The insanity defense

Changing thelegal test definition of insanity remains the remedy of choice when insanity outcomes appear problematic, despite empirical studies showing no significant differences among tests. An alternative strategy suggests changing theverdict schema, although critics contend that jurors will reach compromise verdicts that are unconscionable and incoherent. Undergraduate subjects (N=179) rendered insanity verdicts and ratings for four insanity cases using one of four different verdict schemas: a traditional two-choice schema, a three-choice schema (DR) without instructions, a threechoice schema (GBMI) with instructions, and a sequential schema proposed by Finkel (1988) that separately assesses different types of culpability. When internal consistency measures between verdicts and broad ratings and specific construct ratings of the defendant were examined, the sequential schema produced the highest internal consistency, reducing the most error variance and yielding the highest prediction criterion of any of the schemas.     

The military insanity defense

This article describes the military insanity defense. The success of the litigated insanity defense is explored through the number of insanity acquittals over a 28-month period. A questionnaire distributed to all United States Army psychiatrists provided information on the number of forensic evaluations performed, the number of not criminally responsible (NCR) opinions made, and the disposition of noncontested NCR opinions. The questionnaire also tested the Army psychiatrists' knowledge about recent changes in the military insanity defense. This pilot study raises interesting questions about the military insanity defense that further research can address.     

The insanity defense to suicide

The certification of suicide as the manner of death can result in either the complete loss or a significant reduction in life insurance benefits to the victim's survivors. It is, thus, not uncommon for these beneficiaries to contest suicide as the manner of death. Insanity is a recognized defense in law against suicide. It is recognized in law that, in some cases, an insane man cannot intentionally destroy himself. However, it is also recognized that life insurers can exclude suicide by an insane man from coverage. This article discusses the common law doctrines upon which the insanity defense to suicide is based, with references to judicial opinions from cases which involve contested suicides and the issue of insanity.     

Schizotypal personality disorder and the insanity defense

What constitutes a "mental disorder" for purposes of the insanity defense? Does mental disorder denote any diagnosable condition listed in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders? Is a mental disorder a disturbance wherein the functional criteria of the appropriate insanity law appear to be met? Or does insanity law define mental disorder apart from functional criteria of insanity? The answer to the last question is that some insanity laws attempt to define or qualify mental disorder, but many do not. Unclarities in the law leave room for unnecessary disagreements between expert witnesses even before the functional criteria for insanity are to be addressed. The potential for confusion is compounded when the defendant's disturbance is ambiguous, amphibious, or both. Schizotypal personality disorder is offered as an example of such a disturbance, and inferences are discussed.     

The death-qualified jury and the defense of insanity

We predicted that people who are excluded from serving on juries in capital cases due to their opposition to the death penalty (excludable subjects) tend to place a greater value on the preservation of due process guarantees than on efficient crime control, and therefore are more likely to accept an insanity defense in criminal cases than are people who are permitted to serve on capital juries (death-qualified subjects). Subjects who had previously been classified as death-qualified or excludable read four summaries of cases in which the defendant entered a plea of insanity, and made judgments of guilt or innocence. In the two cases involving nonorganic disorders (schizophrenia), death-qualified subjects were significantly more likely than excludable subjects to vote guilty; in the two cases involving organic disorders (mental retardation and psychomotor epilepsy), there were no differences between the two groups. In addition, excludable subjects gave significantly higher estimates than death-qualified subjects of the proportion of defendants pleading insanity who really are insane.     

Community standards of criminal liability and the insanity defense

Two experiments (N=71) compare lay standards of insanity to standards incorporated in American legal codes. In Experiment 1, case vignettes provided only legally relevant information about defendants' degrees of impairment in cognition or in behavioral control. Respondents' judgments of criminal liability ornot guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) reflected an exculpatory standard of substantial impairment in both cognition and control. In Experiment 2, case vignettes provided realistic information about defendants' psychiatric diagnoses; respondents had to infer levels of cognitive and control impairment. Results showed that respondents made highly idiosyncratic inferences based on diagnostic categories, but once made, these inferences predicted NGRI judgments. Implications of the concordance between laypeople's rules for assigning NGRI verdicts and the rules used in American legal codes are discussed.Daniel Bailis gratefully acknowledges the support of Public Health Service grant No. 5T32 MH18021-07 for Research Training in Social Psychology during the time in which the present research was conducted. John Darley wished to acknowledge the generous support of the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation and Princeton University. Study 2 presents work done for the Princeton University undergraduate thesis of Tracy Waxman. The authors are grateful to Norman J. Finkel, Valerie Hans, and three anonymous reviewers for comments on an earlier draft on this article.Northwestern University.     

Myths of the insanity defense: Inherent and procedural obstacles

Often societies perceptions can be shaped by the media not only by what it reports but by how it is reported. This article discusses the impact that the American media has had on the social perception that the insanity defense is too often successfully used to avoid legal and criminal culpability. Many of the procedural obstacles associated with the assertion of an insanity defense are poorly understood or ignored. The article further address some of the less attractive characteristics associated with the assertion of the insanity defense that are not procedurally founded but nonetheless serve as an impediment the wide spread use of the defense. In conclusion the insanity defense is submitted as an unavoidable necessary evil in a civilized society that incarcerates its criminals.     

司法精神病辩护中证明模式的反思与完善

司法精神病辩护是刑事辩护制度中的一项重要内容.当前世界范围内存在两种精神病辩护证明模式:职权式精神病审查模式与对抗式精神病辩护模式.我国目前的精神病辩护证明模式属于职权式精神病审查模式,在实践中存在诸多问题值得反思.司法精神病鉴定因涉及精神病医学、心理学、法学等诸多领域的专门知识而呈现复杂性,而科学、合理的诉讼证明程序可以抵消司法精神病鉴定中的消极因素.我国职权式精神病审查模式应当吸收对抗式精神病辩护模式中的合理因素,在权力配置上逐渐限缩职权机关的权力,赋予当事人更多的权利;在证明责任上由辩护方承担推进责任,由控诉方承担说服责任;在证明标准上建立司法精神病鉴定启动与精神病辩护二元化的证明标准体系.     

The insanity defense in Shelby County,Tennessee

The purpose of this investigation was threefold: to document the number of cases in Shelby County, Tennessee where an insanity defense was possible: to follow cases through to disposition to determine what percentage of defendants use the defense successfully; and to examine the type of charges for insanity cases. Of the 25.000 individuals processed through the Criminal Courts. 685 (2.7%) were referred for insanity evaluations and 45 defendants (6.6%) were returned to the court with a recommendation from the Midtown Mental Health Center's Forensic Team that an insanity defense was possible. Of the 45 insanity defendants identified, 49% (n=22) pleaded guilty, 31% (n=14) went to trial, and 20% (n=9) were dismissed. Overall, 22% (n=10) of the insanity defendants were adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity. Thus, of all defendants processed (25,000), 04% (n=11) were adjucated not guilty by reason of insanity. While no one type of offense predominated, two general categories were observed: murder and related offenses (33%) and property crimes (27%). The findings are discussed with reference to procedures for handling insanity cases in Tennessee and the position that extreme caution should be exercised before investing substantial resources to effect sweeping changes in laws that effect so few criminal defendants.     

The insanity defense: asking and answering the ultimate question

The authors address the main questions in the insanity defense debate: Should it be abolished? Should psychiatrists participate as expert witnesses? Is the profession damaged by such testimony? Is there a logical leap between providing psychiatric findings and providing an opinion to the ultimate question? Because the free will/determinism model underlying the current insanity defense positions can be used to argue either side of the debate, it does not supply any rational answers. The authors reframe the discussion, using a systems approach, and suggest answers to these questions that are in line with the clinical realities and on a firmer philosophic ground.     

精神分裂症患者病理性“正当防卫”行为的研究

目的探讨病理性防卫对精神分裂症患者凶杀行为的影响及相关犯罪学的特征。方法以61例具有病理性防卫行为的精神分裂症患者凶杀案为研究组,以73例无病理性防卫行为的精神分裂症患者凶杀案为对照组,采用犯罪学调查表进行调查分析。结果具有病理性防卫行为的精神分裂症患者凶杀案中幻觉（χ2=5.69,P〈0.05）及被害妄想（χ2=28.87,P〈0.01）多见;作案动机以病理动机突出（χ2=50.22,P〈0.01）,很少出现现实动机（χ2=15.57,P〈0.01）,案发时行为的紧迫性十分明显（χ2=63.17,P〈0.01）;刑事责任能力评定为无责任能力者明显多于对照组（χ2=16.12,P〈0.01）;疾病诊治情况,研究组未经诊治情况较多见（χ2=5.09,P〈0.05）。结论病理性防卫与正当防卫理论存在某些相同点,在具有病理性防卫行为的凶杀案中,借鉴正当防卫理论,对评定刑事责任能力具有一定的参考价值。     

A comparison of insanity defense standards on juror decision making

Following the Hinckley acquittal, 17 states and the federal government made changes to the insanity defense, including revising the standard, reassigning the burden of proof, and altering the standard of proof. Two studies were conducted to determine whether the specific insanity standard (including the assignment of burden of proof and standard of proof) employed had a significant effect on mock jurors' verdicts. Participants' comprehension of insanity defense instructions was measured and the factors jurors used to decide whether to find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) were also assessed. Participants' comprehension of insanity defense standards was very low. When asked to identify the factors they considered important in determining whether to find a defendant NGRI, only three elements of insanity defense standards were identified as significant. The results may have important implications for policy decisions regarding the insanity defense.     

Guilty but mentally ill: Reform of the insanity defense in Illinois

In 1981 Illinois joined several other states by passing a “guilty but mentally ill” statute. Passed as a response to perceived inadequacies in the existing insanity defense, the statute was intended to protect society better, to provide treatment for offenders, and to compel the offender to assume greater responsibility for his or her criminal acts. This study, based on court data and responses to a survey of state prosectors, suggests that the statute has not been successful in reaching its major objectives. GBMI offenders often may be placed on probation, infrequently receive treatment when institutionalized, and may use the plea to absolve themselves of responsibility for their acts.