The Politics of Administrative Reforms in Ghana: Perspectives from Path Dependency and Punctuated Equilibrium Theories

Since 1957, various Ghanaian governments have made, and continue to make, attempts to reform the administrative state for development. In spite of this, not much seems to have been achieved over the years. Why has the passion of successive governments for reforming the administrative system failed to yield the desired outcomes? What is the nexus between regime turnover and frequent administrative reforms? Where do we want to go, and what will take us there or at least close to our intended destination? What approach is likely to maximize the chances of success and minimize those of failure? We argue that administrative reforms in Ghana have been consistently undermined by the discontinuity of reform initiatives undertaken by successive governments; the inability to have a “national agenda for development”; continuous reliance on expatriates as consultants and advisers; over-reliance on multinational institutions for financial support; and by the absence of a “developmental state.”     

The Core Executive, Modernization and the Creation of PESC, 1960-64

The period between 1957 and 1964 was one of immense yet underestimated political and administrative change. It culminated in what many have seen as a golden age in Whitehall. This is reflected by the wealth of records now available for the study of government and policy networks. The period is thus an ideal one for collaboration between historians and political scientists.
The decisional case study examined in this article focuses on the early years of the Public Expenditure Survey Committee, as viewed from the perspective of welfare policy. The drive to 'modernize' government started with attempts to 'roll back the state' and to hive off the implementation of policy to executive agencies, very similar to those pursued in the 1980s by Mrs Thatcher and Next Steps. The reasoned rejection of such a policy was symbolized by the creation of PESC, a centralized attempt to allocate resources rationally. PESC itself, however, was initially a failure. External circumstances, such as the breakdown of political and administrative networks within the core executive, and internal tensions, including the Treasury's covert attempt to impose its own departmental interest, led the Cabinet Secretary to conclude that the prioritization and strict control of forward expenditure commitments was 'not possible'. This case study demonstrates how future studies of the core executive might be broadened and deepened.     

Making a difference? The role of Statutory Committees in the Northern Ireland Assembly

This paper seeks to examine some aspects of the early operation of the Northern Ireland Assembly and in particular the role of the Statutory Committees. The particular issue that is used to explore these matters is the review of student finances which the Higher and Further Education, Training and Employment Committee (HFETEC) undertook as its first major investigation. It should be noted here that the Department of Higher and Further Education, Training and Employment changed its name to the Department of Employment and Learning during 2000. The Committee also changed its name to the Employment and Learning Committee. Since the issues discussed took place prior to these changes the original name has been used here. Specifically, the paper examines the Review of Student Finances launched by the Department of Higher and Further Education, Training and Employment (DHFETE), how the Committee tackled the issue, tensions within the Committee, the relationship between the Committee and the Minister, between the Minister and the Department, the public debate, how the Committee Report was subsequently dealt with in the Assembly and the Minister's response. It is suggested that this example provides some insights into the operation of the distinctive devolved institutions in Northern Ireland and some early evidence of how such Statutory Committees may develop.     

IMPLEMENTING PERFORMANCE-BASED MANAGEMENT IN THE TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY OF PORTUGAL

The influence of the New Public Management (NPM) movement in Portuguese administrative reform has been one of the country's noticeable trends in recent decades ( Araújo 2001, 2002a ; Rocha 2001 ). Many governments have aimed to introduce a new managerial rationality in public services. The literature about administrative reform shows that institutional bureaucracies resist change, particularly when it challenges prevailing practices and procedures ( Bjur and Caiden 1978 ; Olsen 1991 ). Thus, the influence of NPM in administrative reform has found different expressions and, in several countries, the introduction of NPM ideas is a limited and superficial phenomenon ( Pollitt 2000 ). This paper contributes to these debates. It examines the influence of New Public Management ideas in Portuguese administrative reform and discusses improvements in the way public services are implementing change using new managerial tools in Portugal: the Activity Plan (AP) and the Activity Report (AR). The data collected from official reports and a questionnaire show that the juridical-administrative model persists and transforms both Activity Plan and Activity Report into little more than a formality, another routine to be followed.     

From reorganizing to reinventing: sixty years and “we still don’t get it”

Sixty years ago the “Brownlow Committee Report” was written by some of the most prominent members of the emerging field of public administration. Its recommendations had serious consequences for the way both our democratic republic and the field of public administration have evolved. In developing principles in which to anchor the recommendations, Luther Gulick, who was both the intellectual and political force behind the committee, contributed to a confusion of the concepts of organizations and the polity and those of management and governance.

Some of the story of how the concepts promoted by Gulick and the Papers on the Science of Administration led to a misconception, which became public administration's living legacy is told in this article. We then discuss the Brownlow Committee Report as something which changed: our very conception of the Constitution; Gulick's rationale for cooperation with Franklin D. Roosevelt; the Report as a misplacement of organizational concepts upon a polity; the dimensions of constitutional change in the report; and the staying power of Gulick's and the Committee's ideas. In conclusion, we contend that if we are to move beyond Gulick's legacy, that the field must learn and act upon the distinctions between organizations and the polity and management and governance.

“The charge that the Brownlow Committee set in train the development of the “imperial presidency” can be advanced only by those who have not read the Committee's report.”

James Fesler, former staff member of the Brownlow Committee Public Administration Review (July/August, 1987)

“How interesting it is historically that we all assumed in the 1930s that all management, especially public management, flowed in a broad, strong stream of value-filled ethical performance. Were we blind or only naive until Nixon came along? Or were we so eager to ‘take politics out of administration’ that we threw the baby out with the bathwater?”

Luther Gulick, member of the Brownlow Committee From Stephen K. Blurnberg, “Seven Decades of Public Administration: A Tribute to Luther Gulick” Public Administration Review (March/April, 1981)

was as old in American politics as it was popular. Yet, before the end of his second term, Roosevelt, with the help of Charles Merriam, Herbert Brownlow, and Luther Gulick, would use such hoary symbolism towards ends that would fundamentally alter our perceptions of the constitutional order, the nature of the presidency, and public administration. How did this come to pass? Barry Karl says that “He (Roosevelt) had continued as President to look at reorganization through the eyes of those who saw in it a means of saving money, balancing the budget, and thereby giving security to the nation's economy.” But Karl adds, “By 1936, this viewpoint had undergone drastic revision.”⁽⁶⁾ The revision in his thinking replaced “saving money” with “managerial control” as the principal aim of reorganization. “Managerial control” by the president would enable him not only to manage New Deal programs but protect them against potential Republican counterattacks, i.e., in short, to strengthen his hand as president.

The impetus for this change apparently came directly from the President's experiences in seeking to administer the government's burgeoning and increasingly chaotic Executive Branch. Roosevelt was a skilled, intuitive, and flexible administrator. But, according to Karl, his experience in seeking to administer the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act with a loose arrangement, quickly dubbed “the five ring circus,” taught the President several lessons. First, “it demonstrated the growing dependence of the President on official staff, other than cabinet members, working exceedingly close to the President's own sphere of daily operation. “⁽⁷⁾ Second, the problems of administering the Act raised questions among the participants themselves as to whether or not the President could “administer and control so complex an operation as federal relief given the inadequate machinery in his possession.”⁽⁸⁾ In other words, the effort was not simply a “five ring circus” because of FDR's famed flexible and informal style, but also because of the inadequacy of the available structures. Karl notes that “despite the problems inherent in the fiscal machinery as it stood, a continued development of governments within governments could only lead to a dangerous chaos over which the President would have no control whatsoever.”⁽⁹⁾ The questions raised suggested to the President that perhaps there was some merit to the position of those urging that emergency agencies be absorbed into the existing framework. This could meet a very practical question by “placing agencies within the purview of budget and accounting procedures already in existence.”⁽¹⁰⁾

According to Gulick, FDR told Brownlow and him at a November 14, 1936, meeting “that, since the election, he had received a great many suggestions that he move for a constitutional convention for the United States” and observed that “with Coughlin and other crackpots about there was no way of keeping such an affair from getting out of hand. But,” he said, “there is more than one way of killing a cat, just as in this job I assigned you.”⁽¹¹⁾ Gulick also quotes FDR as specifically telling the Committee, “We have got to get over the notion that the purpose of reorganization is economy. . . . The reason for reorganization is good management.”⁽¹²⁾ Of course FDR meant management as in “presidential management.”

So it was that President Roosevelt by 1936 was prepared to do something quite beyond “abolishing useless offices” in the words of his 1932 speech--something significantly more constitutional in nature. His other aim was no doubt to strengthen his hand significantly to protect the New Deal programs from Republican counterattack. But whatever his aim, the practical effect was to treat the executive branch as a hierarchical organization headed by a chief executive of corporate or city management conception. In so doing, the delicate constitutional balance among branches was altered. Recommending the reorganization of the executive branch as they did inevitably led to reorganization of the larger whole, the government, which was not an organization, but something qualitatively different.⁽¹³⁾     

Ethics and public administration: critique and reconstruction

In the post-Watergate era, many observers saw the renewed interest in administrative ethics as a passing fad. Now, over a decade later, the continued interest in this area belies this judgment. Indeed, this increased concern with administrative ethics is rooted in the realization that administration is as much an ethica, as technical pursuit. One cannot read John Rohr's "Ethics in Public Administration: A State of the Discipline Report," delivered at the 1986 ASPA Conference, without receiving the distinct impression that administrative ethics is an area of practice and study that is experiencing a profound upheaval. Views are diverse and often inchoate. Assumptions behind ethical prescr- ptions are still frequently unstated and unexamined. In addition, we still continue to seek techniques that will ensure administrative ethicality without understanding the nature of the ethical problems confronted in public administration and the reasons they are confronted. In short, there exists a need for theoretical clarification and classification in the area of ethics and public administration.     

ENGINEERING A CONSENSUS: FROM THE FINNISTON REPORT TO THE ENGINEERING COUNCIL

It is now widely accepted that British governments find radical policy change difficult to Secure – especially where such change threatens to disturb a well-developed interest group network. The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Engineering Profession (19801, chaired by Sir Monty Finniston, Engineering Our Future, was interesting because it proposed a very radical change in the way in which the engineering profession was organized and regulated. In essence, Sir Monty wished to displace the established engineering institutions. A study of the long and complex saga following the publication of the Finniston report is a good test of the system's capacity for policy innovation as well as an illustration of the common conflict between state intervention and professional self-regulation. What finally emerged, The Engineering Council, can be seen as the outcome of a process of bargaining, which preserved the power of the professional institutions.     

AUSTRALIAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: INSTITUTIONS, REFORMS AND IMPACT

Over the last decade the Australian Government has enacted a package of legislative reforms dealing with administrative law, some aspects of which are radical and innovative. The reforms comprise the establishment of a general appeals tribunal to review certain administrative decisions on their merits, the appointment of a Commonwealth ombudsman, changes to the procedures and principles concerning judicial review of administrative action, the enactment of freedom of information legislation and the creation of an advisory body to monitor the new system of administrative law. The key features of these reforms are described in this article and some general observations are also made on the impact that the reforms have had on federal public administration.     

Nolan,councillors and planning

This article focuses on the role of councillors in planning. The views of the Nolan Committee, which were expressed in their third report, are set into the context of other reports, published during the 1990s, about the way councillors exercised their planning responsibilities. Two contrasting views of the planning system as a quasi‐judicial process and as an administrative/representative process are highlighted. The article concludes that the Nolan report is significant because it reasserts the representative role of councillors in contrast to the professional planning view that councillors should perform a quasi‐judicial role.     

The Royal Commission on Australian Government and Administration: 1974–76

The following summary of the major themes and recommendations of the Report does not follow the exact order of the chapters of the Report itself (reference to the appropriate chapters is made in brackets by each heading), but groups topics around the following major areas of concern.     

Book Reviews

Book reviewed in this article:
The Executive Process: Volume I: Implementation in a Bureaucracy. Volume II: Control in a Bureaucracy. Andrew Dunsire. Martin Robertson
Public Expenditure, Management and Control: The Development of the Expenditure Survey Committee (PESC) Sir Richard Clarke, edited by Sir Alec Cairncross.
Making Budgets: Public Resource Allocation James N. Danziger.
Political Leadership in Local Authorities Edited by G.W. Jones and Alan Norton.
British Rearmament and the Treasury, 1932–1939 G. C. Peden
The Commonwealth Office 1925–1968 Joe Garner.
The Development of an Education Service: The West Riding 1889–1974 P.H.J.H. Gosden and P. R. Sharp.
Professionals and Management Russell D. Lansbury.
State Shareholding: The Role of Local and Regional Authorities R. Minns and J. Thornley.
Administrative Justice and the Unemployed Julian Fullbrook.     

Reforming the Parliamentary Commissioner

For the most part reforms in administrative procedures in England are not produced by rational argument. So the fact that a Committee of Justice has enumerated the deficiencies in the Parliamentary Commissioner legislation gives one no great confidence that the deficiencies will be remedied. Nevertheless the Committee chaired by David Widdicombe QC has performed a useful service by setting out the obvious flaws in the British Ombudsman machinery. * They can be summed up under five headings.     

The science of administration,the founders,and theories of political association

Drawing on the work of Michael Oakeshott, this paper seeks to examine the theory of political association underlying Luther Gulick and L. Urwick's Papers on the Science of Administration and to contrast this theory with that underlying the Constitution. It is argued that the authors of the Papers clearly viewed the state as a form of purposive association whereas the Founders of the Constitution in large part saw the state as a form of civil association. This explains the difficulties that reformers such as Gulick faced in realizing their vision of administration within our constitutional framework.

Luther Gulick and L. Urwick's Papers on the Science of Administration (1) represent one of the most important attempts at a synthesis of doctrines in the field of public administration prior to World War II. While the Papers exhibit a variety of approaches and views, they are best known for those authors who, like Gulick and Urwick themselves, took a more classical approach to administration. Such an approach rests on a belief in the virtues of hierarchy and centralization of authority and power in the chief executive; a belief in efficiency as the central value of administration; a belief that there must exist certain principles for good administration applicable to all organizations, regardless of institutional setting; and a belief that such principles are susceptible to empirical scientific discovery and verification. These doctrines, expounded so forcefully in the Papers, formed the basis for the administrative reform movement of the time including the President's Committee on Administrative Management, of which Gulick himself was a member. Indeed, the Papers continue to strongly influence modern efforts at administrative reform.(2)

The purpose of this article is to examine the particular vision of political association which seems to underlie the Papers, and to compare it with the vision of political association which guided the Founders of the Constitution. In doing so, the article will draw upon the political thinking of the late Michael Oakeshott, a British political theorist and philosopher. I shall argue that there is a tension between the vision of political association held by the authors of the Papers and that held by the Founders, and that this tension explains the failure of administrative reformers to reshape the administrative state along the lines of classical public administration doctrines.     

Book Reviews

Book Reveiwed in this article
Formulating Government Budgets: Aspects of Australian and North American Experience K. Knight and K. Wiltshire.
Government Secrecy in Democracies Itzhak Galnoor (Editor)
The Politics of the Judiciary J. A. G. Griffith.
Productivity in Local Government Frederick O'R. Hayes.
The Personal Social Services Eric Sainsbury.
The Future of Voluntary Organizations: Report of the Wolfenden Committee .
Corporate Social Responsibility: A Reassessment Michael Beesley and Tom Evans.
Special Interests arid Policymaking: Agricultural Policies and Politics in Britain arid the United States of America, 1956–70 . G. K. Wilson
Direct Participation in Action: the new bureaucracy David Pace and John Hunter     

THE TREASURY AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT: A PERSPECTIVE ON INTER-WAR ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

This paper examines certain administrative constraints which hampered inter-war governments in their operation of public works policies and reinforced their opposition to even more ambitious Keynesian employment programmes. The stabilizing effectiveness of public investment is assessed, as is central government's ability to promote greater capital expenditure by the local authorities, the principal agencies for public investment. To this end, a special study is made of the large-scale public works programmes proposed by Mosley in 1930 and Lloyd George in 1935. It is concluded that there were cogent administrative and political reasons why such programmes were viewed as inappropriate solutions to unemployment between the wars, apart from the more nominally cited economic-theoretic foundations of orthodox opposition to Keynesian policies.     

Venezuela: From doctrine to dialogue to participation in the processes of regional development

The growing toward decentralization and democratization of development planning in Venezuela was discussed. Venezuela has a long tradition of rule by a strong centralized authority. Currently, the Office of the President is vested with considerable power, despite the existence of an elected legislator and an independent judiciary. The president rules by decree. State legislatures are elected, but governors of the states are appointed by the president. There are also elected municipal councils. Both state and municipal governments are almost fully dependent on the federal government for both their operating and capital investment budgets. Development programs are administered through 2 systems. Specific programs are administered by almost 100 different institutes and enterprises. The activities of these various programs are coordinated by administrative bodies at the state and federal level. The 2nd administrative system operates at the regional and federal levels. The administrative body at the federal level is the Central Office for Coordination and Planning and was established by Presidential Decree in 1958. This body prepares and coordinates all national development plans. The administrative bodies at the regional level are the Regional Organizations for Development. These bodies were created in specific regions through a series of legislative acts commencing in 1969 and continuing into the present. The development of these regional bodies represented a 1st step toward decentralization. Decree 478, promulgated in 1980, further promoted the decentalization of developmental planning. The decree established a series of assemblies and councils at various levels. A National Council of Regional Development was created at the federal level, and a Regional Council of Development was established at the regional level. At the state level an Assembly of Participation was organized, and at the municipal level a Committee of Citizen Participation was established. Neighborhood associations were mentioned in the decree, but their role was not formalized. This series of newly established bodies plays a role in both advisory and administrative processes. The advisory process begins at the lowest level, and local concerns are expressed upward through the hierarchy. The administrative process flows in the opposite direction. Participation remains highly formalized and is restricted to the participation of recognized leaders and organizations. For example, members of the Assembly of Participation include the state governor, representatives of municipal councils, and representatives of various industrial and commercial organizations. Despite the formal nature of the participation, the 1980 Decree clearly exhibited the trend toward decentralization predicted by John Freeman in his analysis of Venezuelan political structure and published in a book entitled "venezuela: From doctrine to Dialogue." Increased pressure will now be exerted for broader community participation in the development process, and eventually development planning will focus on the equitable distribution of development benefits rather than on the maximization of economic growth.     

Tipping the scales: The causes and consequences of administrative spending

The public administration literature once devoted great effort to identify the determinants of administrative intensity in organizations. While this literature has received some renewed attention, there remain questions about what aspects of organizational environments generate growth in administrative intensity, particularly as related to political oversight and external accountability mechanisms. This article aims to expand current theory on the determinants of administrative personnel and costs using data on four‐year public universities in the United States from 1998 to 2011, as this setting has received considerable criticism for perceived administrative bloat. Findings suggest that which political party is in control substantially influences both administrative costs and total personnel. These administrative levels, in turn, have a curvilinear relationship with student outcomes.     

An Exocet in a Red Box: Parliamentary Accountability in the Sandline Affair

In the UK, it is commonly proposed that the accountability gap resulting from ministers' reluctance to accept responsibility for departmental failures could be closed by giving parliamentary select committees stronger investigative powers. In the Sandline affair the Foreign Affairs Committee sought to take on such a role, notwithstanding that a separate external inquiry was already under way. This paper compares the two mechanisms of accountability. It concludes that committees are poorly suited to investigate high‐profile administrative failures because they are too influenced by party politics. Independent inquiries are better for the purpose (though improvements are needed here too). A parliamentary resolution gave the inquiry primacy over the committee in the Sandline case. This may become an important precedent.     

An Exocet in a Red Box: Parliamentary Accountability in the Sandline Affair

In the UK, it is commonly proposed that the accountability gap resulting from ministers' reluctance to accept responsibility for departmental failures could be closed by giving parliamentary select committees stronger investigative powers. In the Sandline affair the Foreign Affairs Committee sought to take on such a role, notwithstanding that a separate external inquiry was already under way.
This paper compares the two mechanisms of accountability. It concludes that committees are poorly suited to investigate high-profile administrative failures because they are too influenced by party politics. Independent inquiries are better for the purpose (though improvements are needed here too). A parliamentary resolution gave the inquiry primacy over the committee in the Sandline case. This may become an important precedent.