Narendra Modi’s Pakistan Policy: A Case of Old Wine in Old Bottles

This article examines India’s policy towards Pakistan since Narendra Modi became prime minister. At certain times, India has engaged in talks with Pakistan on various bilateral issues. At other times, it has adopted a hardline approach and canceled talks, stating that Pakistan had not demonstrated any sincerity in wanting to end cross-border terrorism against India. Modi’s critics have described his ‘on–off’ talks policy on Pakistan as flawed, confused and visionless. Is Modi’s Pakistan policy riddled with inconsistencies? Why has he not displayed the same pragmatism that is evident in his other diplomatic engagements when it comes to Pakistan? What explains his hardline approach? This paper argues that reconciliation with Pakistan remains a challenge due to persistent issues that adversely affect ties, namely the Pakistan army’s influence over the country’s foreign policy and meager bilateral economic ties. Expectations of a breakthrough in relations under the circumstances appear bleak. From the perspective of the Modi administration, adopting a cautious approach and maintaining a tough line, i.e. calibrating talks with action on cross-border terrorism by Islamabad, appears to be the more pragmatic option in the short term.     

Borders that continue to bother us: the politics of cross-border security cooperation in Africa’s Lake Chad Basin

Until 2014, security responses to the Boko Haram insurgency were largely domestic and military. However, the increasing expansion of Boko Haram attacks in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB), compounded by the consequent humanitarian crisis, compelled a joint security action. This came in the form of the rejuvenated Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), comprising forces from the LCB member states (Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad) and Benin. My goal in this paper is to interrogate the cross-border dynamics and ramifications of the Boko Haram insurgency, and the nature of security responses to it. The analysis extends to the politics of cross-border security cooperation against Boko Haram in the LCB, as well as the impact of the MNJTF on Boko Haram’s evolving tactics. Along the way, the paper identifies key challenges to the effective operationalisation of the MNJTF.     

Loyalty,disloyalty, and semi-loyalty in Pakistan’s hybrid regime

The 2013 election in Pakistan was a significant point in a presumed transition from autocracy towards democracy, since for the first time an elected government completed a full term and was replaced by another freely elected government. Pakistan’s hybrid regime, however, continues to be threatened by a significant ‘disloyal opposition’, in the form of secessionists in Balochistan and jihadi Islamists of the Tehrik-e-Taliban (the so-called Pakistan Taliban). Drawing on the literature on hybrid regimes, and using Juan Linz’s framework that focused on both ‘disloyal’ and ‘semi-loyal’ oppositions to democratic rule, this article examines the threat to a continuing movement towards democracy posed by secessionists, Islamists, and the military.     

Do Nuclear Weapons Stabilize South Asian Militarized Crises? Evidence from the 1990 Case

Abstract

Scholars have claimed that nuclear weapons help to stabilize South Asia by preventing Indo-Pakistani militarized crises from escalating to the level of all-out conventional war. This article argues that while nuclear weapons have had cautionary effects on Indian and Pakistani decision makers, proliferation also has played a role in fomenting some of the very crises that scholars credit nuclear weapons with defusing. Moreover, nuclear deterrence was not always essential to preventing these crises from escalating to the level of outright war. The article illustrates its argument with evidence from the Indo-Pakistani militarized crisis of 1990.

Leading scholars and analysts have argued that nuclear weapons help to prevent South Asian militarized crises from escalating to the level of all-out conventional war. ¹ 1. See, e.g., Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 109–110; Devin Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 133–170; Kenneth N. Waltz, “For Better,” in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: Norton, 2003), pp. 109–124; K. Subrahmanyam, “India and the International Nuclear Order,” in D. R. SarDesai and G. C. Raju Thomas, eds., Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002), pp. 63–84, at pp. 82–83; Raja Menon, A Nuclear Strategy for India (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), pp. 197–198. A considerable literature exists regarding nuclear weapons’ general effects on the South Asian security environment. Scholars optimistic that nuclear weapons will help to pacify South Asia include Waltz, “For Better”; Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation; John J. Mearsheimer, “Here We Go Again,” New York Times, May 17, 1998; Subrahmanyam, “India and the International Nuclear Order”; Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan India, 2002). Scholars pessimistic as to nuclear weapons’ likely effects on the regional security environment include Scott D. Sagan, “For the Worse: Till Death Do Us Part,” in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons; P. R. Chari, “Nuclear Restraint, Nuclear Risk Reduction, and the Security–Insecurity Paradox in South Asia,” in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagné, eds., The Stability–Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinksmanship in South Asia (Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, 2001), pp. 15–36; Kanti Bajpai, “The Fallacy of an Indian Deterrent,” in Amitabh Mattoo, ed., India’s Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond (New Delhi: HarAnand, 1999); Samina Ahmed, “Security Dilemmas of Nuclear-Armed Pakistan,” Third World Quarterly Vol. 21, No. 5 (October 2000), pp. 781–793; S. R. Valluri, “Lest We Forget: The Futility and Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons for India,” in Raju G.C. Thomas and Amit Gupta, eds., India’s Nuclear Security (United States: Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp. 263–273. This claim has important implications for the regional security environment and beyond. Given the volatile nature of Indo-Pakistani relations, reducing the likelihood of crisis escalation would make the subcontinent significantly safer. The claim also suggests that nuclear weapons could lower the probability of war in crisis-prone conflict dyads elsewhere in the world.

This article takes a less sanguine view of nuclear weapons’ impact on South Asian militarized crises. It argues that while nuclear weapons have at times had important cautionary effects on Indian and Pakistani decision makers, proliferation has played a role in fomenting a number of the very crises that scholars credit nuclear weapons with defusing. Moreover, it is not clear that nuclear deterrence was essential to preventing some of these crises from escalating to the level of outright war. I illustrate my argument with evidence from the period when India and Pakistan were acquiring nascent nuclear weapons capabilities. I show that during the late 1980s, Pakistan’s emerging nuclear capacity emboldened Pakistani decision makers to provide extensive support to the emerging insurgency against Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir. In early 1990, India responded with large-scale force deployments along the Line of Control and International Border, in an attempt to stem militant infiltration into Indian territory, and potentially to intimidate Pakistan into abandoning its Kashmir policy. Pakistan countered with large deployments of its own, and the result was a major Indo-Pakistani militarized standoff. Although scholars have credited Pakistani nuclear weapons with deterring India from attacking Pakistan during this crisis, the preponderance of available evidence suggests that Indian leaders never seriously considered striking Pakistan, and therefore were not in fact deterred from launching a war in 1990. Thus nuclear weapons played an important role in fomenting a major Indo-Pakistani crisis during this period, but probably were not instrumental in preventing the crisis from escalating to the level of outright war.

Below, I briefly describe the emergence of the Kashmir insurgency. I then explain how Pakistan’s nuclear capacity encouraged it to support the uprising. Next, I show how conflict between Pakistan-supported guerillas and Indian security forces in Kashmir drove a spiral of tension between the two countries, which led to a stand-off between Indian and Pakistani armed forces in early 1990. Finally, I discuss the end of the 1990 crisis, and address the role that nuclear weapons played in its peaceful deescalation.     

ASIAN WAR MACHINES

ABSTRACT

The South Asian security landscape is increasingly dominated by a complex four-way dynamic between India, Pakistan, China, and the United States. The stresses and strains of the relationships between these states directly affect the prospects for peace and prosperity for almost half of humanity. This article describes some of the military contours of this landscape, with a focus on strategic postures, weapon acquisitions, and the role of nuclear weapons. It maps the India–Pakistan arms race over the past decade, the economic constraints on the two states, the role of China and the United States as weapons suppliers, and the risk and consequences for nuclear war. The authors then look at India's relationship with China, which is marked by both cooperation and competition, and the rise of China as a close military, political, and economic ally of Pakistan. While the United States has had long-standing cooperative relationships with both India and Pakistan, these relationships have been undergoing major shifts over the last two decades. U.S. concerns about China's increasing military and economic power have also intensified over this period as well. Of particular significance has been the effort to create a U.S.–India strategic partnership to balance and contain a rising China, which may become a central feature of the emerging global order. This article also offers a brief overview of what is publicly known about the nuclear arsenals of the four countries, ongoing production of weapons-usable fissile materials in Pakistan and India, as well as the race to build longer-range missiles.     

从“最低限度介入”到“有条件积极介入”:论中国对阿富汗政策的调整

阿富汗素有"帝国坟墓"之称,不少学者认为中国应尽量避免过多卷入阿富汗问题,尤其是安全事务方面。然而,中国现阶段采取的"最低限度介入"也不能帮助解决阿富汗问题,有必要调整为"有条件积极介入",即:以不单边军事介入、不干涉阿富汗内政和尊重阿富汗人的意愿为原则。在地区安全方面,中国应积极构建中美俄印巴大国安全合作机制,发动五国力量共同提供区域公共安全产品;在外交方面,中国应坚持以双边调解和多边斡旋为主,借中巴、中伊(朗)良好的双边关系以及中国在阿富汗问题上独特地位多方协调,形成稳定有效的双边谈判机制和多边协调机制,并将阿富汗纳入上合组织;在经济方面,中国应依托"一带一路"倡议、中巴经济走廊等机制加大对阿经济援助促进阿富汗经济可持续发展,切实提升阿富汗人民的生活水平;在社会与文化方面,中国可为阿富汗提供可供借鉴的社会管理模式和改革经验,致力于促进中阿两国的文化交流和民心相通,使两国的友谊深入民间;同时,始终保证积极介入的底线所在,以便践行周边外交优先理念,展示负责任大国形象,防范"金德尔伯格陷阱"。     

AFGHAN REFUGEES: THE IMPACT ON PAKISTAN

One of the most important arenas that have been profoundly affected by the security situation in Afghanistan is Pakistan's internal security environment. The instability in Afghanistan has had a negative spill-over effect on Pakistan's domestic security scenario, as the Afghan quagmire poses immense implications on Pakistan's domestic framework. One of the important consequences of the Afghan conflict since the 1970s has been the massive inflow of the Afghan refugee population to the neighbouring Pakistan which in following years has brought about a number of demographic and security challenges to the Pakistani society. Therefore along with a number of factors, at this present juncture, Afghan refugees have also become a principal factor in determining Pakistan's Afghanistan policy.     

Living in the Shadow of Violence: Local Civil–Military Engagement during Anti-Communist Insurgency Operations in the Philippines

Abstract

The Philippine approach to the anti-communist insurgency after 1986 has featured peace talks with the rebels, amnesty and livelihood packages, and strengthened security forces. While the military has remained central to the counterinsurgency campaign, the government has also institutionalized police involvement in conducting operations and requested input from local civilian authorities in paramilitary recruitment and human rights monitoring. Legal restrictions against human rights violations by soldiers were also established. The experience of 20 frontline communities in central Philippines reflects these changes. Local civil-military interaction has moved from confrontation to consultation and accommodation. However, tension remains because the military and civilian leaders disagree on the gravity of the insurgent threat.     

IMPASSE AT MCAS FUTENMA

In 1960, a Japanese prime minister was forced to resign after he committed Japan to an unpopular security relationship with the United States. In 2010, exactly fifty years later, the security relationship with the United States, centered on the stationing of a vast U.S. base complex in Japan, has unseated a prime minister who came to office just last year with an over 70 percent approval rating. In the small southern prefecture of Okinawa, where 75 percent of the U.S. military in Japan is stationed, the continued presence of the unpopular Futenma air base has become a lodestone for Okinawan frustration. High-level talks to remove Futenma from the crowded city of Ginowan have been ongoing since 1996, yet nothing has been accomplished. On 25 April 2010, an estimated 90,000 people rallied in Okinawa and demanded the base be removed from the prefecture completely, and not simply relocated to a location near the city of Nago. This essay attempts to explain Washington's central role in creating the problem and argues that Futenma is an unnecessary burden on the people of Okinawa and on cash-strapped Japanese and American taxpayers.     

Genocidal Violence,Nation-Building,and the Bloody Birth of Bangladesh

Why did the Pakistani military carry out genocidal violence against East Pakistani Hindus during the 1971 civil war when the Hindus did not constitute a security threat? This question carries not only theoretical but also important policy and security implications in present-day Bangladesh. A uniquely in-depth analysis of the little-known genocide in East Pakistan in 1971 shows that genocidal violence may be used as an instrument of nation-building. It was designed to mobilize both the Pakistani troops and the Bengali Muslim population against a convenient, well-defined enemy. The logic of othering – and then exterminating – a religious minority was meant to integrate a defiant, and previously marginalized, group into a reimagined community.     

Civil-military relations in Pakistan: a case study of Sino-Pakistani relations and the port of Gwadar

This article analyses how the dynamics of civil-military relations in Pakistan have ensured policy continuity towards China. By looking at the development of the port of Gwadar, which represents the flagship project of Sino-Pakistani cooperation during the last 15 years, this article contends that the continuity in Pakistan’s policies towards China in the post 9/11 period is explained by a broad-based consensus among the Pakistani elites, in which, however, the military plays a dominant role. Civilian control over the military is a concept that was never fully absorbed in Pakistan and, as the analysis ascertains, most of the policies introduced by General Pervez Musharraf have been adopted by the subsequent civilian regimes under indirect control from the military establishment. The ultimate aim of the Pakistani leadership, civilian and military alike, has therefore been to provide a safe ground for the Chinese investments in the country because of the key role that China plays in Pakistan’s strategic posture. Organised around semi-structured interviews conducted in Pakistan in early 2015, the article is grounded in the relevant literature on civil-military relations and assesses the level of civilian control in three key decision-making areas pertaining to the port of Gwadar: economic policy, internal security and foreign policy.     

Insecure peace: understanding citizen and local government relations in a Maoist-affected region in India

This paper examines emerging citizen and local government relations in a village in the Junglemahal region of the state of West Bengal, once a major bastion of the Maoist insurgency in India. Since 2014, Junglemahal has not experienced a single Maoist-related incident. This has been widely attributed to the West Bengal government’s “model” handling of the insurgency, which rests on the rapid mobilization of public services through the non-elected arms of local governments, bypassing elected officials. How have Junglemahal’s residents experienced this particular form of post-conflict governance? Drawing on the culture-centered approach that ethnographically observes the processes of identifying development problems and developing community-grounded solutions to these problems, our findings indicate that the hyper-developmental state was paradoxically experienced by our respondents as a very distant entity. A recurrent theme in our interviews is the absence of a locally embedded party leadership that could be approached regarding issues of distributive justice. We argue that this desire for party mediation in public service delivery is an expression of a powerful social norm that has survived the conflict and ought to be integrated into post-conflict governance structures if the current peace is to endure.     

Building Trust: Cooperation between Rivals India and Pakistan

ABSTRACT

This article uses the case study of India–Pakistan to explore how rivals build cooperation over time. India and Pakistan have shared an intense rivalry since their independence and subsequent partition in 1947, having fought three major wars and several militarised disputes over the last 70 years. The authors use network analysis to study the pattern of all treaties between the two countries between 1947 and 2017. This expects rivals to focus on non-security issues such as trade as they work to build trust and patterns of cooperation. The article finds that given the long and intense rivalry between the two neighbours, and the subsequent lack of trust, India and Pakistan have adopted a functionalist approach towards building cooperation; most of their bilateral treaties are related to non-security issues such as trade, telecommunications, transport and technology. Only a few of their treaties are nested within prior treaties, indicating ad hoc rather than institutionalised cooperation. The authors also find that efforts by the two states to build cooperation has not spilt over into areas related to security, pointing to a continued lack of trust between the two states. The article notes the implications of this approach for the future of Indo-Pakistani ties as well as peace on the subcontinent.     

Middle East

The author argues that military rule has never been good for Pakistan. Historically it has not helped the fight against extremism, On the contrary, the generals’ search for some sort of legitimacy has tended to give encouragement to militant Islam. Certainly, the democratic road has been difficult in many countries, but there is no alternative. It is the only road for Pakistan. The West should not give support to anti-democratic forces under the mistaken belief that they can provide firm government.     

Nakasone Yasuhiro’s “Autonomous Defense” and the Security of Japan

Former Prime Minister of Japan Nakasone Yasuhiro advocated autonomous defense throughout the post-WWII period. Nakasone’s concept of autonomous defense (jishu boei) went beyond the idea of enhancing national defense capabilities—it was accompanied by a rich and varied internationalism that strove toward assuaging neighboring countries’ concerns toward Japan’s remilitarization. Nakasone also actively engaged major western powers in the global debate over nuclear issues during his term as prime minister, and it went beyond the confines of Japan’s bilateral security relationship with the United States. Thus, Nakasone’s autonomous defense concept reflected both the development of postwar Japan and the many turbulent changes in the postwar global security landscape. This essay follows the evolution of Nakasone’s autonomous defense concept during his political career from 1950 to the end of his premiership in 1988 and concludes with an overall assessment of his initiatives regarding Japanese security.     

The New Cabinet Crisis Management Center and the Leadership of the Prime Minister

In May 2001, a cabinet crisis management center was set up below the prime minister's new official residence. It is from here that Japan's national crises are now to be managed. In an era of constant flux, questions over the circumstances surrounding Japan's strategic security are being raised. Clearly, the structure of crisis management and legislation are crucial for a nation'ssecurity. In this article, Lt. Gen. Toshiyuki Shikata of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (retired) and professor of Law at Teikyo University, examines 30 international and domestic crises that Japan had to deal with in which the leadership of the prime minister determined the outcome. He describes the history of Japanese crisis management, pointing out the current problems and argues that in a post-Cold War era, Japan needs to confront the discrepancies in the structure of its security if it wishes to become a credible member of the international community.     

Security cooperation in Northeast Asia: Problems and prospects

During the past five years there have been a growing number of proposals for dialogue, “regimes” and other cooperative institutions designed to enhance regional security. This article critically evaluates the key proposals and notes the objections that have been raised against them. It goes on to argue that many of these objections are without validity. The article contrasts the considerable progress in this area, which has been achieved in Southeast Asia with the absence of progress in Northeast Asia — and suggests some reasons for the difference. The article concludes with an analysis of some of the contradictory elements of such concepts as “cooperative security,” “security cooperation” and “common security,” which are gaining increasing currency in the region.     

Turkey's Military Victory over the PKK and Its Failure to End the PKK Insurgency

This article explores the major reasons why Turkey could not end the PKK insurgency despite its military defeat in the late 1990s. It argues that Turkish governments have failed to sufficiently address two key aspects of their low-intensity conflict with the PKK, namely the fact that the PKK is not just a group of armed militants, but rather a complex insurgent organization and that it appeals to a large number of Kurds. Turkey's inability to definitively quell the PKK insurgency raises significant questions regarding the justification and effectiveness of the use of military force in dealing with insurgencies.     

India's “Look East” Policy

A combination of economic, strategic, and domestic considerations has led India to pay greater attention to its eastern neighbours since the 1990s. India's steadily growing ties with East and Southeast Asian countries have become an increasingly important element of India's foreign policy. India is working with these countries bilaterally as well as through regional frameworks like the EAS, ASEM, and ASEAN, and sub-regional organizations like BIMSTEC and Mekong-Ganga Cooperation. The main driver remains economic, and India has many ongoing and planned FTAs with the countries of this region. Of late, defence and security ties too have grown. However, India's relations with China remain tense and troubled, with persisting differences over the border, Tibet, and China's patronage of India's South Asian neighbours, particularly Pakistan. Asia's major players will have to overcome internal rivalries and consciously evolve a cooperative paradigm for Asian security and cooperation to enable Asia to play a leading global role.     

美国与巴基斯坦关系的改善及其制约因素

冷战后,巴基斯坦在美国外交中的战略地位明显下降,特朗普上台后更是重印轻巴,推出了高度重视印度的南亚战略和印太战略,对巴基斯坦则实行极限施压政策以逼其加大反恐力度。美国的政策变化引起了巴基斯坦政府和民众的不满与抵制,两国间出现激烈的外交纷争,美巴关系陷入僵局。然而,巴基斯坦在美国的阿富汗战争和外交战略中处于不可忽视的地位,并且巴基斯坦是具有一定的对美反制能力的地区强国,特朗普政府在更为重要的阿富汗和谈问题上需要得到巴基斯坦的帮助。在权衡利弊后,特朗普政府调整对巴基斯坦政策,从以压促变调整为拉拢利用,美巴关系随之从高度紧张走向逐渐缓和。然而,美巴在短期利益和长远战略上都存在难以弥合的矛盾和分歧,双边关系发展缺乏坚实的合作基础和长远计划,两国在主要的共同利益——阿富汗政治和解方面存在目标和利益差异。此外,美印关系不断提升,使美巴双边关系的进一步发展困难重重。美国不愿放弃在巴基斯坦及邻近地区的战略利益,短期内会维持美巴合作,但从长远看,众多挑战和制约因素使两国关系存在较大的不确定性。美巴关系的走向不仅影响到南亚局势,还会冲击到我国的周边安全、中巴关系的发展以及"一带一路"倡议的推进,应当密切关注。