Analyzing Complex Negotiations

Complex negotiations have been conducted for a long time, although until somewhat recently analysts had yet to conceptualize their fundamental nature, their essential elements, and the relationship between these elements. Over the past forty years, however, scholars have gained increasing understanding of the forces that shape negotiation complexity. In this article, I first review literature that has explored complex negotiations, which is found primarily in negotiation studies, and studies of international negotiation. I then develop a five‐part theoretical framework for analyzing complex negotiations: (1) identification of negotiation architecture, (2) context analysis, (3) process analysis, (4) structural and relational analysis, and (5) decisional analysis. I then demonstrate the utility of this five‐part framework by examining the U.S.–Australia Free Trade negotiations that produced the Australia–U.S. Free Trade Agreement of 2005. Finally, the article closes with some observations on complex negotiations and their analysis.     

Buyer and Seller Differences in Business‐to‐Business Negotiations

The purpose of this article is twofold: first, to examine the differences between buyers' and sellers' use of negotiation tactics in face‐to‐face business‐to‐business (B2B) negotiations and second, to explore how negotiators' professed negotiation styles influence buyers' and sellers' use of tactics. The methodology is a multiple case study analysis of eighteen negotiators representing twelve companies in six real‐life buyer–seller negotiations in B2B settings analyzed using qualitative research methods, including both comparative analysis and frequency analysis. We found some difference between buyers' and sellers' use of negotiation tactics, which suggests this question deserves further empirical study. Buyers' and sellers' use of specific tactics differs according to which overall strategy the negotiators chose, and sellers generally use a greater number of negotiation tactics than buyers. The findings challenge previous findings that suggest that B2B negotiations are collaborative and that negotiators communicate in a collaborative manner. The findings also increase our understanding of buyers' and sellers' variable use of tactics in the course of everyday practice as well as the interplay between negotiation tactics and strategies.     

Beyond Offers and Counteroffers: The Impact of Interaction Time and Negotiator Job Satisfaction on Subjective Outcomes in Negotiation

In this study, we examined real‐world sales negotiations by collecting data in collaboration with a large Taiwanese eyeglasses company. We found, as has been established previously, that higher first offers predict higher company profits and that the impact of high opening offers can be muted by greater customer awareness of prices at other stores. When we investigated a more qualitative outcome, customers’ perceptions of service quality, a different set of predictors emerged. Our results indicate that salespeople who spent more time introducing the products and services were perceived by the customers as providing higher service quality, but this effect only occurred for those salespeople who reported high levels of job satisfaction. Also, price reduction by salespeople did not improve customer satisfaction. Our results indicate that customer satisfaction does not require negotiated price concessions, but rather depends on extensive interaction with salespeople who are happy in their work. This is the first study to show that negotiator job satisfaction can affect important negotiation outcomes.     

Sources of Power in Public Negotiations: A Framework Applied to Public-Public and Public-Private Negotiations

The negotiation literature has extensively examined the topic of power and how it can be wielded. Numerous frameworks have been created and utilized in the various treatises on negotiations; analyzing the power differential in any given situation is a common teaching technique. However, despite this focus on the topic, discussions of power have been mainly focused on negotiations in the private sector. As a result, many of the most common frameworks are oriented toward this type of situation, resulting in a clumsy application to a public-sector negotiation. Given the growing importance of negotiations to public-sector leaders, we provide a new structure for analyzing power that can be utilized in such situations. For a municipal leader confronted with a complex public-private partnership, it is important to have the right tools to use when examining the power dynamics at play. After examining several current models of power, as well as other writings on the topic in negotiation and strategy literature, we present a new model. This model divides power into different categories based on whether it stems from formal or informal mechanisms, and then offers several specific forms relevant to the public sector. We then use this new model to examine a case study involving the new mayor of Manchester, New Hampshire and her efforts to negotiate a better response to the opioid and homelessness crisis. This case study illustrates the unique nature of public sector negotiations and provides a roadmap for negotiators looking to use our new framework.     

Precedents in Negotiated Decisions: Korea–Australia Free Trade Agreement Negotiations

Initial random acts can be replicated and evolve into precedents, but precedents can also be built with strategic intent. Regardless of their origin, strategically applying a particular precedent or effectively refuting the relevance of a precedent can help a negotiator control decisions and achieve interdependent goals. The purposeful use of precedents has received little attention in the negotiation literature, even though using precedents can be a powerful negotiating tactic. In this study, we examine how past decisions became precedents that helped establish the Korea–Australia Free Trade Agreement of 2014 (KAFTA). We further consider how precedents established through KAFTA later influenced trade negotiations with Canada, China, India, and Japan. Following an extensive literature review and field research, we developed a two‐dimensional matrix (precedent ownership and negotiator goals) to help guide negotiators both offensively (what I want from you) and defensively (what I don't want to give you). We conclude by proposing research to enhance our understanding of temporal issues in negotiation. No previous study within the negotiation literature has examined precedents empirically.     

The Curse of the Smartphone: Electronic Multitasking in Negotiations

In this study, we have explored the use of mobile phones during negotiations. Specifically, we examined the effects that multitasking — reading messages on a mobile phone while negotiating face to face — had on the outcome achieved in a negotiation, as well as on perceptions of professionalism, trustworthiness, and satisfaction. Using an experimental design in a face‐to‐face dyadic negotiation, we found that multitasking negotiators achieved lower payoffs and were perceived as less professional and less trustworthy by their partners.     

Making the Most of the First‐Offer Advantage: Pre‐Offer Conversation and Negotiation Outcomes

Why do some negotiators benefit from making the first offer during negotiations while others do not? This study explores the contents of conversations that take place before negotiators make their first offers in order to learn more about the differences between ultimately successful first offers that benefit from anchoring effects and ultimately unsuccessful ones in which negotiators apparently derive no benefit from making the first offer. In‐depth qualitative analyses of the conversations that role players engaged in prior to their first offers were conducted in simulated negotiation exercises. Their analysis identified five different conversational tactics that negotiators employed in one‐on‐one negotiations to gain power in the negotiation, or what they call here “power conversation tactics.” Their findings suggest that the negotiation outcome (i.e., net value) was related to how the negotiators employed and combined these tactics during the pre‐offer conversation. Based on these findings, they conceptualized four types of power‐gaining/power‐losing pre‐offer conversation scenarios and explored the link between negotiation outcomes and each of these types of pre‐offer conversations. This study further develops the literature on power dynamics and conversations in negotiations as well as the literature on the anchoring effect of a first offer.     

Diplomatic Interactions and Negotiations

This article examines the role of state actors, organization agencies, and individual agents in diplomatic interactions and negotiations. States as diplomatic actors, organizations as diplomatic agencies, and individuals as diplomatic agents enter into complex and interdependent relationships. Proposing a three‐level analysis of interstate interactions and diplomatic negotiations, I argue that no diplomatic negotiation happens without interactions between parties at the state, organizational, and individual levels. The agency–structure paradigm provides a conceptual framework for understanding behavioral and structural properties of international interactions and their influence on diplomatic negotiations. Diplomatic negotiation employs specific forms of interaction, using a distinct language, protocol norms, symbols, ceremonies, and rituals. The state's “self” (as a social conception of its identity, values, and interests) affects the process of diplomatic negotiation. By managing, organizing, and improving international interactions at the actor, agency, and agent levels, negotiating parties can advance the process and effectiveness of diplomatic negotiation.     

The Effect of Advice on Negotiations: How Advisors Influence What Negotiators Do

Studies of negotiations often overlook, or at least do not fully account for, the important role played by people who advise negotiators. Often deliberately hidden from view, advisors have important but unrecognized influence on the negotiation dynamic. In this article, I explore the roles and methods of advisors in the negotiation process, drawing on role theory and survey research conducted in 2013 among approximately seventy advisors at the European Union Council of Ministers. I define advice as “a communication from one person (the advisor) to another (the client) for the purpose of helping that second person determine a course of action for solving a particular problem” and consider the nature of this advice and the range of relationships that may exist between advisors and their clients. Advising is much more than the mere transmittal of information from advisor to negotiator and that for advice to be effective a relationship must exist between the two parties. I then identify three models of the advisor–negotiator relationship. The first is the advisor as director, wherein the advisor tends to take control of the negotiating process, directing the negotiator toward actions that she or he should take to achieve success at the negotiation. The second is the advisor as servant, in which the advisor merely responds to the demands of the client for help and guidance in the negotiation. And the third is the advisor as partner, wherein advisor and negotiator jointly manage the process and solve the problem together. Finally, I explore the factors that lead advisors and negotiators to adopt each of these three models, the various advising styles that advisors use, and the differing effects on the negotiation process that these elements may have, drawing on historical examples as well as survey data from the EU Council of Ministers.     

Seal the Deal: Bargaining Positions,Institutional Design,and the Duration of Preferential Trade Negotiations

Multilateral negotiations at the World Trade Organization have stalled. This has contributed to a steep rise in preferential trade agreements (PTAs). At the same time, negotiations for PTAs have not always proven quick and painless: While some treaties are sealed within a few months or days only, other agreements are preceded by protracted bargaining processes in trade and trade-related issue areas. In this article, we provide a theoretical explanation for this empirical variation. More specifically, we argue that PTA negotiations take longer the greater the distance between the prospective partners’ initial bargaining positions. Moreover, we contend that negotiation processes become more protracted the higher the relative ambition of the prospective PTA. Due to the limited links to the domestic political arena in autocracies, we expect this latter effect to play out for groups of democratic bargaining partners only. We test these two hypotheses for 198 preferential trade negotiations using novel measures for bargaining templates and the ambition of PTA clauses. In our two-stage survival models, we find support for our argument. In line with qualitative evidence from recent preferential trade initiatives, our models indicate that services, investment and intellectual property rights are particularly sticky agenda items for democratic leaders at the international bargaining table.     

A Conceptual Framework for Modeling Automated Negotiations in Multiagent Systems

In fully automated e‐negotiation all involved parties are software agents, so negotiation takes place in a multiagent system between software agents that have been developed as a computer system for automating tasks in a specific application domain. A multiagent system is a group of agents that interact and cooperate with each other to fulfill their objectives or to improve their performance. How do these agents negotiate with each other to manage their task interdependencies? What negotiation mechanisms are needed? These are important questions. In this article, we present a conceptual framework for modeling and developing automated negotiation systems. This framework represents and specifies all the necessary concepts and entities for developing a negotiation system as well as the relationships among these concepts. This framework can also be used to model human negotiations scenarios for analyzing these types of negotiations and simulating them with multiagent systems. The work reported in this article is the first unified framework that represents all the needed elements for modeling and developing automated negotiation systems and existing relationships between them.     

Understanding Barriers to Peace: Reflecting on Israeli–Palestinian Economic Negotiations

Drawing on relevant negotiations literature, this article describes some of the main barriers in the negotiation process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority as experienced by the author between the years 1998–2000. The analysis of these barriers is viewed through a prism of one case study: the negotiations regarding the economic component of the Wye River Memorandum. By subjecting that two-year negotiation process to a reflective analysis, this article not only attempts to shed light on the case presented, but also to help identify a wider range of barriers and behaviors that characterize the ongoing negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.     

When Negotiations Become Routine: Not Reinventing the Wheel While Thinking Outside the Box

In this article, we seek to apply the insights of recent research on routine to the context of repeated negotiations. To demonstrate the link between both concepts, we introduce an analytical framework in which we identify different negotiation situations in which routine can develop. We distinguish two dimensions of the negotiation process: a problem-solving dimension and a communication dimension. Our framework for analyzing the role of routine in negotiation is built around these two dimensions. We define those skills that we argue in repeated negotiations can help negotiators manage particular kinds of negotiations depending on the level and type of routinization that type of negotiation involves. Moreover, we demonstrate that our framework is inherently dynamic, which we illustrate with simplified business examples.     

Transformations and Critical Moments in Negotiations

Transformation is not a new concept in the conflict literature. It forms the foundation for a particular school of thought in mediation and plays a major role in the analysis of international conflicts. More-over, it shapes the goals and processes for managing public conflicts through dialogue and democracy. Although transformation surfaces in a variety of conflict management arenas, this concept has received only a modicum of attention in the negotiation literature. This article centers on the definition and features of critical moments in negotiation that might foster conflict transformation. It draws from the literature on conflict transformation and applies this work to negotiations. First, the author explores the definitions, characteristics, and types of shifts that set up transformations. Then she examines internal and external factors that contribute to transformative moments. Finally, the essay concludes with a discussion of distinctions between transformation and related constructs, suggestions for conducting research, and implications of this work for negotiation research.     

Negotiators as Mediators: The Case of 1987–1995 Korea–United States Bilateral Trade Negotiations

Despite their widely recognized benefits, integrative approaches to negotiation have seldom been effectively used in interorganizational negotiations. This study analyzes the 1987–1995 Korea–United States Trade Negotiations, identifying elements in those talks that could have moved the negotiations in a more integrative direction. The role of building relationships — especially between key negotiators — is examined. Informal negotiations between the key negotiators from both sides were crucial in building such relationships, which helped both sides create solutions for mutual gains. This process was realized, inter alia, by the dual role that the key negotiators took on as negotiators and as mediators.     

Process in Cross-Cultural Negotiations

This essay describes the four broad themes that emerged from our discussionabout the role of process in cross-cultural negotiations and considerstheir implications for future research. First, we address the nature of theconflict, in particular whether a negotiation is classified as a dispute or atransactional exchange. Second, we contrast the role of cognition and rapportin negotiations and consider when rapport replaces the centrality ofcognition. We also discuss the extent to which negotiating processes createrelationships based on trust or power, and consider how cultural valuesinfluence the development of these underlying relationships. Finally, weconsider the role of culture in defining what is perceived as an optimal outcomeand raise the possibility that suboptimal outcomes may holdsymbolic value in cross-cultural negotiations.     

Bargaining When the Future of an Industry Is at Stake: Lessons from UAW–Ford Collective Bargaining Negotiations

The 2007 American automobile industry labor negotiations involved fundamental challenges for labor and management, including a historic shift of responsibility in the management of retiree health care, a need for new approaches to core employment security issues, identification of ways to create new unionized jobs in the industry, and a joint commitment to the competitive viability of U.S. operations. Less visible, but no less important in the United Auto Workers–Ford case, has been unprecedented levels of information sharing and unique innovations in the bargaining process designed to enable problem solving even when tough issues were on the table. More than 300 people were directly involved in the negotiations, serving at the main table and on twenty‐four subcommittees. This case study covers the context for the negotiations, key events leading up to the bargaining, a unique process of “bargaining over how to bargain,” the actual negotiation process, and the results achieved. Implications are generalizable to the broader concept of pattern bargaining and many other types of negotiations when transformation is on the table.     

Ballots,Bargains, and Bombs: Terrorist Targeting of Spoiler Opportunities

Benjamin Netanyahu's come-from-behind victory over Shimon Peres in the Israeli national elections of May 1996, following an apparent intensification of Palestinian terrorism over the course of that spring, reminded observers of the political ramifications of terrorism. Since May 1996 was also the month in which Israel reentered Final Status negotiations with a Palestinian delegation in Taba, Egypt, the timing of this surge in violence encourages us to ask if terrorists regularly conceive of elections and rounds of negotiations as “spoiler opportunities,” or opportune times to undermine peaceful political processes. We address this question in the context of Israel's long‐running experience with elections, negotiations, and terrorism. We hypothesize that attacks resulting in fatalities are likely to increase in periods immediately surrounding Israeli general elections and key rounds of negotiations affecting the fate of the Palestinian population. Negative binomial event count analyses of the period 1970–2007 suggest that violent opponents indeed viewed the periods preceding negotiations and the ends of electoral cycles as “spoiler opportunities.”