political elites were unified in their perceptions that participating in the invasion would yield essential international gains for Poland.     

Steadfast Yet Reluctant Allies: Japan and the United Kingdom in the Vietnam War

During the Vietnam War there were high expectations from the Johnson and Nixon Administrations for Japan and Britain to provide practical and political support for American military and strategic objectives in Indochina. The leader of Japan's conservative Liberal Democratic Party, Sato Eisaku, and the British Labour Party's Harold Wilson, balanced political support for the United States with significant public pressure at home to eschew any entanglement in the highly unpopular conflict. As junior allies of the United States both Sato and Wilson did not want to see the United States fail in Vietnam or the communist sphere expand in Southeast Asia. Both leaders accrued significant foreign policy advantages as a result of politically and publicly supporting American actions in Vietnam. But to placate domestic electorates that clearly felt uncomfortable over their governments providing explicit, albeit non-military, support to the United States in Vietnam, Sato and Wilson expended substantial prime ministerial diplomacy in attempting to play a mediatory role in the conflict. Each was highly successful in balancing domestic and American demands, whilst maintaining their security partnerships with the United States.     

族性视野中多民族国家族际政治问题比较研究——基于尼日利亚与印度尼西亚民族国家建构的经验观察

族性是影响多民族国家安全及其族际政治走向的关键变量。它既能促进族际政治整合、维护国家安全、有助于民族国家建构,也能导致族际政治冲突、危及国家安全、阻碍民族国家建构。以"族性"为分析视角,通过对尼日利亚与印度尼西亚民族国家建构历程的梳理及其族际政治问题的比较,其共性特征包括:族际政治问题的分析单位是多民族国家;族际政治问题虽然发生在现实中的多民族国家,却往往带有深刻的历史根源;政治与文化边界的重叠是族际政治问题产生的逻辑起点;国内不同民族群体无法得到平等公正对待是导致族际政治问题的核心因素;军事专政和腐败会增加族际政治问题的风险和国家安全的不确定性。解决多民族国家族际政治问题、确保国家安全的关键在于如何让一个在历史上和观念中都不曾存在的国家民族能够超越族性分界而被成功建构。结合两国国情提出应对策略:寻找重叠共识,建构文化多元、政治一体的国族共同体;借鉴差异政治和差别公民权利思想,探寻积极回应不同民族群体正当利益诉求、实现各族人民成果共享、利益均沾的政治制度、体制和机制;消除军人在政治生活中的影响,惩治腐败;探索包容促进多语言、多宗教和谐相处的民族政策。