The status of OSHA reform: A comment on mendeloff's proposals

Since its inception, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has been the target of regulatory reform proposals. OSHA has attracted this continued critical attention both because of inadequacies in the design of OSHA regulation and shortcomings in its implementation. John Mendeloff's critique and program of reform for OSHA focus primarily on inadequacies in the structure of OSHA policy rather than its implementation. Within that class of issues, Mendeloff provides a thoughtful analysis of OSHA policy. His regulatory proposals also address what appear to be the principal shortcomings of OSHA. However, the specific aspects of his proposal raise new problems with respect to the stability of regulatory policy and its unintended role in establishing barriers to entry in industry.     

Synthetic risks, risk potency, and carcinogen regulation.

This article analyzes a comprehensive sample of over 350 chemicals tested for carcinogenicity to assess the determinants of the probability of regulation. Controlling for differences in the risk potency and noncancer risks, synthetic chemicals have a significantly higher probability of regulation overall: this is due to the greater likelihood of U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulation. Measures of risk potency increase the probability of regulation by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), have a somewhat weaker positive effect on regulation by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and decrease the likelihood of regulation by the FDA. The overall regulatory pattern is one in which the FDA targets synthetic chemicals and chemicals that pose relatively minor cancer risk. The EPA particularly performed more sensibly than many critics have suggested.     

Fair siting procedures: An empirical analysis of their importance and characteristics

This article analyzes the reasons why individuals oppose the siting of nuclear waste repositories close to their hometowns. In a simple model based on survey data, we show that the willingness to accept such facilities largely depends on economic criteria, namely expected economic impacts and risk estimates. However, the predictive power of such a model is improved by focusing not only on the consequences—as economic models typically do—but also on the procedural aspects. We show that acceptable siting rules contribute positively to the willingness of local residents to host a noxious facility. Acceptable rules, it is found, are essentially fair rules.     

反腐的关键:规制行政裁量权

行政裁量权由于其可能导致肆意和专断,因而成为腐败的重灾区。因此,反腐的关键在于规制行政裁量权,保证行政裁量权在法治的轨道上运行。行政裁量权的规制属于复合规制模式,包括立法规制、行政规制、司法规制以及权利规制四种规制路径。然而规制模式有其内在的局限性,公众参与作为民主理论在行政过程的投射,其所具有的民意表达、利益协商、程序正义等功能和优势,可以实现对行政裁量权的有效规制。建立起公众参与的配套制度,并完善公众参与的程序设计,可以实现对行政裁量权的有效规制,促进反腐倡廉建设的健康发展。     

Preventing construction deaths: The role of public policies

Are stronger direct financial incentives or regulatory enforcement effective in reducing fatalities in the construction industry? We examine two important policies—state workers' compensation (WC) programs and federal and state Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) activities—which embody those strategies. We examine their impact by looking at state-level fatality rates in the construction industry from 1992 to 2016. Setting aside highway crashes and violence, the majority of employee deaths occur in construction. We find that states which exempt small firms from the requirement to buy WC insurance have higher fatality rates. When eligibility for compensation is restricted by longer waiting periods, fatality rates are substantially higher. More frequent federal or state OSHA inspections and, especially, consultation visits are associated with lower fatality rates, but higher average penalties are not. Limited variation in these policies over our sample period, especially for WC, makes these results suggestive rather than definitively causal.     

OSHA INSPECTION COSTS, COMPLIANCE COSTS, AND OTHER OUTCOMES: THE FIRST DECADE

A number of critics of the Occupational Safety and Health Act have argued that it has greatly increased the cost of operation of the regulated industries while providing very little benefits. But OSHA's inspection costs were relatively inconsequential (only a small percent of work sites actually inspected). Although it engaged in a number of "nitpicking" inspections of non-serious citations, the average penalties were extremely low. At the same time OSHA provided considerable consultation and educational assistance to industry. Compliance costs, in theory, could be much larger, but it is incorrect to attribute all of these to OSHA. A num ber of indirect positive outcomes could be attributed to OSHA, even though it is not possible to measure these through cost-benefit analysis.     

Turning defiance into compliance with procedural justice: Understanding reactions to regulatory encounters through motivational posturing

This paper uses Braithwaite's motivational posturing framework to explain how individuals react to encounters with regulatory authorities. Of interest is whether procedural justice can reduce defiance and improve self‐reported compliance among individuals who are either resistant or dismissive of regulatory authority. Using longitudinal survey data collected from tax offenders (Study 1), and individuals who had a recent police‐citizen interaction (Study 2), it will be shown that procedural justice can promote compliance behavior. Procedural justice is also found to be effective for reducing resistant forms of defiance over time, but not dismissive defiance. Further, the results reveal that neither resistant defiance nor dismissive defiance moderate the effect of procedural justice on compliance, suggesting procedural justice works equally well for both low and high resisters and low and high disengagers. Finally, an unexpected result reveals that resistance, but not dismissive defiance, mediates the effect of procedural justice on self‐reported compliance behavior. The findings have implications for procedural justice research and for the regulation of defiance.     

Accountability in the EU's para-regulatory state: The case of the Economic and Monetary Union

This article revisits Majone's famous argument about accountability in the regulatory state in reference to the European Union's (EU) Economic and Monetary Union. We show that the EU has entered the stage of a “para-regulatory state” marked by increasing EU regulation in areas linked to core state powers. Despite the redistributive and politicized nature of these policy areas, the EU's “para-regulatory state” has continued to rely on its regulatory model of accountability, focused on decisionmaking processes, and interest mediation. In line with Majone, we describe the model as procedural and contrast it to substantive accountability – which is necessary when regulation has clear redistributive implications. Using two case studies from fiscal policy and monetary affairs, we illustrate the predominance of procedural accountability as exercised by the European Parliament and EU Courts. We complement the empirical analysis with a normative discussion of how substantive accountability could potentially be rendered in both fields.     

An overview: A new era of tax enforcement – from “big stick” to responsive regulation

Recent developments in regulation and tax administration in Australia inspired this article on tax compliance and responsive regulation. This article analyzes the economics of crime and compliance as the dominant approach to tax enforcement of the past three and a half decades. It evaluates the key advantages and disadvantages of the economic approach as well as its application to tax. The article then explores responsive regulation as an alternative method that draws on the economic paradigm but also supplements this approach with other theories, particularly those involving identity, conflict escalation, and procedural justice. Building on this analysis and a case study of Australian investors in mass marketed tax schemes, the article suggests that the broader, more balanced, and closely tailored method of regulating responsively may enable regulators to draw on the advantages of the economic model while alleviating some of its drawbacks. Responsive regulation may therefore constitute a superior method for regulating compliance.     

Regulatory inspection and the changing legitimacy of health and safety

The regulation of conduct via law is a key mechanism through which broader social meanings are negotiated and expressed. The use of regulatory tools to bring about desired outcomes reflects existing social and political understandings of institutional legitimacy, the meanings attached to regulation, and the values it seeks to advance. But these contextual understandings are not static, and their evolution poses challenges for regulators, particularly when they reflect political framing processes. This paper shows how inspection has been reshaped as a tool within the United Kingdom's health and safety system by changes in the meanings attached to the concept of “risk‐based regulation.” While rates of inspection have fallen dramatically in recent years, the nature and quality of inspection have also been fundamentally reshaped via an increasingly procedural and economically rational “risk‐based” policy context. This has had consequences for the transformative and symbolic value of inspection as a tool of regulatory practice.     

Assessing OSHA Performance: New Evidence from the Construction Industry

The determinants of OSHA performance can be examined by breaking the regulatory process into three elements relating to enforcement, compliance behavior, and the adequacy of standards in addressing safety outcomes. This paper develops and applies this framework to the U.S. construction industry during the period 1987 to 1993. Enforcement activity among the firms in the sample was substantial, with firms facing a high probability of annual inspection. But, despite this significant enforcement effort, inspections have a modest effect on firm compliance with OSHA standards. Finally, the health and safety standards cited most frequently diverge from the major sources of fatalities and injuries on construction projects. These results suggest that historic enforcement policies toward construction make less sense as OSHA moves into its fourth decade of operation. More generally, the paper illustrates the problem of focusing enforcement resources on large, high‐profile companies even though they often are not the major source of regulatory problems in an established area of public policy intervention. © 2001 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

‘Post-NPM’ by force or fiat? A comparison of administrative reform trajectories in Brazil and Mexico1

‘New Public Management’ (NPM) ideas gained widespread acceptance all over the world in the 1980s and 1990s. In developing countries, notable examples of its influence include the Brazilian ‘Master Plan for Reforming Public Administration’, launched in 1995 by president Cardoso, and the Mexican ‘Federal Public Administration Modernisation Programme’ created in the same year by president Zedillo. Both reflected NPM doctrine and advanced changes for the organisation of the Executive. This article explores the evolution of these two countries' managerial reforms and the extent to which they eventually continued converging (or not) around similar principles, such as those often referred to as ‘Post-New Public Management’ (Post-NPM). By applying quantitative textual analysis of official documents and an analysis of self-reported institutional changes, the article concludes that despite their governing parties' strong political differences Mexico and Brazil did converge during the 2000s, improving controls from the centre, and prioritising the adoption of transparency and participation tools. The comparison of the trajectories of the administrative reforms of these countries between 1995 and 2016 contributes to international debates on policy convergence and Post-NPM reforms.     

Central bank independence in Latin America: Politicization and de-delegation

In the last three decades, legal delegation of monetary policy to independent central banks (CBI) has achieved the status of a global norm of good governance. The recent backlash against this independence is an important but understudied trend. Our article analyzes the potential for delegation reversals with a focus on Latin America where CBI was effective in maintaining price stability, but placed important policy constraints on governments. We theorize that, in the shadow of the global norm for CBI, the increasing distance in preferences between the government and the central bank, and the procedural hurdles to change the status quo, explain the intensity of challenges to the delegation contract or the delegated agent. An analysis of the frequency of irregular central bank leadership replacements, and instances of politicization and de-delegation show the plausibility of our argument. We also show that, in Latin America, reforms de-delegating monetary policy have been small, balancing the needs that justified delegation in the first place, but rolling back the most stringent constraints placed on financing the government.     

The Substitution Approach To Intergovernmental Relations: The Case Of OSHA

Federal legislation of the last two decades has substantiallyreduced state autonomy in dealing with many regulatory issues.Participation in the implementation of these federal programsmay, however, enable states to exert some leverage over policyoutcomes. Variations in state leverage no doubt exist from oneintergovernmental grant program to the next. Substitution authoritymay be one variable accounting for this variation. Under a substitutionapproach, a federal agency cannot only sever the flow of fundsto a grantee; it can also step in and operate a program if statesfail to meet expectations or choose not to participate. Thisarticle generates more basic propositions about the substitutionapproach by analyzing its implementation under the OccupationalSafety and Health Act of 1970. The article examines the roleplayed by substitution authority in motivating the OccupationalSafety and Health Administration (OSHA) to adopt an aggressiveposture toward the states. The article then assesses whetherOSHA's aggressiveness prompted state grantees to exert considerableeffort on behalf of program goals. Finally, the implicationsof current reform proposals, which call for a sorting out offunctions between the states and the federal government, receiveattention.     

On the accuracy of regulatory cost estimates

This study compares ex ante estimates of the direct costs of individual regulations to ex post assessments of the same regulations. For total costs the results support conventional wisdom, namely that the costs of regulations tend to be overestimated. This is true for 14 of the 28 rules in the data set discussed, while for only 3 rules were the ex ante estimates too low. For unit costs, however, the story is quite different. At least for EPA and OSHA rules, unit cost estimates are often accurate, and even when they are not, overestimation of abatement costs occurs about as often as underestimation. In contrast, for those rules that use economic incentives, unit costs are consistently overestimated. The difference between the total‐cost and the unit‐cost results is caused by frequent errors in estimates of the effects of individual rules, which suggests, in turn, that the rule's benefits may also be overestimated. The quantity errors are driven both by difficulties in determining the baseline and by incomplete compliance. In cases of unit‐cost overestimation, unanticipated technological innovation appears to be an important factor — especially for economic incentive rules, although procedural and methodological explanations may also apply. © 2000 by the Association for Public Policy and Management.     

巡视制度建设科学化应遵循法治原则

法治作为现代文明的重要标志,是民主社会的重要保障。法治原则应成为制度、政治制度和巡视制度建设中遵循的重要原则,成为制度建设科学化的重要衡量标准。巡视制度建设科学化遵循法治原则要求,在巡视制度设计方面,无论是实体类规定和程序类规定都要围绕着依法治国理念;在巡视制度执行方面,要使依法巡视成为巡视工作的基本遵循。     

The Portability of Electoral Procedural Fairness: Evidence from Experimental Studies in China and the United States

Elections are now a common feature of countries across regime types, yet we know little about what leads people to perceive an election as fair, or how the democratic context shapes the ingredients of fairness judgments. While the conduct of a process is most important for perceptions of fairness in established democracies, “procedural fairness” may not travel to non-democracies, where economic outcomes occasionally take precedence over procedure. Additionally, individual level characteristics, such as political engagement, may also shape how people view the fairness of elections. Using original experiments conducted in the United States and China, I find procedural considerations are most important for fairness judgments, across democratic contexts and largely independent of political engagement.     

公共行政学研究方法：问题与反思

公共行政学有三种研究取向:解释性、诠释性以及批判性研究,其中实证主义在公共行政学领域曾一度占据着主导地位。一些西方学者以实证主义的有效性标准来评估公共行政学的研究现状,另一些学者则对此展开了批判与质疑,他们认为不同的研究取向都有其自身的价值,不能用主流社会科学的衡量标准来评估诠释性研究与批判性研究,并由此引发了对西方公共行政学研究现状的反思。中国公共行政学研究在方法上也存在一些问题——理论脱离实际倾向严重;基本的公共行政学学术规范还没有建立起来,研究方法极不严谨,研究质量存在严重的问题;对定性研究存在认识上的误区;等等。在比较分析的基础上提出改善中国公共行政学研究状况的对策思考,尤其强调要注意区分公共行政学研究在不同国家所处的阶段不同。     

Imposing Procedural Constraints on State Administrative Agencies: An Empirical Investigation of Competing Explanations

Scholars have offered different explanations for administrative procedures. One general approach stresses the importance of normative theory as a determinant of institutional choice, while two other perspectives emphasize the interests and political influence of pressure groups and legislators. To test these models, this study uses comparative state data to predict the adoption of three types of administrative procedures-legislative rule review, procedural requirements opening up the rulemaking process to public participation, and economic impact analysis. The findings suggest that factors associated with the adoption of one kind of administrative requirement may not be associated with the use of others. The analysis also suggests that, while ideology, political culture, and party competition intermittently affect the adoption of particular administrative procedures, they do not always have the kinds of effects that are suggested by the traditional state policy making literature.     

Policy‐Specific Information and Informal Agenda Power

In Gilligan and Krehbiel's models of procedural choice in legislatures, a committee exerts costly effort to acquire private information about an unknown state of the world. Subsequent work on expertise, delegation, and lobbying has largely followed this approach. In contrast, we develop a model of information as policy valence. We use our model to analyze a procedural choice game, focusing on the effect of transferability, i.e., the extent to which information acquired to implement one policy option can be used to implement a different policy option. We find that when information is transferable, as in Gilligan and Krehbiel's models, closed rules can induce committee specialization. However, when information is policy‐specific, open rules are actually superior for inducing specialization. The reason for this surprising result is that a committee lacking formal agenda power has a greater incentive to exercise informal agenda power by exerting costly effort to generate high‐valence legislation.