When Diversity Works: The Effects of Coalition Composition on the Success of Lobbying Coalitions

Lobbyists frequently join forces to influence policy, yet the success of active lobbying coalitions remains a blind spot in the literature. This article is the first to test how and when characteristics of active coalitions increase their lobbying success. Based on pluralist theory, one can expect diverse coalitions, uniting different societal interests, to signal broad support to policy makers. Yet, their responsiveness to this signal (i.e., signaling benefits) and contribution incentives within the coalition (i.e., cooperation costs) are likely to vary with issue salience. This theory is tested on a unique data set comprising 50 issues in five European countries. Results reveal a strong moderating effect of salience on the relationship between coalition diversity and success: On less salient issues, homogenous coalitions are more likely to succeed, whereas the effect reverses with higher salience, where diverse coalitions are more successful. These findings have implications for understanding political responsiveness and potential policy capture.     

The Politics of Latin America’s Investment and Other Links with China: Contextualizing the Region’s Cash Chasing while Racking Richer Research Rewards

There are three positions about the impact of outward foreign direct investment (FDI) from China on the policies of Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries: the “Wealth is Power” camp, which associates political power with Chinese economic lures; the “Conditionalist” camp, which contends the international and domestic economic and political context determines the specific political effect of Chinese outward FDI (OFDI); and the “Politics is Power” camp, which believes no dramatic political changes have resulted from the economic stimuli of Chinese OFDI (COFDI) and associated economic lures. Case studies herein on Brazil and China, Argentina and China, Ecuador and China, and the Caribbean and China support the Conditionalist camp, albeit to differing degrees and for different reasons. Case studies herein on COFDI in Argentina and in Colombia also deepen our knowledge about the drivers of COFDI. They challenge those asserting that COFDI in LAC is driven purely by political motives. This piece also reviews and critiques the state of the literature on COFDI in LAC and suggests a pathway for moving to the next level. It specifically recommends researchers work to cumulate knowledge by asking similar kinds of questions across cases, exploit theory, and work on variable conceptualization and operationalization.

     

Parties for Rent? Ambition,Ideology, and Party Switching in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies

Party switching by legislators has been common in many countries, including the Philippines, Italy, Nepal, Ecuador, Russia, and Japan. While frequently dismissed as simply an indicator of a weak parties, switching provides a unique window on party systems. To the extent that we understand affiliation decisions, we gain insight on the way politicians use parties to advance their careers. In this article I offer a model of party-membership patterns, where decisions to switch party or to stay put are a function of the strategic interaction of legislators and endogenous party leaders. I test the model on the case of Brazil, where switching is common. Results suggest that Brazilian legislators use parties to maximize pork, ideological consistency, and short-term electoral success, but which of these matters most depends on constituents, i.e., legislators use parties for different purposes in different electoral environments. The approach developed here could easily be applied to study legislative behavior in other political systems.     

Change, Continuity, and the Evolution of the Law

Congress regularly passes significant laws. Some of these laws continue in their initial form, with the original bargain struck by the enacting coalition untouched by any future laws; others are changed—strengthened or weakened—soon after passage. What accounts for this variation in the stability of laws, in the longevity of the original legislative agreement? We contend that political conditions at the time of enactment—in particular, the existence of divided government and the level of ideological disagreement between the House and Senate—influence the likelihood that a law will be amended. We demonstrate that laws originally crafted by diverse political coalitions are less durable than those crafted by strong, unified coalitions, which are in a position to entrench their preferred policies and protect them from future change. Furthermore, we show that the probability of a law being amended is affected by future political conditions, the actions of the judiciary, and factors specific to the law.     

Two-tiered political entrepreneurship and the congressional committee system

Theories of political entrepreneurship usually focus on the construction of coalitions necessary to change policy. We argue that political entrepreneurs who are unable to secure favored policies may redirect their efforts to a “higher tier,” attempting to change the rules of the game to enable the exploitation of future political profit opportunities. We present a taxonomy of three levels of political rules—pre-constitutional, constitutional, and post-constitutional—and identify the salient characteristics of institutional entrepreneurship that targets rules at each level. The development of the congressional committee system is explored as a case study in entrepreneurship over post-constitutional rules.     

Coalitions and Conservation: Conditional Impacts of Coalitions on Ballot Measures for Open Space

Social scientists have long debated the impact of interest group coalitions on public policies. While views on coalition impacts range from dominance to impotence, an emerging perspective suggests that coalitions have impacts under certain conditions. In this paper, we join and expand that perspective by arguing that coalitions have a conditional impact on public policies through ballot measures. Specifically, we argue that coalitions will have greater impact on ballot measure outcomes in non‐presidential election years, when the stakes involved are high, and when the goals of the measure are diverse. We test these hypotheses with analyses of a dataset of over 2,400 ballot measures on spending for open space at the state and local level between 1988 and 2014. We find strong support for our hypotheses. The findings have implications for scholarly debates on interest groups and coalitions, for the role of ballot measures in American public policy, and for assessments of open space and conservation in American society.     

Platforms,media and voters

Abstract The paper presents data on party platforms, political communication and public opinion in the 1996 Italian election campaign. It is shown that the electoral platforms of the two major coalitions were largely overlapping, except for some economic and social issues. The centre–right coalition seemed more inclined to adopt pro–market policies, while the platform of the Ulivo coalition was more oriented toward a social partnership approach. In the month before the elections, policy issues were discussed on television more extensively than political issues. Public and private networks covered the 1996 election campaign at the same level as in 1994 and to some extent with the same bias. Voting intentions seem to have remained stable prior to and during the electoral campaign.     

Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments

One feature associated with democratic governance is frequent leadership turnover. While the ease of replacing leaders improves accountability, it may impede the ability of democracies to make credible long-term international commitments. Using newly collected data that identify cases in which leaders who derive their support from different domestic interests come to power, we evaluate the effects of changes in domestic political leadership on one important aspect of foreign policy—decisions to maintain military alliances. An analysis covering bilateral alliances between 1919 and 2001 reveals that changes in societal supporting coalitions in nondemocratic states are associated with decisions to abrogate alliances prior to their scheduled end dates, but changes in societal supporting coalitions in democracies have no effect on the probability of premature alliance termination. We conclude that international cooperation is sensitive to changes in core supporting coalitions, but that this effect is moderated by democratic political institutions.     

Ideas and Coordination in Policymaking: The Financial Crisis of 2007–2009

Policy change occurs because coalitions of actors are able to take advantage of political conditions to translate their strong beliefs about policy into ideas, which are turned into policy. A coalition's ability to define a problem helps to keep policies in place, but it can also cause coalitions to develop blind spots. For example, policy subsystem actors will often neglect the need for coordination between governmental actors. We examine the financial crisis of 2007–2009 to show how entrenched policy ideas can cause subsystem actors to overlook the need for policy coordination. We first analyze the prevalent idea that policymakers should aim to keep inflation low and stable while employing light touch regulation to financial markets. We then demonstrate how this philosophy led to a lack of coordination between monetary and regulatory policy in the subprime mortgage market. We conclude with thoughts about the need for coordination in future economic policy.     

Pre-electoral coalitions in comparative perspective: A test of existing hypotheses

Despite the vast coalition literature, pre-electoral coalitions have never been at the center of any systematic, cross-national research. Given their prevalence and potential impact on government composition and policies, this represents a serious omission in our knowledge of coalitions. I begin to remedy this situation by testing two hypotheses found in the literature on party coalitions. The first is that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form in disproportional systems if there are a sufficiently large number of parties. The second is that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form if voters face high uncertainty about the identity of future governments. These hypotheses are tested using a new dataset comprising legislative elections in 22 advanced industrialized countries between 1946 and 1998. The results of the statistical analysis support the first hypothesis, but not the second.     

Platforms, media and voters

The paper presents data on party platforms, political communication and public opinion in the 1996 Italian election campaign. It is shown that the electoral platforms of the two major coalitions were largely overlapping, except for some economic and social issues. The centre–right coalition seemed more inclined to adopt pro–market policies, while the platform of the Ulivo coalition was more oriented toward a social partnership approach. In the month before the elections, policy issues were discussed on television more extensively than political issues. Public and private networks covered the 1996 election campaign at the same level as in 1994 and to some extent with the same bias. Voting intentions seem to have remained stable prior to and during the electoral campaign.     

Coalition Government,Legislative Institutions,and Public Policy in Parliamentary Democracies

Most democracies are governed by coalitions, comprising multiple political parties with conflicting policy positions. The prevalence of these governments poses a significant question: Which parties' electoral commitments are ultimately reflected in government policy? Recent theories have challenged our understanding of multiparty government, arguing that the relative influence of coalition parties depends crucially on institutional context. Specifically, where institutions allow credible enforcement of bargains, policy should reflect a compromise among all governing parties; where such institutions are absent, the preferences of parties controlling the relevant ministries should prevail. Critically, empirical work has thus far failed to provide direct evidence for this conditional relationship. Analyzing changes in social protection policies in 15 parliamentary democracies, we provide the first systematic evidence that the strength of legislative institutions significantly shapes the relative policy influence of coalition parties. Our findings have implications for our understanding of coalition government, policymaking, and electoral responsiveness.     

Federalism and regional interest intermediation in Brazilian public policies

Brazil became a highly decentralized country following democratization and the 1988 Constitution. The consequences of decentralization at the federal level are quite clear: the federal government is facing financial constraints and difficulties in building governing coalitions, allowing the Presidents to govern and to implement public policies, especially those concerning fiscal control. At the level of the states, however, the results of decentralization are quite heterogeneous given the country's high degree of regional inequality. The article identifies the cleavages and tensions surrounding federal–state relations, as well as the mutual dependency of the states and the federal government. It argues that the Brazilian experience of political and financial decentralization has contributed to the prospects of democratic consolidation and has forced the federal government to negotiate and compromise with subnational governments the implementation of national policies. On the other hand, the Brazilian experience highlights the constraints of decentralization in countries with deep‐rooted regional disparities. Furthermore, the financial weakness of the federal government which has been brought about by decentralization and by fiscal control brings new tensions to the federal arrangements and to public policies. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rise and Decline of Nations: Sweden

The development of the Swedish political economy is interesting in the perspective of the Mancur Olson theory about the rise and decline of nations. It is shown that the general argument of RADON is not in agreement with facts about the growth of the affluent society in Sweden between 1870 and 1970. The strong growth in the overall economic output took place in a society where a number of distributional coalitions were strongly organized. Also the special argument in RADON about the reversed consequences of broad interest organizations meets with little support. Whatever is meant by an encompassing interest organisation, what was crucial in the Swedish case was the strong position of party government and the broad participatory nature of the political process. Directly contradicting the RADON argument is the fact that the structure of distributional coalitions has in general become even more encompassing since 1970. yet the economic situation of Sweden has deteriorated considerably. The predicament of party government mest be emphasized, as the period since 1970 has witnessed a decline in the capacity of political leadership to govern the country.     

How do voters react when their party forms a coalition they dislike?

Abstract

While coalitions are conventionally seen as opportunities for parties to realise their policy preferences or to secure their control over political offices, recent studies show that citizens have preferences for coalitions which influence their vote choice. However, these studies do not consider how party and coalition preferences influence each other. This study uses panel data from the German Longitudinal Election Study from the 2009, 2013 and 2017 German elections to determine whether voters punish the party for which they voted for being in a coalition they dislike or, alternatively, whether they become more supportive of that coalition. We find weak evidence for the former but strong evidence for the latter.     

Unnatural partners: coalescence in Israeli local government

ABSTRACT

A prominent finding in coalition formation literature is that the underlying political rationale at the subnational level largely follows that of the one revealed by the classic literature on national coalitions. The Israeli political system is extremely centralized, with a local government that is highly dependent on its national counterpart. One could expect such a setting to result in local party behaviour that closely resembles the national one. However, as we show, this is far from being the case. We analyze 34 municipal coalitions in the 17 largest Israeli cities. After establishing that Israeli municipal politics fly in the face of classical coalition formation theories, we turn to explain this discrepancy with a qualitative analysis of interviews with 5 formatuers and 8 councillors. We conclude that mayors face low costs of adding surplus coalition partners, while standing to gain from wider legitimacy, weaker opposition, and constrained future competition. At the same time, municipal lists have strong resource- and policy-related incentives to join the coalition while compromise is met with low political costs. The result is an overwhelming predominance of oversized coalitions and partnerships which would be highly improbable at the national arena.     

Coalition type and voter support for parties: Grand coalitions in German elections

While scholars have generally acknowledged that coalition governments are less accountable to voters than single party majorities, surprisingly little differentiation is made among different types of coalition governments. In this paper, we examine voter support for two very different types of coalition governments: those with a single large party and a junior partner and grand coalitions—governing coalitions between two large but ideologically dissimilar parties. We argue that grand coalitions differ from the more typical senior–junior partners in terms of the ability of individual parties to respond to their constituencies. We test this argument using survey data from four German Election Studies (GES), before and after each of the two German grand coalitions (1965, 1969, 2005, and 2009), which provide a unique opportunity to compare voter support for grand coalitions to those of the more typical senior–junior party model. We find evidence that voters responded to grand coalitions by moving away from their traditional voting patterns, and increasing their support for parties outside of the grand coalition, although this effect varies by the number of alternative parties.     

Women's rights in transition: the collision of feminist interest groups,religion and non-governmental organizations in three Latin American countries

This article explores the roles and successes of feminist interest groups, religious interests and non-governmental organizations in promoting or blocking reproductive policies in three Andean countries—Chile, Ecuador and Peru. Access to reproductive services and facilities, such as birth control and elective abortion, in the transitional democracies of Latin America has remained as restricted as under authoritarian regimes. The issue is complicated by the involvement of ideologically driven domestic and foreign interests attempting to influence policy decisions. The political outcomes have significant implications for the nature of democracy and for women's representation across Latin America. The evidence shows that successes have been varied for all women's groups involved in the reproductive rights issue. The primary reason appears to be that, despite advances in political representation in the region, the more established religious interests and other countervailing forces have managed to maintain the status quo in the face of feminist interest group demands. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Lived citizenship as the locus of political agency in participatory policy

Participatory policies seeking to foster active citizenship continue to be dominated by a territorial imagination. Yet, the world where people identify and perform as citizens is spatially multifarious. This article engages with the tension between territorially grounded perceptions and relational modes of practicing political agency. Studying empirically the Finnish child and youth policies, we address jointly the participatory obligations that municipalities strive to fulfill, and the spatial attachments that children and young people establish in their lived worlds. To this end, we introduce the concept of lived citizenship as an interface where the territorially-bound public administration and the plurality of spatial attachments characteristic to transnational living may meet. We conclude by proposing a re-grounding of lived citizenship in both topological and topographical terms as an improvement in theoretical understanding of mundane political agency and as a step towards more proficient participatory policies.