Applications received in 1987 and allowance rates for supplemental security income

Since the inception of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program in 1974, counts of the numbers of cases processed and individuals who were awarded SSI payments have been available. This study breaks new ground, however, by using administrative data to describe in greater detail the characteristics of persons who applied for SSI over a 1-year period. The information on allowance rates is unique because, for the first time, the data have been gathered from the same set of applications. This article tracks the application process to determine whether or not benefits were subsequently received by these SSI applicants in the ensuing 18 months. Of the 1.2 million persons who applied for SSI during the study period, a large proportion were disabled. Among persons whose application was based on age, a greater proportion applied when they attained age 65 than at any other age and they were the most likely to qualify for payments under the program. The data also show how many of the 1.2 million applicants had previously been SSI recipients. In addition to providing demographic and SSI data, the allowance rates are useful in predicting trends in the composition of the caseload.     

A study of Supplemental Security Income awardees

Since its enactment in 1974, the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program has had a stable caseload of about 4 million recipients. Hidden by this unchanging total is the fact that nearly 9 million persons were served by the program from 1974 to 1986. This study explores some SSI program dynamics by following a group of SSI awardees for a period of 4 years from the initial receipt of award in 1981. Many of these awardees had previous contact with the program either through a previous award or a denial. About 60 percent of the awardees were eligible at the end of the 4-year period. Most persons who became ineligible did so within the first 6 months after the award.     

How postsecondary education improves adult outcomes for Supplemental Security Income children with severe hearing impairments

The rapid growth in the number of children participating in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program before the age of 18 has led policymakers to consider new methods of assisting children with disabilities in their transition from school to work. Postsecondary education represents one path that SSI children may take to acquire the skills necessary to enter employment and reduce dependency on the SSI disability program as adults. Yet little is known about SSI children's experience with postsecondary education, let alone their ability to increase their labor market earnings and reduce their time on SSI as adults in the long term. This lack of information on long-term outcomes is due in part to a lack of longitudinal data. This article uses a unique longitudinal data set to conduct a case study of SSI children who applied for postsecondary education at the National Technical Institute for the Deaf (NTID) within the Rochester Institute of Technology. The data set was created by merging NTID administrative data on the characteristics and experiences of its applicants to Social Security Administration (SSA) longitudinal data on earnings and program participation. We used this data file to estimate the likelihood that an SSI child will graduate from NTID relative to other hearing-impaired NTID applicants, and we estimated the influence of graduation from NTID on participation in the SSI adult program and later success in the labor market. The results of our analysis show that the percentage of NTID applicants who were SSI children increased over time, from a low of 10 percent in 1982 to more than 41 percent in 2000. However, the differences in the probability of graduation from NTID between deaf SSI children and deaf applicants who were not SSI children did not change accordingly. The probability of graduation for SSI children who applied to NTID was 13.5 percentage points lower than for those who were not SSI children. The estimated disparity indicates that targeting college retention programs toward SSI children may be an effective way to improve overall graduation rates. Our results also show that SSI children who graduated from NTID spent less time in the SSI adult program and had higher earnings than SSI children who did not gradu- ate. Compared with SSI children who were accepted to NTID but chose not to attend, SSI children who graduated from NTID left the SSI program 19 months earlier, were less likely to reenter the program, and at age 30 had increased their earnings by an estimated 49 percent. Our findings demonstrate that SSI children need not be relegated to a lifetime of SSI participation as adults, despite the poor overall labor market experience of this population since the creation of the SSI program in 1974.     

Identifying the race or ethnicity of SSI recipients

The Social Security Administration (SSA) has, from its beginnings, recorded the race and ethnicity provided by those who apply for a Social Security card. Although some of these data are eventually used in published tabulations when persons file for benefits, problems with the data prevent a larger selection of published tables. These problems stem from: incomplete internal SSA computer processing; changes in the racial coding schemes over time; and missing codes for younger cohorts of applicants. In spite of these problems, more data can be shared with the public. This article shows how matching administrative files and using statistical techniques make it possible to associate a race/ethnicity code with the great majority of persons receiving a payment under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, a means-tested program for persons who are aged or disabled. The article follows a 1-percent sample of SSI recipients through several steps in an attempt to develop a race code. This approach can provide data for the next several years on the race of all SSI recipients, as well as data on race and ethnicity for recipients under age 40. Beyond the next few years, these techniques will become less useful, and other methods will be needed. SSA is in the process of revising its standards for classification of federal data on race and ethnicity. The census for year 2000 will include coding changes. Other federal agencies will be given as long as January 2003 to comply with the new guidelines.     

SSI at its 25th year.

Beginning in January 1974, the three previously existing State adult assistance programs were amalgamated into the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, to be administered by the Social Security Administration. This change was made to provide a nationwide floor of income for needs-based assistance, and to make such payments more efficiently by working through SSA's existing network of field offices. This article traces the 25-year patterns of growth and changes in the number of persons applying for assistance, the number and proportion of those applicants who were awarded payments, and the overall number of persons who received SSI. Three major age groups are considered separately: those aged 65 or older, disabled adults aged 18-64, and children age 18 and younger. The last group was newly eligible under SSI for payments based on their own blindness or disability and not, as was the case previously, because they were a member of a needy family.     

SSI case closures.

In 1990, about 800,000 persons receiving payments from the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program had their cases closed and their payments stopped. The most frequently cited reasons for these case closures were excess income and death. Of those cases closed for reasons other than death, about 43 percent eventually returned to payment status. This study presents an analysis of a 1-percent sample of SSI recipients whose cases were closed during 1990. Longitudinal data on closures were collected by merging a series of monthly 1-percent sample files containing SSI administrative data. These are the first published data on reasons for SSI case closures.     

Recent trends in the Social Security Disability Insurance Program

Earlier analysis documented the rapid growth of the Disability Insurance (DI) program from 1966 to 1975; this article discusses trends since 1975. Over the decade of the 1970's, the population insured for disability increased by 34 percent, and women as a proportion of the insured population rose from 32.4 percent in 1970 to 39.1 percent in 1980, reflecting the increase in female labor-force participation. Of disabled workers receiving benefits, the proportion that were women rose from 28.4 percent in 1970 to 32.4 percent in 1979. Although inflation caused total benefit costs to rise over the entire period, the number of DI beneficiaries began to decline in 1978. Disabled-worker awards reached a peak in 1975 and fell subsequently so that the 1969 and 1981 figures are approximately equal. Relative to 1970, the fraction of awards going to women increased, the share for persons aged 50-54 rose, and the proportion received by those aged 60-64 declined. Decreased in total awards, and hence recipients, stemmed primarily from higher rates of denial at both the initial application and the reconsideration stages. Higher denials were countered by substantial rises in the number of hearings and reversals by administrative law judges (ALJ's). in 1980, only 65 percent of all awards came from initial applications, while over a fourth resulted from ALJ reversals. In future years, recent legislative changes may be expected to curtail program expansion further.     

The net effects of the Project NetWork return-to-work case management experiment on participant earnings, benefit receipt, and other outcomes

The Social Security Administration (SSA) initiated Project NetWork in 1991 to test case management as a means of promoting employment among persons with disabilities. The demonstration, which targeted Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) beneficiaries and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) applicants and recipients, offered intensive outreach, work-incentive waivers, and case management/referral services. Participation in Project NetWork was voluntary. Volunteers were randomly assigned to the "treatment" group or the "control" group. Those assigned to the treatment group met individually with a case or referral manager who arranged for rehabilitation and employment services, helped clients develop an individual employment plan, and provided direct employment counseling services. Volunteers assigned to the control group could not receive services from Project NetWork but remained eligible for any employment assistance already available in their communities. For both treatment and control groups, the demonstration waived specific DI and SSI program rules considered to be work disincentives. The experimental impact study thus measures the incremental effects of case and referral management services. The eight demonstration sites were successful in implementing the experimental design roughly as planned. Project NetWork staff were able to recruit large numbers of participants and to provide rehabilitation and employment services on a substantial scale. Most of the sites easily reached their enrollment targets and were able to attract volunteers with demographic characteristics similar to those of the entire SSI and DI caseload and a broad range of moderate and severe disabilities. However, by many measures, volunteers were generally more "work-ready" than project eligible in the demonstration areas who did not volunteer to receive NetWork services. Project NetWork case management increased average annual earnings by $220 per year over the first 2 years following random assignment. This statistically significant impact, an approximate 11-percent increase in earnings, is based on administrative data on earnings. For about 70 percent of sample members, a third year of followup data was available. For this limited sample, the estimated effect of Project NetWork on annual earnings declined to roughly zero in the third followup year. The findings suggest that the increase in earnings may have been short-lived and may have disappeared by the time Project NetWork services ended. Project NetWork did not reduce reliance on SSI or DI benefits by statistically significant amounts over the 30-42 month followup period. The services provided by Project NetWork thus did not reduce overall SSI and DI caseloads or benefits by substantial amounts, especially given that only about 5 percent of the eligible caseload volunteered to participate in Project NetWork. Project NetWork produced modest net benefits to persons with disabilities and net costs to taxpayers. Persons with disabilities gained mainly because the increases in their earnings easily outweighed the small (if any) reduction in average SSI and DI benefits. For SSA and the federal government as a whole, the costs of Project NetWork were not sufficiently offset by increases in tax receipts resulting from increased earnings or reductions in average SSI and DI benefits. The modest net benefits of Project NetWork to persons with disabilities are encouraging. How such benefits of an experimental intervention should be weighed against costs of taxpayers depends on value judgments of policymakers. Because different case management projects involve different kinds of services, these results cannot be directly generalized to other case management interventions. They are nevertheless instructive for planning new initiatives. Combining case and referral management services with various other interventions, such as longer term financial support for work or altered provider incentives, could produc     

SSI eligibility and participation among the oldest old: evidence from the AHEAD

The proportion of elderly SSI recipients aged 70 or older has been growing in recent years, perhaps because of rising life expectancies overall and a higher incidence of poverty among the oldest old. In 1999, 84 percent of all elderly SSI recipients were 70 or older. This article examines Supplemental Security Income (SSI) eligibility and participation among the oldest old. The analysis was based on 1993 data from the Study of Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old that were used to build a detailed SSI eligibility model to identify individuals who meet the federal criteria for SSI income and resource eligibility. The participation rate among those eligible for federal SSI benefits is 53.9 percent, which is generally consistent with the findings of other studies. Furthermore, eligible participants would receive a significantly higher federal SSI benefit than eligible nonparticipants. Correspondingly, eligible participants have significantly lower incomes and assets than eligible nonparticipants. An econometric model is used to estimate the influence of various demographic, financial, and health care use characteristics on the probability of SSI participation among eligible individuals and couples. The model corrects for measurement error in calculated benefits and for misclassifying someone as ineligible. The empirical results show that the effect of higher SSI benefits on the probability of participation is substantial--a $100 increase in benefits would increase the probability of participating for an average eligible unit by 15 percentage points. Many of the demographic, financial, and health care use variables also are important predictors of SSI participation among the oldest old. The eligibility and participation models are also used to simulate the effect of increasing the SSI unearned income disregard from $20 to $125. Those made eligible by this policy change would receive a very low federal SSI benefit on average, suggesting that they are on the margin of eligibility under the original program rules. The simulated participation rate is 48.8 percent--5 percentage points lower than under the original program rules--reflecting the low benefit that new eligibles would receive. Only 36 percent of those made eligible by the new program rules are predicted to participate. These SSI eligibility and participation models are potentially useful tools for policy analysis. It is fairly straightforward to use these models to change a feature of SSI eligibility, reestimate the group of eligible individuals and couples, and predict participation among those who are eligible under the simulated program rules. New eligibles can be compared with those eligible under original program rules. New participants can be compared with old participants. Although these models focus only on individuals aged 70 or older, this type of analysis can be helpful in estimating the potential distributional effects of proposed SSI policy changes.     

Disability benefit coverage and program interactions in the working-age population

Over three-fourths of the working-age population in the United States is insured for Disability Insurance (DI); this group is protected against a total loss of earned income typically associated with severe disability. However, little is known about the role the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program plays in protecting against the financial consequences of severe disability for this population. We find that over one-third (36 percent) of the working-age population is covered by SSI in the event of a severe disability. Three important implications follow, which we discuss in sequence below: (1) SSI increases the overall coverage of the working-age population; (2) SSI enhances the bundle of cash benefits available to disabled individuals; and (3) interactions with other programs also enhance the safety net, most notably in the area of health insurance coverage. Ignoring these implications could lead to inaccurate inferences about disability program coverage, health insurance coverage, and the well-being of working-age individuals with disabilities. The first major finding is that SSI substantially increases overall cash benefit coverage. Thus SSI dramatically increases protection against the financial risk of disablement in the working-age population. While roughly 23 percent of the U.S. working-age population was not insured for DI in November 1996, SSI provides coverage for more than half of this seemingly "uncovered" population. An important innovation of our analysis is that we account for the possibility that many of those who appear ineligible for SSI based on current income could become eligible as a result of a disability shock that causes their earnings to drop. Thus the estimated proportion that is protected by SSI increases when the possibility of earnings loss because of disability is considered. Considering DI and SSI together, roughly 90 percent of the working-age population would be potentially covered for benefits in the event of a disability. Those who are covered by SSI--as opposed to those covered by DI alone-tend to be relatively young, less educated, and in relatively poor health. The remaining 10 percent or so are not covered by either DI or SSI. This group is economically vulnerable in some sense (they are poorer, older, and more likely to be women than those covered only by DI), but they are not as economically vulnerable in terms of income, resource holdings, and private health insurance coverage as those who are eligible for SSI. A disproportionate share of those who are not covered by either DI or SSI consists of married women. The second major finding is that SSI substantially enhances the bundle of available cash benefits. Roughly one-third of those covered by DI are initially covered by SSI as well. SSI enhances the bundle of available cash benefits through two mechanisms: (1) SSI provides cash payments during the 5-month DI waiting period, and (2) SSI supplements the DI benefit after the DI waiting period for people whose initial SSI payment is larger than the DI benefit. We find that the role of SSI cash payments is temporary for most of those who are initially covered by both SSI and DI: They would receive SSI during the DI waiting period, but would lose SSI eligibility afterwards because the higher DI benefit completely offsets the SSI benefit. However, a smaller group of DI beneficiaries with low DI benefit levels would continue to be covered by both SSI and DI after the DI waiting period because the relatively low DI benefit would not completely offset the SSI benefit. The third major finding is that interactions with other programs also substantially enhance the safety net. The most important interactions involve health insurance coverage. In the working-age population, Medicare is available to DI beneficiaries, but only after a 24-month waiting period. By contrast, SSI is an important pathway to Medicaid benefits for severely disabled adults with limited income and resources and has no waiting period. SSI can provide a pathway to health insurance coverage during the 24-month Medicare waiting period for some DI beneficiaries through providing access to Medicaid. Interactions with other programs, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Food Stamp, Unemployment Insurance (UI), workers' compensation (WC), and veterans' disability programs, modify the role of DI and SSI in protecting people against the adverse financial effects of disablement. The nature of the interactions with other programs differs depending on individual circumstances. Employment-related programs (including UI, WC, and veteran's disability programs) are particularly important for those who are covered by DI. By contrast, the means-tested programs (including TANF and Food Stamp) are more important for those who would be eligible for SSI. In conclusion, SSI plays a substantial role in protecting working-age people against the adverse financial consequences of disablement through three mechanisms: (1) providing coverage to many who are not DI insured; (2) providing additional cash benefits to many who are DI insured and also covered by SSI; and (3) enhancing the social safety net by interacting with other programs, most notably Medicaid. Through these mechanisms, the role of SSI is substantial enough that it cannot be safely ignored in econometric and policy research on DI.     

The Effect of Lower Transaction Costs on Social Security Disability Insurance Application Rates and Participation

Transaction costs pose significant barriers to participation in public programs. We analyze how Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) application behavior was affected by iClaim, a 2009 innovation that streamlined the online application process. We use a difference‐in‐differences design to compare application rates before and after 2009 across counties with varying degrees of access to high‐speed internet. We estimate that counties with internet connectivity one standard‐deviation above the mean experienced a 1.6 percent increase in SSDI applications, and a 2.8 percent increase in appeals after the reform. We estimate that the increase in applications due to iClaim can explain 15 percent of the overall increase in applications between 2008 and 2011. Higher exposure to the online application led to a slightly larger increase in SSDI awards, meaning there was a small but significant increase in the overall award rate. Application rates increased the most in rural areas, while appeals and awards had more significant increases in urban areas. These results suggest that the online application reduced transaction costs to applicants, and the lower costs improved the overall targeting efficiency of the application process.     

Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984: legislative history and summary of provisions

This article describes the legislative history of the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-460), and contains a summary of the provisions in the new law. Major provisions include: standards for continuing disability reviews (CDR's) of disability insurance (DI) beneficiaries and supplemental security income (SSI) recipients who get payments based on disability or blindness; the right of a DI beneficiary or an SSI recipient to have payments continued during appeal of a CDR decision to an administrative law judge that disability or blindness has ceased; and suspension of CDR's of mentally impaired persons until the evaluation criteria for mental impairments are revised. The new law was enacted in response to problems that arose as a result of the implementation by the Social Security Administration (SSA) of a provision in the 1980 disability amendments that required periodic CDR's. In enacting the new law, Congress intended to assure more accurate, consistent, and uniform disability decisions at all levels and equitable and humane treatment not only to beneficiaries who must undergo CDR's but also to new applicants for DI benefits or SSI payments based on disability or blindness.     

SSI recipients in domiciliary care facilities: federally administered optional supplementation, March 1976

Under the supplemental security income program, federally administered payments amounting to $24.7 million were made in March 1976 to 107,000 persons who were residing in domiciliary care facilities and under other supervised living arrangements. These persons were unable to function under totally independent living arrangements but did not require medical or nursing care on a regular basis. Of the total, $9.5 million was represented in Federal SSI payments and $15.2 million came from optional State supplements--with California paying $6.2 million and New York $4.6 million. The average payment to the residents of these facilities was $232 a month. Comparable data for four States show greater caseload growth for persons in domiciliary care facilities and under other supervised living arrangements than for the total SSI population. Nearly two-thirds of the States are adding funds to Federal SSI payments for persons under such care. Data are available, however, only from Social Security Administration program records for those States that have elected Federal administration of their optional programs.     

Earnings histories of SSI beneficiaries working in December 1997.

Disabling conditions previously considered to be permanent and total are no longer viewed as automatic barriers to work. Medical advances, improved accommodations in the workplace, and changes in the nature of work for the working disabled have allowed many disabled people to rejoin the workforce. The Social Security Administration (SSA) has followed those developments with a view toward encouraging people receiving disability benefits to consider returning to work. To effectively target SSA's efforts and evaluate their success, information about previous work histories of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) beneficiary population is used to provide baseline data. This article examines the earnings histories of 300,000 disabled SSI beneficiaries--one of the populations targeted by the expanded work-incentive measure under Public Law 106-70--who were working in December 1997. The article also investigates whether beneficiaries who are working have significant lifetime earnings and whether earnings patterns exist that might assist with SSA's work-support activities. SSI program records were matched to data in the Master Earnings File to explore the characteristics and earnings patterns before and after a person applies for benefits. The article addresses several questions: What are the general characteristics of disabled SSI beneficiaries? What are their earnings histories? Did they have an earnings record when they applied for SSI? Of the SSI beneficiaries working in December 1997, most tended to be younger than other disabled beneficiaries, to have some sort of mental disability, and to have earnings well below levels that would suggest their eventual, complete independence from the SSI cash benefits program. A look at past covered earnings revealed that the vast majority of SSI workers had a history of earnings before they applied for SSI benefits. Despite their severe impairments and age at the time of first eligibility, nearly 40 percent had earnings in 11 years or more. The amounts of those earnings were quite low, however, and were usually not high enough to preclude SSI eligibility. Examining the years immediately before and after the point of application indicated whether recent pre-application earnings were consistent with post-application return to work. Results were a bit surprising. They revealed that one-third of the 1997 SSI workers had no earnings, and another 28 percent returned to work despite having no earnings in the 4-year period before application. Persons receiving SSI because of mental retardation seemed to have poorer earnings histories than other workers but were more likely to return to work after application. That may be explained by their younger ages or may reflect the outside assistance they received in responding to SSA work incentives.     

The TANF/SSI connection

Interactions and overlap of social assistance programs across clients interest policymakers because such interactions affect both the clients' well-being and the programs' efficiency. This article investigates the connections between Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and TANF's predecessor, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Connections between receipt of TANF and SSI are widely discussed in both disability policy and poverty research literatures because many families receiving TANF report disabilities. For both states and the individuals involved, it is generally financially advantageous for adults and children with disabilities to transfer from TANF to SSI. States gain because the federal government pays for the SSI benefit, and states can then use the TANF savings for other purposes. The families gain because the SSI benefits they acquire are greater than the TANF benefits they lose. The payoff to states from transferring welfare recipients to SSI was substantially increased when Congress replaced AFDC with TANF in 1996. States retained less than half of any savings achieved through such transfers under AFDC, but they retain all of the savings under TANF. Also, the work participation requirements under TANF have obligated states to address the work support needs of adults with disabilities who remain in TANF, and states can avoid these costs if adults have disabilities that satisfy SSI eligibility requirements. The incentive for TANF recipients to apply for SSI has increased over time as inflation has caused real TANF benefits to fall relative to payments received by SSI recipients. Trends in the financial incentives for transfer to SSI have not been studied in detail, and reliable general data on the extent of the interaction between TANF and SSI are scarce. In addition, some estimates of the prevalence of TANF receipt among SSI awardees are flawed because they fail to include adults receiving benefits in TANF-related Separate State Programs (SSPs). SSPs are assistance programs that are administered by TANF agencies but are paid for wholly from state funds. When the programs are conducted in a manner consistent with federal regulations, the money states spend on SSPs counts toward federal maintenance-of-effort (MOE) requirements, under which states must sustain a certain level of contribution to the costs of TANF and approved related activities. SSPs are used for a variety of purposes, including support of families who are in the process of applying for SSI. Until very recently, families receiving cash benefits through SSPs were not subject to TANF's work participation requirements. This article contributes to analysis of the interaction between TANF and SSI by evaluating the financial consequences of TANF-to-SSI transfer and developing new estimates of both the prevalence of receipt of SSI benefits among families receiving cash assistance from TANF and the proportion of new SSI awards that go to adults and children residing in families receiving TANF or TANF-related benefits in SSPs. Using data from the Urban Institute's Welfare Rules Database, we find that by 2003 an SSI award for a child in a three-person family dependent on TANF increased family income by 103.5 percent on average across states; an award to the adult in such a family increased income by 115.4 percent. The gain from both child and adult transfers increased by about 6 percent between 1996 (the eve of the welfare reform that produced TANF) and 2003. Using data from the Department of Health and Human Services' TANF/SSP Recipient Family Characteristics Survey, we estimate that 16 percent of families receiving TANF/SSP support in federal fiscal year 2003 included an adult or child SSI recipient. This proportion has increased slightly since fiscal year 2000. The Social Security Administration's current procedures for tabulating characteristics of new SSI awardees do not recognize SSP receipt as TANF We use differences in reported TANF-to-SSI flows between states with and without Separate State Programs to estimate the understatement of the prevalence of TANF-related SSI awards in states with SSPs. The results indicate that the absolute number of awards to AFDC (and subsequently) TANF/SSP recipients has declined by 42 percent for children and 25 percent for adults since the early 1990s. This result is a product of the decline in welfare caseloads. However, the monthly incidence of such awards has gone up-from less than 1 per 1,000 child recipients in calendar years 1991-1993 to 1.3 per 1,000 in 2001-2003 and, for adult recipients, from 1.6 per 1,000 in 1991-1993 to 4 per 1,000 in 2001-2003. From these results we conclude that a significant proportion of each year's SSI awards to disabled nonelderly people go to TANF/SSP recipients, and many families that receive TANF/SSP support include adults, children, or both who receive SSI. Given the Social Security Administration's efforts to improve eligibility assessment for applicants, to ensure timely access to SSI benefits for those who qualify, and to improve prospects for eventual employment of the disabled, there is definitely a basis for working with TANF authorities both nationally and locally on service coordination and on smoothing the process of SSI eligibility assessment. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 reauthorized TANF through fiscal year 2010, but with some rules changes that are important in light of the analysis presented in this article. The new law substantially increases effective federal requirements for work participation by adult TANF recipients and mandates that adults in Separate State Programs be included in participation requirements beginning in fiscal year 2007. Thus SSPs will no longer provide a means for exempting from work requirements families that are in the process of applying for SSI, and the increased emphasis on work participation could result in more SSI applications from adult TANF recipients.     

Modeling SSI financial eligibility and simulating the effect of policy options

This article simulates eligibility for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) among the elderly, analyzes factors affecting participation, and looks at the potential effects of various options to modify financial eligibility standards for the federal SSI program. We find that in the estimated noninstitutional elderly population of 30.2 million in the United States in 1991, approximately 2 million individuals aged 65 or older were eligible for SSI (a 6.6 percent rate of eligibility). Our overall estimate of the rate of participation among eligible elderly is approximately 63 percent, suggesting that more than a third of those who are eligible do not participate in the program. The results of our analysis of factors affecting participation among the eligible elderly show that expected SSI benefits and a number of demographic and socioeconomic variables are associated with the probability of participation. We also simulate the effects of various policy options on the poverty rate, poverty gap, annual program cost, the number of participants, and the average estimated benefits among participants. The simulations consider the potential effects of five policy alternatives: Increase the general income exclusion (GIE) from $20 to $80. Increase the earned income exclusion (EIE) from $65 to $260. Increase the federal benefit rate (FBR) by $50 for individuals and $75 for couples and eliminate the GIE. Increase the asset threshold to $3,000 for individuals and $4,500 for couples. Increase the asset threshold to $6,000 for individuals and $9,000 for couples. Using 1991 microdata from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) matched to Social Security Administration administrative records and making adjustments reflecting aggregate program statistics, we present the results of our simulations for December 1999. The results show substantial variation in the simulated effects of the five policy alternatives along the various outcome dimensions considered. The simulated effects on the poverty gap of the elderly population range from a 7.9 percent reduction ("Increase the GIE from $20 to $80") to a 0.1 percent reduction ("Increase the EIE from $65 to $260"). All simulated interventions are expected to increase the rate of SSI participation among the elderly from a high of 20.3 percent ("Increase the GIE from $20 to $80") to a low of 0.5 percent ("Increase the EIE from $65 to $260"). We also find that the interventions that have greater estimated effects in terms of increased participation and reduced poverty tend to cost more. At the high end, we estimate that increasing the GIE from $20 to $80 could raise annual federal SSI cash benefit outlays by about 46 percent, compared with only 0.9 percent for increasing the EIE from $65 to $260. Similar to the EIE intervention, raising the resource thresholds by 50 percent would reduce the overall poverty gap of the elderly by only 0.2 percent, would increase SSI participation only modestly (by 1.3 percent), but would entail slightly higher program costs (by 1.4 percent). Increasing the asset threshold by 200 percent would have higher estimated effects on all three outcomes, but it would still be associated with relatively low increases in both costs and benefits. Finally, the simulated effects on the three key outcomes of increasing the FBR by $50 for individuals and $75 for couples, combined with eliminating the GIE, are relatively large but are clearly less substantial than increasing the GIE from $20 to $80. This work relies on data from the SIPP matched to administrative data on federal SSI benefits that provide a more accurate picture of SSI participation than has been feasible for previous studies. We simulate eligibility for federal SSI benefits by applying the program rules to detailed information on the characteristics of individuals and couples based on the rich array of demographic and socioeconomic data in the SIPP, particularly the comprehensive information SIPP provides on assets and monthly income. A probit model is estimated to analyze factors affecting participation among the eligible elderly. Finally, we conduct the policy simulations using altered program rules represented by the policy alternatives and predicted participation probabilities to estimate outcomes under simulated program rules. We compare those simulated outcomes to observed outcomes under current program rules. The results of our simulations are conditional on the characteristics of participants and eligibles in 1991, but they also reflect aggregate adjustments capturing substantial changes in overall participation and program benefit levels between 1991 and 1999.     

Does state AFDC generosity affect child SSI participation?

This article examines the extent of interactions or spillovers between the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) programs for children. In the early 1990s, the Social Security Administration substantially relaxed child eligibility criteria for SSI benefits. Since the changes, the number of U.S. children receiving cash and medical benefits through SSI tripled to nearly 1 million. The article describes a family's decision to participate in SSI and/or AFDC, and uses state‐level data for three years before, and three years after, the Zebley decision to estimate the effect of state program generosity on child program participation. The expansions in child SSI eligibility increased child SSI participation and contributed to increased total program participation by children in the early 1990s. Child SSI participation increased more in states with lower AFDC payments and higher state SSI supplementation payments. These results suggest that families use SSI and AFDC as substitutes. At least 32 percent of the Zebley increase in SSI is likely attributable to the SSI–AFDC benefit gap for the median AFDC benefit state. © 2000 by the Association for Public Policy and Management.     

The new supplemental security income—Implications for other benefit programs

Supplemental Security Income (SSI), a federal assistance program for the needy aged, blind and disabled, replaced the old federal-state welfare programs in January 1974. The enactment of this income floor, following a decade of revolutionary growth in aid to these three groups, may precipitate further program reform. First, the VA pension program aiding a beneficiary group similar to that of SSI, could be merged with SSI into a single federal program. Second, SSI may mark a turning point in the development of the social security system. A federally-administered income floor for the poor who are elderly or disabled can relieve social security of the welfare elements built into that system in an earlier period, allowing its original function of wage-replacement to be improved. A reorientation of social security vis-à-vis SSI would also allow a more equitable treatment of persons covered under one or both programs.     

Resources of supplemental security income recipients

In order to receive payments under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, an aged, blind, or disabled person's countable resources must fall below specified limits. The current limits are +2,000 for an individual and +3,000 for a couple. In 1987, when the data were collected for this study, these limits were +1,800 for an individual and +2,700 for a couple. This study found that the resource levels of most SSI recipients were well below the 1987 limits. A majority of SSI recipients had less than +100 in countable resources, and only about 12 percent of SSI recipients had more than +1,000 of resources. These low levels of resources ensure that relatively few recipients become ineligible for SSI payments because of resource accumulation. The most common forms of countable resources held by SSI recipients were cash, checking accounts, and savings accounts.