The Ethics of Corporate Legal Strategy: A Response to Professor Mayer

In this issue of the American Business Law Journal, Professor Don Mayer continues an important conversation regarding the ethics of corporate legal strategy. 1 Addressing several of my published works, Mayer offers two primary criticisms: (1) the works are too sanguine with regard to the appropriate scope of the strategic decision to “breach‐and‐pay,” and (2) the works offer too little guidance for the well‐intentioned corporate executive. In this response, I briefly restate my views, address Mayer's two criticisms, and offer concluding remarks.     

In Defence of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Punishment</Emphasis> and the Unified Theory of Punishment: A Reply

My book, Punishment, has three aims: to provide the most comprehensive and updated examination of the philosophy of punishment available, to advance a new theory—the unified theory of punishment—as a compelling alternative to available theories and to consider the relation of theory to practice. In his recent review article, Mark Tunick raises several concerns with my analysis. I address each of these concerns and argue they rest largely on misinterpretations which I restate and clarify here.     

Putting interpretation in its place

What can a philosophical analysis of the concept of interpretation contribute to legal theory? In his recent book,Interpretation and Legal Theory, Andrei Marmor proposes a complex and ambitious analysis as groundwork for his positivist assault on “interpretive” theories of law and of language. I argue (i) that the crucial element in Marmor's analysis of interpretation is his treatment of Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on following rules, and (ii) that a less ambitious analysis of interpretation than Marmor's can take better advantage of those insights about rules. I explore some implications of such an analysis for the role of interpretation in legal reasoning.     

Medical and Familial Claims to Long‐Term Care: Institutional Gaps and Shifting Jurisdictions

In light of the contemporary long‐term care crisis, Sandra Levitsky's book Caring for Our Own examines why there has been no movement to secure state support for caregivers. Speaking to sociolegal and social movement audiences, Levitsky reveals how lack of collective identity, the power of family‐based ideologies, and the separation of support organizations from political ones help to repress mobilization. In this essay I refract Levitsky's findings through the lens of organizational theory and medical sociology. I argue that the social problem of long‐term care is caught in an institutional gap since it does not readily fall under the purview of either medicine or family. I also discuss the implications of lay caregivers' provision of sophisticated medical care for theories of professional jurisdictions and gatekeeping.     

A Vision of Social‐Legal Change: Rescuing Ehrlich from “Living Law”

The hundredth anniversary of the original publication of Eugen Ehrlich's Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law is nearly upon us. The book earned high praise from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound, and Karl Llewellyn as one of the outstanding works of its time. Ehrlich has been identified as an early legal realist, a pioneering figure in legal sociology, and a leading theorist of legal pluralism. In this retrospective review, I explain the strengths and weaknesses of this classic book. Ehrlich articulated an unsurpassed account of dynamic social‐legal change, an account that remains fresh and timely today.     

Libertarian Paternalism,Externalities, and the “Spirit of Liberty”: How Thaler and Sunstein Are Nudging Us toward an “Overlapping Consensus”

In their 2008 book Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein use research from psychology and behavioral economics to argue that people suffer from systematic cognitive biases. They propose that policy makers mitigate these biases by framing people's choices in ways that help people act in their own self‐interest. Thaler and Sunstein call this approach “libertarian paternalism,” and they market it as “the Real Third Way.” In this essay, I argue that the book is a brilliant contribution to thinking about policy making but that “choice architecture” is not just a solution to the problem of cognitive biases. Rather, it is a means of approaching any kind of policy making. I further argue that policy makers must take externalities into account, even when using choice architecture. Finally, I argue that libertarian paternalism can best be seen as motivated by what Sunstein has celebrated in his work on constitutional theory: a humility about the possibility of policy‐maker error embodied in Learned Hand's famous aphorism about the “spirit of liberty” and an attempt to reduce social conflicts by searching for what John Rawls called an “overlapping consensus.”     

A Human Right not to be Punished? Punishment as Derogation of Rights

In this essay, I apply international human rights theory to the domestic discussion of criminalization. The essay takes as its starting point the “right not to be punished” that Douglas Husak posited in his recent book Overcriminalization. By reviewing international human rights norms, I take up Husak’s challenge to imbue this right with further normative content. This process reveals additional relationships between the criminal law and human rights theory, and I discuss one analogy: the derogation by states of an individual’s human rights under specified conditions has certain similarities to the punishment by states of an individual who holds a right not to be punished. Along the way, I highlight the normative implications of defining a human right not to be punished under both generalist and specificationist perspectives on moral rights. Noting the similarities as well as the differences in the concepts of punishment and derogation, this essay aims to contribute to the exchange between theories of human rights and the criminal law.     

B. F. Skinner's utopian vision: behind and beyond walden two

This paper addresses B. F. Skinner's utopian vision for enhancing social justice and human well‐being as it was introduced in his 1948 novel, Walden Two. In the first part, we address the historical, intellectual, and social context that situates the book in the utopian genre, the critiques of its premises and practices, and the fate of intentional communities patterned on the book. In the second part, we review practices in Skinner's book that advance social justice and human well‐being under the themes of health, wealth, and wisdom, and then focus on contemporary practices that are the legacy of his vision. His vision was neither the a priori truth of a particular premise about human behavior or a necessary practice (blueprint) for an intentional community but rather the use of empirical methods to discover premises and practices that work to advance the health, wealth, and wisdom of individuals and survival of the culture.     

Form and Formalism: The View from Legal Theory

Abstract. The article considers Robert Summers' new book ( Summers 2006 ), in the context of Summers' earlier work and the role of form and formalism in other jurisprudential discussions. While accepting the value of a form‐centered approach to studying law, the article questions Summers' claim that his approach is clearly superior to (and not merely complementary with) traditional analytic theories, like those of Hart and Kelsen. The article also suggests that the book's discussion of form in contract and commercial law is somewhat disappointing, given Summers' expertise in this area, and the many difficult form‐related questions that area raises.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">The Lesser Evil Dilemma for</Emphasis> Sparing Civilians

The rule I call ‘Civilian Immunity’ – the rule that prohibits targeting civilians in war – is the heart of the accepted jus in bello code. It prohibits targeting (viz., intentionally killing) civilians in a wide variety of war circumstances. Seth Lazar's brilliant book, Sparing Civilians, attempts to defend Civilian Immunity. In this essay I show, first, that his ‘Risky-Killing based argument’ fails to provide civilians with the robust protection Sparing Civilians promises. I argue, secondly, that the moral framework that Sparing Civilians employs, a moral framework that centralizes the Deontological Clause (stating that one's intentional killing is worse than enabling others to kill), leaves the immunity of civilians against Leaders unexplained.     

Schauer's Anti‐Essentialism

In his new book, The Force of Law, Frederick Schauer maintains that law has no necessary properties (a position he calls legal anti‐essentialism), and that therefore jurisprudents should not assume that an inquiry into the nature of law has to be a search for such properties. I argue, however, that Schauer's attempt to show that legal anti‐essentialism is a defensible position fails, because his one main argument (the cognitive science argument) is either irrelevant or else incomplete, depending on how one understands it, and because the other main argument (the family resemblance argument) is false.     

Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration: Creating a New Theoretical Framework for Understanding Involuntary Property Loss and the Remedies Required

In We Want What's Ours: Learning from South Africa's Land Restitution Program, I introduced the concept of “dignity takings,” which I defined as property confiscation that involves the dehumanization or infantilization of the dispossessed. I argued that the appropriate remedy for a dignity taking is “dignity restoration”: material compensation to dispossessed populations through processes that affirm their humanity and reinforce their agency. For this symposium, contributors were invited to examine these paired concepts through case studies beyond the South African context. This introductory essay summarizes the central arguments of We Want What's Ours and considers how the symposium contributions confirm, extend, or revise the concepts of dignity takings and dignity restoration.     

The Politics of Jurisprudence Revisited: A Swedish Realist in Historical Context

This article argues that juristic theories must be understood in relation to the historical conditions in which they have emerged. This is not to reduce theories to their context but to gain essential insight into their aims, meaning, and scope with the aid of such “external” reference points. Here I use the ideas of the Swedish legal realist Vilhelm Lundstedt to illustrate these claims, choosing his juristic theory for this purpose specifically because it has been so widely seen (at least by non‐Scandinavian interpreters) as deeply puzzling and “extreme.” The article argues that his central ideas are readily intelligible in historical context. But such a contextual examination of juristic ideas also makes it possible to assess what in them can properly travel beyond immediate context: in other words, what insights about the nature of the jurist's task can legitimately be taken from them for more universal application. Lundstedt's work, despite having been largely ignored or excluded from international juristic debate, has something to offer here if seen through a contextualising lens that sets the possibilities for its broader application in sharp relief.     

《查拉图斯特拉如是说》“论幻觉与迷”一章法理释读

《查拉图斯特拉如是说》是尼采思想发展第三阶段中最为成熟的作品,尼采本人亦将其称作"第五福音书"。聚焦于该书第三卷,"论幻觉与迷"一章囊括了尼采思想殊为重要的三个方面,即在隐微术背景之下人的"上升"、"复返"、"形变"。本文通过梳理"论幻觉与迷"的内容意涵,管窥尼采思想的总趋势,从而对"上升"、"复返"、"形变"这三个形异而质联的概念形成一些认识。     

Why Tolerate Conscience?

In Why Tolerate Religion?, Brian Leiter argues against the special legal status of religion, claiming that religion should not be the only ground for exemptions to the law and that this form of protection should be, in principle, available for the claims of secular conscience as well. However, in the last chapter of his book, he objects to a universal regime of exemptions for both religious and secular claims of conscience, highlighting the practical and moral flaws associated with it. We believe that Leiter identifies a genuine and important contemporary legal and philosophical problem. We find much to admire in his reasoning. However, we raise questions about two claims that are crucial for his argument. The first claim is that it is not religion as such, but conscience that deserves toleration and respect. The second claim is that respect for religion and conscience demands ‘principled toleration’ but does not entail stronger policies of legal exemptions. Against the first claim, we argue that Leiter does not successfully distinguish religious belief from secular conscience and morality; and he does not explain why secular conscience (which shares many of religious conscience’s epistemic features) deserves respect. Against the second claim, we argue that the most promising theories of legal exemptions are not classical theories of liberal toleration.     

Book review

This article looks at the vast contributions political philosopher Hal Pepinsky has made to effecting a peaceful, needs‐meeting vision of justice in the academic fields of criminology and criminal justice over the past three decades. The article examines his life's work as reflected in his most recent book, Peacemaking: Reflections of a Radical Criminologist. This work demonstrates that those who push the boundaries of scholarly disciplines, such as he has done, sometimes find themselves in conflict with those most invested in controlling the allocation of the rewards those disciplines mete out. As Professor Pepinsky increasingly became an outsider he took the risk of taking on the burdens of other outsiders whose pain and suffering the vast majority of his academic colleagues turned their eyes from.     

Ritual Texts and Literary Texts in Abhinavagupta’s Aesthetics: Notes on the Beginning of the ‘Critical Reconstruction’

In a recent paper in this Journal Hugo David discussed the possible sources for the comparison that Abhinavagupta draws between ritual and literary discourse at the beginning of his “critical reconstruction” of the theory of rasa in the sixth chapter of his New Dramatic Art. The question of Abhinavagupta’s sources raises more general questions about Abhinavagupta’s use of the concepts and analytical procedures of Mīmā?sā in his literary-theoretical works. What, if anything, does Mīmā?sā really have to do with the analysis of literary texts? How, if at all, can we construct parallels between ritual and literary texts such that the hermeneutics of one can illuminate the hermeneutics of the other? And more specifically, what are the examples that might convince us that there are such parallels? With these questions I attempt, modestly, to reach a somewhat better understanding of the beginning of Abhinavagupta’s “critical reconstruction,” which has already received a disproportionate amount of scholarly attention. I also hope, however, that this passage might serve as an example for how to think of the “borrowing” of concepts typically associated with Mīmā?sā into the realm of literary theory.     

“MORE OF A STREET COP THAN A DETECTIVE”: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF PARENTING COORDINATORS IN NORTH CAROLINA

This research project examined roles and functions of parenting coordinators (PCs) identified by AFCC's Guidelines for Parenting Coordination and other literature. The researcher used a semi‐structured interview schedule that included information about practices, procedures, and a series of five case‐based vignettes that contained commonly occurring ethical and legal dilemmas in PC practice. The results found that PCs generally saw their role as enforcers of existing orders and primarily used skills in conflict management, parent education, and information coordination with other professionals. PCs would use arbitration powers to make minor decisions or refer to court as a last resort.     

G. A. Cohen's Conception of Law: A Critique*

This note will challenge G. A. Cohen's view of the interaction between legal systems and economic structures; such interaction raises the so-called problem of legality, which Cohen sets out to solve in the eighth chapter of Karl Marx's Theory of History (Cohen 1978, 216–47). In the course of this note, we shall interrogate the presumed rigor of Cohen's theory of base/superstructure relations, to which his understanding of law is central. His approach will not be simply destroyed, but will be resituated in a network of problems that can highlight a certain fissure between his aspirations and his performance.     

MARRIAGE,IN‐LAWS,AND CRIME: THE CASE OF DELINQUENT BROTHERS‐IN‐LAW*

With marriage comes in‐laws, and if the in‐laws include delinquent males, their delinquency could affect the prosocial effects of the given marriage. In this article, I focus on the effect of having a convicted brother‐in‐law as a general indicator of this broader phenomenon of family‐formation processes impairing the positive impact of marriage on crime desistance. I use registry data on all men from birth cohorts 1965–1975 in Denmark (N = 69,066) to show that when a man marries, his new family ties to delinquent brother(s)‐in‐law do indeed hinder his criminal desistance. The results that take into account the characteristics of husbands, wives, their shared family‐formation process, and the criminality of male family members suggest that 1) family dynamics tend to keep criminality within family networks and 2) influences from one's broader social network through marriage are important for the protective effects of marriage. Analyses of previous conviction, co‐offending between a man and his brother‐in‐law, as well as analyses of in‐laws who reside in close proximity confirm the two mentioned main findings. In all, the findings reported in this article add to our understanding of the processes by which families are tied, and how these family‐formation processes influence men's behavior.