Russia and the Iraq War: was Putin's policy a failure?

Although Russian President Vladimir Putin has been faced with numerous crises since coming to office in 2000, most importantly the war in Chechnya, the Iraq War was the first major international crisis with which his administration was confronted. As in the case of Kosovo for Yeltsin, and the Gulf War for Gorbachev, the Russian President had to deal with conflicting domestic pressures and apparently still more conflicting Russian national and international interests. Indeed, one result of such a situation was a post-war accusation that Putin actually had no policy or at least no consistent policy with regard to the Iraq crisis [Golan, G., 1992. Gorbachev's difficult time in the Gulf. Political Science Quarterly 107 (2), 213–230]. One may remember similar accusations of Gorbachev's “zigzaging” in the Gulf War and claims that the Yeltsin government failed to forge a Kosovo policy altogether [Levitin, O., 2000. Inside Moscow's Kosovo muddle. Survival 42 (1), 130]. Yet, a certain pattern did appear to repeat itself in the Iraqi crisis, namely, pre-war efforts to prevent a military conflict from breaking out, then gradual escalation of rhetoric if not actual involvement, and finally gradual but relatively rapid retreat to conciliatory posture toward the United States (in all three crises). Moreover, Putin was indeed consistent throughout the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods in his opposition to the Americans' use of force against Iraq and in the need to remain within a United Nations framework. Actually, one might ask (and we shall below) why Putin did not abandon the first part of this policy, in order to maintain the second component, when it became certain that the U.S. was going to attack with or without UN Security Council approval.     

“Why not love our language and our culture?” National rights and citizenship in Khrushchev's Soviet Union

This paper highlights campaigns for national rights among two non-titular communities in the Soviet Union and places them in local historical contexts. Drawing on archival sources and oral history interviews, the author not only delves into the campaigns themselves, but also explores broader debates about the nature of Khrushchev's Thaw and Soviet citizenship, which was far from an empty concept in the Khrushchev era. Petitioners invoked discourses that indicate both an awareness of national rights and an expectation of the state's obligation to protect them. Oral history interviews with surviving petitioners and community members support the notion that petition language can serve as a reflection of how petitioners viewed their place in Soviet society and interpreted the Soviet citizen contract.     

Not Everything that Matters is Measurable and Not Everything that is Measurable Matters: How and Why Local Education Authorities ‘Fail’

Following the change of government in 1997, local education authorities were inspected for the first time and a number were deemed to be ‘failing’. This article takes a critical look at the criteria applied to ‘failing’ LEAs. In doing so, it considers a range of other factors that affect LEA performance but may not be adequately accounted for in the official criteria. This discussion illustrates that, in relation to the notion of ‘failing’ LEAs, not everything that matters is measurable, and not everything that is measurable matters.     

The core executive and small states: Is coordination the primary challenge?

This article interrogates three key arguments derived from the functional approach to studying the core executive: (1) that coordination is the primary problem that confronts executive decision‐makers; (2) that improved coordination will lead to better governance; and (3) that linkage problems dissipate as policy systems consolidate. Drawing on the experience of hitherto understudied small states, including 112 interviews with political elites, we show how the effects of country size create governance challenges in the form of leader dominance, patronage systems and capacity constraints. Our findings support the call to broaden the focus of functional analysis beyond its traditional emphasis on coordination. For scholars of small states we synthesize existing empirical findings and provide a theoretical justification for future work using an adaptation of the core executive approach.     

“Name the Republic that was joined to Russia in 2014:” Russia’s New Civics and History Test for Migrants

This article examines Russia’s civics and history test, which has been mandatory, since January 2015, for millions of labor migrants applying for a work permit. An analysis of the test’s content and of the context in which it was adopted provides a strong case to study how autocracies can use civics tests as instruments of control. Specifically, I argue that the test must be understood in light of Russia’s state-sponsored nationalism, latent xenophobic sentiments, and its increasingly restrictive and incoherent migration policy. Not only are many questions irrelevant or disconnected from migrants’ everyday concerns: their personal experiences of paying bribes, obtaining fake certificates, or being harassed by the police often contradict the correct answers on the exam. While it is doubtful that this test – along with several other new requirements imposed on migrants – will dissuade foreign laborers to seek employment in Russia, it is bound to make them even more vulnerable to bribes.     

The EU,the United States and Partnership in Development Cooperation: Bridging the Gap?

This paper investigates the degree to which EU and United States development policies reflect partnership, meaning that aid is based on negotiations on an equal basis. It finds that, while the EU has traditionally been more focused on partnership than the United States, in recent years the gap is narrowing. The EU is increasingly providing aid based on a security rationale and has become reluctant to give budget support, while the United States is starting to work more with local actors. Changes in public support for aid, the EU’s growing role as a security provider and institutional changes can explain this trend.     

Why aren't countries rich?: Weak states and bad neighbourhoods

This article challenges a common viewpoint that the policy choices made by state leaders are central to explanations of economic growth. It argues that there are two possible flaws in this viewpoint. First, that state leaders have a free choice in policy decisions; second, that it is policies that in large part determine growth rates. Using a set of variables designed to capture the weakness of the policy autonomy of the state and possible non‐policy influences on growth rates, the article concludes that initial conditions are a better determinant of wealth and growth than free policy choice.     

The Globalization of Nationalism and the Future of the Nation?CState

The state is a specific form of government, distinguished from others by its impersonal character and the recognition on the part of the office holders that they represent the will of the people. This form of government is an implication of nationalism. Thus, every state is a nation?Cstate. Since nationalism is the cultural framework of modernity in all its expressions, every state is also a modern state. The future of the nation?Cstate depends on the future of nationalism. The recent globalization of nationalism into the formidable civilizations of South-East Asia has opened a new era for the latter. Therefore, the future of the nation?Cstate at present looks brighter than ever.     

The Benefits of Globalization: Why More for South Korea than Mexico?

ABSTRACT

This article examines the arguments for globalization and analyzes Mexico’s “maquiladora experience,” which indicates that globalization alone does not bring about a higher standard of living. The primary reason that Mexico has not benefitted as much as might be expected from globalization has to do with the poor quality of its governance, referring especially to public administration. This assertion is supported by a comparison of Mexico and South Korea. In explaining South Korea’s greater success, Political Elasticity (PE) theory is introduced, suggesting that political power needs to become elastic in two meanings of this word: a “rubber band” meaning (referring to the ability of leaders to delegate power without losing or diminishing it) and “a balloon meaning” (having to do with the ability of leaders to reliably influence the behavior of the general public). Based upon studies of rural and industrial development, South Korea is shown to be more politically elastic than Mexico. This article concludes by examining the lessons that Mexico can learn from Korea’s experience.     

Marketization reforms and co-production: Does ownership of service delivery structures and customer language matter?

In public services that are tax funded, public goods are sometimes marketized by being delivered using private companies instead of public organizations. In addition, marketization reforms can entail service users being described as customers for the service rather than as citizens. We assess the effects of these aspects of marketization reforms on users' willingness to co-produce public services. First, service delivery using private companies risks reducing users' willingness to co-produce because firms cannot commit ex ante to not appropriate donated labour for private gain. Second, using customer-oriented language risks reductions by priming individualistic market norms that lower prosocial motivation compared to citizen-oriented language priming citizenship duty. Using three survey experiments in the United States, we find that delivery structures are not neutral. Private firms delivering local public services reduce users' willingness to co-produce, although similar effects are not evident from primimg customer rather than citizenship thinking.     

The extraterritorial dimensions of biofuel policies and the politics of scale: live and let die?

Despite criticism, global biofuel production continues to rise, using primarily food crops. Between 2001 and 2012 it increased nearly six-fold, driven primarily by domestic policies, yet raising strong international concerns, eg over impacts on global food prices. Nevertheless, little international biofuel governance has emerged. This article examines the various extraterritorial dimensions of domestic biofuel policies and investigates why international biofuel governance has remained vague, despite its controversial nature. It uses the politics of scale to analyse why countries may wish to frame it as a global or domestic issue. Three extraterritorial dimensions are identified: global environmental impacts, global socioeconomic impacts, and attempts at extraterritorial control over biofuel production abroad. While major producers have successfully avoided liability for impacts by preventing the scaling up of much biofuel governance to the international level, major importers have tried to fill perceived governance gaps using policies aimed at extraterritorial control. We show that both the rise of nationally oriented development policies with extraterritorial impacts and of unilateral sustainability rule making primarily affect weaker countries, making global inequalities more pronounced. It is essential that adaptation governance take into account both environmental and global socioeconomic changes, such as higher agricultural commodity prices.     

Corporatized Public Land Development Bodies in Australia: Who Are the Stakeholders and Why Are They Important?

This study examines post-corporatization activities of public sector organizations, which are expected to act according to commercial principles, but, at times, are also asked to undertake projects that are not profitable: community service obligations (CSOs). Managers of government-owned corporatized entities in land development are interviewed, and a focus group at a state Treasury department conducted. We determine, when undertaking CSOs, who are the stakeholders, as perceived by management, and why they are considered important. The stakeholders are government, community, treasury (as separate from government) and the relevant private sector. Values, in addition to power, urgency and legitimacy, influence stakeholder prioritization.     

East Africa's pastoralist emergency: is climate change the straw that breaks the camel's back?

The global warming trend of climate change is having severe adverse effects on the livelihoods of the Turkana pastoralists of northwestern Kenya. Care has to be taken in making assertions about the impact of climate change. The biggest effects may come not from lower average rainfall but from a widening of the standard deviation as weather extremes become more frequent. In a region already prone to drought, disease and conflict, climate change, access to modern weapons and new viral livestock diseases are now overwhelming pastoralists' coping capacity and deepening the region's roughly 30-year dependency on famine relief. This article examines the livelihood strategies of the Turkana and several poverty reduction programmes currently established, while addressing the reality that traditional pastoralism may no longer be a viable livelihood option, given the effects of climate change, disease and the ensuing conflict over diminishing resources. The findings conclude that the future for traditional Turkana pastoralists is dismal because they continue to depend on an environment that may no longer support them. Humanitarians are recommended to shift their focus to advocate and invest in alternative livelihood strategies that generate economic independence and help the Turkana adapt to their changing environment.     

Why is the “KGB Bar” possible? Binary morality and its consequences

This article asks why a popular bar named after a criminal Soviet secret police organization has not provoked the outrage of the developed world's intellectual and artistic elites, who would surely condemn an SS Bar. It attributes this moral blindness to the Holocaust's centrality in Israeli, German, and American national discourse and the resultant binary morality that ascribes collective innocence to all Jews at all times and in all places and collective guilt to all Germans – and potentially to all non-Jews – at all times and in all places. The moral logic of the Holocaust thus transforms Jews into victims and non-Jews into victimizers; the moral logic and reality of the Gulag transform everybody into both victim and victimizer. The binary morality of the Holocaust insists that all human beings be heroes; the fuzzy morality of the Gulag recognizes that all humans are just humans constantly confronted by moral ambiguity. But because the Gulag's moral ambiguity concerns non-Jews and Jews, the Gulag undercuts binary morality. The Holocaust and the Gulag are not just incompatible moral tales; they are incompatible and intersecting moral tales. As a result, they cannot co-exist. We therefore fail to respond to the KGB Bar because to recognize the Gulag as a mass murder worthy of categorical moral condemnation would be to challenge the sacred status of the Holocaust. Ironically, the KGB Bar is possible precisely because an SS Bar is impossible.     

Globalising Russia? The neoliberal/ nationalist two-step and the Russification of the West

This paper argues that the major ideological dynamic of the post-cold war era is the conflictive complicity of neoliberalism and various authoritarian and racist nationalisms. This is nowhere more apparent than in post-Soviet Russia. Indeed, far from being 'exceptional', contemporary Russia actually provides an exemplary instance of where the neoliberal road to the market is really taking a great number of countries - in the first instance, the debt-ridden countries of the so-called 'Third World'. But perhaps the lessons of Russia's experience extend somewhat further. Might it not be the case that, in an epoch in which IMF-style 'structural adjustment' policies are extended to all and sundry, those pathologies which at first seemed the exclusive preserve of 'backward nations', are coming increasingly to install themselves in the very heartlands of the 'West'? If this describes an important aspect of the historical process today, it is a process that has an additional, often neglected, negative condition of possibility: the more-or-less comprehensive defeat of the Left world-wide: the defeat, in other words, of progressive anti-capitalist models of modernisation and development. Any viable challenge to neoliberal globalisation and racist nationalism will therefore depend, to begin with, on an accurate diagnosis of that defeat. Here the case of Russia is once again significant, above all for what Russian history dramatises, especially over the past decade, about the 'subjective factor' in political and social change. My exploration of these issues is pursued here with reference to the recent impressive account of globalisation advanced by Russian political scientist Boris Kagarlitsky. However, the mismatch in Russia between the huge scale of the recent social catastrophe and the small size of the popular protest points to what Kagarlitsky's account misses. To begin to advance an alternative to the neoliberal/nationalist two-step, to disarticulate a progressive response to neoliberal globalisation from racist nationalist responses, it will be necessary to develop a more careful relationship to another two-step, that of Marxism/'postmodern identity politics'. We can make a start in this respect by foregrounding the psychoanalytic dimension of fantasy.