Toward a Theory of Fiscal Slack

Though the fiscal slack literature has advanced over the past decade, more research is needed for a systematic understanding of the determinants and uses of fiscal reserves at the local level. This paper reviews theory and empirical evidence on the determinants of municipal fiscal reserves offers a conceptual framework for analyzing fiscal reserves accumulation and tests a series of hypotheses using a panel of 2007–2012 financial data for 145 U.S. cities from 21 states. Generalized least squares models show that unassigned general fund balances and unrestricted net assets are positively associated with general fund surpluses in the previous year and with local household incomes, while not being related to measures of fiscal risk, revenue effort, and voter characteristics. Overall, the findings suggest a relatively stronger influence of the capacity to save than the need to save on local fiscal reserves.     

Does fiscal decentralization constrain Leviathan? New evidence from local property tax competition

This paper reexamines whether fiscal decentralization constrains Leviathan government. Using panel data for Pennsylvania, we compare actual property tax rates to the Leviathan revenue-maximizing rates for municipalities, school districts, and counties. Using spatial econometric methods we also estimate the degree of spatial dependence at the three levels of local government. We find that fiscal decentralization results in stronger intergovernmental competition and lower tax rates. We also find evidence of collusion among school districts that exhibit high interdependence but also high tax rates. This calls into question the current literature??s blind use of spatial dependence as a measure of intergovernmental competition.     

Local Fiscal Distress: Measurement and Prediction

During and after the Great Recession, many local governments were compelled to declare fiscal emergencies, lay off workers, and cut services while others weathered the recession without needing to take such actions. In this paper, we construct an action‐based measure of fiscal distress using comprehensive annual financial reports, budgets, and media coverage and then use it as a dependent variable to model fiscal distress as a function of past financial performance and socio‐economic environment. The empirical models show the relative importance of fiscal reserves, debt, and revenue composition in predicting local fiscal distress.     

Explaining Fiscal Balances with a Simultaneous Equation Model of Revenue and Expenditure: A Case Study of Swiss Cantons Using Panel Data

Empirical literature on the analysis of the efficiency of measures for reducing persistent government deficits has mainly focused on the direct explanation of deficit. By contrast, this paper aims at modeling government revenue and expenditure within a simultaneous framework and deriving the fiscal balance (surplus or deficit) equation as the difference between the two variables. This setting enables one to not only judge how relevant the explanatory variables are in explaining the fiscal balance but also understand their impact on revenue and/or expenditure. Our empirical results, obtained by using a panel data set on Swiss Cantons for the period 1980–2002, confirm the relevance of the approach followed here, by providing unambiguous evidence of a simultaneous relationship between revenue and expenditure. They also reveal strong dynamic components in revenue, expenditure, and fiscal balance. Among the significant determinants of public fiscal balance we not only find the usual business cycle elements, but also and more importantly institutional factors such as the number of administrative units, and the ease with which people can resort to political (direct democracy) instruments, such as public initiatives and referendum.     

Fiscal Slack and Counter‐Cyclical Expenditure Stabilization: A First Look at the Local Level

There is a rich literature on how state governments use slack fiscal resources—most often in the form of rainy day funds and budget stabilization funds—to minimize the effect of economic downturns. This paper presents the first known examination of whether slack resources have the same counter‐cyclical effects at the local level. It uses a panel data set to determine whether one particular form of local fiscal slack, general fund balance, stabilizes current annual expenditures among a sample of 103 Minnesota cities from 1990 to 2000. The findings suggest different fund balance portions have marginal but nonetheless important effects on expenditures.     

Fragmented Government Effects on Fiscal Policy: New Evidence

Using a panel of 22 OECD countries over the 1971–1996period, this paper extends previous literature on the effectsof fragmented government on fiscal policy outcomes in variousdirections. First, we focus on data relating to centralgovernment as alltheories refer to central government. Second, we also examinegovernment's position vis-à-vis parliament andgovernment's political fragmentation. We find evidence thatmore fragmented governmentshave higher deficits, while governments that have a largemajority in parliament have lower deficits. Right-winggovernments appear to have been fiscally more responsible inthe seventies. Political fragmentation does not affect agovernment's budget deficit.     

Exit,Voice, and Mimicking Behavior: Evidence from Swiss Cantons

Previous empirical literature hasshown that in order to overcome agencyproblems voters make inter-jurisdictionalcomparisons of fiscal performance whenmaking electoral decisions. Incumbents therefore anticipate voters'feedback by copying fiscal policy decisionsfrom neighbors. This paper argues thatfiscal autonomy (exit) as well as directlegislation (voice) enrich politicalcompetition, reducing thus the influence of electoral competition onfiscal decisions. Consequently, policymimicking does not matter in circumstancesof direct legislation and fiscal autonomywhere the impact of voters on the politicalagenda is particularly strong. Based onpanel data between 1980 and 1998 we findencouraging evidence supporting ourtheoretical arguments.     

Oil,elections and fiscal transparency

How does governments’ ability to gain financing from oil income affect their behaviour? Numerous studies have explored the effects of oil wealth on countries’ political characteristics, especially the level of democracy. Oil has also been associated with a significant electoral incumbency advantage across different political regimes. However, the relationship between oil wealth and incumbent governments’ behaviour, including election-year fiscal manipulation, has been studied to a lesser extent. This article argues that higher oil rents increase election-year public spending as they provide national governments both with direct revenue and increased financing opportunities. However, fiscal transparency mitigates this effect. Consequently, oil-induced electoral budget cycles decrease as fiscal transparency increases. Using a high-quality measure of fiscal transparency in a panel of countries, robust evidence in favour of this argument is found. The findings suggest that many of the previous results on the political effects of oil, including incumbency advantage, might run through an election-year spending channel, and that fiscal institutions might matter substantially for the political effects of oil.     

The political economy of local government financialization and the role of policy diffusion

By analyzing why English local governments have made extensive use of long-term market loans with embedded derivatives, this paper seeks to contribute to the growing literature on local government financialization. Using an original, large-N panel dataset for the period from 1998 to 2014, we show that the configuration of the local political economy is an important driver of financialization processes: a Labour Party majority as well as fiscal and economic stress make it more likely that councils adopt risky financial instruments. As the use of financial innovations has also diffused geographically, policy diffusion impacts local governments as well. Highlighting the conditional effect of finance sector power, which only increases the use of financial innovations in very large councils, as well as the temporal dimension of fiscal and economic stress, we create ample avenues for further research.     

Does public sector efficiency matter? Revisiting the relation between fiscal size and economic growth in a world sample

This paper revisits the relationship between fiscal size and economic growth. Our work differs from the empirical growth literature because this relationship depends explicitly on the efficiency of the public sector. We use a sample of 64 countries, both developed and developing, in four five-year time periods between 1980 and 2000. Building on the work of Afonso et al. (Public Choice 123:321–347, 2005), we construct a measure of public sector efficiency in each country and each time period by calculating an output-to-input ratio. In addition, we get an estimate of technical efficiency of public spending for 52 countries from 1995 to 2000 by employing a stochastic frontier analysis. Using these two measures, we find evidence of a non-monotonic relation between fiscal size and economic growth that depends critically on the size-efficiency mix.     

Revisiting the (lack of) association between objective and subjective measures of local fiscal condition

Recent fiscal condition literature has been attentive to the consistency between subjective measures of local fiscal condition based on public officials' perceptions and their objective counterparts measured using financial data. Studies have found little evidence of a relationship between them, leading scholars to speculate flaws in measurement or intentional lack of association. This study reevaluates the issue by investigating intervening explanations for the absence of connection. Analyzing survey and audited financial data from 185 municipalities across 31 states, we identify various individual and organizational attributes that help clarify the association between the two types of fiscal condition measures.     

转移支付对地方财政收入稳定效应的实证分析——基于中国省市县三级面板数据

从理论上讲,政府间转移支付可以作为稳定政策工具发挥作用。尤其自1994年以来,中央对地方的转移支付已成为地方各级政府重要的财政收入来源,然而,对于转移支付在财政收入稳定性方面发挥的作用,无论是政策制定者和学术研究者均没有注意到。为此,本文利用1993-2005年中国7个省861个县（区）的财政面板数据,把偏离趋势值变动的比率作为因变量,运用固定效应模型和Prais-Winsten模型或者Cochrane-Oreutt模型,实证分析了转移支付对省、市、县（区）财政收入稳定效应。实证结果表明转移支付对省、市、县（区）财政收入有较大的拉动作用,而且当财政收入处于下降阶段时,转移支付的稳定效应更加明显。所以,有必要重新反思政府间转移支付的目标,将其稳定作用纳入政策制订目标和实施效果的考虑范围,并考虑把转移支付作为稳定地方财政的一种政策工具。     

Assessing the Financial Impact of Natural Disasters on Local Governments

In recent decades, the increase in the frequency and the severity of natural disasters has posed growing challenges to governments’ disaster response activities. Disasters can have a considerable financial impact on local governments, but this impact has not been systematically analyzed. This study assesses disaster impact using 17 years of panel data (between 1996 and 2012) from the city and county governments in New York state. The research examines many aspects of local governments’ financial conditions, including liquidity, fund balance, and debt. It tests whether governments’ financial conditions are affected by disasters and whether fiscal institutions moderate disasters’ impacts. The results show that a local government's unreserved fund balance and disaster reserve significantly affect its financial condition, while financial condition indicators are not significantly impacted by natural disasters when the fiscal institution variables are controlled.     

Political budget cycles and election outcomes

This paper addresses two empirical questions. Is fiscal policy affected by upcoming elections? If so, do election-motivated fiscal policies enhance the probability of re-election of the incumbent? Employing data for 65 democratic countries over 1975–2005 in a semi-pooled panel model, we find that in most countries fiscal policy is hardly affected by elections. The countries for which we find a significant political budget cycle are very diverse. They include ‘young’ democracies but also ‘established’ democracies. In countries with a political budget cycle, election-motivated fiscal policies have a significant positive (but fairly small) effect on the electoral support for the political parties in government.     

Financial Condition and Internal Control Deficiencies: Evidence From New York Counties

In recent years, significant attention has been given to measuring the financial condition of local governments, predicting when those governments will experience fiscal distress, and understanding how public managers navigate financial shortfalls. Researchers have given less focus, however, to understanding how financial condition affects other financial management practices—such as the administrative systems used to ensure financial accountability. This study uses a 19-year panel of county-level data from New York State to examine whether financial condition affects the likelihood of internal control deficiencies. The findings indicate that the incidence and severity of internal control deficiencies increase as financial condition deteriorates.     

Ready to Bargain: The Effect of Fiscal Stress on Supermajority Requirements to Raise Taxes

This paper analyzes the interaction effect between fiscal stress and supermajority requirements to raise taxes. I hypothesize that fiscal stress nullifies the effects of supermajority requirements, making states with and without supermajority requirements equally likely to raise taxes during these periods. This conclusion was drawn from a theory on how fiscal stress affects the legislative bargaining environment. The hypothesis was tested using data from 49 states from 1980 to 2010, and the results confirmed expectations. This research contributes to a growing literature that suggests that the effect of institutions cannot be analyzed without considering the context of the political environment.     

Do fiscal rules cause budgetary outcomes?

This paper focuses on the observed empirical relationship between fiscal rules and budget deficits, and examines whether this correlation is driven by an omitted variable, namely voter preferences. We make use of two different estimation methods to capture voter preferences in a panel of Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions. First, we include a recently constructed measure of fiscal preferences. Second, we capture preferences through fixed effects with a structural break as women are enfranchised. We find that fiscal rules continue to have a significant impact on real budget balances.     

Political budget cycles and media freedom

This paper examines the effects of elections on the conduct of central governments' fiscal policies. To do so, it uses a unique panel database that includes disaggregated spending and revenue series at the central government level for multiple countries over the 1975–2010 period. Examining political environments under which incumbent governments generate political budget cycles (PBCs), and comparing the relative importance of factors influencing cycles, we identify media freedom as the factor that plays the most critical role. This result provides a micro-foundation for rational opportunistic models for PBCs that rely on asymmetry of information about politicians' competence, and also offers a way to relate different conditioning factors of PBCs, including fiscal transparency and the maturity of democracies. Further, we show that the election-year rise in budget deficits under low media freedom is primarily driven by an increase in the current, not capital, component of public expenditure.     

Is The National Budget Controllable?

Previous scholarly analyses of national spending have shown a penchant for incre-mentalism in interpreting changes. They have also focused almost exclusively on annual national outlays or annual expenditures. This article argues that, in many cases, budget authority figures provide a better basis for analyzing the national budget. The author gathered annual budget authority (BA) figures from fiscal years 1969 to 1993 and used this BA data for an empirical test of budget controllability. If the national budget has or has not been controlled in the recent past, then it should help us to judge whether or not it is controllable now. Five potential major budget interventions from fiscal year 1980 to 1993 were tested using an interrupted time-series and two regression models. Different intervention results are anticipated depending upon whether one has a policy perspective that is incrementalist, international systemic, or domestic political. The analysis provides more support for the domestic political perspective than for incrementalist or international systemic views. Budget authority was found to be superior to outlays for linking budget results to policy decisions. The national budget responded appropriately to policy decisions in the recent past. In this sense, the budget was controlled and we should view it as controllable.     

The effect of school district and municipal government financial health information on local tax election outcomes: evidence from fiscal stress labels in Ohio

A key informational asymmetry in local public finance is the lack of information available to local residents regarding the financial status of the school districts and local governments in which they reside. Given that voters in many states must approve property and income tax increases for these local entities, the lack of full information on the financial status of these local entities may lead to sub-optimal voting decisions. State financial intervention systems have begun to make financial problems more salient to residents, potentially alleviating these informational asymmetries. This paper examines the effect of the Ohio fiscal stress labeling program on voting outcomes and the tax-setting behavior of local officials for school district and municipal government tax referendums. We use a difference-in-differences approach to examine data from over 3000 school district and 2300 municipality property tax elections from 2004 to 2012. While we find minimal evidence that the yes vote share changed for school district referendums following fiscal stress label receipt, we find very large increases (15 to 23 percentage points) in the likelihood of referendum passage for school districts following label receipt. We do not find much evidence of changes in the likelihood of passage or the yes vote share following label receipt for municipalities, but we do find that these voting outcomes rise following label removal. We also find that local officials do not appreciably change their tax-setting behavior in response to these labels, as the size and likelihood of property tax proposal are largely unchanged following label receipt or removal.