语言法:塔吉克斯坦“去俄罗斯化”的新发展

自独立以来,塔吉克斯坦实施渐进式、温和型的去俄罗斯化政策,旨在复兴主体民族文化、进而建构国家民族。2009年出台的《国家语言法》则是进一步去俄罗斯化的探路石,标志着去俄罗斯化迈向了全面化、强制性的新阶段。俄语的地位和发展问题已成为塔俄关系走向的敏感要素。     

文明冲突视角下的乌克兰与俄罗斯关系研究

乌克兰是一个＂具有两种文化的割裂的国家＂,东部乌克兰属于东正教文明,而西部属于西方天主教-新教文明。在乌克兰与俄罗斯关系中,东正教文明和西方天主教-新教文明同时在起作用,两种文明博弈的结果决定了乌克兰对外政策的制定,也决定了乌俄关系的走向。乌克兰最大可能仍将是一个统一的、充满裂痕的、独立的国家,乌俄关系总体上仍将保持密切合作。     

乌克兰俄语地位问题探析

乌克兰独立后,由于语言政策与现实严重背离,俄语地位问题凸显,并成为各种政治力量谋求利益最大化的工具,具有严重政治化和意识形态化、影响因素多、地区差异大、目标多样性等特点。要想成功解决这一问题,就必须做到完全地“去政治化”和“去意识形态化”。赋予俄语区域语言地位已成为乌克兰社会的主流意识,为俄语谋求更高法律地位的斗争将长...     

俄罗斯与乌克兰经贸合作关系论析

俄罗斯与乌克兰的经贸合作关系问题,是研究俄乌两国关系的重要方面,也是在独联体问题上被关注的焦点之一.本文以翔实的资料为基础,在简要回顾俄乌经贸合作关系的发展历程以及分析两国经贸合作关系的发展现状与问题的基础上,着重分析研究了俄乌两国经贸合作关系的发展趋势与前景,并对一些具体合作领域的未来发展作了展望和判断.认为俄罗斯与乌克兰今后仍将是互为最重要的经济合作伙伴,两国经贸合作关系的发展前景依然总体看好.     

国内外史学界关于俄乌关系史研究综述

苏联解体后,俄乌关系史成为国内外史学界特别是俄罗斯和乌克兰史学界研究的热点。目前,国内外学者在这一领域研究多集中在《佩列亚斯拉夫协议》及其影响、俄罗斯帝国版图内的乌克兰、乌克兰分离主义运动、乌克兰大饥荒、二战中的乌克兰、乌克兰独立等方面。由于从不同视角解读俄乌关系史,加之有些历史问题被人为政治化,学者们的研究结论存在明显差别。     

欧洲政治中的俄罗斯与乌克兰

冷战结束以来,原苏联的主要东欧盟国已经被纳入欧盟—北约体系,后苏联空间的部分地区也已经被计划纳入欧盟—北约体系。乌克兰作为欧盟北约和俄罗斯的"共同邻国",俄乌关系不可避免地具有了欧洲政治属性。欧洲政治的目标就是要把乌克兰纳入欧盟北约体系,这同俄罗斯的利益产生尖锐的矛盾。要缓解俄乌关系必须从调整俄欧关系入手。     

影响俄罗斯与乌克兰关系的地缘经济因素解析

在一个相互依赖日益强化的世界里,地缘经济冲突和地缘经济力量已经成为影响国家间关系的重要因素。苏联解体后,俄罗斯与乌克兰毗邻的现状以及历史上形成的经济联系,并没有因为边界和关税的存在而消失。俄乌经济关系的互补性和经济联系的紧密性,不能不对俄乌两国关系的走向产生影响,在某种程度上还是很重要的影响。俄乌之间的经济关系和政治关系的发展是成正比例关系的。地缘经济因素成为影响俄乌关系的重要因素。     

美国在乌克兰危机中的战略目标——基于美乌关系的分析(1992～2014)

美国在乌克兰实现无核化目标后,对乌政策的本质就是支持乌克兰的独立,遏制俄罗斯的崛起。其表现有三:一是坚决维护乌克兰主权领土完整,二是推动乌克兰加入美国主导的大西洋一体化,三是帮助乌克兰摆脱对俄罗斯的经济能源依赖。乌克兰危机后美国的种种举措是这一政策在特殊时期下的更鲜明体现。美国的对鸟政策从属于对俄政策这一根本特点,决定了美俄在乌克兰的对抗更多是一场战略意志的比拼,而非战略利益的较量。未来美俄以某种方式化解危机走出对抗的可能是存在的,乌克兰陷入内战后美国的新做法也在一定程度上印证了这一点。     

俄乌天然气争端的起因及影响

2009年初,俄罗斯与乌克兰之间的天然气争端硝烟再起,并再次发生"断气"事件,致使严重依赖俄天然气供应的欧洲18个国家不同程度地受到影响.经过艰苦谈判,欧盟、俄罗斯、乌克兰三方在1月12日签署天然气过境供应监测协议,俄乌两国并于1月19日签署2009-2019年天然气购销合同,1月20日俄罗斯正式恢复经乌克兰管道向欧洲供应天然气.由于诱发双方纷争的根源依然存在,俄乌矛盾不会因一纸协议彻底解决,两国围绕能源问题的博弈将成为常态.     

俄乌克里米亚争端及其原因浅析

1954年,为纪念乌克兰与俄罗斯合并300周年,苏联最高苏维埃主席团决定将克里米亚作为“礼物”赠送给乌克兰,以示俄乌之间的亲密关系。但这一决定,却为后来双方的争吵埋下了祸根。苏联解体后,克里米亚争端伴随着俄乌之间一系列冲突的发生很快浮出水面,成为90年代初困扰俄乌关系发展的一大障碍。经过多回合的较量、妥协与各种力量的分化组合,克里米亚争端在1997年基本得到了解决,也给我们留下了一些值得思考的问题和启示。     

俄罗斯诸共和国语言问题探析

苏联解体后,俄罗斯联邦诸共和国掀起语言改革浪潮,在此过程中出现主体民族语言虚无主义、民族语言文字拉丁化、俄语地位不稳定、少数民族语言生存堪忧等一系列语言问题。出现这些问题的原因主要有四个：一是语言问题的政治化;二是政治民主化和民族语言扩张的矛盾;三是共和国和联邦层面的立场存在分歧;四是语言政策的具体实施环节存在漏洞、缺乏力度。目前,诸共和国所面临的语言问题触及民族关系,须俄联邦政府和诸共和国政府共同努力才能解决。     

Framing yourself into a corner: Russia,Crimea, and the minimal action space

A long-held axiom, political leaders are said to favour an action space sufficiently wide to allow them, as a minimum, a face-saving exit. This makes it particularly interesting for us to study those rare cases where political leaders seem to be deliberately reducing their policy options to the point of having merely one line to pursue. The handling by Russian President Vladimir Putin of the early 2014 crisis over Crimea, eventually leading to the annexation by Russia of the Ukrainian Peninsula on 21 March 2014, seems to represent such a rare case. Through the use of state-controlled media, a highly dichotomized framing of the crisis was presented to the Russian audience, essentially leaving Putin with just the one option of acting to “save” the Crimeans from the Ukrainian Government by bringing them into Russia.     

From East to West,and back again: Economic reform and Ukrainian Foreign Policy

In this article we argue that when Former Soviet Union (FSU) leaders can obtain Western economic resources, then their foreign policy will more often be independent of Russia. The principal factor we examine with respect to securing Western economic assistance concerns the willingness of leaders to implement economic reform, an enabling condition that allows leaders to adopt policies more independent from Russia. In contrast, if leaders cannot secure Western economic resources because of a lack of reform, they are more likely to adopt a pro‐Russian orientation. In the case of Ukrainian foreign policy throughout the past decade, we contend that there are three distinct phases. These include the initial anti‐Russian policy of the early 1990s that proved unsuccessful because of a lack of reform, the more moderate Russian orientation in the middle of the decade when moderate reform was implemented, and a stronger pro‐Russian orientation by the end of the decade as reform slowed.     

Russia's economic and strategic interests in North-East Asia

  Since the middle of the 1990s and especially after Vladimir Putin assumed the presidency Russia started to pursue an active foreign policy in North East Asia, an area considered vital for Russian national political, economic and strategic interests. While continuing to use every available method to conduct this policy Moscow placed special emphasis on promoting economic cooperation with the neighboring states, not in the least because of the development needs of Siberia and the Russian Far East. The current trends on the world energy market as well as the growing energy requirements of Russia's neighbors help to make at this stage exploration of Russian rich energy resources in East Siberia and around the Sakhalin Island to be one of the most attractive areas of regional economic cooperation. Even though these developments help to meet some of the current Russian requirements in foreign investments and modern technologies Russia is clearly interested in extending the scope of regional cooperation to other areas as well. In particular, Russia is interested in promoting its industrial exports. Another prospective area of its cooperation with regional states may cover joint transport projects – from construction of international gas and oil pipelines to linking Russian and Korean railway systems.     

当代俄罗斯远东地区的俄汉洋泾浜简

洋泾浜俄语作为一种语言形式,广泛存在于中俄边境地区民间贸易活动中.目前,在远东,俄汉洋泾浜作为一种接触语言,有其自身发展的历史以及社会语言特征.     

The Practice and Impacts of Russian-style Hybrid Warfare

The term hybrid warfare was first coined by US military scholars and later widely adopted in the West to refer to Russian military operations in the Ukrainian and Syrian crises.In Russia,it is called "Gerasimovism".Russia adapted the idea of hybrid warfare for its military operations in Ukraine and Syria into a Russian-style hybrid warfare that has seen successful results so far.This model is likely to impact future military developments.     

Turning Counter-Terrorism into Counter-Revolution: Russia Focuses on Kazakhstan and Engages Turkmenistan

Abstract

From the early days of Putin's presidency, Russia's energy policy towards Central Asia has been intertwined with the policy of counter-terrorism, which initially was aimed at exploiting the threat of the Taliban in order to cajole the post-Soviet regimes into closer cooperation with Moscow. The deployment of US and NATO forces in the region in autumn 2001 signified a serious shrinking of Russia's influence but it invested considerable effort in recovering its position. A series of setbacks from spring 2004 to spring 2005 culminating in the'orange revolution’ in Ukraine made this period a true annus horribilis for Russian foreign policy but the brutal crackdown on the uprising in Andijan, Uzbekistan in May 2005 was the turning point. It helped Russia to design a counter-revolutionary strategy according to which it would be ready to provide extensive support to the regimes that were ready to defend themselves with forceful means. In order to legitimize this support, Moscow decided to revive and strengthen several post-Soviet inter-state organizations that for many years had essentially been ‘paper structures’. Russia has achieved some success in instrumentalizing the counter-revolutionary momentum to advance its energy interests; in this sense, it certainly works much better than the tired counter-terrorism policy. Building on this success is going to be more difficult due to the pronounced anti-Western content of this strategy.     

Russia and the OSCE: From High Hopes to Disillusionment

The subject of this article is the changing balance between Russia's positive and negative interests in the Conference on/Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE) as these have evolved in relation to Western policies on the OSCE and European security relations in general. Parallel to the decline of positive Russian interests in the CSCE/OSCE, an increase in negative attitudes can be observed, most of which concern the OSCE's activities in post-Soviet countries. While the Soviet Union was traditionally a reliable supporter of the CSCE, the Russian Federation, which initially pursued the same policy, has lost most of its sense of ownership in the OSCE. This change in Russian attitudes is critical for the Organisation's future, for an OSCE without active Russian participation would lose much of its raison d'être.