Insuring legislative wealth transfers: theory and evidence

Authorities rely on reports from private citizens to detect and enforce more than a trivial portion of effective law-breaking. The present article is the first to study the cultural aspect of peer reporting experimentally. By collecting data in a post-Soviet country (Moldova), we focus in particular on how the Soviet legacy of using citizens as private informants may have a long-lasting effect on their willingness to cooperate with state authorities. We then contrast those effects with peer reporting behavior in France, a Western society. Our results suggest that participants in Moldova view cooperation with authorities as less socially acceptable than their counterparts in France. Our results also suggest that participants in Moldova engage less frequently in peer reporting than individuals in France. However, we also find that less peer reporting does not necessarily imply less tax compliance. Participants in both countries exhibit very similar tax compliance rates. We explain the effect of peer reporting on tax compliance in Moldova using the country's past experience during the Soviet era, when being reported to authorities was common and carried grave consequences.

     

The legislative consequences of Mexico’s mixed-member electoral system, 2000–2009

The emergence of mixed-member electoral systems across the globe has been an attempt to balance local representation through single-member districts (SMD) with programmatic representation through proportional representation lists (PR). However, there are several competing theoretical interpretations for the consequences of mixed systems on legislative bodies. Through a study of the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, I test several empirical implications of these competing theories by examining the impact of the electoral system on party discipline, participation, and legislative organization. I find little convincing evidence of differences between legislators elected through PR and those elected through SMD in their levels of party discipline, but I do find that PR legislators participate in a manner theoretically consistent with their mode of election. I also find that PR legislators have disproportionate control over key leadership positions. I suggest the primary reasons for these findings is due to differing methods of candidate selection and restricted use of dual candidacy.     

The June 2015 legislative election in Turkey

The Republic of Turkey held its first presidential election, which employed a universal suffrage based on popular vote, on 10 August 2014. Unlike most of the countries organizing separate ballots for electing the president and the MPs, Turkey did not hold both elections on the same day. Instead, the subsequent parliamentary election would be held ten months later, i.e. on 7 June 2015. The reason behind this is not only due to the differences of the term lengths between parliament and the President (which are four and five years respectively), but also the peculiarity in the inclusion of a “presidential element” (a president elected by popular vote) into a political regime which must still be seen as a parliamentary system. This oddness arose from the political crisis in 2007.     

The bargaining range in legislative district apportionment

One of the few laws of political science is the fairly regular relationship in any given plurality electoral system known as thecube law, transforming vote shares into seat shares. In this paper, we develop an altogether different and more robust paradigm relating seats to votes which generates similar results as the cube law. In our model, political parties bargain with each other for an expected number of seats using the ability to gerrymander in determining their bargaining strength. We find that an arbitrated solution to the seat-vote allocation problem generates solutions remarkably similar to the conventional cube-law-based solutions. Thus our model can in some way replace the cube law paradigm. With our model, we are able to evaluate the impact ofBaker v. Carr (1962) on gerrymandering. We also find that proportional representation results can be achieved within our model by allowing non-zero population deviations between districts.I am grateful for the comments and criticism of David Levy, Bernard Grofman, Charles Rowley, William Crain, and Robert Tollison. Responsibility for all errors, of course, remains mine alone. This paper does not necessarily reflect the views of the American Association of Retired Persons.     

"Bru-u-u-uce": The simple economics of mob goods

This paper provides a pure economic rationale for chronic excess demand for tickets to events like rock concerts. The model focuses on "mob goods", which are consumed jointly with crowd reaction, or "noise". Whereas the primary commodity is provided by the seller, the joint product is provided collectively by buyers. If propensities to make noise are inversely correlated with reservation prices and a capacity constraint applies, excess demand (queuing) is a necessary condition for profit maximization. One important implication is that anti-scalping laws may be welfare-increasing. The paper explores other applications in professional sports, restaurants, and on-stage theatre.     

The strategic determinants of legislative malapportionment in new democracies

When the number of seats to be elected in the districts of an electoral system is not proportional to their population, the cost of seats in raw votes tends to vary across districts. Malapportionment generates partisan bias when some parties do better (worse) in the districts where seats are cheaper (costlier) than in other districts. While existing research has focused on the exogenous determinants of malapportionment, in this article we argue that malapportionment also derives from the strategic decisions of ruling elites to maximize their legislative representation. The degree of malapportionment in newly democratized countries increases when ruling policymakers have reliable ex ante information about the geographical distribution of partisan support, and the authoritarian incumbent, at the moment of democratic transition, is strong. Our arguments are tested with original data from 60 third and fourth-wave democracies at national and district levels.