Grain Procurement,Tax Instrument and Peasant Burdens during China's Rural Transition

In this paper, we argue that China's grain procurement system as a major instrument in rural taxation survived the communes and lost its importance only gradually in recent years. However, as agricultural liberalization progressed, the traditional tax instruments of ‘tax deduction prior to grain procurement payment’ and implicit taxation through ‘price scissors’ gradually eroded. Under such a circumstance, local governments in agriculture-based regions resorted to informal fees collected directly from individual rural households while the more industrialized regions shifted to non-agricultural taxes that are less costly in terms of tax collection. Empirical evidence based on a large panel data set supports our hypotheses of rural taxation in China.     

论中国农村综合改革的两大基本任务

中国农村综合改革的两大基本任务是再造市场经济的微观基础和基层民主权威。下一步应坚持“整体推进”和“重点突破”相结合的原则,重点推进农地产权制度、民间融资机制、农业科技推广体制和乡镇机构、农村义务教育体制、县乡财政管理体制等项综合改革,为新农村建设提供体制保障、财力支持和动力源泉。     

Business‐Government Relations in Industrializing Rural China: A principal‐agent perspective

This paper explains why rural enterprises prosper in the post-Mao reform era. Based on a case study of Shaanxi province, the paper argues that the institutional arrangements in rural China under economic reforms are conducive to sustained economic growth because the principal‐agent problem is alleviated in two dimensions. First, the interests of local government officials and enterprises overlap. Prompted by the fiscal pressures on local governments as a result of the fiscal reforms, particularly the 1994 tax-assignment reform, local governments are eager to promote local industrial growth. Apart from absorbing rural surplus labour and contributing to the provision of communal welfare to local residents, rural enterprises provide local governments with tax and non-tax revenues to finance their expenditure obligations. In return, local governments provide preferential aid to their enterprises in the form of tax and credit privileges. Second, the principal‐agent problem is abated by a closer effort-and-reward link for the various parties involved in the operation of rural enterprises.     

论农业人口向小城镇集聚的动力——以山东省汶南镇为例

农业人口向小城镇转移集聚是城镇化进程中的必然。山东省汶南镇作为一个农业大镇和小城镇建设示范镇,在农业入口转移和小城镇建设方面取得了一定的成绩。该镇农村土地减少,农业生产效率提高等因素形成的推力推动农业人口向小城镇集聚,而镇区合理的产业结构所形成的强大经济磁力,优越的生活环境等因素所形成的拉力吸引着农业人口向该镇区集中。     

乡镇政府职能二维度解读——基于职能嬗变的动因及价值定位的思考

在中国实现现代化的过程中,乡镇政权在我国农村的经济发展和社会进步方面都曾做出巨大的贡献。随着城镇化建设的加快、税费改革的逐步推行、公共产品的市场化趋向、新的管理理念的冲击,乡镇政府已有的职能出现了不适应的状态。对其职能进行科学定位是其解脱困境的必然选择。     

Evaluation Processes,Local Cadres' Behaviour and Local Development Processes

This study investigates the impact of political evaluations on the behaviour of leading county and township cadres in rural China. The article is structured in two parts. In the first section the institutional foundations of the evaluation system for local administrations in rural China will be introduced. The section will conclude with a brief overview of policy reforms initiated by the centre to tackle some of the perceived shortcomings of the present system. The second part of this article will feature the behavioural responses of local cadres to evaluations as identified in our field research interviews and secondary literature. It becomes obvious that the performance evaluation system and its targets have become an important point of orientation for local cadres—although there are important variations among different groups of officials. Finally, in the conclusion the argument for an alternative perspective on performance evaluations in the context of rural China will be developed: on the one side a channel for specialised political communication, steering cadres' behaviour and promoting an incentive system; on the other side a trigger to a multitude of social responses of leading local cadres. In the end these social responses might have more influence on cadre behaviour than the incentives embodied in the evaluations themselves.     

新农村建设中的城市政府

新农村建设向城市政府职能转变与创新提出了新要求。在乡镇企业吸收农业劳动力作用日渐式微的背景下,城市已成为农业劳动力转移的主要方向。为此,城市政府需要制定非歧视性的就业政策以促进农业劳动力转移,按照比例原则制定城市管理政策以降低农民工的城市生活成本,构建社会政策体系以推进农民工公民权的获得,以及帮助农民工获得现代性。总之,城市政府要通过综合配套改革推动农民工的市民化进程。城市政府的职能转变与创新,迫切需要各层级政府尤其是中央政府在制度、政策上给予支持与配合,以实现不同区域、不同层级政府间职能的有效衔接。     

The Politics of Central Tax Collection in China since 1994: local collusion and political control

The central leaders in China adopted a tax assignment system and centralized taxation in 1994 with the goal of increasing central tax revenues. By setting up the National Tax Bureau, the central leaders intended to leave central tax collection undisturbed by local influences. However, informal practices at the local level revealed that the local governments colluded with the central tax bureaucrats stationed in their regions at the expense of central interests. The need to develop local economies, an important task assigned to local governments, is one important reason behind local interference in central tax collection. This study finds that the central government coped with this problem by changing the incentives of the provincial party secretaries through linking central tax collection in a jurisdiction with their chance of promotion.     

适应现代市场经济必须取消农业税——我国农村税制改革的出路思考之一

我国农村税制改革的第一步是取消农业税,认清我国农业税的性质和取消农业税的原因是一个重要理论前提.我国的农业税名义上(法定的)是收益税,形式上是资源税,本质上是对农业生产行为征税,是行为税.在当代工业化市场经济国家,免征农业税是通例,而且征收农业税违背税收公平和效率原则.为了保持我国农业部门的可持续发展和增强我国农产品的国内、国际竞争力,"支农"措施必须从取消农业税开始.     

多重博弈:税费改革后乡村基础设施投入面临的困境——以湖北鄂州市z乡东大堤维修为例

税费改革明确了农民的税费负担 ,但是诸如乡村基础设施之类的公共产品仍然需要投入 ,谁投入、如何收等问题仍然存在。在乡村基础设施投入问题上 ,市县政府、乡镇政府以及农民 (其代表为村委会 )都根据自己的理性进行博弈 ,而博弈结果是乡镇政府最终倾向于继续收费 ,农民被动交纳。这就形成了税费之外的收费继续出现的局面 ,进而陷入“黄宗羲定律”怪圈的困境之中。因此 ,税费改革还需要相配套的改革同时进行。     

论税务机关征管、税制因素与纳税遵从

纳税遵从也叫纳税人遵从或税收遵从，是指纳税人必须遵照并服从税法的规定来按期申报、按期足额缴税。税收遵从是依法治税的体现，只要存在税收，纳税人就必须要按税法规定来履行纳税义务。影响纳税人遵从行为的因素是多方面的，既有纳税人自身的因素，也有社会环境的因素，另外，税务人员本身的执法与服务水平、税务机关征管模式、税务机关的征管与处罚力度、税制简便程度等因素也影响着纳税遵从。     

社会转型与中国乡村权力结构研究--传统文化、乡镇企业和乡政村治

党的十一届三中全会以来,我国农村的改革促进了乡村社会的转型,传统文化的复兴、乡镇企业的崛起、乡政村治的建立等等导致了乡村权力结构中包含的具有各自利益需求和交换关系的主体--国家、基层政府、社区组织、乡镇企业、村民等等--不同身份特征的获得,并决定了他们有可能占有的资源及其相互的利益关联.对11省14个村庄的调查和比较,再现了转型期乡村权力结构的调整和重构.     

乡镇政府回应：意义、存在的问题及对策

乡镇政府及其工作人员能否对乡村社会和广大农民的需求做出积极、负责任的回应，直接关系到新农村建设的成效。因此，提升乡镇政府回应能力就要改革压力型行政体制，合理划分各级政府的事权；把握好回应指向；转变乡镇政府职能；建立健全乡镇政府回应机制和注重对乡镇政府回应进行科学的绩效评估等。     

财政立宪主义与“土地财政”治理

我国地方政府的"土地财政"引发了不少问题。财政立宪主义视野下,该现象是由央地财权划分不够合理,以及地方政府权力与当地居民权利不够平衡造成的。如果能够做到以宪法绝对统摄各类财税法律法规,则"土地财政"问题就可得到治理。     

影响农村法律秩序实现的因素分析——以周口平坟事件为例

改革开放以后,农村社会在经历了联产承包责任制的推行、土地改革的实施和农业税的废除后,逐渐由"熟人社会"向"半熟人社会"转变。在这个转变中,法律与社会的关系也发生了微妙的变化,法律逐渐成为规范社会的主要力量。但是,法律并没有在任何由其规范的社会环境内实现法律秩序,周口平坟事件就是一个典型的例证。影响农村法律秩序的形成有内在和外在因素,政府在行政活动中应充分考虑到各种内外因素。     

以深化改革为动力推进新农村建设

该文认为农村发展存在一系列突出问题,深化农村综合改革势在必行,推进新农村建设重在构建农村工作新机制。该文还从明确土地产权制度、重构农村合作经济组织、促进农业适度规模经营等方面提出改革和完善农村经营体制的对策,提出适当调整基层政府经济管理职能,改革农村行政和社会管理制度的思路和对策,以及构建公共财政体系、探索建立农村公共产品多元化提供机制的制度安排。     

The effects of China's rural industry on agricultural environment

Rural industry is the fastest growing sector in China's economy and made up 27.52% of the GNP in 1990. The development of rural industry not only enhances the peasants’ living standard, but also demonstrates the advantages and potential of a new ownership system. Along with the development of the rural industry, however, some serious environmental problems have emerged in the agriculture. Traditional agriculture and farmers are rapidly disappearing in the developed rural industrial areas. Due to some unique characteristics of rural industry, such as its wide distribution, small size and frequent production change, a set of new environmental problems have arisen. These problems threaten a vast area of China's best cropping land. Solving those problems is beyond the capacity of current agricultural and industrial policies, because these problems are directly related to China's political system. The author proposes a set of strategies and policies that, under the current political constraints, may mitigate the negative effects of rural industry on the agricultural environment.     

Representation without Taxation: political changes in Chinese authoritarian regimes

The question of why some authoritarian regimes choose to incorporate institutions of democracy such as village elections into their governing systems remains largely unanswered. As a typical case of a resilient authoritarian state that implements democracy in its villages, China has provided an invaluable case for researchers to study. Current theories focus on the influence of political elites and rural forces separately. Insightful as they are, these theories are invalid as an explanation of the variation of local governance in China across time and thus are incomplete. It should be recognized that central fiscal strategies have great effects on local governance. Specifically, if the central government largely relies upon fiscal revenue from rural areas, it has to expand its bureaucracy to the countryside to extract revenue. In contrast, if it does not rely on the rural areas for revenue, the central government will establish local democracy in the countryside. This hypothesis is historically reflected in the authoritarian regimes led by the Nationalist Party (KMT) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China. As opposed to the familiar story about representation through taxation, the logic of representation without taxation seems to be the case in China.     

个人所得税改革探讨

我国个人所得税起征点由800元提高到了1600元,这一改革措施没有从根本上解决个人所得税由于实行统一免征额所带来的实际上的不公平问题。除此之外,我国个人所得税还存在着税制不完善、税率结构不合理、征纳不充分等缺陷。我国可以从采用分类综合所得税制、提高边际税率、加强税收征管等措施入手,进一步深化个人所得税的改革。     

大陆与台湾涉外税收协定之比较析论(下)——兼谈两岸避免双重征税之议题

国际税收协定是国际税收协调的基本形式。大陆与台湾经贸往来日益密切，因双方未签订避免双重征税协定．关于避免双重征税的议题在两岸经贸实践中日显突出。作为解决该问题的积极探索，应从国际征税现象之原因导入．运用归纳分析和比较研究的方法对国际上两个主要国际税收协定范本OECD范本和UN范本展开论述．进而对大陆与台湾各自对外签订的税收协定做一比较。