Bowling the state back in: Political institutions and the creation of social capital

Abstract. While some studies have revealed that social capital is shaped within civil society, the role of political institutions in forming social capital has not yet been clearly shown. This article, therefore, tries to evaluate the politico-institutional foundations of social capital measured in terms of associational life in Switzerland. The purpose is to apply Putnam's method of comparing subsystems to the Swiss cantons. The empirical analyses show that government structures are strongly associated with social capital. More specifically, the availability of direct democracy promotes a lively associational life. In addition, consensus democracy and decentralized political structures contribute to social capital. In this vein, the access points of the politico-institutional structure constitute a feasible 'top-down' path to breaking out of the vicious circle of distrust, disengagement and weak democracy.     

National financial structures,capital mobility,and international economic rules: The normative consequences of East Asian,European, and American distinctiveness

In addressing the relationship between the structures of national financial markets, capital mobility, and the rules governing international trade and investment, this article combines theory and policy. Focusing mainly on the United States, Germany, and Japan, it first draws together themes and suggestive evidence from diverse bodies of research on international capital mobility and national financial structures. On this basis, it argues that, notwithstanding the increasing mobility of capital, asymmetries in those structures persist and have important consequences for the rules of the international economic game as they are now evolving. The article then looks more deeply at East Asia, the region that appears to be presenting the clearest challenge to existing international rules. In its conclusion, and in light of that challenge, the article discusses the agenda that confronts researchers and policy-makers as they attempt to assess and re-calibrate rules to govern the more complex international economy of the 1990s and beyond.     

Collaborative environmental institutions: All talk and no action?

Many analysts view collaborative institutions that attempt to forge consensus and build cooperation among conflicting stakeholders as a potential remedy to the pathologies of conventional environmental policy. However, few analyses have demonstrated that collaborative institutions actually increase levels of cooperation, and critics accuse collaborative institutions of all talk and no action. This paper reports the use a quasi‐experimental design to compare the levels of consensus and cooperation in coastal watersheds with and without U.S. EPA's National Estuary Programs, one of the most prominent national examples of collaborative institutions in the environmental policy domain. Panel survey data from more than 800 respondents shows that while the level of consensus is higher in NEP estuaries, there is no difference between NEP and non‐NEP estuaries in the level of cooperation. © 2004 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

全球化竞争格局下的中国资本市场发展的路径探析

20世纪90年代以来,随着全球经济一体化的不断深化,全球范围内国际贸易和国际投资快速增长,金融自由化程度的提高,国际资本流动规模不断扩大,金融市场的竞争加剧,呈现出此消彼长的多极化趋势,在此条件下,中国作为新兴市场国家的代表,在此轮竞争中面临着新的发展机遇。中国在可预见的将来有可能成为国际金融中心之一。探讨全球化竞争格局下,中国金融崛起过程中资本市场发展应当顺势而为的战略选择。     

Satisfaction with democracy and collective action problems: the case of the environment

Whether a country is able effectively to address collective action problems is a critical test of its ability to fulfill the demands of its citizens to their satisfaction. We study one particularly important collective action problem: the environment. Using a large panel dataset covering 25 years for some countries, we find that, overall, citizens of European countries are more satisfied with the way democracy works in their country if (a) more environmental policies are in place and if (b) expenditures on the environment are higher, but environmental taxes are lower. The relation between environmental policy and life satisfaction is not as pronounced. The evidence for the effect of environmental quality on both satisfaction with democracy and life satisfaction is not very clear, although we find evidence that citizens value personal mobility (in terms of having a car) highly, but view the presence of trucks as unpleasant. We also document that parents, younger citizens, and those with high levels of educational attainment tend to care more about environmental issues than do non-parents, older citizens, and those with fewer years of schooling.     

Cultural institutions and value formation on the art market: A rent-seeking approach

The formation of value in the artistic market can be specifically affected by the behavior of cultural institutions, acting on it as monopolistic quality certifiers. The rent-maximizing strategy limits quantities to sub-optimum levels and keeps prices and costs higher. This can be worsened by institutional rent-seeking. The establishment's strategies cannot always be matched through public policies, because this can result in an increase of monopoly social losses and of the establishment's lobbying efforts.     

International capital mobility and Third World development: Compatible marriage or troubled relationship?

The current surge of foreign capital to the Third World resembles that of the 1970s. The channels are now different but the extra-regional flows are again predominantly to Latin America followed by East Asia. Many of the Latin American countries whose overborrowing brought on the 1980s debt crisis are again overborrowing to compensate for low savings rates and other structural flaws, putting their balance of payments at increasing risk. The likelihood that this time they can handle the rising debt servicing and impending slowing of the inflows sans prolonged crisis or a major retreat from their market liberalization policies is not very high, whereas the East Asian countries appear once more structurally capable of riding out the repercussions from an international financial market pullback.     

Brown kids in white suburbs: Housing mobility and the many faces of social capital

Abstract

Social capital has many faces in the geography of urban opportunity, and as such, particular housing policies might have positive effects on some forms of social capital and negative effects on others. The author defines social support and social leverage as two key dimensions of social capital that can be accessed by individuals. A sample of 132 low‐income African‐American and Latino adolescents is used to examine the early impacts of a Yonkers, NY, housing mobility program on social capital.¹

Overall, program participants (^‘’movers^‘’) appear to be no more cut off from social support than a control group of “stayer” youth. On the other hand, movers are also no more likely to report access to good sources of job information or school advice— to leverage that might enhance opportunity. Adding just one steadily employed adult to an adolescent's circle of significant ties has dramatic effects on perceived access to such leverage.     

Social capital in the Japanese youth labor market: Labor market policy,schools, and norms

This paper develops the concept of institutional social capital and discusses its importance in the labor market. Institutional social capital is constituted by the resources inherent in an organization (such as a school) and thereby available to members of that organization. This is contrasted with the social capital available to individuals through their own personal networks. In the labor market context, an example of institutional social capital is the ties that schools have with employers who recruit a proportion of their new employees as they prepare to graduate. The paper examines how these ties and the norms governing the important labor market screening role played by the high school developed in post-WWII Japan. I also discuss an important positive externality – social control over students – generated by schools institutional social capital. Finally, I examine current challenges to Japanese high schools institutional social capital.     

Policy making and collective action: Defining coalitions within the advocacy coalition framework

Research on policy communities, policy networks, and advocacy coalitions represents the most recent effort by policy scholars in North America and Europe to meaningfully describe and explain the complex, dynamic policy making processes of modern societies. While work in this tradition has been extraordinarily productive, issues of collective action have not been carefully addressed. Focusing on the advocacy coalitions (AC) framework developed by Sabatier (1988) and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) as an example of a productive research program within the policy network tradition, this article (1) examines the potential of the AC framework, with its emphasis on beliefs, policy learning, and preference formation, to provide richer explanations of policy making processes than frameworks grounded exclusively in instrumental rationality; (2) suggests that paradoxically, however, the AC framework can more fully realize its potential by admitting the explanations of collective action from frameworks based on instrumental rationality; (3) incorporates within the AC framework accounts of how coalitions form and maintain themselves over time and of the types of strategies coalitions are likely to adopt to pursue their policy goals; and (4) derives falsifiable collective action hypotheses that can be empirically tested to determine whether incorporating theories of collective action within the AC framework represents a positive, rather than a degenerative, expansion of the AC framework.     

国家角色与社会资本建构的双重效应

以帕特南为代表的社会资本理论通过参与、互惠以及信任的相互促进模型,建构了“去国家中心化”的多中心社会治理模式,从而削弱了国家在社会治理和社会控制过程中的唯一合理性和唯一权威。这类社会资本理论强调了社会资本的积极效应,而忽视了社会资本建构的结构性因素所导致的一些负面效应。同时,国家是一种拥有合法强制力量的特殊制度形式,能够通过营造多元化的制度和政策环境缓解社会资本建构引发的负面问题。     

The private stake in public goods: overcoming the illogic of collective action

Conclusion According to the Logic of Collective Action, most actions in the service of common interests are either not logical or not collective. In a large group, the argument goes, individual action counts for so little in the realization of common interests that it makes no sense for a person to consider group interests when choosing a course of personal conduct. Only private interests are decisive. Their fulfillment, at least, depends in a substantial way on one's own behavior. Individual actions designed to achieve private advantage are therefore rational. Actions aimed at collective goods are a waste of time and effort. Occasionally, of course, a person acting on the basis of private interests may inadvertently provide some collective good from which many other people derive benefit. This is what happens in the case of the Greek shipping tycoon. But it occurs only because one person's private good fortuitously coincides with the collective good of a larger group. From the tycoon's perspective, there are no collective interests at stake in the sponsorship of an opera broadcast, only his own private interests. Nor does his decision to underwrite a broadcast take account of the other people who will listen to it. His action is a solitary one designed to serve a private interest, and it is perfectly consistent with Olson's argument concerning the illogic of collective action, because it is not grounded in collective interest and is not a case of collective behavior. Olson's theory permits people to share collective interests but not to act upon them voluntarily. The only acknowledged exception occurs in the case of very small groups, where each member's contribution to the common good represents such a large share of the total that any person's default becomes noticeable to others and may lead them to reduce or cancel their own contributions. In this instance, at least, one person's actions can make a perceptible difference for the chance of realizing collective interests, and it is therefore sensible for each person to consider these collective interests (and one another's conduct) when deciding whether or not to support group efforts. Outside of small groups, however, Olson finds no circumstances in which voluntary collective action is rational. But in fact the conditions that make collective action rational are broader than this and perhaps more fundamental to Olson's theory. They are inherent in the very ‘collectiveness’ of collective goods - their status as social or group artifacts. In the absence of a group, there can be no such thing as a collective good. But in the absence of mutual awareness and interdependence, it becomes extremely difficult to conceive of a social group. The assumption that group members are uninfluenced by one another's contributions to a collective good is no mere theoretical simplification. It may be a logical impossibility. Being a member of a group, even a very large one, implies at the very least that one's own conduct takes place against a background of group behavior. Olson's assumptions do not acknowledge this minimal connection between individual and group behavior, and they inhibit recognition of the elementary social processes that explain why slovenly conduct attracts special attention on clean streets, or why the initial violations of group norms are more momentous than later violations. It may be argued, of course, that the groups of Olson's theory are not functioning social groups with a collective existence, but only categories or classes of people who happen to share a collective interest. The logic of collective action is intended precisely to show why these ‘potential’ groups are prevented from converting themselves into organized social groups whose members act in a coordinated way. In such latent groups, perhaps, members are unaware of one another, and Olson's assumption that they are uninfluenced by one another's conduct becomes a reasonable one. Another implication, however, is that Olson's theory is subject to unacknowledged restrictions. The logic of the free ride is for potential groups. It may not hold for actual ones. The distinction is exemplified, in the case of public sanitation, by the difference between what is rational on a clean street and what is rational on a dirty one. The logic of the free ride does not make sense for the members of an ongoing group that is already operating to produce collective goods such as public order or public sanitation. While this represents a notable limitation upon the scope of Olson's theory, it apparently leaves the logic of collective action undisturbed where potential or latent groups are concerned. But suppose that a member of an unmobilized group wants her colleagues to contribute to the support of a collective good that she particularly values. Her problem is to create a situation in which such contributions make sense to her fellow members. As we have already seen in the case of the neighborhood street-sweeper, one possible solution is to provide the collective good herself. If it has the appropriate characteristics, its very existence may induce other members of the latent group to contribute to its maintenance. This is not one of those cases in which one person's private interest fortuitously coincides with the collective interest of a larger group. The neighborhood street-sweeper is acting on behalf of an interest that she is conscious of sharing with her neighbors. Her aim is to arouse collective action in support of that interest. She does not expect to pay for public cleanliness all by herself, or to enjoy its benefits all by herself. Her role bears a general resemblance to the one that some analysts have defined for the political entrepreneur who seeks to profit personally by supplying a collective good to the members of a large group (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young 1971). Like the neighborhood street-sweeper, the entrepreneur finds it advantageous to confer a collective benefit on others. But the similarity does not extend to the nature of the advantage or the manner in which it is secured. The entrepreneur induces people to contribute toward the cost of a collective good by creating an organizational apparatus through which group members can pool their resources. The existence of this collection mechanism can also strengthen individual members' confidence that their colleagues' contributions are forthcoming. What the entrepreneur gains is private profit - the difference between the actual cost of a collective good and the total amount that group members are prepared to pay for it. By contrast, the neighborhood street-sweeper induces support for a collective good, not by facilitating contributions, but by increasing the costs that come from the failure to contribute. As a result of her efforts, she gains a clean street whose benefits (and costs) she shares with her fellow residents. She takes her profit in the form of collective betterment rather than private gain, and her conduct, along with the behavior of her neighbors, demonstrates that effective selfinterest can extend beyond private interest. Self-interest can also give rise to continuing cooperative relationships. The street-sweeper, acting in her own interest, brings into being a cooperative enterprise in which she and her fellow residents jointly contribute to the production of a collective good. Cooperation in this case does not come about through negotiation or exchange among equal parties. It can be the work of a single actor who contributes the lion's share of the resources needed to establish a collective good, in the expectation that its existence will induce others to join in maintaining it. The tactic is commonplace as a means of eliciting voluntary collective action, and it operates on a scale far larger than the street or the neighborhood. Government, paradoxically, probably relies on it more than most institutions With its superior power and resources, it may be society's most frequent originator of voluntary collective action. Its policies, imposed through coercion and financed by compulsory taxation, generate a penumbra of cooperation without which coercion might become ineffectual. By providing certain collective goods, government authorities can move citizens to make voluntary contributions to the maintenance of these goods. The stark dichotomy between private voluntary action and public coercion - one of the mainstays of American political rhetoric - may be as misleading as the identification of self-interest with selfishness. There is more at stake here than the voluntary production of collective goods. Continuing cooperative behavior can have other results as well. Once group members begin to expect cooperation from one another, norms of cooperation and fairness are likely to develop. Axelrod (1986) has suggested that modes of conduct which have favorable outcomes for the people who pursue them tend to evolve into group norms. Public-spirited action that serves self-interest could therefore engender a principled attachment to the common good, undermining the assumption of self-interestedness that gives the logic of collective action its bite. Laboratory studies of cooperative behavior have already demonstrated that experimental subjects have far less regard for narrow self-interest than rational choice theory requires (Dawes 1980). In one extended series of collective action experiments, however, Marwell and Ames (1981) found a single group of subjects who approximated the self-interested free-riders of Olson's theory. They were graduate students in economics.     

Corporations, collective action and corporate governance: One size does not fit all

A review of the theory and evidence on corporate governance indicates several related themes. First, corporate governance is multidimensional. Second, corporate governance is an endogenous response to a firm’s economic environment. Third, the role of different governance mechanisms varies across industries. New analysis of a sample of 1235 US corporations from 40 different industries in the year 2000 confirms the empirical regularities reported in prior research. The central policy implication of the prior research and new supporting evidence is that one size does not fit all in corporate governance.     

Citizenship,reproduction and the state: international marriage and human rights

The relationship between citizenship, marriage and family has often been overlooked in the social and political theory of citizenship. Intimate domestic life is associated with the private sphere, partly because reproduction itself is thought to depend on the private choices of individuals. While feminist theory has challenged this division between private and public – ‘the personal is political’ – the absence of any systematic thinking about familial relations, reproduction and citizenship is puzzling. Citizenship is a juridical status that confers political rights such as the right to carry a passport or to vote in elections. However, from a sociological point of view, we need to understand the social foundations and consequences of citizenship – however narrowly defined in legal and political terms. This article starts by noting the obvious point that the majority of us inherit citizenship at birth and in a sense we do not choose to be ‘Vietnamese’ or ‘Malaysian’ or ‘Japanese’ citizens. Although naturalisation is an important aspect of international migration and settlement, the majority of us are, as it were, born into citizenship. Therefore, the family is an important but often implicit facet of political identity and membership. In sociological language, citizenship looks like an ascribed rather than achieved status, and as a result becomes confused and infused with ethnicity. This inheritance of citizenship is odd given the fact that, at least in the West, there is a presumption, following the pronouncements of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, to think of citizenship in universal terms that are ethnically ‘blind’, but it is in fact closely connected with familial or private status. These complex relations within the nation-state are further complicated by the contemporary growth of transnational marriages and this article considers the problems of marriage, reproduction and citizenship in the context of global patterns of migration.