Ineligible spouses of SSI beneficiaries, December 1976.

A study based on program records showd that about 200,000 persons receiving supplemental security income (SSI) payments in December 1976 were living with a spouse who was not eligible for payments. In most cases, the beneficiaries were disabled and the spouses were too young to be eligible. Some spouses were receiving help indirectly from the program through the essential-person increment, State supplementary payments, or the deeming-of-income provision. Fewer than half the spouses had income of their own, however, and even when the income of both partners was combined, 55,000 households had no income other than the SSI payment. A sizable number of families included dependent children and thus may have been eligible for aid to families with dependent children.     

SSI: trends and changes, 1974-80

By the end of 1980, the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program was making monthly cash assistance payments, averaging $170, to almost 4.2 million aged, blind, and disabled persons. When SSI payments began in January 1974, the number of recipients was 3.2 million and the average payment was $117. Since 1975, both SSI payments and Social Security benefits have been automatically adjusted each year to correspond with increases in the Consumer Price Index. A number of other trends in addition to growth can be discerned in the size of the population served, as well as in their categorical, geographic, and age distributions. This article discusses some of these trends and changes, using program data for the end of each calendar year through 1980. It also presents a brief summary of the program at the end of that period.     

SSI recipients in domiciliary care facilities: federally administered optional supplementation, March 1976

Under the supplemental security income program, federally administered payments amounting to $24.7 million were made in March 1976 to 107,000 persons who were residing in domiciliary care facilities and under other supervised living arrangements. These persons were unable to function under totally independent living arrangements but did not require medical or nursing care on a regular basis. Of the total, $9.5 million was represented in Federal SSI payments and $15.2 million came from optional State supplements--with California paying $6.2 million and New York $4.6 million. The average payment to the residents of these facilities was $232 a month. Comparable data for four States show greater caseload growth for persons in domiciliary care facilities and under other supervised living arrangements than for the total SSI population. Nearly two-thirds of the States are adding funds to Federal SSI payments for persons under such care. Data are available, however, only from Social Security Administration program records for those States that have elected Federal administration of their optional programs.     

A profile of children with disabilities receiving SSI: highlights from the National Survey of SSI Children and Families

This article provides a nationally representative profile of noninstitutionalized children 0 to 17 years of age who were receiving support from the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program because of a disability. To assess the role of the SSI program in providing assistance to low-income children with disabilities and their families, it is important to obtain detailed information on demographic characteristics, income and assets, health and disabilities, and health care utilization. Yet administrative records of the Social Security Administration do not contain many of the relevant data items, and the records provide only an incomplete picture of the family relationships affecting the lives of children with disabilities. The National Survey of SSI Children and Families fills this gap. This summary article is based on survey interviews conducted between July 2001 and June 2002 and provides some highlights characterizing children with disabilities who were receiving SSI and their families. Most children receiving SSI (hereafter referred to as "SSI children") lived in a family headed by a single mother, and less than one in three lived with both parents. A very high proportion, about half, were living in a household with at least one other individual reported to have had a disability. About 70 percent of children received some kind of special education. SSI support was the most important source of family income, with earnings a close second. On average, SSI payments accounted for nearly half of the income for the children's families, and earnings accounted for almost 40 percent. When all sources of family income were considered, slightly more than half (54 percent) of SSI children lived in families above the poverty threshold, a notable fact given that the federal SSI program guarantees only a subpoverty level of income. However, beyond these averages there was substantial variation, with some children living in families with income well below the poverty threshold and others having income well over 200 percent of the poverty threshold. About one-third of SSI children lived in families owning a home, two-thirds lived with parents or guardians with at least one car, and about 40 percent lived with parents or guardians with zero liquid assets. Less than 4 percent lived with adults who owned stocks, mutual funds, notes, certificates of deposit, or savings bonds. The Social Security Administration's administrative records contain only a limited amount of information about disability diagnoses. The National Survey of SSI Children and Families supplements those records with data from an array of questions on functional limitations, self-reported health, and the perceived severity of disabilities. The data suggest that a great degree of variation in severity exists within the childhood caseload, as reflected in reports of the presence or absence of six functional limitations, perceived overall health status, and perceived impact of disability on the child's ability to do things. Overall, 36 percent of the children were reported to have had disabilities that affected their abilities to do things "a great deal," and for 21 percent their difficulties had very little or no impact. Physical disabilities were most common among children aged 0 to 5, and mental disabilities dominated the picture for the other two age groups: 6 to 12 and 13 to 17. Virtually all SSI children are covered by some form of health insurance, with Medicaid being by far the most common source of health insurance coverage. Just as in the case of the severity of disabilities, substantial variation was reported in health care utilization among SSI children. Almost 30 percent of children had two or fewer doctor visits during the 12 months preceding the interview, and close to 50 percent had five or more doctor visits. About four-fifths of the children had no reported hospitalizations or surgeries during the previous year. More than 40 percent of the children visited an emergency room during the previous year, most of them more than once. Importantly, no out-of-pocket costs associated with medical care were reported for more than two-thirds of the children, and only about 3 percent had annual expenses exceeding $1,000 for physical and mental health care. This finding suggests that SSI payments are not used to cover medical expenses for the overwhelming majority of children. The use of supportive therapies varied widely among SSI children: more than half reported having used physical, occupational, or speech therapy; only 8 percent used respite care for the parents or other family members. An analysis of the perception of the survey respondents shows that more than one-third of children had unmet needs for mental health counseling services, and about three-quarters of families had unmet needs for respite care. In several service categories, the proportion perceived to have had unmet service needs was around 10 percent or less. In the dominant service category of physical, occupational, and speech therapy, only 11 percent perceived to have had unmet service needs.     

Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S. Courts of Appeals

Why do lower courts treat Supreme Court precedents favorably or unfavorably? To address this question, we formulate a theoretical framework based on current principal‐agent models of the judiciary. We use the framework to structure an empirical analysis of a random sample of 500 Supreme Court cases, yielding over 10,000 subsequent treatments in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. When the contemporary Supreme Court is ideologically estranged from the enacting Supreme Court, lower courts treat precedent much more harshly. Controlling for the ideological distance between the enacting and contemporary Supreme Courts, the preferences of the contemporary lower court itself are unrelated to its behavior. Hence, hierarchical control appears strong and effective. At the same time, however, a lower court's previous treatments of precedent strongly influence its later treatments. The results have important implications for understanding legal change and suggest new directions for judicial principal‐agency theory.     

Administration and service delivery in the SSI program: the first 10 years

This article provides an overview of the administrative structures and processes through which the Social Security Administration delivers its services to Supplemental Security Income (SSI) claimants and recipients. It documents the improvements and adjustments that have been made in the administration of SSI from 1974, when the program began, through 1983, the 10th year of its operation. The first decade of SSI was marked by significant changes that have led to improvements in fiscal responsibility and administrative efficiency for the program. Among the subjects covered are the legislative history of the program, the claims process, posteligibility procedures, underpayments and overpayments, the administrative complexities that have had to be surmounted, and administrative efforts aimed at quality assurance.     

SSI eligibility and participation among the oldest old: evidence from the AHEAD

The proportion of elderly SSI recipients aged 70 or older has been growing in recent years, perhaps because of rising life expectancies overall and a higher incidence of poverty among the oldest old. In 1999, 84 percent of all elderly SSI recipients were 70 or older. This article examines Supplemental Security Income (SSI) eligibility and participation among the oldest old. The analysis was based on 1993 data from the Study of Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old that were used to build a detailed SSI eligibility model to identify individuals who meet the federal criteria for SSI income and resource eligibility. The participation rate among those eligible for federal SSI benefits is 53.9 percent, which is generally consistent with the findings of other studies. Furthermore, eligible participants would receive a significantly higher federal SSI benefit than eligible nonparticipants. Correspondingly, eligible participants have significantly lower incomes and assets than eligible nonparticipants. An econometric model is used to estimate the influence of various demographic, financial, and health care use characteristics on the probability of SSI participation among eligible individuals and couples. The model corrects for measurement error in calculated benefits and for misclassifying someone as ineligible. The empirical results show that the effect of higher SSI benefits on the probability of participation is substantial--a $100 increase in benefits would increase the probability of participating for an average eligible unit by 15 percentage points. Many of the demographic, financial, and health care use variables also are important predictors of SSI participation among the oldest old. The eligibility and participation models are also used to simulate the effect of increasing the SSI unearned income disregard from $20 to $125. Those made eligible by this policy change would receive a very low federal SSI benefit on average, suggesting that they are on the margin of eligibility under the original program rules. The simulated participation rate is 48.8 percent--5 percentage points lower than under the original program rules--reflecting the low benefit that new eligibles would receive. Only 36 percent of those made eligible by the new program rules are predicted to participate. These SSI eligibility and participation models are potentially useful tools for policy analysis. It is fairly straightforward to use these models to change a feature of SSI eligibility, reestimate the group of eligible individuals and couples, and predict participation among those who are eligible under the simulated program rules. New eligibles can be compared with those eligible under original program rules. New participants can be compared with old participants. Although these models focus only on individuals aged 70 or older, this type of analysis can be helpful in estimating the potential distributional effects of proposed SSI policy changes.     

Change over Tenure: Voting, Variance, and Decision Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals

Existing scholarship on the voting behavior of U.S. Courts of Appeals judges finds that their decisions are best understood as a function of law, policy preferences, and factors relating to the institutional context of the circuit court. What previous studies have failed to consider, however, is that the ability to predict circuit judge decisions can vary in substantively important ways and that judges, in different stages of their careers, may behave distinctively. This article develops a theoretical framework which conceptualizes career stage to account for variability in voting by circuit judges and tests hypotheses by modeling the error variance in a vote choice model. The findings indicate that judges are more predictable in their voting during their early and late career stages. Case characteristics and institutional features of the circuit also affect voting consistency.     

Taking It to the Next Level: The Elevation of District Court Judges to the U.S. Courts of Appeals

We address an important aspect of judicial careers: the elevation of judges from the U.S. District Courts to the Courts of Appeals. We argue that the likelihood of a judge being elevated is a function of informational cues and signals regarding the nature of the judge and the judge's compatibility with presidential preferences. We also expect norms involving the intersection between geography and Senate politics to affect a judge's elevation chances. Using data on district court judges appointed between 1946 and 1995, we find that the likelihood of a judge being elevated is a function of the judge's ideological compatibility with the president, the judge's previous ABA rating, and Senate norms involving state "ownership" of appeals court seats. Blunt indicators of policy preferences trump direct signals when presidents decide whom to elevate, leaving judges little control over their career prospects and thus less incentive to slant their decisions in the direction of the president's preferences.     

The Etiology of the Occurrence of En Banc Review in the U.S. Court of Appeals

The U.S. Courts of Appeals, working principally through three-judge panels, constitute important final arbiters of the meaning of the federal constitution, laws, and regulations and, hence, significant policymakers within the federal system. En banc rehearing—reconsideration of the decision of a three-judge panel by the full complement of judges appointed to the circuit—is an institutional device that ensures circuit decisions are in line with the established preferences of the circuit. The use of en banc varies in frequency across circuits and within circuits over time. Drawing on legal, attitudinal, and strategic perspectives of judicial behavior, we develop and test a set of integrated expectations regarding the causes of this variation. Our analysis finds support for the operation of all three models and suggests that the influence of ideology on the use of en banc in the recent era is not unique but part of a long-standing pattern .     

Comparing Attitudinal and Strategic Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals

Students of judicial behavior have increasingly turned to strategic accounts to understand judicial decision making. Scholarship on the Supreme Court and state high courts suggests that the decision to dissent is better understood in light of strategic considerations rather than simply reflecting ideological disagreement. We investigate whether these findings comport with behavior by judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. We develop a spatial model of the decision to dissent that incorporates both attitudinal and strategic elements and subject this model to empirical analysis. We find that ideological disagreement between a judge and the majority opinion writer is a more persuasive explanation of the decision to dissent than a strategic account in which a judge conditions a dissent on whether circuit intervention would obtain the judge's preferred outcome. Though we do not discount the existence of other types of strategic behavior on the Courts of Appeals, our research suggests that strategic accounts of dissenting behavior are not generalizable to all courts .     

The 1976 Election: New Trends in the Swedish Electorate

This article summarizes some of the main findings from the 1976 Swedish Election Study. The defeat of the Social Democrat government in 1976 was caused by three issues: bureaucracy, socialization, and nuclear power. Although net changes were small, the actual number of voters switching parties was the largest recorded during the last twenty years. The traditional image of the stable Swedish voter is becoming a myth. Aggregate stability is combined with a large and increasing individual volatility.     

Income of the population aged 55 and older, 1976.

This article inaugurates a biennial series of reports on the income of persons aged 55 and older. The survey on which it is based updates information on the broad economic picture for a cross-section of this population and forms the basis for an analysis of trends in the financial status of the group as a whole. In 1976, persons aged 55--61 were generally working full-time, not receiving income from pensions, and married. Those aged 73 and older were predominantly not working, mostly recipients of retirement pensions, and likely to be widows. Most persons aged 65 and older were receiving social security benefits; those with neither earnings nor a second pension constituted the largest subgroup and had the lowest median income. Married couples, as a group, were substantially better off financially than nonmarried persons because they were younger, two-person rather than one-person units, and had one member who was a man. Blacks were less likely than whites to receive pension income other than social security benefits, and their median benefits and earnings were both lower.     

The Gnomes of Washington: Four Myths of the 1976 IMF Crisis

The IMF settlement of December 1976 looms large in popular and partisan views of the politics of the 1970s. It is argued here that conventional academic wisdom has come to embody several misleading myths about its impact on economic policy. Evidence is presented to challenge four such myths which suggest that the IMF forced the Labour government to launch an attack on public spending, introduce cash limits to control public spending, introduce monetary targets and abandon the pursuit of full employment through demand management.
Although the language of the [IMF] negotiations reflected the arcane terms of international finance… the decisions required of the British Government were profoundly political… behind the technical financial decisions lay fundamental differences over the appropriate balance between the private and public sectors, the priority between capital accumulation and social welfare, the relative weight to be given to incentives and equality… What was at issue was the future shape of the political economy of Great Britain.¹     

Usable information for policy: An appraisal of the U.S. Global Change Research Program

The U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) was established in law in 1990 (P.L. 101–606) with a mandate to provide policymakers with usable information. The law gave a White House Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES) responsibility to implement the program with respect to its policy mandate. In 1994 CEES was replaced, in part, because it failed to provide usable information. This article, documenting the development of the program's policy mandate and CEES implementation of the USGCRP, finds a performance shortfall. The shortfall is attributed to a breakdown in the legislative process, participant perspectives, and the structure of post-World War II science policy. The purpose of the article is to explain the CEES performance shortfall in hope that its successor can improve USGCRP performance with respect to its legal mandate based upon the lessons of experience.