Mass Violence and the Recognition of Kosovo: Suffering and Recognition

In instances of international negotiations over state recognition, the way the violence sustained by a given group is categorised becomes a critical factor in the international community's decision to support independence or not. This essay argues that the recognition of Kosovo in February 2008 was made possible by the use of justifications based on Kosovo Albanians' collective status as victims of ethnic cleansing. The essay bridges the gap between two bodies of literature that have not been used in conjunction up to now, namely normative theories of ‘remedial’ secession and works on the logic of mass violence against ethnically defined groups. It finds that the international community has used the ‘remedial argument’ for Kosovo's recognition because it allowed it to minimise the risk of further unilateral declarations of independence in a volatile region.     

Kosovo,Self-Determination and the International Order

Yugoslavia's wars provide a rich example of the range of challenges posed to international stability and fundamental principles of international relations since 1989. Within this context, Kosovo's independence has now become a cause celebre of the use of the principle of self-determination in state-creation. In addition, the case of Kosovo is an important development in the practice of humanitarian intervention and by implication the evolution of the concept of the Responsibility to Protect. To better understand the effects of Kosovar claims to self-determination on international order, a clearer understanding is required of the factors shaping that order and how self-determination (as it emerges from the road to Kosovo's independence) relates to those factors. The issue of ‘self-determination after Kosovo’, is placed here into both the context of Yugoslavia's collapse and a number of broader key features which could be said to have played a dominant role in shaping international order post-1989.     

Kosovo and the Framing of Non-Secessionist Self-Government Claims in Romania

This contribution focuses on the consequences of the international controversy over Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) for domestic debates over sub-state territorial restructuring. The main argument is that, in the absence of a clear distinction in international politics between secessionist and non-secessionist claims, state elites employ ‘Kosovo’ effectively for invoking the spectre of secessionist violence even in consistently non-secessionist and non-violent settings, delegitimising all culturally framed claims for territorial restructuring. This strategy leads to radicalised group claims and increased democratic fragility. The Romanian case highlights the imperative to take seriously non-secessionist claims as a separate category of study and international norm-setting.     

The quest for legitimacy in independent Kosovo: the unfulfilled promise of diversity and minority rights

When Kosovo declared its independence in 2008, it did so not as a nation-state, but as a “state of communities,” self-defining as multiethnic, diverse, and committed to extensive rights for minorities. In this paper, this choice is understood as a response to a dual legitimation problem. Kosovo experienced both an external legitimation challenge, regarding its contested statehood internationally, and an internal one, vis-à-vis its Serb minority. The focus on diversity and minority rights was expected to confer legitimacy on the state both externally and internally. International state-builders and the domestic political elite in post-conflict Kosovo both pursued this strategy. However, it inadvertently created an additional internal legitimation challenge, this time from within Kosovo’s majority Albanian population. This dynamic is illustrated by the opposition movement “Lëvizja Vetëvendosje” (Self-Determination Movement), which rejects the framing of Kosovo as first and foremost a multiethnic state. The movement’s counter-narrative represents an additional internal legitimation challenge to the new state. This paper thus finds that internationally endorsed “diversity management” through minority rights did not deliver as a panacea for the legitimacy dilemmas of the post-conflict polity. On the contrary, the “state of communities” continues to be contested by both majority and minority groups in Kosovo.     

美国国会涉台立法的新进展及其影响——基于第111—115届国会涉台法案的分析

第111-115届国会期间(2009—2018),美国国会涉台立法进入了一个新阶段,其提出涉台法案的核心诉求与上一个十年相比,立法意图更加具有指向性——服务于美国对华战略,分别紧随奥巴马政府的“亚太再平衡战略”和特朗普政府的“印太战略”两大主题。美国国会在相关法案中核心诉求主要包括:强化与台湾的“军事关系”、促进提升美台关系实质、协助台湾争取“国际生存空间”。美国国会涉台立法产生了多方面的破坏性影响,一方面,对美国政府的涉台政策施加了“刚性”约束力,严重损害了中国的核心利益,增加了中国政府解决台湾问题的难度;另一方面,这些涉台法案助长了“台独”分裂活动,破坏了中美新型大国关系的构建。     

Preventing the Emergence of Self-Determination as a Norm of Secession: An Assessment of the Kosovo ‘Unique Case’ Argument

When Kosovo declared independence, in February 2008, it was stated that the move was not an act of self-determination. Instead, the key states that supported the decision insisted that the case for statehood arose from a unique set of circumstances. Kosovo was not a precedent; it was a sui generis case in international politics. This essay considers the arguments underpinning this claim to exclusivity and argues that, taken either individually or collectively, the main justifications used to support Kosovo's ‘unique’ statehood—such as the abuse of human rights—in fact have serious consequences for other separatist conflicts elsewhere.     

The water and the fish: Public opinion and the provisional IRA in Northern Ireland

Abstract

The methods and goals of the Provisional IRA make it difficult to categorize it simply as a “terrorist” group. Its longevity and its affinity to Irish political culture suggest that it will not be defeated by force but by being rendered irrelevant. This is likely to come about as a result of the state demonstrating its own legitimacy among those sections of the Catholic community which have been understandably reluctant to give the state their full allegiance in the past. Survey evidence supports the contention that the Provisional IRA's goals and grievances are shared by many who would spurn their tactics.     

Disputes over the 15-point agreement on normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia

This paper examines the 15-point agreement on normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Two mainstream discourses have prevailed since the agreement was ratified by both countries: on one hand, the Government of Kosovo has branded this agreement as historic, given the fact that in the last century no agreement has ever been reached between Kosovo and Serbia. On the other hand, Kosovo's political opposition has critiqued this agreement stressing that the 15-point agreement devastates Kosovo's statehood. Beyond both extreme stances, we argue that an enhanced autonomy for four northern Serb municipalities ought to be seen as a tool for integration, rather than disintegration of Kosovo statehood. This paper concludes that the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia as a top-down arrangement lacks transparency, and this might jeopardize the achievements reached through this process. Moreover, the EU position should be clearly articulated that redrawing and rearranging the borders of Kosovo and Serbia might overturn the EU's and USA's immense investments in stability, peace, and prosperity in the Western Balkans.     

Stalin's Genocides

In this essay I explore the ways in which the internal Albanian politics of memory in Kosovo rely on a longer, lived history of militant self-organisation than the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) war period alone. On the basis of recent ethnographic research, I argue that the memory of prewar militant activism is symbolically codified, ritually formalized, and put on the public stage in Kosovo today. Not only has this process effectively rehabilitated and consolidated the personal, social, and political status of specific former activists, it also has produced a hegemonic morality against which the actions of those in power are judged internally. On the one hand, this process reproduces shared cultural references which idealise ethno-national solidarity, unity and pride and which have served militant mobilisation already before the 1990s. On the other, it provides the arguments through which rival representatives of the former militant underground groups (known as Ilegalja) compete both socially and politically still today. Although this process demarcates some lines of social and political friction within society, it also suggests that international efforts to introduce an identity which breaks with Kosovo's past and some of its associated values, face a local system of signification that is historically even deeper entrenched than is usually assumed.     

Gaspirali v. Il'minskii: Two identity projects for the muslims of the Russian Empire

As “music of commitment,” in the period from the late 1970s to the late 1980s rock music in Yugoslavia had an important purpose of providing a popular-cultural outlet for the unique forms of socio-cultural critique that engaged with the realities and problems of Yugoslav society. The three “music movements” that embodied the new rock’n’roll spirit – New Wave, New Primitives, and New Partisans – used rock music to critique the country's “new socialist culture,” with the purpose of helping to eliminate the disconnect between the ideal and the reality of socialist Yugoslavia. This paper examines the New Partisans as the most radical expression of music of commitment through the works of its most important rock bands: Bijelo dugme, Plavi orkestar, and Merlin. The paper's argument is that the New Partisans' socio-cultural engagement, animated by advocacy of Yugoslavism, was a counter-logic to the nationalist dissolution of a distinctly Yugoslav fabric of a socialist community in crisis. Thus, the movement's revolutionary “spirit of reconstruction” permeating its “poetics of the patriotic” was a mechanism of socio-cultural resistance to political, cultural and moral-ethical de-Yugoslavization of Yugoslav society. Its ultimate objective was to make the case that the only way into the future – if there was to be any – rested on strategic reanimation of the Partisan revolutionary past as the only viable socio-cultural foundation of the Yugoslav socialist community.     

Discourse in Bosnia and Macedonia on the Independence of Kosovo: When and What is a Precedent?

Bosnia and Macedonia declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 and 1992, and subsequent referenda legitimised these declarations, but unitary state actors did not emerge. Rather, Bosnia and Macedonia each contain groups with divisive views regarding the nature of the state in which they live. Kosovo is regularly invoked as an example in their contentious discussions. In this essay, I present a framework for understanding this discursive contention in which Kosovo provides the focus for disputes between extremists and moderates of different groups. Within the two states, groups differ over the recognition of Kosovo's declaration of independence and the question of whether this might constitute a precedent. A political, rather than simply a legal, view on these discussions helps us to better understand not only these dynamics, but similar contestations unfolding elsewhere.     

The Consociational System of Democracy in Kosovo: Questioning Ethnic Minorities' Special Status in Kosovo's Constitutional Regime

This article examines the constitutional position of ethnic minorities in Kosovo, the individual features, and the key protection mechanisms applied therein. At the outset, the article provides a general introduction to the topic, illustrating the character of Kosovo's state model. Subsequently, it builds upon the view that Kosovo was shaped under an international supervision, which aimed to establish a state freed from mono-ethnicity, which is regarded as both multi-ethnic and a state of citizens. The article proceeds to explain the institutional mechanisms established with the objective to protect and uphold the ethnic minorities’ position at both central and local levels. Furthermore, it discusses the affirmative human rights law standards granted to ethnic minorities—both at personal and collective levels. The article concludes by suggesting that the constitution of Kosovo provides for a broad degree of self-rule to ethnic minorities, which, in turn, provides them with the capacity to enjoy a rather constitutive position as regards the essential components of the polity.     

Unacademic academics: Holocaust deniers and trivializers in post-Communist Romania

The Romanian Academy (and much of the country's historical establishment) is packed with Holocaust deniers and trivializers, many of whom indulge in Holocaust obfuscation against the background of the post-Communist “competitive martyrdom” between the victims of the Holocaust and the Gulag. Quite a few of these deniers and trivializers are also former secret police informers. On closer examination, however, it turns out that explaining the reluctance to face the country's “dark past” as being the independent variable resultant of the post “Romanianization” of the Communist Party and its Securitate is a partial explanation at best. A substantially more convincing one might be provided by scrutinizing the phenomenon as the product of post-mnemonic cultural traumas.     

“Serbs” in Bela krajina: a (deliberately) forgotten minority?

There are three constitutionally recognized national/ethnic minorities in Slovenia: the Italians, the Hungarians and the Roma. In addition, there are other ethnic groups that could perhaps be considered as “autochthonous” national minorities in line with Slovenia's understanding of this concept. Among them is a small community of “Serbs” – the successors of the Uskoks living in Bela krajina, a border region of Slovenia. In this article we present results of a field research that focused on the following question: Can the “Serb” community in Bela krajina be considered a national minority? On the basis of the objective facts, it could be said that the “Serbs” in four Bela krajina villages are a potential national minority, but with regard to their modest social vitality and the fact that they do not express their desire for minority status, the realization of special minority protection is questionable.     

Language and education laws in multi-ethnic de facto states: the cases of Abkhazia and Transnistria

Even after the conflicts of the early 1990s that brought them to their de facto independence, both Abkhazia and Transnistria remained strongly multi-ethnic. In both territories, no single ethnic group is an absolute majority and Russian is the language that is mostly spoken on the streets of Sukhumi and Tiraspol. Legislators of both entities felt the need to deal with multi-ethnicity and multilingualism, including in their constitutions, in laws related to education, or more directly with specific language laws (1992 law “On languages” in Transnistria; 2007 law “On the state language in Abkhazia”). The protection of linguistic rights that is formally part of the legislation of both territories finds limitations in practice. The language of education has proved to be particularly contentious, in particular for Moldovan/Romanian language schools in Transnistria and Georgian language schools in Abkhazia. Why are language laws in Abkhazia and Transnistria so different, in spite of the fact that they are both post-Soviet, multi-ethnic territories that became de facto independent in the early 1990s? The different approaches found in Abkhazia and Transnistria represent remarkable examples of language legislation as a tool for nation-building in ethnically heterogeneous territories.     

War of words: the impact of Russian state television on the Russian Internet

How effective is Russian state television in framing the conflict in Ukraine that began with the Euromaidan protests and what is its impact on Russian Internet users? We carried out a content analysis of Dmitrii Kiselev's “News of the Week” show, which allowed us to identify the two key frames he used to explain the conflict – World War II-era fascism and anti-Americanism. Since Kiselev often reduces these frames to buzzwords, we were able to track the impact of these words on Internet users by examining search query histories on Yandex and Google and by developing quantitative data to complement our qualitative analysis. Our findings show that much of what state media produces is not effective, but that the “fascist” and anti-American frames have had lasting impacts on Russian Internet users. We argue that it does not make sense to speak of competition between a “television party” and an “Internet party” in Russia since state television has a strong impact in setting the agenda for the Internet and society as a whole. Ultimately, the relationship between television and the Internet in Russia is a continual loop, with each affecting the other.     

Before Jihadists There Were Anarchists: A Failed Case of Transnational Violence

With the wave of violent jihadist activities in recent years, the world's attention has shifted away from a traditional prioritizing of state forms of formal violence toward one focusing on an apparently “new” phenomenon of transnational violence. Yet transnational violence itself is not a new phenomenon; it in fact precedes international, state-centric violence. For reasons related to gaps or defects within the state system or to surges in the capacities of individuals and societies, transnational violence has periodically made attempts to regain its primary position. Prior to the violent jihadists, the last of these efforts was that of the late-nineteenth-century Anarchists. This article looks at the dynamics of the Anarchists's failure as part of a transnational violence continuum, using a framework based on their autonomy, representation, and influence. The results provide an historical example against which future studies about the current episode of transnational violence may be compared.     

The making of Maoist model in post-Mao era: The myth of Nanjie village

Bucking the general trend of privatization in China, the model village of Nanjie has cultivated the image of a “small zone of communism,” a modern-day commune that practices extreme measures of egalitarianism. Such an image is promoted by some Party leaders at the center as well as local cadres, and bolstered by the spectacular display of the village's wealth. With the aid of fieldwork data, our research examines the claims of “success,” “egalitarianism,” and the attribution of “success” to “egalitarianism.” We find that the village's early rise to prosperity took place before the celebrated Maoist practices were introduced, and that its later rapid development was an artifact of politically awarded state loans. We then examine the “actually existing Maoism” by uncovering the capitalist labor relations between the local villagers and the hired laborers, and the political inequality among the village's own legal residents. We conclude by examining the political processes that gave rise to this star village in the post-Mao era.     

Minorities and marginality: pertinacity of Hindus and Sikhs in a repressive environment in Afghanistan

The situation of Hindus and Sikhs as a persecuted minority is a little-studied topic in literature dealing with ethno-sectarian conflict in Afghanistan. Hindu and Sikh communities' history and role in Afghanistan's development are examined through a structural, political, socioeconomic, and perceptual analysis of the minority populations since the country gained its independence in 1919. It traces a timeline of their evolving status after the breakdown of state structure and the ensuing civil conflicts and targeted persecution in the 1990s that led to their mass exodus out of the country. A combination of structural failure and rising Islamic fundamentalist ideology in the post-Soviet era led to a war of ethnic cleansing as fundamentalists suffered a crisis of legitimation and resorted to violence as a means to establish their authority. Hindus and Sikhs found themselves in an uphill battle to preserve their culture and religious traditions in a hostile political environment in the post-Taliban period. The international community and Kabul failed in their moral obligation to protect and defend the rights of minorities and oppressed communities.     

Development's Denial of Social Justice

Abstract

American public administration as a field is “mature” in terms of its identity, roles, knowledge, and open-system nature. Yet it lacks maturity in the sense of an adequate sense of self-worth. This “inferiority complex” is revealed by the field's obsession with two intertwining, persistent themes: a perceived state of societal illegitimacy and of permanent need for reform.