Formal and Informal Volunteering in a Nordic Context: The Case of Denmark

This article compares three different forms of volunteering: formal volunteering which is typically carried out in formalized organizations; informal practical help which is most often provided in a face-to-face context and requires the giving of time; and economic assistance which requires neither the co-presence of actors nor the giving of time. The different nature and structuring of these formal and informal ways of contributing to society suggest that they require different resources. Grounded in sociological theory we argue that three sets of factors are particularly relevant for explaining volunteering: personal or ‘human capital’ factors, social network resources, and civic values. We test in a multivariate analysis how various indicators of these personal and social resources relate to the different forms of volunteering. The study relies on a comprehensive survey of the Danish adult population. The findings, therefore, are interpreted in the light of this particular institutional environment which forms the backdrop for individual choices about volunteering. We find that the different forms of formal and informal volunteering seem to form a continuum of civic engagement going from the most public to the most private. Furthermore, compared to informal ways of volunteering, formal volunteering seems to be more contingent upon access to and supply of different forms of personal and social resources.     

Formal Theory and the Institutions of Governance

Understanding governance in the world's democracies requires study of the political institutions — the chief executives, the bureaucracies, and the legislatures — most involved in national policymaking. There are many approaches to the study of these institutions. This article examines the potential of an approach which is relatively unfamiliar to most students of governance: the development of formal mathematical theories of political institutions. The costs and benefits of this approach are discussed, various types of formal theories are surveyed, and a variety of possible applications to some central problems of governance are described.     

行政组织中的非正式组织问题分析

行政组织中的非正式组织是一种客观存在,它对政府行政管理实践产生重要影响,而传统行政学理论对此没有给予足够的重视。本文通过对行政组织中的非正式组织的产生过程、特征、表现形式、影响等问题分别予以阐述并得出,对待行政组织中的非正式组织,既不能简单否定,也不能完全肯定,而是鼓励其发挥积极作用,同时抑制其消极作用,这样才能收到比较好的效果。     

Formal Rules and Informal Cooperation: Inter-governmental Relations in Domestic European Policy Making in Comparative Perspective

One of the key elements of the strategies of interest representation of strong legislative regions in EU policy making is active participation in the co-ordination processes within the member state. This article argues that Europeanization of inter-governmental relations leads to a greater emphasis on cooperation in the formal rules on inter-governmental cooperation in EU affairs. However, when informal practices are taken into account, some member states become more cooperative, others arguably less. This divergence can be explained by the circular interplay of formal and informal practices.     

Institutions and Labour Market Performance in Western Europe

Labour market institutions in most European countries are caught mid-stream between flexibility and coordination. On the one hand, most countries fail to capture the positive externalities that may arise from the mutual interdependence of institutions and ground level labour market behaviour. Productive and commercial changes make it exceptionally difficult to create such coordination arrangements. At the same time, there has not been a widespread rejection of labour market institutions. This can be seen in the cautious and pragmatic manner with which most European countries approach the themes of flexibility and deregulation. The common pattern has been to mesh flexibility and regulation. Thus whilst institutions still matter their role should not be overstated. In many ways, a governance gap is emerging in the European labour market.     

Making Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe,and the Impact of Europe

The end of communism in Central and Eastern Europe offered the region a unique opportunity for institutional redesign. Thanks to the variety of historical experiences, inherited structures, transition paths and deal sweeteners during the round-table talks, post-communist Europe initially witnessed much institutional diversity. Throughout the course of the past decade, however, there has been a notable convergence of institutional designs across the region. The process of convergence has been, in part, a response to domestic political concerns, but the demands of the European Union have also played a role. This article plots the course of institutional development in the region, outlining some of the major cases of institutional redesign and highlighting both the positive and negative impact of 'Europe' on the process.     

Structuring Europe: Powersharing Institutions and British Preferences on European Integration

Scholars examining British-European relations typically ascribe UK governmental positions firstly to a combination of distinct and incompatible values, attitudes, and beliefs stemming from historical experience; secondly to a distinct and incompatible set of functional imperatives – namely less interaction with European partners than is the case for other EU member states; and third a distinct and incompatible set of domestic interests. This article challenges these views. It presents evidence to suggest that British governments have failed to assimilate social demands, and that the reason is an under-recognized and untheorized intervening variable – namely the structure of decisionmaking institutions in Parliament. It models the influence of this variable, and suggests that historical institutionalist theory captures key elements of the variable in a manner superior to extant approaches.     

Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis

This study examines the role of public notice and comment in the development of 42 rules. These procedures can provide useful information to policy makers about the preferences of those who stand to be affected by agency actions. More importantly, they serve as cues for the accommodation of interests and the resolution of conflict through processes that are grounded in agencies' accountability to political officials. Yet, an examination of the interrelationship between formal, procedural constraints and the informal processes surrounding them reveals that the effects of notice and comment in promoting bureaucratic responsiveness are limited in ways that have received little systematic analysis. A consideration of the tension between the instrumental goal of procedural accountability and the political tasks that often dominate bureaucratic policy making suggests that it is desirable to return to the original use of notice and comment as a device for exposing agencies to the views of affected interests.     

The Survival and Return of Institutions: Examples from Pension Reforms in Central,Eastern and South-eastern Europe

Opening a new phase in historical institutionalism, Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen show how a rigid dichotomy between incremental adaptation and radical transformation fails to capture important transformative processes common to advanced political economies. While their research focuses on gradual but radical transformation, the two authors leave open the interpretation of what constitutes abrupt, but only limited change. This article integrates their framework, defines what they call survival and return, and, within this genus, indicates two analytically distinct species: replication, where the old logic survives due to the redundancy of the new institutional arrangement; and reaction, where structural reforms generate demand for the old incentive structures, which are ultimately reintroduced. To elucidate the concepts, recent Croatian, Hungarian and Polish pension reforms are compared and their institutional instability analysed.     

The Role of Informal Institutions in U.S. Immigration Policy: The Case of Illegal Labor Migration from Kyrgyzstan

Immigration is a sensitive topic on the American political, social, and economic agenda. Globalization as well as the end of the Cold War have meant that people are on the move worldwide as never before. Millions of people from poor countries migrate to richer ones to provide better lives for themselves and their families through legal and illegal channels. Heated debates surround this subject. A dramatic divide persists between proponents, who equate immigration policy with civil rights, and opponents, who cite the burden of illegal immigration on public education and public welfare systems. The author argues that informal institutions involved in migration processes, such as migrant smuggling networks, explain why the current crisis persists. The role of informal institutions is examined by focusing on those who migrate from Kyrgyzstan to the United States seeking low‐wage labor. The author generalizes how formal and informal institutions interact in the processes of migration and how informal institutions decisively influence immigration‐related policies in the United States.     

Institutions and the stabilization of party systems in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe

Most explanations of party system stability focus on the strength of mass-elite linkages. We highlight the role of institutions, focusing on how electoral rules and elected institutions, especially the presidency, impact elites' incentives to coordinate on a stable set of parties or to form new parties, thus affecting electoral volatility. Using Central and Eastern European elections data, we find that directly elected presidents increase volatility and that presidential power magnifies this effect. Absent a directly elected president, high district magnitude is associated with increased volatility, but district magnitude dampens the impact of an elected president on volatility; hence, our findings underscore the interactive impact of institutions on party systems. We also find evidence that bicameralism and concurrence of presidential and parliamentary elections decrease electoral volatility. Our model not only explains persistently high electoral volatility in Eastern Europe, but the extreme stability of Western European party systems.     

Informal institutions rule: institutional arrangements and economic performance

Institutions are widely believed to be important for economic development. This paper attempts to contribute to our understanding of how institutions matter by examining the effect of formal and informal institutional arrangements on economic progress. Formal institutions represent government defined and enforced constraints while informal institutions capture private constraints. The findings suggest that the presence of informal institutions is a strong determinant of development. In contrast, formal institutions are only successful when embedded in informal constraints, and codifying informal rules can lead to negative unintended consequences. This suggests that institutions cannot be easily transplanted in order to spur economic development.     

Informal institutions and foreign investment in China

During the reform era, China has been very successful in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) for its economic development. That this has taken place despite a rather weak legal system in China challenges conventional institutional theories, which emphasize the centrality of effective state institutions to economic development and international cooperation. This article suggests that the solution to the puzzle lies in the informal institutions underlying FDI development in China. On the basis of extensive interviews in the mid- and late 1990s, I find that networks of personal connections (guanxi), which are pervasive in Chinese society, have played a major role in facilitating FDI flows to China. They have done so by complementing and compensating for the weak Chinese legal system. This article dispels a number of misconceptions about the nature of guanxi, discusses its relationship with friendship, bribery, and social capital, and analyzes the conditions underlying the transnationalization of guanxi networks. It concludes with some important caveats to the major thesis and a discussion of possible future scenarios of institutional development in China.     

哲学价值论:形式之维与实质之维

哲学价值范畴特指人的价值,论及价值必须联系人的存在,即价值是以人的存在为其本体论前提。而人的存在又包括现实的存在和“类”存在两种样态,相形之下,价值也具二维性:形式之维与实质之维。二者旨趣与言说层次的不同本身明证着哲学价值的二维性。     

Corruption and women in cabinets: Informal barriers to recruitment in the executive

Research on corruption and women in politics has mainly focused on legislatures, generally finding that corruption decreases the election of women. This article turns the spotlight to the executive branch—an arena where selection is less transparent than recruitment to legislative seats—and examines if corruption decrease the share of ministers who are women. Drawing on feminist institutionalist theories, we posit that in an environment of high political corruption, (male) elites involved in cabinet formation will tend to appoint ministers whom they can trust with secretive tasks. In systems with corrupt networks, relative newcomers, such as women, should face obstacles to career advancement. The article tests this reasoning empirically on a global sample of countries across time. Using a new indicator measuring corruption in executive bodies, we find support for our argument; corruption tends to hinder women's presence in cabinets, albeit only in democracies and not autocracies.