Pussy Riot as a feminist project: Russia's gendered informal politics

This article considers Pussy Riot as a feminist project, placing their actions and the regime's reactions in the context of three post-9/11 developments in gender and sexuality politics in Russia. First, I assert that Pussy Riot's stunts are a logical reaction to the Kremlin's masculinity-based nation-rebuilding scheme, which was a cover for crude homophobic misogyny. Second, Pussy Riot is part of the informal feminism emerging in Russia, a response to nongovernmental organization (NGO) feminism and the regime's repression of NGO feminism, albeit likely to be outflanked by regime-supported thuggery. Third, the members of Pussy Riot were so harshly prosecuted because they – swearing, covered up and disloyal – violated the political cleaner role that the Kremlin has given women in the last few years. Feminist social scientists have long looked for politics outside of formal institutions and processes. The Pussy Riot affair makes clear how much gender is central to the informal politics that gender-blind observers of Russia have come to see as crucial to understanding Russia's regime.     

Russian feminist perspectives on Pussy Riot

While Pussy Riot's “Punk Prayer” and its aftermath constituted something of a turning point for Russia politically – as well as personally for the women imprisoned afterwards – it was neither the first nor last of Pussy Riot's endeavors. Among other things, their series of songs, published as video clips on the web, endorsed mass protest against the Putin regime, criticized state-sponsored homophobia, and praised feminism as a possible curative for Russia's many ills. In setting forth their ideas, however, Pussy Riot's lyricists made use of traditional masculine and feminine gender norms as well as homophobia, wielding these against their opponents in the regime and thereby reinforcing them in ways that other self-identified Russian feminists found problematic at best.

In this article, I review Pussy Riot's collection of songs in chronological order, highlighting the areas where gender norms and apparent misogyny, sexism, and homophobia appear. I weave my explications of the content of Pussy Riot's productions in with the responses of Russian feminist activists to Pussy Riot's lyrics and actions. Taking into account the views of some non-feminist Russian commentators in addition to self-identified feminist activists, I discuss a range of evaluations of the content of Pussy Riot's compositions, as well as differing appraisals of the means that Pussy Riot employed to achieve what they viewed as feminist ends: undermining or even unseating the Putin regime.     

The politics of ethnic cleansing: The P.P.R., The P.Z.Z. and Wielkopolska's nationalist revolution, 1944‐1946

The Pussy Riot affair was a massive international cause célèbre that ignited a widespread movement of support for the jailed activists around the world. The case tells us a lot about Russian society, the Russian state, and Western perceptions of Russia. It also raises gender as a frame of analysis, something that has been largely overlooked in 20 years of work by mainstream political scientists analyzing Russia's transition to democracy. It has important implications for how Western feminist categories can be applied to the Russian context. This introduction summarizes the main events associated with the trail of the three group members who were accused of staging a “punk prayer” performance in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in February 2012. It also introduces the findings of the six papers that make up this special section.     

Is sextremism the new feminism? Perspectives from Pussy Riot and Femen

As Pussy Riot has changed the face of political protest in Russia, to the south, Ukraine has seen the emergence of Femen, famous for their topless protests against everything from sex tourism and trafficking to hot water shut-offs in Kyiv to sexism in the Ukrainian government to Putin's visits to Ukraine. Their concurrent appearance in the post-Soviet sphere encourages a discussion around the mobilization of sexuality as protest in the region. Both groups appropriate sexual language and imagery as well as physical sexuality in protest of their current regimes. This article engages the question of similarities between the two groups’ efforts and considers what differences structure their political goals and philosophies. What potential does the global visibility of these groups have to influence an emerging women's movement, and, more generally, how can sexuality be harnessed as a unifying force in anti-government activism in post-socialist Russia and Ukraine?     

Pussy Riot as agent provocateur: conspiracy theories and the media construction of nation in Putin's Russia

This article studies the impact of conspiracy theories on post-Soviet Russian nation-building through the analysis of how the Pussy Riot trial was constructed by the Russian media. Conspiracy theory as a phenomenon is defined as a populist tool for relocation of power among different political actors, which creates identities and boosts social cohesion. This interpretation of conspiracy theories helps investigate how the media constructed the image of Pussy Riot and their supporters as a conspiring subversive minority, which threatened the Russian nation. The ability of conspiracy theory for swift social mobilization helped the authorities to strengthen the public support of its policies and model the Russian nation as ethnically and religiously homogeneous.     

Continuity and change in Russia's policy toward Central and Eastern Europe

The accession of the CEE states to NATO and the European Union has put an end to the geopolitical ambiguity and implicit insecurity in the region between Russia and the so-called ‘Old Europe’. Instead of being an area of great powers' rivalry, elements of ‘buffer belts’ lacking meaningful strategic options, objects of raw Nazi-Soviet deals, or zones under Russian occupation and domination, the three Baltic States and the Visegrad group countries became full-fledged members of the European Union and were given NATO's security guarantees. By the middle of the 2000s, one would conclude that traditional geopolitics had ended in this region.However, the changes in the strategic situation in CEE have not changed the deep rooted moving forces and long-term strategic goals of the Russian policy toward the region. Moscow seeks to have the position, as its official rhetoric says, of an ‘influential centre of a multipolar world’ that would be nearly equal to the USA, China, or the EU. With this in view Moscow seeks for the establishment of its domination over the new independent states of the former USSR and for the formation of a sphere of influence for itself in Central Eastern Europe. If it achieves these goals, then Europe may return once again to traditional geopolitics fraught with great power rivalries and permanent instabilities radiating far beyond CEE borders.Yet a few questions remain. Has Russia come to the conclusion that attempting to restore its privileged position of influence in Central-Eastern Europe is wrong? Has Russia enough power to threaten the CEE countries? How credible are NATO's security guarantees? How may Russian behavior in CEE affect a wider European geopolitical context? These questions are appropriate in the light of Russia's ‘resurgence’ as a revanchist power and because Russia is, and most probably will remain in the next five to ten years, a weighty economic and strategic factor in areas along the Western borders of the former USSR.     

War of words: the impact of Russian state television on the Russian Internet

How effective is Russian state television in framing the conflict in Ukraine that began with the Euromaidan protests and what is its impact on Russian Internet users? We carried out a content analysis of Dmitrii Kiselev's “News of the Week” show, which allowed us to identify the two key frames he used to explain the conflict – World War II-era fascism and anti-Americanism. Since Kiselev often reduces these frames to buzzwords, we were able to track the impact of these words on Internet users by examining search query histories on Yandex and Google and by developing quantitative data to complement our qualitative analysis. Our findings show that much of what state media produces is not effective, but that the “fascist” and anti-American frames have had lasting impacts on Russian Internet users. We argue that it does not make sense to speak of competition between a “television party” and an “Internet party” in Russia since state television has a strong impact in setting the agenda for the Internet and society as a whole. Ultimately, the relationship between television and the Internet in Russia is a continual loop, with each affecting the other.     

Russia as a great power: Status inconsistency and the two Chechen wars

The article examines Russia as a great power from the point of view of status inconsistency theory. Applications of the theory to Russia have focused on the status accorded to Russia in diplomatic representation and membership of key international organizations, which suggests that Russia is a ‘status overachiever’ in that it has an international status that is greater than its actual capabilities would warrant. However, this article focuses on Russian perceptions of the country's status internationally, especially as reflected in the actual experience of membership in international organizations (OSCE, Council of Europe) and relations with the EU in the context of the two Chechen wars. The article demonstrates that, at least according to Russian assessments, Russia is accorded lower status in these organizations than the great power status which most Russians believe should be theirs. While concluding that status inconsistency is a useful tool for explaining Russian foreign policy behavior, the article notes that differing assessments of what Russia's level of status recognition is pose challenges for status inconsistency theory.     

Battle for Perceptions: Projecting Russia in the West

The article provides an analysis of Russia's image that the Kremlin has been projecting in Western countries in the years of Vladimir Putin's presidency. The negative character of Russia's image in the West was recognised as one of the major security threats for the country, and an energetic public relations campaign was launched to improve it. The article explores the core elements of this ‘constructed’ image, and examines how they are related to the self-images of Russia held by Russian political elites. Finally, it considers the implications of the ambition to create this ‘desired’ image for Russian foreign policy.     

Globalising Russia? The neoliberal/ nationalist two-step and the Russification of the West

This paper argues that the major ideological dynamic of the post-cold war era is the conflictive complicity of neoliberalism and various authoritarian and racist nationalisms. This is nowhere more apparent than in post-Soviet Russia. Indeed, far from being 'exceptional', contemporary Russia actually provides an exemplary instance of where the neoliberal road to the market is really taking a great number of countries - in the first instance, the debt-ridden countries of the so-called 'Third World'. But perhaps the lessons of Russia's experience extend somewhat further. Might it not be the case that, in an epoch in which IMF-style 'structural adjustment' policies are extended to all and sundry, those pathologies which at first seemed the exclusive preserve of 'backward nations', are coming increasingly to install themselves in the very heartlands of the 'West'? If this describes an important aspect of the historical process today, it is a process that has an additional, often neglected, negative condition of possibility: the more-or-less comprehensive defeat of the Left world-wide: the defeat, in other words, of progressive anti-capitalist models of modernisation and development. Any viable challenge to neoliberal globalisation and racist nationalism will therefore depend, to begin with, on an accurate diagnosis of that defeat. Here the case of Russia is once again significant, above all for what Russian history dramatises, especially over the past decade, about the 'subjective factor' in political and social change. My exploration of these issues is pursued here with reference to the recent impressive account of globalisation advanced by Russian political scientist Boris Kagarlitsky. However, the mismatch in Russia between the huge scale of the recent social catastrophe and the small size of the popular protest points to what Kagarlitsky's account misses. To begin to advance an alternative to the neoliberal/nationalist two-step, to disarticulate a progressive response to neoliberal globalisation from racist nationalist responses, it will be necessary to develop a more careful relationship to another two-step, that of Marxism/'postmodern identity politics'. We can make a start in this respect by foregrounding the psychoanalytic dimension of fantasy.     

New directions in Russian international studies: pluralization,Westernization, and isolationism

The essay argues that Western scholars can improve their understanding of the post-Soviet Russia by studying the discipline of new Russian international relations (IR). The other objective of the essay is to move away from the excessively West-centered IR scholarship by exploring indigenous Russian perceptions and inviting a dialogue across the globe. The essay identifies key trends in Russian IR reflective of the transitional nature of Russia’s post-Soviet change. It argues that Russian IR continues to be in a stage of ideological and theoretical uncertainty, which is a result of unresolved questions of national identity. For describing Russia’s identity crisis, the authors employ Erving Goffman’s concept of stigma defined as a crisis of a larger social acceptance by Russia’s “significant other” (West). The essay suggests that, until this crisis is resolved, much of Russian IR debates can be understood in terms of a search for a national idea. It also introduces the authors of the issue and summarizes their contribution to our understanding of Russian and Western IR.     

Islamic Terrorism and the Question of National Liberation,or Problems of Contemporary Chechen Terrorism

Scholars have analyzed various causes of contemporary Chechen terrorism in Russia and have offered multiple explanations as to why this terrorism persists. Most commonly, these scholars accuse Russia of suppressing a Muslim struggle for national liberation in Chechnya because of Russia's own interests in Chechen territory or its lucrative oil resources. This work analyzes various instances of Chechen terrorism, 1991–2002, to conclude that the dynamics of terrorism do not support the claims of various scholars, journalists, and Chechen terrorists that Chechen rebels are fighting a war of independence and that the Russian government's failure “to let Chechnya go” instigates future acts of terrorism.     

European Reactions to the 2008 Georgian–Russian War: Assessing the Impact of Gas Dependence

Western observers and policymakers have voiced anxiety about Europe’s increasing dependence on Russian natural gas fueling Russian imperial ambitions. In 2008, speculation appeared to become reality, as war broke out between Russia and its post-Soviet, but Western-leaning neighbor, Georgia. But did a country’s dependence on Russian natural gas influence its politicians’ responses to the Georgian–Russian war? An analysis of the voting behavior in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe provides insight into conventional claims that a reliance on Russian energy dampens the willingness of European states to publicly criticize Russia.     

Book reviews

Historically speaking, the self-identification process of Russia has revolved around the West–East axis. However, there has been a considerable asymmetry in the impact of these two poles. In this article I will argue that “the West” was a dominating concept in the self-narration of Russians and “the East” was mostly a function of the interaction between Russia and the West. The difference in the level of attention and emotions which Russia manifests towards the West and the East has been caused by the religious factor, which was crucial for shaping Russia's identity and her sense of uniqueness. While the West and Western Christianity presented a challenge to the Orthodox fundamentals of Russia's self-image, China was neutral in terms of religious identity. The negligible importance of the religious factor added to rationality in Russian policy towards China. In the article I analyze the Chinese factor in Russia's self-identification process in the context of Moscow's attitude towards the West and the East by using two main elements: identity and fear. Comparing the historical pattern with the present one, I attempt to determine the consequences of these two factors for the Russian Federation.     

Status conflicts between Russia and the West: Perceptions and emotional biases

This article looks at the status conflicts between Russia and the West and asks: why do these conflicts exist despite attempts to avoid them? If status conflicts refer to merely a symbolic recognition, then they should arguably be easier to solve than conflicts stemming from competition for power and resources. Yet, status conflicts can be difficult to solve even when they were not conceived as zero-sum games. The article argues that status conflicts cannot be understood without the interplay of perceptions and emotions. First, what really matters is not objective status but perceptions thereof and there seems to be a gap how Russia and the West perceive status in general. Secondly, the perceptions of when status is gained or lost seem to be emotionally loaded. Russia is more willing to understand its relative status when military or economic issues are at stake, but if the dispute deals with international norms and questions of justice Russia is more likely to interpret Western action as violating its status and conversely, it is more likely to interpret its own action as enhancing its status when it is defending such values differently from the West.     

On socialization,patriotism and trust: the migration of homeward-bound Russian academics

Because global labor markets affect the self-assignment of academics, they also affect structural changes in migration movements. To understand the migration patterns of highly qualified academic scholars, research has focused on their mobility, including their return migration. Thus far, studies have examined migrants from Latin America to the United States, but the impacts of cultural or societal contexts on migration have not been investigated.

Based on an empirical study of Russian academics who have migrated to Germany, we propose theory-based answers to the following questions: Is trust a relevant motivation for homeward-bound academic migrants to return to their native countries, and who or what is the object of this trust? Why do these migrants, in contrast to the vast majority of interviewees, self-identify with their society of origin? Does transaction cost theory explain these academics' motives for migration? Is their temporary stay beneficial to the host society?     

Russia in the European Home? Convergence,Cosmopolitanism and Cosmism in Late Soviet Europeanisation

The aim is to present a conceptual and historical reconstruction of Gorbachev's notion of a ‘European home’, its underlying philosophy of history as well as its relation to Russian cosmism. The concept is contextualised within the convergence debate of the post-war period, in which a rapprochement between communism and capitalism was posited. The essay concludes with reflections on what the conceptualisation can tell us about the fall of communism and what impact the concept has had on today's search for a common European identity. An argument is advanced that the notion contained paradoxes that contributed to the dislocation of post-Soviet Russia from Europe.     

Watchdogs or attack dogs? The role of the Russian courts and the central election commission in the resolution of electoral disputes

Do Russian courts constrain the state? Or do they facilitate arbitrary state action by favouring state agents over other litigants where such bias is not built into the written laws? Are Russian elections fair? The answers to these questions would help us assess Russia's progress towards establishing the rule of law and a democratic regime. The evidence presented in this article suggests that in electoral registration cases where incumbent politicians have a stake, the Russian courts and the Central Election Commission (CEC) are responsive to pressure from them. More specifically, the systematic analysis of all denials of registration by a District Election Commission (DEC) associated with the 1999 parliamentary election suggests that the Russian judiciary was subject to pressure from the regional authorities. Regional oppositionists tended to seek redress at the CEC, rather than at the local courts. Protégés of the regional administration, on the other hand, preferred to take their appeal to the local courts. A further indicator of the weakness of rule of law in Russia is that previous experience with the legal system made a candidate less rather than more likely to pursue an appeal. At the same time, however, scathing journalistic accounts of judicial corruption, inefficiency, and total subservience to politicians seem to be exaggerated. In 1999, both the courts and the CEC were acceptable appeal venues, since opposition candidates used them to defend their electoral rights more often than all other groups of candidates.     

Russia's Post-Orange Revolution Strategies to Increase its Influence in Former Soviet Republics: Public Diplomacy po russkii

The role of public diplomacy in Russian foreign policy has grown in recent years. There are two distinctive strands of Russian public diplomacy: one directed mainly towards Western states, and one towards the former Soviet republics. Despite the rhetoric of mutual interests and high respect for state sovereignty, the post-Soviet strand of Russian public diplomacy has more in common with the Soviet practice of ‘active measures’ than with the soft power of attraction commonly connected with public diplomacy. Russia's current policy runs the risk of eating away the soft power potential that Russia still enjoys in many post-Soviet states.     

Explaining the 2014 Sino–Russian Gas Breakthrough: The Primacy of Domestic Politics

On 21 May 2014, during a state visit by President Vladimir Putin to Beijing, China and Russia signed a $400 billion, 30-year gas deal. Under this agreement, China will import 38 billion cubic metres of natural gas from Russia’s Gazprom, beginning in 2018. Why, after 15 years of stalemated negotiations, did this breakthrough occur in 2014? Why did a natural, symbiotic gas relationship not develop earlier and more gradually? Most studies explain this by looking at Russia’s international isolation post Ukraine. Based on interviews with both Chinese and Russian officials this article argues the following: domestic incentives, rather than foreign-policy pressures, are the real force behind the timing of Sino–Russian energy breakthroughs in 2014.