South Korea's elusive middlepowermanship: regional or global player?

South Korea aspires to a larger regional and global role, fuelled by economic success, and complemented by cultural and diplomatic achievement. However, a gap exists between the rhetoric and reality of its foreign policy. This paper examines Seoul's middle-power activism. It poses questions about the conceptual deficit of ‘middle power’, proffering an operational definition in illuminating the characteristic identity formation of middle powers. It analyses how the Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak governments sought to articulate their respective middle-power foreign policy aspirations. Finally, it investigates how domestic political and institutional conditions shape Republic of Korea foreign policy, and identifies policy implications.     

From rule-taker to rule-promoting regulatory state: South Korea in the nearly-global competition regime

When rapid economic growth catapults a country within a few years from the margins of the global economy to middle power status, does global regulatory governance need to brace for a challenge to the status quo? To answer this question, we extend the power transition theory of global economic governance to middle powers: A rising middle power should be expected to challenge the international regulatory status quo only if increasing issue-specific strength of its regulatory state coincides with preferences that diverge from the preferences of the established powers, which are enshrined in the status quo. We examine this argument empirically, focusing on South Korea in the realm of competition law and policy. We find that South Korea, a non-participant in the international competition regime until the 1980s, developed in the 1990s substantial regulatory capacity and capability and thus “spoiler potential.” At the same time, however, its policy preferences converged upon the norms and practices established by the United States and the European Union, albeit with some distinct elements. Under these conditions, we expect a transition from rule-taker to rule-promoter. We find that South Korea has indeed in recent years begun to actively promote well-established competition law and policy norms and practices – supplemented by its distinct elements – through technical assistance programs, as well as various bilateral channels and multilateral institutions. The findings suggest that the power transition theory of global economic governance is usefully applicable to middle powers, too.     

Contested multilateralism 2.0 and regional order transition: causes and implications

This article proposes a new concept of ‘contested multilateralism 2.0’ to describe the puzzling institutional building efforts by non-ASEAN members after the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) in the Asia-Pacific. It suggests that different to ‘multilateralism 1.0’ of the 1990s, which was mainly led by ASEAN, this wave of multilateralism has been initiated by other powers, such as the United States, China, Japan, Australia and South Korea, either by forming new institutions or by reinvigorating existing ones. This article advances an institutional balancing argument. It suggests that ‘contested multilateralism 2.0’ is a result of institutional balancing among major states under the conditions of high strategic uncertainty and high economic interdependence after the GFC. One unintended consequence may be that it could well lead to a more peaceful transformation of the regional order in the Asia-Pacific if regional security hotspots, such as the Korean crisis and the South China Sea dispute, can be managed appropriately.     

Future of South Korea–Japan Relations: Decoupling or Liberal Discourse

South Korea–Japan relations are at their lowest point in decades, as colonial era disputes flare once again. Most pundits argue that the South Korean public is strongly united against Japan. We argue that South Korean elites are sharply divided over how to manage the crisis; this division is starting to impact how South Koreans understand colonial era narratives; and, long-term, bilateral relations depend on how these growing divisions play out. Despite state censorship, a rising counter-narrative in South Korea challenges the dominant, Manichaean, anti-Japanese one. For the first time, Korea and Japan have a realistic chance of reconciling based on liberal public discourse and a nuanced, empirically based understanding of history.     

China's economic slowdown: implications for Beijing's institutional power and global governance role

China's spectacular economic growth over the past decades has given rise to a more confident and proactive China in global governance. China is now an institution-builder, with new Chinese-led institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank designed to cement Beijing's central role in global economic governance. What, then, are the potential implications of a slowing economy for China's institutional power and global governance role? This article locates China's economic growth and slowdown in broader discussions about China's global position and questions about responsibility, order and governance. It argues that China's economic slowdown will not result in a drastic impact on Beijing's institutional power as there are key material, historical and ideational drivers at play here. Unless China is confronted with the prospect of an economic collapse, it will continue to pursue an active institutional role, speak the rhetoric of South–South solidarity with emerging economies and seek a leadership role in reforming global economic governance, even with a slowing economy, because this is intrinsically tied to its identity and how China now positions itself in an evolving global order.     

Foreign policy as a socially divisive issue: the KORUS free-trade agreement

While the Korea–United States (KORUS) free-trade agreement negotiations were concluded in 2007, and ratified in 2011, the agreement has remained deeply controversial. Labor unions, civil society groups, and opposition politicians in South Korea have criticized the agreement as being unfair, and also in the United States have voices spoken out against the agreement. The process of negotiation by South Korea was deeply flawed, and the conclusion of the agreement, that included a unilateral ratification by the ruling party in National Assembly, was forcefully opposed by many groups in South Korean society with violent demonstrations leading almost to the collapse of the Lee Myung-bak government. This article argues that it was not only the perception of potential economic damage to, in particular agricultural, domestic interest that was the main cause of the public resistance to the agreement, but that the unique nature of the relationship with the United States, and how this influenced the progress of negotiating and ratifying the agreement in South Korea, was a leading course of the divisiveness of the agreement and the massive resistance it faced. This is also why while the conservative Park Geun-hye government has expressed its willingness to re-negotiate other free-trade agreements, it has remained adamant in its refusal to even consider reopening the KORUS agreement. It is not only the apparent trade benefits that accrued to South Korea that is behind this refusal. With the ruling party having lost the April 2016 National Assembly elections and presidential elections scheduled for December 2017, the conservative elite, concerned about its electoral fate, has no interest in re-opening such a divisive issue as the KORUS free-trade agreement.     

South Korea under the United States–China rivalry: dynamics of the economic-security nexus in trade policymaking

With the advent of the Trump administration and the subsequent U.S.–China trade conflict, South Korea's trade policy is under immense pressure. The KORUS FTA has been pushed for renegotiation while the China–South Korea trade relations have stumbled after the THAAD deployment to South Korea. This challenge can be characterized by the economic-security nexus shifted from positive to negative: that is, South Korea is compelled to either sacrifice its economic benefits in favor of security interest or vice versa. In contrast to Japan that seeks to retain TPP as a way of benefitting from a regionwide trade integration and balancing both Trump unilateralism and Chinese mercantilist influence, South Korea is forced to play a more complex game. Given its deep yet asymmetric economic interdependence with China and North Korean security threats, South Korea needs to accommodate China while at the same time courting US engagement in resolving the North Korean nuclear problems.     

Rule-takers,rule-makers,or rule-promoters? Turkey and Mexico's role as rising middle powers in global economic governance

Rising middle powers play increasingly active international roles, yet so far we lack systematic analyses of their aspirations and impact on global economic governance. This paper addresses this gap. I argue that the role that rising middle powers assume in global economic governance depends on the degree of alignment of their regulatory preferences with those of established powers, and on the strength of their regulatory institutions. If their preferences are aligned and they develop high regulatory capacity in an issue area, they will aspire to promote existing global rules in their own region. They will engage in regional rule-promotion because of growing economic ties to their region, and also because their regulatory agencies are socialized into these rules within transgovernmental networks. I explore these arguments empirically through case studies of two rising middle powers, Turkey and Mexico, in the global governance of competition law and policy.     

Work disincentive perceptions and welfare state attitudes: A survey experiment in South Korea

Scholars and policymakers have long examined whether and to what extent public income transfer programs create work disincentives. Less explored are the patterns and mechanisms through which perceived work disincentives shape public attitudes toward such programs. The present article bridges this gap by examining how individuals' exposure to a moral hazard discourse affects their support for an income transfer program. Our original survey experiment in South Korea finds that the effect of an identically worded piece of moral hazard information plays out differently depending on the eligibility criteria of the program in question (means‐tested vs. universal) and the economic status of the respondents. The findings have significant implications for understanding the support base for the welfare state in the context of resurging interest in basic/guaranteed income.     

China's engagement-oriented strategy towards North Korea: achievements and limitations

In response to the challenge of unstable North Korea (weak economy, weapons of mass destruction [WMD] development), China has followed an engagement-oriented strategy based on diplomatic persuasion, economic interaction and moderate economic sanctions. Intensified engagement (2009–2012) facilitated North Korean convergence with China in respect of economic reform but divergence has persisted over WMD development. Despite the widening of divergence since 2013, China has refrained from applying crippling sanctions. This article seeks to explain these diverging results and their implications for China's strategy towards North Korea. Reviewing recent literature and data, it will argue that Chinese economic input reinforced the trend of economic reform that formed the basis of political consolidation under the new hereditary regime. On the other hand, the prospect of stable dependence on China ran counter to that regime's pursuit of WMDs as the basis of security and diplomatic diversification. These mixed results reveal the limits of China's strategy: its economic input involuntarily reinforces North Korea's WMD potential but it is not prepared to accept the risks of enforcing WMD restraint by crippling sanctions either. With limited room for manoeuvre, the attainment of China's strategic objectives ultimately depends upon policy change from the US or South Korea.     

Australian Federalism: A Prospective Assessment

On 1 January 2001, Australia celebrated the centenary of itsfederal Constitution. Throughout its history, the Australianfederal system has proved both resilient and flexible, servingthe Commonwealth through the trials of depression, total war,imperial decline, and economic reconstruction. The constitutionalsystem has been developed through interpretation by the HighCourt and popular input via referendums, as well as by the ongoingprocess of intergovernmental relations. There has been an overallexpansion of Commonwealth powers with the politics of nation-building,but the states remain significantly powerful although financiallydependent on the Commonwealth. Given the institutional and popularsuccess of Australian federalism, the challenges facing theCommonwealth in the new century are not expected to be domesticor constitutional, but strategic and economic: principally,how a smallish middle power should meet the difficulties ofglobalization and security from a position of relative isolationadjacent to Asia in the southern Pacific.     

Protest by candlelight: A comparative analysis of candlelight vigils in South Korea

ABSTRACT

Protest activist leaders must make a series of decisions about the strategies they use; one such decision is the choice of tactic or performance, often informed by their cultural historic contentious repertoire. In South Korea's contentious repertoire, the use of candlelight vigils has become an increasingly prevalent form of protest tactic. Candlelight vigils have become an increasingly prominent tactic in South Korea’s repertoire over the last two decades, as evidenced by major candlelight vigils in 2002, 2008, and 2016-2017. In this study, we explore the ways in which candlelight vigils as a protest tactic have evolved over time in South Korea. We notably find that vigils emerged as a left-wing protest tactic in 2002, but right-wing protesters began adopting the tactic during the counter-protests opposing President Park Geun-Hye’s impeachment in 2016–2017 (Taegeukgi Giphoei). Additionally, we find that candlelight vigils drew participants from an increasingly wide swath of society over time and average citizens assumed greater organizational roles. This research not only contributes to the literature on South Korean social movements and civil society, but to understanding candlelight vigils as a distinct form of protest and how contentious repertoires evolve over time more broadly.     

North and South Korean Space Development: Prospects for Cooperation and Conflict

North and South Korea both have developed rocket technology for military and civilian applications, but their space programs differ in many important aspects. As late developing space powers, neither country poses a serious direct threat to U.S. space assets, but a successful U.S. cooperative engagement strategy towards the Koreas could help achieve U.S. policy objectives. The domestic politics of the two Koreas are very different, and Korean space development will depend upon a number of variables including inter-Korean relations and whether the two Koreas unify, domestic politics and budget constraints, the overall strategic environment, as well as opportunities for Korea in the realm of international space cooperation. The United States has opportunities to implement an engagement strategy in Korea, but it could be complicated by different U.S. objectives in North and South Korea, and by linkage to other issues. Despite the complexities, Washington should be prepared for a number of possibilities.     

Shimane Prefecture,Tokyo and the territorial dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima: regional and national identities in Japan

Abstract

This paper joins the debate on Japan's territorial dispute with South Korea over the Dokdo/Takeshima islets. Informed by the ontological security framework of analysis, this paper seeks to explain the decision to adopt the ‘Takeshima Day’ ordinance by the Shimane Prefectural Assembly and the subsequent ascendance of ‘Takeshima’ to the fore of Japan's identity construction vis-à-vis the Korean ‘other’. In this paper, I distinguish between two processes: one that led to the adoption of the ordinance and another that resulted in the entrenchment of ‘Takeshima’ in Japan's identity construction vis-à-vis the Korean ‘other’. The paper argues that the former process should be understood within the context of Shimane Prefecture's distinct identity construction vis-à-vis Tokyo, while the latter can be attributed to recent changes in Japan–Korea relations unrelated to the territorial dispute per se.     

Multilateral CBMs on the Korean Peninsula: Making a virtue out of necessity

Abstract

As its economy has become near to collapse, North Korea has tried to avoid direct contacts with South Korea because of the ‘absorption phobia’. Instead, the North has made continuous efforts to improve its relations only with the United States, seeking a guarantee for its survival. Given this circumstance, this paper argues that useful multilateral approaches such as KEDO and Four‐Party Talks will contribute to improving inter‐Korean relations. Thus, it would be sensible to explore every possible way (even through multilateral mechanisms) until both Koreas make a breakthrough for the deadlocked inter‐Korean CBMs. But the multilateral CBMs constitute a transitional and complementary role as South and North Korea should be primarily responsible for addressing major problems such as reunification. Among the multilateral approaches, the Four‐Party Talks will be a most useful mechanism which will enable the two Koreas to resume dialogue for the peace and reunification on the Korean Peninsula. In this peace process, more positive roles of major powers are also requested.     

Development and security in international aid to North Korea: commonalities and differences among the European Union,the United States and South Korea

In this paper, we contend that the nexus of security and development lies in the crux of challenges confronting human security and aid failure in North Korea. We first review academic and policy discourses concerning the security-development nexus. We then analyse how the nexus works out its logic in North Korea by exploring how insecurity and underdevelopment have fed into each other, producing a vicious cycle that complicates efforts to address human security in North Korea. In the third and main section, we examine the ways in which South Korea, the USA and the EU provided for assistance to North Korea from 1995 to 2012 at national and international policy levels. We analyse their approaches to international aid and identify differences and commonalities in them so as to better understand how aid giving exacerbates or mitigates the insecurity/underdevelopment and then impacts on the development-security nexus. We finally conclude with a consideration of various strategies to help overcome the dual challenges of underdevelopment and insecurity that besiege North Korea.     

The sustained incremental multi-actor multi-action building of South Korean soft power in Indonesia

ABSTRACT

Since the end of the East–West divide in the 1990s, the world has slowly lost its US-based unipolarity to globalisation, and a shift towards East Asia. This phenomenon has given more space to middle powers and furthered the embeddedness of the political, economic, and cultural spheres into the dynamics of social structures. It is highly visible when observed from the digital communication standpoint, which has become pervasive. In this context, the study of international power has moved towards the concept of soft power, which remains a fuzzy concept concerning ‘who’ and ‘what’. We define power as a continuum, in which various types of public and private actors carry out different types of coercive to cooptive actions in various but embedded spheres. We propose an empirically tractable conceptual framework that we use as a tool to analyse soft power within a hard-to-soft power spectrum, in which the articulation, dynamics and incremental nature of soft power become observable. We illustrate our point with the case study of South Korean power in Indonesia in the twenty-first century and draw conceptual as well as practical conclusions.     

Japanese policy and the North Korean ‘soft landing’

Abstract

The nature of security on the Korean Peninsula has undergone fundamental change in the post‐Cold War period, characterized by the growing recognition on the part of the major regional powers that there is a need for economic as well as military approaches to security and conflict avoidance. The chief manifestation of this trend is the emergence of the US Department of State's ‘soft landing’ and other engagement policies as attempts to resolve North Korean security threats. Some commentators have seen the soft‐landing policy as an opportunity for Japan to use its economic power to contribute to regional and international security. This article examines the evolution and rationale of the soft‐landing policy, how Japanese policy‐makers evaluate its potential as a solution to the North Korean security problem and the current extent of Japan's contribution to it. The article also points out the‐limitations of Japanese support for the soft landing due to international restrictions on the Japanese government's room for diplomatic manoeuvre, domestic political obstacles to engaging North Korea and the general lack of Japanese private business interest in the North. Finally the conclusion shows that, despite the recognition of the need to engage North Korea economically, Japanese policy‐makers have devoted their energies principally to the redefinition of the US‐Japan military alliance based on the legitimacy of the North Korean threat.     

Better by design: Korea's neoliberal economy

Abstract

This paper examines the processes of bank and corporate restructuring in South Korea since the 1997–98 economic crisis, and seeks to highlight how the state has intervened in a highly dirigiste manner in order to expedite restructuring in both the commercial bank and corporate sectors. At the same time it demonstrates the clear neoliberal principles that have underpinned the state's attempts to promote restructuring. The state has shown a clear determination to take action against insolvent firms and financial institutions no matter how large or strategically important they may be, to impose hard budget constraints on key economic actors. Furthermore, the state has actively sought to engineer the sale of key domestic firms and banks to foreign investors. We argue that Korea's efforts to create a functioning neoliberal economy have been largely successful and are functional from the perspective of Korean capitalism, if not the perspective of individual Korean firms. Changes in the global economy in the two decades preceding the 1997–98 crisis imposed an increasingly inescapable pressure on the Korean state to effect a neoliberal transformation and Korea's future as a centre of capitalist accumulation has for some time been bound up with the success of the neoliberal project. In conclusion, this paper seeks to draw out the broader implications of this reading of the post-crisis restructuring programme for debates on global economic liberalization and the future of capitalist diversity.