权利能力与未出生者的民法地位

从“纯利益权利能力附停止条件说”来看,未出生者既不是权利主体,也不是毫无权利主体地位,而是“权利主体地位待定者”,待“出生”这一条件成就时,权利能力则生效至出生前。但是,在没有活体出生的情况下,则需依据“利益关联说”确立个体未出生者的民法地位,即未出生者是其父母生育权(或其母生命健康权)的客体。“两说”相结合,较为科学、全面地阐释了未出生者的民法地位。     

未出生者权益保护研究

随着现代社会的发展,未出生者受到不法侵害的情况与日俱增,而且现代医学证明行为与损害结果之间有一定的因果关系,但是我国的现行立法中并没有对其做出明确的规定,这样使得未出生者的保护成为法律空白。本文认为应承认未出生者的民事权利,以及对侵权行为的认定并提出加害人为父母的特殊情况的看法。     

司法实践中未出生者的民法地位

通过研究国内外司法实践中未出生者的民法地位 ,提出了我国民法典立法中未出生者民法地位的立法建议。     

浅议公民先期民事权利

我国《民法通则》第九条规定：“公民从出生时起至死亡时止，具有民事权利能力，依法享有民事权利，承担民事义务。”依此规定，公民的民事权利在其生命存续期间终身事有，未脱离母体的胎儿不能作为民事权利主体。但从社会客观存在来看，公民在出生前就存在某些特定的民事权利，这些特定的权利在公民出生前只是受法律保护的利益，只有当公民出生时具有民事主体资格，产生民事权利能力，才能享有、维护和支配，这就是公民先期民事权利。公民的先期民事权利是指公民在出生前，根据法津赋予胎儿享有的利益，于出生后以自己的名义实现民事权利的…     

未决羁押者的劳动权保护:一个宪政维度的分析

在我国刑事诉讼实践中,未决羁押者被强迫劳动、超强度超时间劳动以及克扣劳动报酬等现象较为普遍,有些地方还相当严重.从宪政维度分析,劳动是未决羁押者的权利而非强制性义务;未决羁押者的劳动权是宪法意义上的劳动权而非劳动法意义上的劳动权利;未决羁押者的劳动权既不同于普通社会劳动者,也有别于已被定罪的囚犯,具有相当的特殊性.应当采取有效措施,完善未决羁押者的劳动权保护制度,以提升其整体的权利保障水平.     

胎儿不应有法律上利益——《民法总则草案》第16条质疑

主体本质上是意志之存在形式.欠缺行为能力人以监护人意志为意志.拟制主体以法定代表人职务行为意志为意志.法律定分止争之适用范围限于法律主体,本质上限于意志.所谓人格、主体资格、权利能力,均以意志为其充要条件和唯一根据.权利能力存续期间即意志存续期间,就现代人而言,只能始于出生,终于死亡.民法之利益即归属之财产,归属者即法律主体.如胎儿有自己的利益,即为主体,但在很多情况下,法律将无法区分归属胎儿的行为后果与归属其母亲的行为后果,丧失定分止争功能,监护制度不适用于胎儿.遗产分割时保留胎儿的预留份额,是使胎儿活产后与其他继承人享有平等继承资格.保护胎儿在法理上是保护胎儿出生后的权利.     

论法律关系的客体

一、对法律关系客体的几种不同见解关于法律关系的客体问题，解放前我国法学者多是只讲“权利客体”，如：1.认为人之生命身体自由名誉为权利之客体，其最重要者，则为物。2.认为“权利之客体者，依法律之保护以满足人类生活之资料者也。……权利之客体为物”。     

浅论刑事被害人的权利保障

被害人的权利取决于被害人的诉讼地位,在不同的历史阶段被害人的诉讼地位有着明显的差异.从刑罚的执行者、控诉者、证人到当事人,不同的诉讼地位决定了其在诉讼中所享有的诉讼权利不同,体现的诉讼结构和价值取向也不同.当前我国刑事诉讼法虽明确规定了被害人当事人的诉讼地位,但由于权利的不完整,导致被害人徒有当事人的名分.     

“未按”表决器应视为“操作失灵”

笔者认为,由于我国《代表法》和《选举法》并未对“未按”这种现象作出明确规定,故而无论“未按”产生的原因如何,其与反对、弃权、未出席的最终作用一样,造成的皆是直接或间接“不赞成表决事项”的这样一种结果. 然而,“未按”与保留个人意见的“弃权”毕竟还是有着本质上的区别的.因为,“弃权”是“人作为程序主体在实现实体权利或为保障实体权利不受侵犯时所享有的一种自主权利”,因而直接将“未按”视为“弃权”确实是不妥的.而将“未按”表决器视为“操作失灵”,笔者认为这样或许还更为准确一些.     

刑事被指控人程序性权利研究

刑事被指控人的程序性权利,作为与实体性权利相对的概念,尚未受到刑诉学界的充分重视.程序性权利可以归结为人们以自己的行为享有和获取某种实体利益的正当性,以及享有作为道德主体、捍卫其人格尊严权利的正当性.它与实体性权利绝非简单的落实和保障之关系.程序公正和程序人道构成了其价值基础.刑事被迫诉人的程序性权利包涵了程序启动权、程序参与权、程序选择权、程序救济权、程序抵抗权、受告知权等多种权利类型.落实实体性权利,实现程序价值,提高刑事裁判和决定的可接受性,限制决定者的恣意、规制权力的运作,推动和落实善治是其功能所在.     

胎儿人身利益保护的法理思考--兼论胎儿在我国未来民法典中的民事主体地位

胎儿没有民事权利能力,其人身利益一旦受到侵害,无法以民事主体身份获得法律保护.文章结合案例和学者观点,检讨了传统法律人格的缺陷,借鉴了国外及我国台湾地区胎儿保护的立法经验,认为未来民事立法应当赋予胎儿一定的民事主体地位.     

Creating Legal Space for the Unborn

This article explores how the unborn moved from inhabiting an implicit mother-centric space, tacitly expressed in the Irish constitutional order, to a separate legal space created first by the Eighth Amendment and later through public discourse, judicial interpretation and failed constitutional referenda. The article opens with a brief examination of the relationship between law and space in recent scholarly works. It goes on to assess the impact of post-colonial and gender discourse in producing the first legal space in which the unborn was tacitly understood. This is followed by an exploration of how cultural and gender rhetoric gave birth to a definite legal space in which the right to life for the unborn was protected by the Constitution and the government’s subsequent attempts to solve the legal limbo by shifting the debate to the social policy space. The paper concludes by discussing the extent to which a wider, more universal space, that of human rights discourse, may have an impact on the legal space created for the unborn, by either protecting or weakening its right to life.     

面对死刑的人的诉讼权利的保障

面对死刑的人,在检察机关提起公诉前后分别称为“犯罪嫌疑人”和“被告人”。合法、充分保障面对死刑的人的诉讼权利,是有效限制死刑适用的重要方面。我国《刑事诉讼法》对面对死刑的人的诉讼权利保障规定得较为系统,在有些方面已达到国际标准,但在另一些方面还存在差距。为了保障面对死刑的人的人权,需进一步从获知权、辩护权、无罪推定、沉默权等方面加以完善。     

Conforming to the rule of law: when person and human being finally mean the same thing in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence

The Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect people from discrimination and harm from other people. Racism is not the only thing people need protection from. As a constitutional principle, the Fourteenth Amendment is not confined to its historical origin and purpose, but is available now to protect all human beings, including all unborn human beings. The Supreme Court can define "person" to include all human beings, born and unborn. It simply chooses not to do so. Science, history and tradition establish that unborn humans are, from the time of conception, both persons and human beings, thus strongly supporting an interpretation that the unborn meet the definition of "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment. The legal test used to extend constitutional personhood to corporations, which are artificial "persons" under the law, is more than met by the unborn, demonstrating that the unborn deserve the status of constitutional personhood. There can be no "rule of law" if the Constitution continues to be interpreted to perpetuate a discriminatory legal system of separate and unequal for unborn human beings. Relying on the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court may overrule Roe v. Wade solely on the grounds of equal protection. Such a result would not return the matter of abortion to the states. The Fourteenth Amendment, properly interpreted, would thereafter prohibit abortion in every state.     

On deriving rights to goods from rights to freedom

This paper examines a particular type of argument often employed to defend welfare rights. This argument contends that welfare rights are a necessary supplement to liberty rights because rights to freedom become hollow when their bearers are not able to take advantage of their freedom. Rights to be provided with certain goods are thus a natural outgrowth of a genuine concern to protect freedom.I argue that this reasoning suffers from two fatal flaws. First, it rests on an erroneous notion of what it is to have a right, neglecting the fact that the exact source of a person's inability to exercise a right is crucial to determining whether that right is being respected. Second, the argument equivocates as to the freedom that rights are intended to protect, sometimes confusing freedom with ability, sometimes confusing not being free with not having other desired things, and sometimes confusing what a person is able to do with what a person is entitled to do.     

所有权主体在民法中的归依——对以所有制为基础的所有权形式的重新设计

先要澄清物权主体与所有权主体的概念范畴,依据我国立法,物权主体与所有权主体在外延上不是一致的,法人在我国可以成为他物权主体,但不能成为所有权主体。这种状况造成逻辑上的混乱。另外要澄清私人与自然人的概念,私人这个词不是严格的法律概念,因为它的内涵虽然意为“私”,但是“私”与“公”的比较从来是相对的,有一定参照前提的,法人中的成员相对于法人是“私”,法人是“公”;而法人相对与国家是“私”,所以用私人所有权取代自然人所有权不科学。应该根据民法的民事主体制度,打破原来的所有权“三分法”,建立新“三分法”。     

部分权利能力制度的构建

局限于19世纪的哲学认识,权利能力仅被赋予自然人和法人,其他人和组织形态的权利能力被忽略。因而,当迫切需要法律对这些人和组织予以调整时,传统权利能力的规定成为不可逾越的体系障碍,必须通过法律续造的方法构建部分权利能力制度。事实上,民法关于权利能力制度的构造以及立法上的一些规定已经为部分权利能力的构建提供了坚实的理论基础和立法例支撑。部分权利能力是在部分而非全部的民事法律关系中作为民事权利享有者和义务承担者的能力,它通过考察自然人和法人以外的人和组织的人格状态和特定法律关系的价值和目的来认定。部分权利能力是一个开放的概念,它不但包括胎儿、死者与合伙的部分权利能力,还包括其他一些人和组织的部分权利能力。     

Legal pragmatism and the pre-birth continuum: an absence of unifying principle

The common law has historically been clear - the rights of the unborn do not exist prior to birth. A child becomes a legal person and able to enforce legal rights upon being born alive and having a separate existence from her or his mother. This article assesses whether new developments in biomedical technologies have left this legal principle inviolate and explores what the state of law is in relation to pre-birth. It argues that there is a pre-birth continuum where the law punctuates points in a lineal timeline fashion as to when a pre-birth "non-entity" becomes a legal entity. The article concludes that there is no singular rule of law with respect to being or becoming a human but rather a collection of discrete and increasingly divergent legal categories. This recognition of a pre-birth continuum or timeline as to the legal recognition of this "non-entity" has significant ramifications for the future development of law and impacts on legal thinking about what it means to be human.     

论胎儿生命利益的刑法保护

自然人包括生命权在内的各项基本权利始于出生,终于死亡。胎儿因缺乏主体资格,从被侵害法益的层面来看,无法成为刑事被害人。现行刑法对伤害胎儿的行为按故意伤害处理,这与行为的本质和行为人的主观故意内容均存在较大的出入。无论从胎儿被侵害的可能性、与母体的相对独立性、还是从刑法与其他部门法的协调性等角度出发,对侵害胎儿的生命利益的行为都有必要设置独立的罪名。