Environmental Policy as a Political Problem

The politics of the environment may not be unique, but they present some distinctive characteristics. In undertaking policy analyses and administrative strategies an appreciation of concepts, assumptions and circumstances, and underlying environmental policy issues is needed. To ignore these fundamentals is to risk superficiality in analysis, and error in findings and conclusions. Yet getting down to basics is often rejected as diversion from the goal of analysis. It deviates from a "straight to the point" approach, adds cost and time to investigation, and seldom interests practical-minded analysts. Even so, this paper will be prefaced by a concise reminder of some basic factors that make environmental policy problematic. Among these are: (1) incompatible concepts of man-nature relationships—notably conflict between perceived facts and values, (2) inadequate comprehension of the complexities of nature, (3) sectoral subdivisions of knowledge, (4) assumptions, situations and motivations in environmental politics, (5) fractionated structure of laws and administration, and (6) short-range perception of time. In addition to these conceptual factors the widely varied subject-matter of environmental politics narrows the scope of generalization for policy purposes.     

Towards a New Political Economy of Behavioral Public Policy

The dominant normative framework in behavioral public policy postulates paternalistic intervention to increase individual utility, epitomized by the so‐called nudge approach. In this article, an alternative political economy of behavioral public policy is proposed that sits within, or at least closely aside, the liberal economic tradition. In short, rather than impose utility maximization as the normative ideal, this framework proposes that policy makers provide an environment that is conducive to each person's own conception of a flourishing life, while at the same time regulating against behaviorally informed harms and for behaviorally induced, otherwise forgone, benefits.     

Environmental Policy,Public Interest and Political Market

In this paper, we highlight the factorswhich influence governments in theirdecision to implement environmentalpolicies of varying degrees of severity. Wesubstantiate our arguments with analyticalevidence from the public interest theoryand the economic theory of regulation(``interest group theory''). We show, throughempirical analysis based on the policies of22 OECD countries, that pressure groupshave sufficient impact on environmentalregulation so that the economic theorypredominates over the public interesttheory.     

The Political Economy of State Environmental Regulation: The Distribution of Regulatory Burdens

This article examines interstate variance in the distribution of costs for hazardous waste regulation in the American states. The analysis identifies the distribution of regulatory costs for technical externalities and answers specific questions about the regulatory strategies of competing states in a federal system.     

The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy: An Experimental Study on the Strategic Use of Deficits

Field data on the strategic use of deficits to limit thebudgetary scope of future governments are inconclusive aboutthe effects of political polarization or a government'sre-election probability on fiscal policy. Therefore, wedesigned a controlled experiment to examine the strategic useof deficits. Using a within-subjects design, we find thatdeficits rise with a higher degree of polarization and a lowerreelection probability. However, in a between-subjects designneither polarization nor reelection probabilities have asystematic effect. We discuss the implications of ourexperimental results for empirical tests of the strategic useof deficits with field data.     

Jiwei Qian,The Political Economy of Making and Implementing Social Policy in China

Journal of Chinese Political Science -     

Chicago Political Economy

I am indebted to James Buchanan, William Dougan, David Fand, William Mitchell, and George Stigler for helpful discussions and comments. The usual caveat applied.     

论马克思政治经济学的理解方法及其性质

马克思政治经济学方法内容丰富且成体系,概括性提法是“解剖典型”,理解方法是其中的有机组成部分.理解方法是马克思主体、客体及二者之间辩证关系这一哲学分析框架的方法论化,实质是主体性.理解方法与资产阶级经济学科学方法论主张判然有别,主体性质、批判性质、过程性质、逆溯性质、革命性质和整体性质是题中应有之义.鉴于此,在马克思主义政治经济学教科书、专著和论文中应给予理解方法以表示存在的机会.     

Interrogating the Political Economy of Age

This article considers the argument by Tim Vlandas, in this issue, that an ageing electorate may undermine democracies’ ability to make the right economic choices. Vlandas suggests that the emergence of gerontocratic politics may give rise to ‘gerontonomia’: an economy run for the old, at the expense of younger generations and of future prosperity. However, evidence from the UK suggests a more mixed picture. Age-based voting patterns have been consequential around single issues, not least the 2016 Brexit referendum. However, voters’ interests in broad economic policy models are not easily reducible to age dynamics, and intergenerational politics are filtered through a set of normative and affective considerations beyond straightforward self-interest. Moreover, since the rational interests of different age groups do not speak for themselves, cueing by political elites is potentially significant and may be contributing to older voters’ relative tolerance of a poor economic record.     

Market Instruments for a Sustainable Economy: Environmental Fiscal Policy and Manifest Divergences

The introduction of environmental taxation policies had reached most European countries by the late 1990s. The pricing of activities considered harmful to the environment has given rise to the design of various economic instruments, such as environmental taxes, aimed at promoting environmental responsibility and at enabling the Kyoto Protocol targets to be met, and at the same time generating a marked increase in tax revenues. The aim of this article is to examine whether convergence in environmental taxation has taken place among 27 EU countries, doing so by analyzing time series and applying unit root tests. Our findings show there has been no such convergence, overall, despite the existence of groups of countries with common patterns of behavior.     

论发展中国家在经济全球化条件下的竞争政策

经济全球化条件下,发展中国家的竞争政策既需要加强竞争法规制,维护竞争秩序,又需要通过竞争法豁免政策实现发展的目标。内容相互冲突的豁免和规制的并存,可能导致竞争政策的失效。为此,这种冲突必须得到适当的协调和控制。一方面,发展中国家在国际竞争政策的制定和发展过程中必须强调豁免政策的发展功能,拓展使用豁免政策的空间;另一方面,要加强对国际和国内限制竞争行为的规制,并对豁免政策的使用施加适当的限制,避免滥用。     

论市场经济条件下政治资源的配置与整合

政治资源是政治系统运行和发展的必要条件,在社会经济转型的过程中,政治资源会发生量的变化,或是增加或是减少,对社会变化过程的政治资源进行合理的配置和整合,保持政治系统的稳定和有序运转,具有十分重要的意义。     

Anomalies in Political Economy

Results in cognitive psychology and experimental economics indicate that under identifiable conditions individuals do not act in an economically rational way. These results are important for Political Economy. Anomalies appear in the behaviour of voters, politicans and administrators. Economic markets do not fully eliminate anomalies in the aggregation process. It is shown that political aggregation by democracy, bargaining or bureaucracy may weaken or strengthen such individual anomalies. Moreover, institutions can partially be interpreted as endogenously emerging as a result of individuals' demands to cope with anomalies.     

The Political Economy of the Enhanced HIPC-Initiative

Only three years after its endorsement bythe World Bank and the IMF, the HeavilyIndebted Poor Country (HIPC) – Initiativewas considerably altered and enhanced. Thispolicy shift can be explained as a resultof utility maximization behavior bynational and international politicians,international bureaucrats and NGO. Apolitico-economic model suggests that theoverall rise of HIPC default risk and thesymbolic value of the year 2000 have beenthe two major determinants of changes involume, eligibility, and conditionalityrequirements.