Evaluating development policies and programmes in the third world

The issues and methodologies of programme evaluation have largely been developed within the North American context of an open and competitive political process. The policy cycle in Third World nations, especially authoritarian regimes, is a closed system with little consultation with affected target groups, suppression of criticism of government officials and policies, and a severe weakness in policy implementation. Third World governments prefer evaluation methods such as cost-benefit analysis which will not undermine fragile regimes by indicating problems in the policy formulation and implementation process. However, the most useful form of evaluation is implementation analysis, which can pinpoint the reasons why policies succeed or fail.     

Institutional analysis and decentralization: Developing an analytical framework for effective third world administrative reform

As we enter the 1990s, scholars and practitioners of development administration in the Third World share a deep concern with its disappointing performance. Looked to as the primary agent of modernization during the optimistic first days of independence, many now blame it for the development stagnation of much of the Third World over the past two decades. Reinforced by the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe, calls for privatization and radical cutbacks in the state are increasing. Indeed, while the causes of Third World development stagnation are undoubtedly multiple and diverse, it is difficult to refute the charge that the hierarchical, bureaucratic, centrally-led strategy has not achieved what was expected of it. The question which faces responsible and concerned scholars, practitioners and officials today, is what can and should be done about all this? This paper recommends avoiding grand and precipitous changes in organizational strategies: indiscriminate privatization and dismantling the state, it argues, would be just as much an error as the earlier whole-cloth commitment to centralist-bureaucratic organization. Instead it argues that theoretical and analytical tools effective in making more subtle and refined choices among institutional alternatives must be developed. It presents a preliminary analysis of one strategy which might offer this, and illustrates how it can be used to design organizations more likely successfully to deliver services and sustain investments in the Third World.     

Decentralization and development: Theory and evidence from Bangladesh

There is a view that decentralization brings tangible benefits to the developing world, increasing material welfare and reducing the alienation of traditional societies when faced with centralized and modernizing bureaucracies. In theory, this is plausible, but in practice decentralization seldom lives up to its promises. Only strong states are in a position to cede a realistic range of powers. ‘Successful’ decentralization often takes place in conscious opposition to the state, and for that reason it is likely to be short-lived. This paper draws on the past history and more recent experience of decentralization in Bangladesh, to conclude that the reform of local government structures has not in practice been of benefit to rural areas, the villages and the rural poor. The delivery of basic needs has not improved, nor has there been any significant increase in popular participation. The conclusion emphasizes the need to view decentralization in its social and political context. Proper account needs to be taken of the interests that dominate the political process in a highly stratified society such as Bangladesh.     

Managing organizations in the third world: A case study of management control in a Bangladeshi jute mill

This article reports on a study of the operation of management control systems in a large nationalized jute mill of Bangladesh. The study seeks to describe how ‘control’ operated in practice and to explain why the systems of control worked in these ways. Investigations revealed a number of significant factors. First, the organization operated in both competitive and regulated environments; it had little authority over its operational activities and, head office and the sponsoring ministry were prominent in organizational planning and control. Second, the accounting system in the mill was mainly a response to external legitimacy (e.g. stewardship and tax matters). Third, although budgeting was perceived as part of the formal structure of control, it was not a dominant mode of control in the organization; the budgeting system was created to comply with head office and state requirements. Fourthly, the mill managers used a variety of social/informal control and mechanisms to cope with the complexity and uncertainty around the mill's operations. This study reinforces the conclusions of other research claiming that the wider social, economic, political and institutional contexts govern the ways management control operates in an organization.     

Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth: Evidence from Spanish Regions

The degree of fiscal decentralization in Spain is similar to main federal countries and greater than unitary ones. The demand of public sector decentralization is based on a supposed efficiency gains that is far from being obvious. Using a data set for the Spanish regions, we reject the null hypothesis of a significant relationship between growth in per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and expenditure distribution among fiscal administrations. Nonetheless, we find empirical support for a relationship between revenue decentralization, far less advanced than the expenditure one, and growth. In both cases we do reject the null hypothesis of a nonlinear linkage between fiscal decentralization and growth in per capita GDP.     

Between Deadlock and Decentralization: Bargaining Dynamics in Federal States

A classic way to meet regionally diverse interests is to grant partial autonomy to sub-national entities, either by assigning them the right to decide upon policies (federalism), to implement policies (decentralization), or both. This article argues and formally elaborates that central governments may intentionally choose to increase decentralization in an effort to facilitate agreements that otherwise would be deadlocked. In this regard, a central government's decision to promote decentralization depends on its own relative valuation of policy change and congruence. We illustrate the empirical validity of our argument with a case study pertaining to the Swiss New Regional Policy.     

Decentralization and Democratic Instability: The Case of Costa Rica

This article examines the consequences of the decentralization process that is under way in Costa Rica and which may undermine, rather than bolster, democracy in that country. I first outline three key contextual variables relating to the reform process: existing sociopolitical realities (constructing local legitimacy), the dynamics of the reform process (bottom-up versus top-down), and the timing or sequencing of the proposed reforms (what is being decentralized and when). Though I focus here on Costa Rica, these three variables are generally applicable in any case of decentralization. After considering these contextual factors, I evaluate the likelihood of four negative side effects arising from the ongoing decentralization process: party-system fragmentation, reinforced or mutated clientelism, intermunicipal conflict and polarization, and local government instability. Early evidence suggests that some of these effects, particularly party-system fragmentation and municipal instability, have begun to manifest themselves.     

Federalism and Decentralization: Ownership Rights and the Superiority of Federalism

The benefits and costs usually ascribed to federalism are benefitsand costs of decentralization; they are, therefore, presentin unitary states that are in fact all decentralized. The benefitsand costs specific to federalism pertain to ownership rightsin constitutional powers. Federalism is superior to confederalismand unitarianism because the ownership rights peculiar to thatsystem of government are such that they ensure the perduranceof competition when one or more competitors are unsuccessful.They do so because under federalism, powers cannot be repossessedunilaterally. Ownership rights have to be enforced; as a consequence,there are also costs that are specific to federalism.     

Trends in development administration: The continuing challenge to the efficay of the post-colonial state in the third world

‘Development administration’ has become established and recognized as a distinct enterprise of academic study and practice. This paper visits some of the major themes that have been examined by. the ‘development administration community’ by focusing on common concerns with (1) building effective administrative capacity as part of the development process that is also. (2) responsive and accountable and (3) equitable. It is argued that these persistent themes—amid the diversity of approaches and ideological susceptibilities-constitute a continuing challenge to the efficacy of the post-colonial state in the management of development activities.     

Decentralization of road administration: case studies in Africa and Asia

A study of decentralization of road administration in developing countries has been undertaken, including a literature review, and field studies in Nepal, Uganda and Zambia. The findings are reported under the headings of: constitutions and governance; policy and planning; financial and fiscal aspects; institutions, management and human resources; operations; and contribution to poverty alleviation. Decentralization of road administration has potential for improving the delivery of rural transport infrastructure services. But the evidence from this study suggests that it is proving difficult to realize fully the expected benefits. Problems include: lack of local government powers to exercise political influence; insufficient financial resources; lack of management capability; and a lack of accountability mechanisms. Limited data also suggest that there is little evidence of existing decentralized systems being particularly responsive to addressing the needs of the rural poor. There is a need for the poor to be involved more actively in the planning, financing and implementation process. Different models for administrative decentralization are described and recommendations are made for approaches likely to be the most appropriate for rural transport infrastructure administration and management. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cluster‐Based Policy Making: Assessing Performance and Sustaining Competitiveness

Tremendous changes in technology, political and social frameworks, as well as the impacts of globalization, have put pressure on countries to become competitive. One strategy for creating an engine of economic growth is the creation of clusters. These clusters, be they naturally or artificially conceived, hold the promise of becoming the economic weapons of a country. Many studies have been done to understand the factors behind the successes and failures of clusters. One of the reasons behind the inconsistent success of existing cluster policy frameworks in managing cluster performance is the fact that clusters often are at different levels of development, and it will require different strategies to create, enhance, and sustain their competitive advantage. This paper aims to propose and demonstrate a more holistic framework designed to understand key cluster dynamics that drives cluster performance, which then will enable policy makers to work toward ensuring sustainable cluster development.     

集中与分化:全球化视野下的中国行政改革

以全球化与行政改革、西方应对全球化挑战的治道变革为背景,在分析全球化对中国传统行政权力的挑战的基础 上,提出并分析了集中和分化是中国行政改革的现实选择,有重要意义。     

The effects of alternative power-sharing arrangements: Do “moderating” institutions moderate party strategies and government policy outputs?

Advocates of consensual political institutions, i.e. institutions that promote compromise and powersharing among political parties, claim that these institutions promote moderation in government policy outputs. To date, however, there exists little research – either theoretical or empirical – that evaluates whether consensual institutions promote moderation in parties' policy declarations. We develop a multiparty spatial model with policy-seeking parties operating under proportional representation, in which we vary the extent to which government policies reflect power-sharing among all parties as opposed to being determined by a single party. We determine parties' optimal (Nash equilibrium) policy positions and conclude that power-sharing does not typically motivate parties to moderate their policy declarations; in fact, policy positioning under power-sharing appears to be similar to or more extreme than under single-party dominance. Consistent with previous research, however, we find that power-sharing does promote moderation in government policy outputs. Our results have implications for parties’ election strategies, for the design of political institutions, and for representative government.