驯服印尼激进民族主义--肯尼迪政府对印尼的政策(1961-1963年)

肯尼迪政府上台后调整了对印尼政策,在促成西伊利安争端和平解决之后,在印尼发起了新的一轮外交攻势,试图抓住当前美印(尼)关系的转机,通过经济手段加强印尼与西方联系的纽带,把印尼注意力由国际事务转向解决国内问题,以促进改造印尼民族主义,影响印尼政治构成和国内外政策的长远目标。这一时期,美国改造印尼民族主义的政策,英国维持在东南亚的势力与影响的目标,以及苏加诺在地区内部消除一切殖民主义残余的努力之间产生了错综复杂、难以调和的矛盾。印尼苏加诺政权对于来自美国的压力也不会轻易就范。肯尼迪政府的对印尼政策不免于以失望告终。     

In Defence of the West: General Lauris Norstad, NATO Nuclear Forces and Transatlantic Relations 1956-1963

In the history of NATO, lack of Atlantic communality is a recurring theme. Atlantic cohesion was constantly challenged. However, the discord among NATO members rarely threatened the very existence of the Alliance. The late 1950s and early 1960s witnessed such a rare occurrence. In Europe the question of nuclear sharing triggered the development of blue-prints for a step-by-step replacement of the Atlantic security co-operation by a European Security Community. These blueprints were discussed among the EEC member-states and within the forum of the WEU. This study analyses not only those concepts, but also the role of the SACEUR, General Norstad, in defending NATO from external threats and internal decay. By studying the leeway of the SACEUR, this study tries to establish whether the subsystem of the international system, formed by the nations of the North Atlantic area after the Second World War, should be characterised as a system of hegemonic stability or as a pluralistic security community. The article is based on recently declassified archival material from both sides of the Atlantic.     

Negotiating At Cross-Purposes: Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks, 1961-68

Previous studies on the Sino-American ambassadorial talks have underestimated the efficacy of the negotiations from 1961 to 1968. New documentation from both U.S. and Chinese sources shows that both Washington and Beijing viewed the Warsaw channel as vitally important in managing the delicate relationship and made every effort to keep it going. Based on these new sources, this article analyzes the context of the Sino-American talks in the 1960s, the major issues discussed, maneuvers, rhetoric and follow-up actions. It concludes that the Warsaw channel was a useful facilitator for managing Sino-American relations in the turbulent 1960s, an important part of the mutual learning process, and it shortened the learning curve for the future policy makers.     

Anglo-American Competition in Central America, 1905-13: The Role of Sir Lionel Carden

Lionel Carden's years as a senior diplomat coincided with the rise of American power in, and Great Britain's strategic disengagement from, the Caribbean region. This changing order naturally gave rise to complications: Great Britain had extensive economic interests in the region, and diplomatic personnel - Carden in particular - endeavoured to protect these interests while at the same time the Foreign Office sought to maintain a good relationship with the United States. Carden's vigorous defence of British economic interests in Central America earned him the reputation in Washington of being 'anti-American'. Carden, however, was most likely acting as a 'buffer' to deflect criticism from policy makers at home.     

Anglo-American Competition in Central America, 1905-13: The Role of Sir Lionel Carden

Lionel Carden's years as a senior diplomat coincided with the rise of American power in, and Great Britain's strategic disengagement from, the Caribbean region. This changing order naturally gave rise to complications: Great Britain had extensive economic interests in the region, and diplomatic personnel - Carden in particular - endeavoured to protect these interests while at the same time the Foreign Office sought to maintain a good relationship with the United States. Carden's vigorous defence of British economic interests in Central America earned him the reputation in Washington of being 'anti-American'. Carden, however, was most likely acting as a 'buffer' to deflect criticism from policy makers at home.     

Austen Chamberlain and Britain's Relations with France, 1924-1929

Several historians have suggested that Austen Chamberlain's Francophile tendencies during his period as foreign secretary between 1924 and 1929 were the defining features of his European diplomatic strategy. By examining four key events: the rejection of the Geneva Protocol, the conclusion of the Treaty of Locarno, the Anglo-French Compromise on disarmament and the negotiation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, this article argues that Chamberlain's relationship with the French was not entirely harmonious. After the high point of Locarno, Britain's relations with France became increasingly tense because of Chamberlain's growing disillusionment with Briand's willingness to pursue a diplomatic agenda that did not have at its heart a reinvigorated Entente Cordiale.     

The Anglo-American “Special Relationship”: The Lazarus of International Relations

Scholars have variously queried the existence of the Anglo-American “special relationship,” consigned it to history as “special no more,” or demanded that Britain choose between its European and American relationships. These critiques have become increasingly prevalent since the Cold War. Yet the current British government, like many before it, continues to portray a choice between America and Europe as a “false choice,” and the “special relationship” has arguably deepened in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. This article contends that international diplomatic history can contribute much to understanding the “Lazarus-like” quality of the “special relationship.” Specifically it argues that a number of critical continuities in post-World War II British foreign policy survived the end of the Cold War and have since contributed heavily to the determination of the British foreign policymaking elite to maintain the “special relationship” at the same time that Britain pursues a leadership role within Europe.     

With a Little Help from My Friends: The Anglo-American Atomic Intelligence Partnership, 1945-1958

This article looks at the Anglo-American atomic intelligence relationship in the early post-war period. In 1946 the wartime sharing of technical atomic information was terminated; despite this barrier, atomic intelligence relations continued and given the common objective of discerning Soviet capabilities, flourished. The close relationship offered many mutual benefits to both sides. As such, the atomic intelligence relationship was to become a crucial instrument in achieving a resumption of relations in 1958, what Prime Minister Harold Macmillan referred to as the “great prize.” This article details the composition of the Anglo-American special-relationship's special-relationship, describing joint operations and placing these within the normal nuclear partnership at this time.     

失败的国家建设方针——肯尼迪政府与越战初期的南越“战略村计划”(1961-1963)

肯尼迪执政时期,随着冷战战场向第三世界的转移,美国政府越来越致力于通过国家建设(Nation Building)①方针应对欠发达国家不断出现的叛乱问题,意图通过引导落后地区以发展现代化来消除共产主义滋生的根源。越南战争时期南越的战略村计划是肯尼迪政府在第三世界展开的第一次完全意义上的国家建设行动。本文旨在通过对战略村计划从出台到实施再到失败这一过程的历史考察,分析肯尼迪政府对第三世界的国家建设方针存在的两点困境:一个是美国自身在国家建设中的定位问题,一个是文化冲突问题。     

Britain and the Kuwaiti crisis, 1961

The Kuwaiti crisis of 1961 has conventionally been accorded little attention in histories of Britain's role in the Middle East. In fact, the crisis was an important defining moment, focusing the minds of policymakers on British interests in the Gulf, and the question of the best means of preserving them. It was also the largest scale mobilization of British forces in the Middle East in the post-Suez era. This article sets the crisis in the context of longer term British relations with Kuwait, internal developments in the Emirate, the evolution of British strategy in the region since Suez and Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations in order to understand the significance of the episode.     

Anglo-American relations after Suez,the rise and decline of the working group experiment,and the french challenge to NATO, 1957-59

This article explores the establishment of a number of Anglo-American working groups at the Washington Conference of October 1957, and explains how the British regarded the groups as an attempt to institutionalize the principle of consultation in Anglo-American relations. American and British officials were anxious that the existence of the groups be kept secret for fear that they would be a cause of resentment to other close allies. De Gaulle's attacks on an Anglo-American monopoly within NATO, and disruptive calls for institutionalizing tripartite cooperation following his assumption of power in June 1958 underlined this point, and helped to cool US attitudes to any notion of formal machinery that by-passed established alliance structures. Practical problems associated with the functioning of the groups, as well as the potential for political embarrassment they could represent, meant that their role had largely by the spring of 1959, yet their brief history was illustrative of the tensions that exclusivity in ANglo-American relations could bring to the Western alliance.     

美印战略伙伴：进展、问题和前景

冷战结束后 ,美印关系的进展引人注目。通过 1998年后的战略对话和最高领导人的互访 ,以及 9 11后两国关系的转型 ,到今年年初双方宣布“下一步战略伙伴”倡议 ,双边关系进入一个新的高度。基于共同的价值和利益 ,华盛顿和新德里在经济和安全领域开展了前所未有的合作。但在双边关系不断升温的同时 ,两国在一系列国际问题上仍存在分歧。美印战略伙伴是暂时现象 ,还是会进一步走向战略同盟 ?这值得我们关注和准备必要的应对措施。     

Anglo-American relations after Suez, the rise and decline of the working group experiment, and the french challenge to NATO, 1957-59

This article explores the establishment of a number of Anglo-American working groups at the Washington Conference of October 1957, and explains how the British regarded the groups as an attempt to institutionalize the principle of consultation in Anglo-American relations. American and British officials were anxious that the existence of the groups be kept secret for fear that they would be a cause of resentment to other close allies. De Gaulle's attacks on an Anglo-American monopoly within NATO, and disruptive calls for institutionalizing tripartite cooperation following his assumption of power in June 1958 underlined this point, and helped to cool US attitudes to any notion of formal machinery that by-passed established alliance structures. Practical problems associated with the functioning of the groups, as well as the potential for political embarrassment they could represent, meant that their role had largely by the spring of 1959, yet their brief history was illustrative of the tensions that exclusivity in ANglo-American relations could bring to the Western alliance.