Public choice in a local government setting

From its beginnings, public choice has always had a substantial component devoted to federalism and local government decision-making. The DeVoe Moore Center at Florida State University has made the study of local government within a public choice framework a core component of its mission. The Center held a conference February 17?C19, 2011, on public choice in a local government setting. This special issue of Public Choice contains the papers presented at that conference.     

Intergovernmental Relations in Canada: The Emergence of Collaborative Federalism

"Executive federalism" or "federal-provincial diplomacy" haslong been considered the defining characteristic of Canadianfederalism, which combines federalism and Westminster-stylecabinet government. However, these processes have come underincreasing stress in recent years from a number of forces thathave affected the nature and conduct of federalism and intergovernmentalrelations in Canada. Executive federalism has not been displaced,but has been increasingly informed by a set of practices thatwe call "collaborative federalism," characterized more by theprinciple of co-determination of broad national policies ratherthan by the more traditional pattern of federal-leadership.     

The Future of Belgian Federalism Through the Eyes of the Citizens

How do Belgian citizens see the future of federalism? In the typical consociational Belgium citizens have not had much to say about the federalization process, which has been largely elite-driven. And actually not so much is known about the future of Belgian federalism through the eyes of the citizens. Survey research shows some differences in identity and in institutional preferences between the two language groups, but also a low salience of the issue when they cast a vote. This article, therefore, looks at alternative methods to capture the perceptions of the citizens: focus groups, deliberative experiments and mental maps.     

Vertical influence or horizontal coordination? The purpose of intergovernmental councils in Switzerland

ABSTRACT

In 1993, the Swiss cantons established the conference of cantonal governments (KdK). While the literature on Swiss federalism generally acknowledges the important role of the KdK, little is known about its specific purpose, in particular compared to other, older intergovernmental councils operating in Switzerland. We therefore investigate the purpose of the KdK and contrast it with two other intercantonal conferences with nationwide scope, namely those on education and finance. To do so, we trace two of the most important federal reform processes of the last decade: the latest renewal of fiscal equalization and educational harmonization. We find a division of labour between the KdK and policy-specific councils. While the former aims at vertical political influence, the latter primarily engage in genuine horizontal policy coordination. This flexible and smooth interplay of the two types of councils has contributed to further strengthening the political role of the cantons in the Swiss federation.     

Brazil: The Prospects of a Center-Constraining Federation in a Fragmented Polity

Although there have been deep changes in the federation as aconsequence of redemocratization and decentralization, Brazilcontinues to exhibit profound imbalances among regions. Theseimbalances create contradictions and tensions in Brazilian federalism.The central problem addressed in this article is to identifythe main difficulties facing federalism, and to assess theirconsequences on the prospects of federalism should tensionscontinue unabated. Brazilian federalism has always been a meansof accommodating deep-rooted regional disparities. Althoughthere are political and fiscal mechanisms to offset some ofthe problems of regional disparities, such mechanisms have beeninsufficient to counteract a long history of uneven regionaldevelopment. Because of the country's inequalities, the capabilitiesof subnational governments to respond to Brazil's current demandsand agendas are highly uneven.     

Federalism, the Bush Administration, and the Transformation of American Conservatism

Most recent Republican presidents have proposed signature federalisminitiatives intended to devolve power or sort out federal andstate functions. The Bush administration has not propoundedan explicit federalism policy of this sort, but its approachto federalism can be gleaned from analyzing presidential advocacyof legislation and constitutional amendments, fiscal policies,administrative actions, and judicial policies. What emergesfrom this analysis is an administration that has been surprisinglydismissive of federalism concerns and frequently an agent ofcentralization. In one sense, Bush is merely the latest in astring of presidents who have sacrificed federalism considerationsto specific policy goals when the two have come in conflict.However, the administration's behavior is somewhat surprising,given the president's background as a governor and the factthat he has been the first Republican president to enjoy Republicancontrol of Congress since 1954. Our explanation for the Bushapproach begins with the president's lack of any philosophicalcommitment to federalism and explores the changing status offederalism concerns within conservative ideology. Any explanationfor the Bush approach should account for this shifting politicaldynamic, which has seen Republicans in recent years become increasinglysupportive of exerting federal authority on behalf of theireconomic and social objectives, encouraging Democrats at timesto become more supportive of state authority.     

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT VIEWED FROM SYDNEY

This conference on "Public Administration in Co-operative Federalism", fittingly convened by the Royal Institute of Public Administration, is a most timely one. It is tangible evidence that co-operative federalism is not only possible but, in many areas, positively flourishes, and it provides an opportunity for those of us with state or federal responsibilities in public administration to state our problems fairly and frankly and seek ways of extending co-operation to secure future prosperity for Australia.     

Competing Approaches to the Study of American Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations

The development of theory in the study of American federalismand intergovernmental relations has long been marked by divergentapproaches. This article reviews the literature produced byfive "schools" within the field: (1) dual federalism, (2) cooperativefederalism, (3) pragmatic federalism, (4) noncentralized federalism,and (5) nation-centered federalism. As different as these approachesare, scholarly work in this field has made only sparing useof two other potentially useful approaches: distributive justiceand public choice theory. This article suggests how these alternateapproaches might contribute to reinvigorating a field that appearsto be otherwise at an intellectual impasse.     

Federalism and Decentralization: Ownership Rights and the Superiority of Federalism

The benefits and costs usually ascribed to federalism are benefitsand costs of decentralization; they are, therefore, presentin unitary states that are in fact all decentralized. The benefitsand costs specific to federalism pertain to ownership rightsin constitutional powers. Federalism is superior to confederalismand unitarianism because the ownership rights peculiar to thatsystem of government are such that they ensure the perduranceof competition when one or more competitors are unsuccessful.They do so because under federalism, powers cannot be repossessedunilaterally. Ownership rights have to be enforced; as a consequence,there are also costs that are specific to federalism.     

American Federalism as American Exceptionalism

Americans paradoxically claim uniqueness for their politicalsystem, yet promote it as a model for others. This is especiallytrue of federalism, the clearest example of American exceptionalism.At its inception, American federalism was produced in an environmentclosely approximating what scholars have since distilled asoptimal conditions for fostering such a system. In other contexts,federalism has not flourished, because those preconditions areseldom approximated. Remarkably, American federalism has adjustedto meet drastically changed social, geographic, and politicalconditions, and the case for its continued adaptiveness andappropriateness remains strong. Although enclaved state differencesin economics and religion are no longer a reality, these andother differences are widespread especially on a regional basis.Even on a statewide basis, cultural mixes keep the country heterogeneous.The U.S. Constitution has been reinterpreted to permit rathermore nationalized control in accordance with this process ofeliminating differences. Indeed, this is to the point wherefederalism could become legally problematic, explaining theRehnquist court's recent decisions.     

Guess What Happened on the Way to Revolution? Precursors to the Supreme Court's Federalism Revolution

In recent years, the Rehnquist Court has been accused of usheringin a "federalism revolution." The Court's decisions have beencontentious and often viewed as assertions of the Court's anti-majoritarianpower. However, these assessments misunderstand the role ofthe Court in the American political system. Not only are theCourt's recent decisions relatively modest departures from existingconstitutional doctrine, but its rediscovery of federalism follows,rather than leads, developments in the elected branches. Effortsto rehabilitate federalism as a political value began in theelected branches as early as the 1960s. By 1980, federalismhad become an important cleavage issue between the parties;Republicans advocated a form of "fixed federalism" while Democratsadvocated a form of "flexible federalism." Despite the desireof the Reagan and Bush administrations to use the judiciaryto advance the GOP's view of federalism, confirmation hearingsfor members of the Rehnquist Court demonstrate that Democratsin Congress paid little attention to federalism. Attitudes aboutfederalism thus made their way onto the Court without noticeand without challenge, and the sharp disagreements that emergedon the Court during the late-1990s mirror the same party cleavagesthat developed much earlier in the elected branches.     

George W. Bush, the Party System, and American Federalism

George W. Bush's presidency presents two major puzzles. TheRepublican Party has traditionally stood for "limited government,"but Bush's principal legacy for federalism is centralizationof power in the federal government and the executive branch.Most modern presidents have neglected their partisan duties,but Bush has been a uniquely vigorous party leader. Here, weshow that Bush's puzzling lack of attention to federalism issuesis in large part the result of his efforts to strengthen theRepublican Party to cope with the political and electoral challengescharacteristic of the contemporary political context. We explainwhy the Bush administration's strategy for redressing the Republicanparty's shortcomings has presupposed the deprecation of federalism,and consider the implications of our argument for the developmentof federal arrangements.     

The U.S. Senate and Federalism Policy in the 96th and 97th Congresses

Although the Congress of the United States has a major influenceon American federalism, there has been little systematic attentiongiven to what factors influence congressional voting on federalismissues. This article is an initial effort to address this question.Drawing on previous literature which has attempted to explainvoting decisions of congressmen, senators' "federalism" votingin the 96th and 97th Congresses is considered. The analysisindicates that ideology and party, especially the former, arethe major influences on senators' votes. Moreover, the variablesfound to be most important to senators' federalism votes appearsomewhat distinct from those that influence other domestic policies.Some suggestions for further research are also offered.     

Intergovernmental Innovation and the Administrative State in Canada

Canadian federalism has experienced considerable pressure for change and innovation in recent years. There have been calls for more collaborative federalism and demands for public sector reforms consistent with the precepts of New Public Management. This article examines the hypothesis that these pressures might be expected to have resulted in some intergovernmental institutional innovation in the arena of federal–provincial–territorial relations. Using a conceptual distinction between federalism, intergovernmental relations, and intergovernmental management (IGM) as the basis of analyzing institutional innovation at six levels in the Canadian intergovernmental administrative state, the authors find a differentiated impact with more institutional innovation evident at the micro levels of IGM and innovation more constrained at the macro levels of the administrative state by the traditional institutional infrastructure of executive federalism.     

How federalism influences welfare spending: Belgium federalism reform through the perspective of the synthetic control method

The question of whether and how federalism influences a country's welfare state has been a longstanding concern of political scientists. However, no agreement exists on exactly how, and under what conditions, federal structures impact the welfare state. This article examines this controversy. It concludes theoretically that the specific constellation of federal structures and distribution of powers need to be considered when theorising the effects of federalism on the welfare state. Using the case of Belgium and applying the synthetic control method, it is shown in the article that without the federalism reform of 1993, the country would have had further decreases in social spending rather than a consolidation of this spending in the years after 1993. In the case of Belgium, the combination of increased subnational spending autonomy in a still national financing system provided ideal conditions for a positive federalism effect on social spending to occur.     

Federalism in Africa: Origins,Operation and (In)Significance

Abstract

Recent years have seen major advances in the comparative study of federalism and a growing literature on decentralization in Africa, but there has been surprisingly little systematic comparison of African federalism. This article explains several commonalities in the origins and operation of Africa's three main federal states: Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa. Each country used ‘holding-together’ federalism in order to accommodate ethnic pluralism. Each country—especially Ethiopia and South Africa—also experienced several key centripetal forces: dominant governing parties, top-down state administration and high degrees of fiscal centralism. Federalism mattered in offering accommodative decentralization, but in its operation subnational governments have limited autonomy because of these interlocking centralizing features. This African variant of federalism can have certain salutary features, even as it precludes the possibility of many of the theorized advantages of federalism that are predicated on real subnational autonomy.     

Föderalismus, Dezentralisierung und Performanz. Eine makroquantitative Analyse der Leistungsfähigkeit territorialer Politikorganisation in entwickelten Demokratien

Does federalism matter? We develop a theoretical model on the causal relationships between federalism, decentralization and system performance by merging the two literatures on political and fiscal federalism. The model is then tested in a quantitative analysis, including the OECD countries. We find that, consistent with our model, federalism and decentralization are different dimensions of the territorial organization of politics. Decentralization has positive effects; federalism tends to result in either no or a negative performance effect.     

Bodo ethnic self-rule and persistent violence in Assam: A failed case of multinational federalism in India

Indian federalism has been credited in the literature on comparative federalism for having successfully resolved many of its ethnic conflicts (in a country of immense ethnic diversity) since 1956 by conceding varied forms of statehood. In most cases, the resolution of ethnic conflict has entailed self-determination for ethno-nationalist groups. There are however cases when the experiment has failed and the institutional arrangements for recognition of ethnic self-determination have given birth to more conflicts and persistent violence. In this article, we argue that the Bodoland Territorial Authority (created in 2003) in Assam is a failed case of multinational federalism in India. We argue that the case of Bodoland illustrates the limits of territorial management when groups are intermixed and highlight the need for power sharing in government and/or non-territorial representation as a better method for managing ethnic conflict in such cases.     

Federalism and the European Parliament

The European Parliament has been a source of controversy sinceits inception. Its direct election was seen as endorsing a federalstructure and political future for the European Community (laterEuropean Union). Changes in its authority and legislative powerswere seen as symptomatic of creeping federalism and the emasculationof member states' national sovereignty. The European Parliament'sconscious contribution to developing federalism and constructinga federal Europe relate to its direct election, its powers,and its proposals to hold a constitutional convention. The Anglo-Saxonmisconception of federalism is analyzed, the role of a billof rights examined, and the failures of democratic legitimacyexposed with a view to see what contribution federal bargainsmay make to close the democratic deficit and to impel a reviewof the current institutional arrangements.