共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Lainie Friedman Ross 《The Journal of law, medicine & ethics》1993,21(2):251-257
2.
道德律是人们道德地生活的基本法则,唯有道德律才能提供一种道德生活,也才能使道德生活成为可能.我们的时代缺乏对我们生活的准则是否合乎道德法则的检视,康德的实践理性的基本法则--道德律给我们提供了可资思考的维度.康德实践理性的基本法则指出了一种道德地生活的可能性.道德是人之为人应有的生活方式,只有严格的道德规范,只有过一种严格的道德生活才是国民当下的道德选择,而伦理研究者的责任则尤为重要. 相似文献
3.
4.
5.
6.
Brandon Mattalo 《Journal of Legal Studies Education》2024,41(1):49-71
While it is important to research the negative impact of generative artificial intelligence on academic integrity, academics should focus most of their efforts on the opportunities these technologies present for improving pedagogical practices. In this note, I attempt to flip the narrative from one of fear to one of opportunity. I suggest that academics should research the use of generative AI to improve teaching effectiveness and efficiency. I offer various practical suggestions on how these tools can be used to advance pedagogical practices, with specific business law examples. 相似文献
7.
8.
PETER RIJPKEMA 《Ratio juris》2011,24(4):413-434
According to contemporary legal positivism, law claims to create obligations. In order for law to be able to create obligations, it must be capable of having authority. Legal positivism claims that for law to be capable of having authority, it only has to meet non‐moral or non‐normative conditions of authority. In this paper it is argued that law can only be capable of having authority if it also meets certain normative conditions. But if something must meet certain normative conditions in order to be capable of having authority and if it must be capable of having authority in order to be law, then it is only law if it is conceivable that it meets these normative conditions and this can only be ascertained by means of an evaluation. Therefore, legal positivism's claim that determining what the law is does not necessarily, or conceptually, depend on moral or other evaluative considerations (the separation thesis) is incompatible with its claim that law must be able to create obligations. Further, an analysis of Hart's concept of law shows that it is not only possible that the identification of the law depends on moral evaluation, as Hart claims, but that it is conceptually necessary that it does. 相似文献
9.
在维护道德权利上,司法克制主义与司法能动主义立场各有其理,但分歧并非不可调和,司法哲学上的主流与非主流之分以及两者互补关系的定位不容忽视。从司法主体、司法正义、守法道德义务和道德约束机制四个角度比较分析,两种立场所产生的道德风险也自不同,道德风险也有共性风险与个性风险之分。 相似文献
10.
论税法的道德性——税法不能承受之重 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
翟继光 《西南政法大学学报》2008,10(1):76-79
现代税法具有浓厚的道德性,这种属性导致税法背离了税收公平原则和"一事不二罚"原则,使得衡量税收立法科学性的标准多样化和模糊化,不利于税收立法的完善。税法已经不能承担各种社会原则和道德准则的重负,应当以量能课税原则为基础构建道德中性税法。 相似文献
11.
论人身保险中的道德风险 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
黄英 《西南政法大学学报》2003,5(6):56-58
虽然保险合同的双方都可能面临利益失衡的风险,但相形之下,投保人一方因利益失衡而导致心态失衡的可能性要大得多,加之巨额保险金的强烈诱惑,投保人和保险关系人就可能抛开道义和良知的约束,在主观上产生一种故意或恶意,最终铤而走险,不择手段地促就保险事故的发生,这样就引发了道德风险。 相似文献
12.
从鸦片战争开始,中国"数千年未有之大变局"至今尚未结束,解决"数千年未有之大变局"的问题是中国19世纪以来的最高任务,也仍是当前中国人和中国文化亟待解决的最大问题.应对"数千年未有之大变局"的根本出路在于文化变革.中国文化变革的核心在于启蒙与革心,启蒙与革心是中国道德教育的文化使命,也是中国文化变革的根本任务. 相似文献
13.
Patrick Masiyakurima 《The Modern law review》2005,68(3):411-434
It is usually argued that moral rights are severely handicapped by their inconsistent entrenchment in common law and civilian legal systems. This article argues that the main trouble with moral rights protection is that the justifications for the existence of these rights are riddled with internal inconsistencies generated by the vagaries of copyright exploitation. Harmonising moral rights protection or using moral rights justifications cumulatively may not resolve the theoretical inconsistencies. Copyright protection must therefore be seriously overhauled if moral rights are to be widely perceived as vehicles for protecting authors' rights. 相似文献
14.
15.
16.
17.
影视“恶搞”现象引发了笔者对作品精神权利秩序价值的思考。根据洛克的“劳动财产学说”,作品是作者劳动的结果,作者应当享有署名权、发表权、修改权、保护作品完整权等权利,总之,作品精神权利秩序价值具有正当性。精神权利的秩序价值在现实中又具体表现为一定的秩序状态,这一秩序状态对于鼓励创作、提高效率都具有重要意义,一旦当作品精神权利所确认的秩序状态受到破坏时,法律的救济功能则会力求恢复原有秩序状态或重建新的秩序状态进行救济。 相似文献
18.
道德教育回归生活的基本问题辨析 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
厘定道德与生活的关系是道德教育回归生活的基础性课题.道德是生活中的道德,道德离不开生活.道德是生活的构成性因素,道德不能"同质化"为生活的一个独立领域,道德挺立是建构生活意义的方式之一,生活的过程也是道德学习的过程,不能有与生活过程不同的道德学习过程. 相似文献
19.
CARLOS S. NINO 《Ratio juris》1991,4(1):36-51
Abstract. The author deals with one aspect of the justification of governmental action and its product (the law). He focuses on the authoritative character of legal rule, analyzing the apparent capacity of governments to produce reasons for action not grounded on substantive moral considerations. The assumption of that capacity seems necessary in order to establish a general moral obligation to obey a government irrespective of the actions required. This question is faced in connection with the thesis that only a particular form of government, democracy, is morally justified insofar as it rests on legal rules issued by a legitimate source. 相似文献