The causes of legal rents extraction: evidence from Spanish municipalities

This paper analyzes the causes of legal political rent extraction by using a direct measure of it, namely, local top politicians’ wages. In particular, we investigate whether local politicians’ incentives to extract rents by setting their own wages are influenced by the degree of political competition and voter information. We use a sample of the largest Spanish municipalities over the years 2008–2010. The results indicate that weaker political competition and lesser voter information are related to more rent extraction. In an additional analysis, we show that higher wages do not ensure better financial management. These findings confirm that when politicians can set their own salaries, higher wages do not mean better management, but they are just political rents.     

Seeking rents in the shadow of Coase

In this paper, we study a two-stage rent-seeking game. In the first stage, contestants compete à-la-Tullock; in the second stage, the winner can resell the rent à-la-Coase. We consider a complete information Tullock game in which the contestants have different valuations for the rent. The analysis focuses on the ex ante effects of a secondary market on efforts, payoffs, rent-dissipation and rent-misallocation. We show that the secondary market, while correcting possible misallocations, may exacerbate rent dissipation. In some situations, the increase in rent dissipation more than offsets the allocative advantage, so that a secondary market might reduce welfare. We further show how the effect of ex post tradeability on welfare depends on the parties’ bargaining power and valuations of the rent, also considering the case of endogenous bargaining power.     

Democracy,dictators and the regulation of arms exports: The UK and Iraq

Chris Cowley, Guns, Lies and Spies: How We Armed Iraq (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1992). Pp.273. £7.99.

Paul Henderson, The Unlikely Spy (London, Bloomsbury, 1993). Pp.294. £16.99.

David Leigh, Betrayed: The Real Story of the Matrix Churchill Trial (London, Bloomsbury, 1993). Pp.271. £5.99.

John Sweeney, Trading With the Enemy: Britain's Arming of Iraq (London, Pan Books, 1993). Pp.197. £5.99.     

The incumbency dilemma and rent extraction by legislators

An incumbent is able to shirk or otherwise obtain rents based on his tenure of office because more senior representatives are better able to advance their legislative agendas than are more junior members. The realization of incumbent rents implies that an electoral prisoners' dilemma occurs at the level of voters across electoral districts. Pivotal voters in each district would benefit if all incumbents were replaced by challengers with similar legislative programs because the cost of incumbent rents can be avoided, but each benefits if his representative has more seniority than those from other districts.     

The distribution of honoraria income in the U.S. Congress: Who gets rents in legislatures and why?

The major conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that low-cost suppliers of political favors receive the highest honoraria incomes. There is no evidence that being a lawyer, acquiring a large number of committee assignments, receiving high ratings by labor unions, representing a safe district, or introducing numerous legislative bills, increases one's honoraria income in any significant way. The wider dispersal of power reduces the effects of seniority, and membership on the Finance Committee, in determining institutional power in the Senate; hence, these variables are only significantly related to honoraria income in the House. The smaller the number of suppliers in the Senate, relative to the House, means that senators obtain higher prices for their services. As a result, business groups are more willing to pay extra — a price premium — to assure that no shirking occurs.While the distribution of honoraria has caused considerable concern and given rise to cynical explanations as to who gets them and why (see, for example, McChesney, 1987), this analysis suggests a less pejorative but empirically valid conclusion: business, and therefore honoraria, gravitate to those who can supply political favors at a lower cost than other legislators, just as low-cost suppliers gain a greater proportion of the sales in the market than those who supply the same service but at a higher price.     

氯化银沉淀提取金属银之方法探讨

本文研究了利用碳酸盐与氯化银在高温下作用生成碳酸银,从而提取出高纯银.同时,对方法中碳酸盐与氯化银的配比进行了研究,得出了较优化的实验条件.     

试论法治信仰

法治包含着这样三层意蕴 :法治意味着法律至上 ,法治意味着民治、自治 ,法治意味着理性的选择。法治被信仰取决于法律的普遍社会服从性 ,取决于参与法律实践活动要素的完备性和协调性 ,取决于普法教育的社会性效果 ,建立这种信仰是一个渐进式的社会演进过程。     

论依法治国的制约因素

依法治国将是一个长期和艰辛的过程,不可避免地会受到传统法律文化、法学理论、司法体制及过低的人口素质的制约.     

论列宁对马克思主义物质观的发展

作为彻底的唯物主义者,马克思和恩格斯并未给物质下过明确的定义。在自然科学不断取得发展的情况下,为了辩驳唯心主义的反诘,列宁给出了物质的明确定义,并把哲学基本问题表述为物质和意识的关系问题,有力地反驳了唯心主义,捍卫了唯物主义,并丰富和发展了马克思主义的物质观。     

江泽民依法治国论

实行依法治国,建设社会主义法治国家,是以江泽民同志为核心的党的第三代领导集体对邓小平民主与法制建设理论的继承与发展,是党领导人民治理国家的基本方略。依法治国,是党的领导、发扬人民民主和严格依法办事的统一,是政治体制改革的重要内容。依法治国是一项巨大的系统工程,从立法、行政、司法和普法教育等方面有大量艰苦的工作要做。加强对权力的监督制约,实行依法治国与以德治国并举是依法行政的重要保障。     

人体携毒案件中的证据形式及其固定

利用人的身体携带毒品,在我国并不是一个独立的罪名,而是走私、贩卖、运输毒品犯罪中一种越来越常见的藏毒形式。人体携带毒品犯罪中的证据,既有其他案件中常见的证据形式和证据特点,也有其独有的证据形式及证据特点。昆明铁路公安局在对近十年查获的人体携带毒品案件进行综合分析后,基于犯罪嫌疑人藏毒、携毒的方式,以及查缉手段、技术设备的应用,对这类案件中的常见证据及其固定、收集,进行了深入的研究探讨。