THE MISSING LINK IN GENERAL DETERRENCE RESEARCH*

Research on the deterrent effects of punishment falls into two categories: macro‐level studies of the impact of aggregate punishment levels on crime rates, and individual‐level studies of the impact of perceived punishment levels on self‐reported criminal behavior. For policy purposes, however, the missing link—ignored in previous research—is that between aggregate punishment levels and individual perceptions of punishment. This paper addresses whether higher actual punishment levels increase the perceived certainty, severity, or swiftness of punishment. Telephone interviews with 1,500 residents of fifty‐four large urban counties were used to measure perceptions of punishment levels, which were then linked to actual punishment levels as measured in official statistics. Hierarchical linear model estimates of multivariate models generally found no detectable impact of actual punishment levels on perceptions of punishment. The findings raise serious questions about deterrence‐based rationales for more punitive crime control policies.     

HEURISTICS AND BIASES,RATIONAL CHOICE,AND SANCTION PERCEPTIONS*

The relevance of several cognitive heuristics and related biases for rational choice perspectives on crime, and for perceptions of sanction risk, were investigated. We present findings from a series of randomized experiments, embedded in two nationwide surveys of American adults (18 and older) in 2015 (N = 1,004 and 623). The results reveal that offender estimates of detection risk are less probabilistically precise and more situationally variable than under prevailing criminological perspectives, most notably, rational choice and Bayesian learning theories. This, in turn, allows various decision‐making heuristics—such as anchoring and availability—to influence and potentially bias the perceptual updating process.     

DETERRENCE,CRIMINAL OPPORTUNITIES,AND POLICE

In this article, we join three distinct literatures on crime control—the deterrence literature, the policing literature as it relates to crime control, and the environmental and opportunity perspectives literature. Based on empirical findings and theory from these literatures, we pose a mathematical model of the distribution of criminal opportunities and offender decision making on which of those opportunities to victimize. Criminal opportunities are characterized in terms of the risk of apprehension that attends their victimization. In developing this model, our primary focus is on how police might affect the distribution of criminal opportunities that are attractive to would‐be offenders. The theoretical model we pose, however, is generalizable to explain how changes in other relevant target characteristics, such as potential gain, could affect target attractiveness. We demonstrate that the model has important implications for the efficiency and effectiveness of police deployment strategies such as hot spots policing, random patrol, and problem‐oriented policing. The theoretical structure also makes clear why the clearance rate is a fundamentally flawed metric of police performance. Future research directions suggested by the theoretical model are discussed.     

ON AMBIGUITY IN PERCEPTIONS OF RISK:IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL DECISION MAKING AND DETERRENCE*

Deterrence theorists and researchers have argued that the critical dimension of sanction certainty is its level—increasing the certainty of punishment from a lower to a higher level will inhibit criminal conduct. However, the true certainty of punishment is rarely known with much precision. Both Sherman (1990) and Nagin (1998) have suggested that ambiguity about the level of punishment certainty is itself consequential in the decision to commit or refrain from crime. Here, we investigate this proposition. We find some evidence that individuals are “ambiguity averse” for decisions involving losses such as criminal punishments. This finding means that a more ambiguous perceived certainty of punishment is a greater deterrent of some crimes than a nominally equivalent but less ambiguous one. However, this effect depends on how large an individual's risk certainty perception is initially. That is, we find evidence for “boundary effects” (Casey and Scholz, 1991a, 1991b) in which this effect holds for lower probabilities but reverses for higher ones. For higher detection probabilities, individuals become “ambiguity seeking” such that a less ambiguous detection probability has more deterrent value than a nominally equivalent but more ambiguous detection probability. Results are presented from two distinct, but complementary, analysis samples and empirical approaches. These samples include a survey to college students with several hypothetical choice problems and data from the Pathways to Desistance study, a longitudinal investigation of serious adolescent offenders transitioning from adolescence to young adulthood.     

Bounded rationality of identity thieves: Using offender‐based research to inform policy*

Research Summary Data for this study were collected in semistructured interviews with 59 individuals serving time in federal prisons for identity theft. We explore how offenders' experiences and life circumstances affected their subjective assessments of risks and rewards and thus facilitated the decision to engage in identity theft. Our findings suggest that offenders perceive identity theft as an easy, rewarding, and relatively risk‐free way to fund their chosen lifestyles. Policy Implications The findings suggest that several situational crime‐prevention measures may be effective at curbing identity theft. Crime‐prevention programs that are geared toward removing excuses and advertising consequences may be effective in deterring potential offenders. We also recommend that rehabilitation programs for convicted identity thieves be cognitive‐based interventions aimed at changing the way offenders think about their crimes.     

TESTING A BAYESIAN LEARNING THEORY OF DETERRENCE AMONG SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS*

The effect of criminal experience on risk perceptions is of central importance to deterrence theory but has been vastly understudied. This article develops a realistic Bayesian learning model of how individuals will update their risk perceptions over time in response to the signals they receive during their offending experiences. This model implies a simple function that we estimate to determine the deterrent effect of an arrest. We find that an individual who commits one crime and is arrested will increase his or her perceived probability of being caught by 6.3 percent compared with if he or she had not been arrested. We also find evidence that the more informative the signal received by an individual is, the more he or she will respond to it, which is consistent with more experienced offenders responding less to an arrest than less experienced offenders do. Parsing our results out by type of crime indicates that an individual who is arrested for an aggressive crime will increase both his or her aggressive crime risk perception as well as his or her income‐generating crime risk perception, although the magnitude of the former may be slightly larger. This implies that risk perception updating, and thus potentially deterrence, may be partially, although not completely, crime specific.     

DETERRENCE AND MORAL PERSUASION EFFECTS ON CORPORATE TAX COMPLIANCE: FINDINGS FROM A RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIAL*

Previous studies on tax compliance have focused primarily on the tax‐reporting behavior of individuals. This study reports results from a randomized field test of the effects of deterrence and moral persuasion on the tax‐reporting behavior of 4,395 corporations in Israel. Two experimental groups received tax letters, one conveying a deterrent message and the other a moral persuasion message. Three types of measures are used to evaluate compliance based on the magnitude of the difference‐in‐differences of means in 1) gross sales values reported to the authority, 2) tax dollars paid to the authority, and 3) tax deductions. Overall, both deterrence and moral persuasion approaches do not produce statistically significant greater compliance compared with control conditions. These results do not support the ability of a policy of sending tax letters to increase substantively the reporting of true tax liability or tax payments by corporations. However, these results also show that moral persuasion can be counterproductive: Corporations in this experimental group show an increase rather than a decrease in tax deductions, which translates into loss of state revenues. The implications for theory, research, and tax policy are discussed.     

SELF-CONTROL, CRIMINAL MOTIVATION AND DETERRENCE: AN INVESTIGATION USING RUSSIAN RESPONDENTS

With data from respondents in Nizhni Novgorod, Russia, we address the generality of self-control theory. We also assess two hypotheses. The first focuses on the attractiveness of criminal acts, that is, motivation toward crime. The second concerns the contention that the mediating link between self-control and criminal conduct is the failure of those with less self-control to anticipate the long-term costs of misbehavior. Although the magnitude of associations between self-control and indicators of criminal behavior is about the same in this study as it is in others, which suggests that the theory is not culturally bound, those associations are largely overshadowed by criminal attraction. Consistent with that, failure to anticipate costly long-term consequences does not appear to be the mediating link between self-control and criminal behavior: the evidence shows no tendency for sanction fear to be greater among those with greater self-control. In fact, sanction fear is modestly and significantly related to the crime measures independent of self-control, though sanction fear also appears to be influenced by criminal attraction. The results suggest that in the production of criminal behavior, motivation may be more important than controls inhibiting criminal impulses.     

THE IMPACT OF BRITISH COUNTERTERRORIST STRATEGIES ON POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND: COMPARING DETERRENCE AND BACKLASH MODELS*

Since philosophers Beccaria and Bentham, criminologists have been concerned with predicting how governmental attempts to maintain lawful behavior affect subsequent rates of criminal violence. In this article, we build on prior research to argue that governmental responses to a specific form of criminal violence—terrorism—may produce both a positive deterrence effect (i.e., reducing future incidence of prohibited behavior) and a negative backlash effect (i.e., increasing future incidence of prohibited behavior). Deterrence‐based models have long dominated both criminal justice and counterterrorist policies on responding to violence. The models maintain that an individual's prohibited behavior can be altered by the threat and imposition of punishment. Backlash models are more theoretically scattered but receive mixed support from several sources, which include research on counterterrorism; the criminology literature on labeling, legitimacy, and defiance; and the psychological literature on social power and decision making. In this article, we identify six major British strategies aimed at reducing political violence in Northern Ireland from 1969 to 1992 and then use a Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the impact of these interventions on the risk of new attacks. In general, we find the strongest support for backlash models. The only support for deterrence models was a military surge called Operation Motorman, which was followed by significant declines in the risk of new attacks. The results underscore the importance of considering the possibility that antiterrorist interventions might both increase and decrease subsequent violence.     

TOWARD A BIFURCATED THEORY OF EMOTIONAL DETERRENCE

Since Hobbes (1957 [1651] and Beccaria (1963 [1764]), scholars have theorized that the emotion of fear is critical for deterrence. Nevertheless, contemporary deterrence researchers have mostly overlooked the distinction between perceived sanction risk and fear of apprehension. Whereas perceived risk is a cognitive judgment, fear involves visceral feelings of anxiety or dread. Equally important, a theory explicating the influence of deterrence on both criminal propensity and situational offending has remained elusive. We develop a theoretical model in which perceived risk and fear are distinguished at both the general and situational levels. We test this theoretical model with data from a set of survey‐based experiments conducted in 2016 with a nationwide sample of adults (N = 965). We find that perceived risk and fear are empirically distinct and that perceived risk is positively related to fear at both the general and situational levels. Certain background and situational factors have indirect effects through perceived risk on fear. In turn, perceived risk has indirect effects through fear on both criminal propensity and situational intentions to offend. Fear's inclusion increases explanatory power for both criminal propensity and situational offending intentions. Fear is a stronger predictor than either self‐control or prior offending of situational intentions to offend.     

DEMOGRAPHY,POLICE BEHAVIOR,AND DETERRENCE *

This paper presents a model of police response to changes in crime frequencies and a criminal response model characterizing the deterrent effects of police arrest behavior. These models are estimated for data taken from police department records in the city of St. Louis. The underlying theoretical conception is that arrests constitute communication to criminals in general in addition to the specific deterrence achieved through the arrest it see Disaggregation in both space and time enables identification of the statistical models through measurement rather than through statistical manipulation. The models are estimated for burglaries under varying demographic conditions and using data organized through aggregation in time (by weeks) and space (by census tracts). Under some demographic conditions, both police response and deterrent effects on criminal behavior are enhanced. Under other demographic conditions, these effects are suppressed. Enhancements and attenuations arising from specific demographic conditions for both the police response and criminal response models have a similar pattern, consistent with the underlying communication hypothesis.     

PERCEPTUAL DETERRENCE AND DRINKING AND DRIVING AMONG COLLEGE STUDENTS*

This research examines the effect of perceived legal risks on drinking and driving. Data are from college students who were surveyed three times. Self-reports of recent drinking and driving at Time 3 are regressed on Time 1 and Time 2 measures of perceived risk of punishment. Prior moral evaluations, past drinking and driving, and previous legal intervention for drinking and driving are controlled. Perceptions of risk of arrest and severity of punishment are not related to subsequent drinking and driving, but moral tolerance, prior drinking and driving, and previous legal intervention all predict subsequent drinking and driving.     

Modeling Change in Perceptions about Sanction Threats: The Neglected Linkage in Deterrence Theory

Deterrence theory describes a process of offender decision making that consists of two linkages—one in which official sanctions and other information affect a would-be offenders perceptions about the risks of criminal conduct, and another in which such perceptions influence the decision whether or not to offend. Decades worth of empirical research has concentrated virtually exclusively on this latter linkage, and in so doing, has produced an incomplete account of the deterrence process. This article develops a model of how perceptions of sanction certainty are modified in response to an individuals involvement in criminal activity and the consequences (if any) therefrom. Implications of the model are tested with data from a multi-wave, panel survey of 1,530 high school students from the southeastern U.S. Key findings include: the manner in which new information affects perceived certainty depends on the level of perceived certainty before the new information is received, and the extent of peer offending was one of the most influential factors in determining change in perceived sanction certainty over time.     

CAN RATIONAL CHOICE BE CONSIDERED A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME? EVIDENCE FROM INDIVIDUAL‐LEVEL PANEL DATA

In the last few decades, rational choice theory has emerged as a bedrock theory in the fields of economics, sociology, psychology, and political science. Although rational choice theory has been available to criminologists for many years now, the field has not embraced it as other disciplines have. Moreover, rational choice scholars have fueled this skepticism of the theory's generality by modeling offender decision making that is one‐sided—large on the costs of crime (sanction threats), short on the benefits of crime. In this article, we directly assess the generality of rational choice theory by examining a fully specified model in a population that is often presumed to be less rational—adolescents from lower socioeconomic families who commit both instrumental (property) and expressive crimes (violence/drugs). By using a panel of N = 1,354 individuals, we find that offending behavior is consistent with rational responses to changes in the perceived costs and benefits of crime even after eliminating fixed unobserved heterogeneity and other time‐varying confounders, and these results are robust across different subgroups. The findings support our argument that rational choice theory is a general theory of crime.     

INCENTIVES FOR COLLECTIVE DEVIANCE: GROUP SIZE AND CHANGES IN PERCEIVED RISK,COST, AND REWARD*

Research has demonstrated that the presence of others shifts decision‐making about risky/deviant behavior. One reason for this shift could be changes in the anticipated experience of formal sanctions, informal costs, and rewards. To investigate this possibility, this study conducted two randomized controlled trials with hypothetical vignettes, in which a range of how many other people were also involved in the criminal act defined the treatment conditions. Across two samples of university students (Ns = 396 and 263), the results revealed that as the size of the involved group increased, the anticipated experience of sanction risk and several informal social costs associated with engaging in the act decreased, and the anticipated experience of two rewards increased. Additional analyses suggest that, with one exception in each data set, these changes are not only tied to the solo/group distinction.     

CRACK DEALERS AND RESTRICTIVE DETERRENCE: IDENTIFYING NARCS*

Data drawn from semistructured interviews with 40 active street-level crack dealers are used to illustrate, apply, and expand the concept of restrictive deterrence. The article focuses on the perceptual shorthand dealers use to determine whether buyers in question are “narcs.” In presenting this shorthand, the article seeks to demonstrate how interactions among marketplace democratization (i.e., the idea of selling to as many different customers as possible to maximize profits), marketplace volatility, transactional brevity, and threats from law enforcement affect its complexity and refinement. Respondents operated out of a medium-sized, midwestern metropolitan area (population: 2.2 million) within a central city of 390,000.     

POLICE SUSPICION AND DISCRETIONARY DECISION MAKING DURING CITIZEN STOPS*

This study examines the influence of racial, demographic and situational variables on types of police suspicion and the ancillary decision to stop and question suspects. Data were drawn from an observational study of police decision making in Savannah, Georgia. Based on the literature, we hypothesized that minority suspects will be more likely to be viewed suspiciously by the police for nonbehavioral reasons. We also hypothesize that minority status will play a significant role in the decision to stop and question suspicious persons. The findings from this study provide partial support for these hypotheses. The results indicate that minority status does influence an officer's decision to form nonbehavioral as opposed to behavioral suspicion, but that minority status does not influence the decision to stop and question suspects. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding race and its role in police decision making.     

THE ROLE OF RACE AND ETHNICITY IN PAROLE DECISIONS*

The parole board plays an integral part in the reentry of offenders into the community from prison in most states; yet, little is known about the decision‐making practices of this group. In particular, few studies have used quantitative data to examine parole among a large group of offenders, and less is known about the direct and joint effects of race and ethnicity on this decision point. We extend previous work by considering variation in parole timing among a sample of young, serious offenders incarcerated in one state. Results from a series of proportional hazard models reveal substantial variation in parole timing. Consistent with the existing theoretical research on parole, parole actors are most concerned with community protection and heavily weigh measures of the current offense, institutional behavior, and the official parole guidelines score. The direct effects of race and ethnicity were also revealed. Black offenders spent a longer time in prison awaiting parole compared with white offenders, and the racial and ethnic differences are maintained net of legal and individual demographic and community characteristics. These findings provide important insight into the parole process and augment the existing theoretical work on disparities in decision making.