Problems,politics, and policy streams in policy implementation

We apply Kingdon's multiple streams framework (MSF) to policy implementation to reflect a nested process separate from but interdependent with policymaking. Then, we generate a hypothesis concerning the conditional nature of problems, policies, and politics stream impacts on policy implementation. We test our hypotheses with state‐level implementation of the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, using a pooled data set of 10 years of toxic releases data. Findings suggest an important interaction occurs among problems, policies, and politics during the policy implementation process. More specifically, when any of the three is held at median levels, only marginal differences in outputs occur; however, when all three are increased to extreme levels, substantive differences emerge. Conclusions connect policy implementation to larger issues of MSF theoretical development and suggest implications for governance.     

Interests,passions and politics: business associations and the sovereignty dispute in Turkey

This paper examines business associations in a context where the state is being contested from below, focusing on Diyarbak?r, a major Kurdish city in Turkey. Against the backdrop of armed conflict, reform processes triggered by the country’s EU candidacy and socio-economic change, Diyarbak?r has become a contested zone over which the Turkish government and the Kurdish movement have been competing for control. Local business associations have also been implicated in such contestation. Considering the situation of dual power and moral economy at the local level, the paper examines how these associations deal with an adverse situation that is characterized by political instability and uncertainty. The analysis shows that business leaders have been able to make the ‘best’ of the situation.     

Estimates and public policy: The politics of numbers

Abstract

Estimates of the number of homeless persons in the United States are frequently said to range from 250,000 to three million. In fact, the latter number is an invalid guesstimate that developed staying power for political reasons. National estimates of homeless persons based on explainable methodologies actually range from 230,000 to 736,000, with the most likely estimates around the half‐million mark. Despite the confrontational politics surrounding the numbers issue in the 1980s, a consensus is developing in the 1990s among private groups, including some major advocacy organizations, and all levels of government regarding policy direction in assistance programs for the homeless. There is widespread recognition that the goal should be to end homelessness, not simply to provide emergency assistance. Permanent housing solutions for special populations are needed in the context of renewed efforts to combat poverty.

In the public debate about the policy implications of divergent national estimates of the numbers of homeless persons, a common assumption is that the estimates vary widely and inexplicably—anywhere from a few hundred thousand to three million or more. Those who do try to explain the odd discrepancy between the extremes seem to assume that any count is politically motivated. They say that it depends on how one defines homelessness and who is counting. In other words, the implication is that numbers derive from policy and politics, rather than the other way around.

Given such perceptions, it is not surprising that some who have neither the time nor, perhaps, the resources to judge the accuracy of estimates begin to feel that the truth must be somewhere in between, as if a mathematical average were equivalent to a political compromise. Others will believe the message if they like the messenger. In a recent book on homelessness, for example, the author confesses that he trusts estimates “made by people who live where ‘the rubber meets the road’… rather more than the bright theorists tucked away in ivory towers.”¹ Although many statistics are politically controversial, it is probably safe to say that the debate on homelessness during the past decade represents the apogee of political numerology. It is worth reviewing just how this came to pass.     

Transnational policy influence and the politics of legitimation

Many domains of transnational policy are now governed through dynamic, multilevel governance processes, encompassing transnational, national, and subnational scales. In such settings, both membership of policy communities and distributions of authority within them become more fluid and openly contested—increasing the importance of the politics of legitimation as a basis for distributing influence over policy processes and outcomes. Drawing on insights from theories of organizational and institutional legitimation, this article theorizes three distinctive strategies of policy influence exercised by transnational actors in multilevel governance settings, through which strategic efforts to legitimize transnational actors and forums are deployed as means of transnational policy influence. The three strategies involve: transnational field building, localized network building, and role adaptation. The effects of these influencing strategies on policy processes and outcomes are illustrated with reference to the case of Indonesian land governance, in which highly dynamic, contested, and multiscalar governance processes lend our theorized strategies particular salience.     

The disentanglement of interest politics: Business associability,the parties and policy in Italy and Greece

Abstract. The article explores changes in the politics of business associability in Italy and Greece, focusing in particular on a set of comparable domestic and European developments that have played the roles of stimuli for the slow but unmistakable transformation of interest politics. Against a background of intense politicization, changes that are taking place since the 1980s suggest that organized interests become disentangled from the linkages which sustained party colonization and state dominance. Changes in interest politics were facilitated by the transition to a majoritarian system (in Italy) and party alternation (in Greece). The disentanglement we refer to would be difficult under conditions of sharing–out government; conversely, alternating governments facilitate changes in the relationships between interests, parties and policy–making. Apart from the domestic sources of change, the article argues that shifts in interest politics are the combined outcome of wider challenges and of the impact of Europeanization. On the basis of this analysis, we speculate that the disentanglement of interest politics may be conducive to national policy adjustment in two possible scenarios. Either by enabling intersectoral agreements over policy issues or by freeing national policymaking from the burden of oligopolistic coalitions — a social democratic and a neoliberal scenario respectively.     

Political culture, alternative politics and foreign policy: The case of Israel

This article analyzes how sociopolitical dynamics within a state can help explaining foreign policy. We show that under certain conditions, the public can be involved in ways that extend beyond expressing opinions that act as constraints on policy makers, and also takes active initiatives that eventually shape foreign policies. The article explains how sociopolitical processes in Israeli society, which transformed the nature of citizen–politician relations from a top-down to a bottom-up orientation, gradually led to shifts in foreign policy regarding the conflict with the Palestinians. The Israeli public has adopted an approach to solving social problems by unilateral initiatives, as part of its attempts to shape foreign policy from the bottom up, due to continuous government failure to provide public services, combined with blocked influence channels. As long as Israeli politicians ignored these changes, they failed to mobilize support for policies imposed from the top down and lost their positions of power.     

The weakness of strong policies and the strength of weak policies: Law,experimentalist governance,and supporting coalitions in European Union health care policy

The experience of European Union (EU) health care services policy shows the importance of supporting coalitions in any effort to effect policy change and the extent to which the presence or absence of such coalitions can qualify generalizations about policymaking. EU health care services law is substantively liberalizing and procedurally driven by the courts, with little legislative input. But the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been much better at establishing an EU competency in law than in causing policy development in the EU or member states. Literature on courts helps to explain why: courts are most effective when they enjoy supporting coalitions and the ECJ does not have a significant supporting coalition for its liberalizing health care services policy. Based on interview data, this article argues that the hard law of health care services deregulation and the newer forms of health care governance, such as the Open Method of Coordination and the networks on rare diseases, depend on supporting coalitions in member states that are willing to litigate, lobby, budget, decide cases, and otherwise implement EU law and policy. Given the resistance that the Court has met in health care sectors, its overarching deregulatory approach might produce smaller effects than expected, and forms of experimentalist governance that are easy to deride might turn out to have supporting coalitions that make them unexpectedly effective.     

Symposium comment: On the new politics of public policy

The process is not the problem, the problem is the problem. Rudolph Penner (1984). …We argue the superiority of the outcome from the process, not of the process from the outcome. The constancy of the economist's objection to this conclusion when applied to governmental rather than market decisions simply often reflects the fact that, while some economists are not disturbed that consumer preferences lead to allocation policies other than best respond to their own tastes, when political preferences lead to governmental policies not consistent with his informed and considered preferences, they are tempted to attribute irrationality to government.     

Between knowledge and politics: Three faces of policy analysis

Various conceptual schemes have been employed to make sense of the diverse policy literature. Attempting to understand policy analysis in terms of its political and historical significance, this essay points to three distinct faces, distinguished with regard to differing relationships between knowledge and politcs: one where knowledge purports to replace politics, one where politics masquerades as knowledge, and one where knowledge and politics attain a measure of reconciliation. Historically, these three faces may be viewed, to an extent, as periods in the development of policy analysis: from positivism, to its critique, to present post-positivist efforts.     

Asia's rise and the politics of Australian aid policy

Abstract The economic rise of developing Asia has given impetus to debates over the geographic orientation, strategy, organisation, and collaborative relationships of the Australian aid programme. This paper examines these debates, Australian government responses, and the politics underlying these responses. It points to, among things, the different ways in which the Labor Party and the Liberal–National Coalition have dealt with these issues, reflecting their different constituencies and foreign policy philosophies. The paper also assesses the future trajectory of Australian aid policy, in particular, the extent to which it is embracing the Chinese model of aid.     

Foreign aid and the politics of participation in economic policy reform

Research suggests that borrower ‘ownership’ of reforms is highly correlated with the success of reforms in developing countries. One of the most important components of ownership is the nature of public–private relations and consultation with interest groups. Yet participatory reform must overcome several political dilemmas, including problems of credibility, collective action, and distributive (in)justice. The characteristics of reforms also affect the possibilities for participation. Democratic governments interested in making policy reform more participatory and presumably more sustainable can draw on several strategies, including the selective use of incentives and compensation, public education and communications, capacity building in society, institutional mechanisms for consultation, and political sequencing of reforms. These strategies have implications for the foreign aid agencies who often fund reforms. They suggest that donors need to recognize the political rationality behind cross‐payments and spending to maintain important constituencies; that political sustainability may require reform sequences that are out of step with current orthodoxy; that policies ought to create winners before creating losers; that democratic consultation will require much more time in achieving consensus; and that outside actors need to refrain from intervening too directly in the political process by throwing their support behind particular interests. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The paradox of politics and policy in redistributing income

With political ideology with respect to the income distribution measured by proxy as the fraction of conservative coalition victories, it is found that over the period 1961–1984 the degree of conservative coalition strength is positively associated with changes in inequality, holding the effects of unemployment and inflation constant.A natural question is why don't the low income types vote in candidates who will consistently redistribute income in their favor? The result of such a political process would be a downward trend in income inequality. In point of fact, there is no evidence whatsoever of any trend in income equality over the period. The answer to both questions may be that Tullock (1983, 1986) is on to something. If the middle class voters transfer gains back and forth, the poor can't gain and they don't, then the distribution should be stable and is.