Cheap talk or incredible commitment? (Mis)calculating transparency and anti‐corruption

Why do “tainted” politicians in high‐corruption countries adopt transparency and anti‐corruption policies that risk exposing their wrongdoing? Using the cases of freedom of information and public asset disclosure in Romania, we assess three explanations: that these policies are meant to be mere window dressing, facilitate bottom‐up monitoring, or ensure access to information for the ruling party if it loses power. We find that decision makers adopt transparency and anti‐corruption policies because they want to signal their integrity and because they underestimate their consequences. Because they assume they will be able to control implementation, decision makers discount the potential costs of damaging information being released. Sustained political competition can keep corruption and lack of transparency on the public and political agenda, shifting attention from policy adoption to implementation and leading to increased compliance. Since politicians miscalculate the consequences of their actions, signals that are intended to be cheap can end up being quite costly.     

Corruption monitoring and the supply of politicians in China

Monitoring institutions are usually perceived as efficient instruments for improving governance. This article evaluates the link between corruption monitoring and the supply of politicians in nondemocracies. Using China as a case, I show that corruption monitoring pushes capable young elites away from seeking government positions. This effect may be driven by two possible mechanisms: economic returns and career prospects. Specifically, corruption investigations may reduce the expected economic returns for government officials, undermining capable young elite’ willingness and efforts to become government officials. In addition, corruption investigations may indicate that there are potential uncertainties and risks involved when taking on a political career, which reduce capable young elites’ desire to pursue a political career. The empirical analysis confirms these two mechanisms and provides unique evidence for the unintended negative impact of corruption monitoring institutions.     

Market Structure,Tariff Lobbying and the Free-Rider Problem

The effect of changes in industry structure on the ability tomaintain a cooperative level of tariff lobbying are analyzed in arepeated game setting in which a simple trigger strategy is theenforcement mechanism. The difficulty of maintaining cooperation isidentified with the minimum discount factor necessary for themaintenance of cooperation. Factors which increase this criticalvalue of the discount parameter are said to make cooperation moredifficult. Some changes in industry structure which reduce measuredconcentration have ambiguous effects, while others may makecooperation among a given group of firms more likely.     

How much income redistribution? An?explanation based on?vote-buying and?corruption

This paper studies how income tax rates are determined and how they are related to government corruption in the form of fund capture. A?model is presented where rich voters can block redistribution by buying the votes of some poor voters. In equilibrium there is only limited redistribution and income tax rates are a negative function of government corruption. When rich voters can bribe the government, an additional equilibrium with zero taxation is possible. The link between corruption and tax rates is tested using cross country data; the empirical evidence is fully consistent with the predictions of the model.     

“裸官”腐败的生成机理与治理路径

近年来,一些典型腐败大案要案中,"裸官"腐败的现象较为严重。"裸官"腐败的黑洞,不在"裸",而在"逃"。"裸官"腐败的生成主要源自理想信念缺失,监管制度存在漏洞,"裸官"出逃的高收益、低成本等多因素的驱动。因此,有效治理"裸官"腐败现象,要在强化制度反腐的同时,更加注重制度防腐。一是注重制度建设,不断提高"裸官"腐败的预见性;二是加强监管,大力提升"裸官"腐败的防范性;三是协作联动,全面强化"裸官"腐败的控制性。     

Public sector corruption and major earthquakes: A potentially deadly interaction

Recent studies have identified various negative effects of public sector corruption. We add to these by considering the association between corruption and deaths due to major earthquakes. After developing a brief theoretical model of the relation between these two variables we test the proposition by analyzing 344 quakes occurring between 1975 and 2003. The empirical model takes into account the endogeneity of corruption and controls for factors, such as earthquake frequency, magnitude, distance from population centers, and a country’s level of development which influence quake destructiveness. The results indicate that public sector corruption is positively related to earthquake deaths.     

《联合国反腐败公约》及其借鉴意义

《联合国反腐败公约》详细规定了反腐败的预防机制、定罪与执法机制、国际合作机制以及资产的追回机制,对我国反腐机制的完善具有重要的借鉴价值。我国也应通过建立预防性反腐败机构,进一步完善公务员制度,建立利益冲突避免机制,做好政务公开,提高反腐工作的社会参与度等措施加强对腐败的预防;通过修订和完善刑法,完善证人制度和加大制裁力度等措施确保腐败犯罪分子受到与其所犯罪行严重性相当的制裁;通过加强金融监管,落实金融实名制和加大对洗钱与窝赃的打击力度等措施降低腐败收益;通过订立双边或多边协定加强国际合作,做好对犯罪分子的引渡工作和犯罪所得的追回工作。     

Beyond Weber: Conceptualizing an alternative ideal type of bureaucracy in developing contexts

The study of public administration in developing countries requires that we look beyond the Weberian model as the only ideal type of bureaucracy. When we assume that there exists only one gold standard of public administration, all other organizational forms that do not conform to the Weberian ideal are dismissed as corrupt or failed. Drawing on neo‐institutional economics, I introduce an alternative ideal type of bureaucracy found in contemporary China. This model, which I call bureau‐franchising, combines the hierarchical structure of bureaucracy with the high‐powered incentives of franchising. In this system, public agencies can rightfully claim a share of income earned to finance and reward themselves, like entrepreneurial franchisees. Yet distinct from lawless corruption, this self‐financing (or prebendal) behavior is sanctioned and even deliberately incentivized by state rules. Although such a model violates several Weberian tenets of “good” bureaucracy, it harnesses and regulates the high‐powered incentives of prebendalism to ameliorate budgetary and capacity constraints that are common in developing countries like China.     

Corruption and government size: A disaggregated analysis

Using annual state-level data over 1983–1987, this paper examines the effect of government size on corruption by public officials by including both demand and supply side incentives for engaging in corrupt practices. Our objectives are twofold. First, we assess the relationship between the incidence of corruption and overall measures of the size of the federal government and the state-local sector in each state. Second, we explore what kinds of government activities are more likely to be successful in deterring abuse of public office. Our results are generally supportive of Becker's “crime and punishment” model. Regarding the primary focus of the paper, our results show that government size, in particular spending by state governments, does indeed have a strong positive influence on corruption.     

政府部门谋位型腐败的经济学分析

分析了我国政府部门由职务变动引发的腐败问题。在我国市场经济尚未完全建立的现状之下,含有经济租金的一些政府部门职位成为一些人追逐的目标,加上目前我国政府部门的晋升制度还不够完善、政府组织的职位派生能力有限、政府组织与官员个人在实际工作能力和工作绩效方面存在着信息不对称、在补偿机制方面政府职位与经济福利待遇联系紧密等,为以谋取政府职务为目标的腐败行为提供了条件。谋位型腐败同时还成为引发谋利型腐败的一个重要根源。采用经济学研究方法,将谋位型腐败与谋利型腐败糅合在一个模型中加以分析,得出了如下一些结论:谋位型腐败发生的概率与参与同一职位竞争的人数负相关;工作能力弱的备选人相对于工作能力强的备选人更加倾向于采用行贿的手段谋取职务晋升;在两个备选人的工作能力和绩效相当的情况下,谋位型腐败发生的概率上升;谋位者个人、特别是握有人事安排决策权的部门负责人的腐败倾向性是谋位型腐败发生的关键因素;不同职位之间的经济收入差距越大,越易引发谋位型腐败。根据上述结论,提出了相应的政策建议。     

Corruption and the shadow economy: an empirical analysis

This paper analyzes the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice versa. We hypothesize that corruption and the shadow economy are substitutes in high income countries while they are complements in low income countries. The hypotheses are tested for a cross-section of 98 countries. Our results show that there is no robust relationship between corruption and the size of the shadow economy when perceptions-based indices of corruption are used. Employing an index of corruption based on a structural model, however, corruption and the shadow economy are complements in countries with low income, but not in high income countries.     

制度化、生态化与大众化反腐模式的自觉建构

在中国特色反腐倡廉道路上,有效预防和惩治党内腐败,实现腐败的标本兼治,建设廉洁政治,我们党就必须自觉建构和牢固确立制度化、生态化与大众化反腐模式。制度化反腐模式强调把权力关进制度的笼子里,通过制度来约束权力。生态化反腐模式强调反腐倡廉须在集约化和系统化的原则下追求综合效益,达到内生态与外生态的良性互动。大众化反腐模式强调让反腐倡廉的主体——人民大众真正归位,成为"价值层面的主体",并发挥他们的主体性、能动性和自觉性,形成"大众参与、大众负责、大众监督"的反腐倡廉氛围。这三种模式不是非此即彼的关系,而是相互配合协作的关系。将三者有效地融合并统一于党的反腐倡廉建设全过程,是我们党治理腐败的根本之道。     

Does corruption suppress voter turnout?*

This paper investigates to what extent voters’ perceptions of political corruption affect turnout. In previous research, two opposing views are put forward with regards to the relationship between corruption and turnout. On the one hand, corruption increases turnout because voters either are bought off to participate or because they are mobilized on clean government issues. On the other hand, corruption decreases turnout because presence of corruption corrodes the political system which leads to general cynicism, distrust and voter apathy. In this paper, we contribute to the existing research by adopting a multi-level approach to the relationship between corruption and turnout. We test the hypothesis that voters’ perceptions of corruption dampens turnout but that the effect is conditional upon the corruption context. We test our hypothesis by combining individual-level data and country-level data from 26 countries from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and country-level data from the Quality of Government Data Set. The findings show that perceiving corruption negatively affects turnout, but only in countries with low to medium levels of system corruption.     

论构筑反腐败的制度平台

中国目前正处于从单一的以政府为中心的治理结构向多中心的、自主的治理结构的转变过程之中。中国目前许多腐败形式的流行,都与转型期治理结构的某些过渡性特征有着密切的关系。推进治理结构的变革,建立政治国家-市场经济-公民社会分工合作的新型治理结构,乃是构筑反腐败制度平台的重要举措。为此要求深化以市场化、民营化、分权化、自治化、网络化为基本面向的反腐败体制改革,同时要求市场经济和公民社会的各类主体共同参与到反腐败过程中来。     

Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of growth?

This paper assesses the relationship between the impact of corruption on growth and investment and the quality of governance in a sample of 63 to 71 countries between 1970 and 1998. Like previous studies, we find a negative effect of corruption on both growth and investment. Unlike previous studies, we find that corruption has a negative impact on growth independently from its impact on investment. These impacts are, however, different depending on the quality of governance. They tend to worsen when indicators of the quality of governance deteriorate. This supports the “sand the wheels” view on corruption and contradicts the “grease the wheels” view, which postulates that corruption may help compensate bad governance.     

Persistent rent extraction

Representative democracy does not necessarily eliminate political corruption. Existing models explain the survival of rent-taking politicians by ideological divisions in the electorate and/or informational asymmetries. The current paper demonstrate that rent extraction can persist even if voters are fully informed and ideologically homogenous. We show that in such an environment, voters may gain by persistently reelecting a rent-taker that limits his rent extraction. Such an equilibrium occurs when voters and politicians do not discount the future too heavily, and the share of honest candidates is relatively small.     

Lights on the shadows of public procurement: Transparency as an antidote to corruption

The increased focus on marketizing mechanisms and contracting‐out operations following the New Public Management reform agenda has sparked a debate on whether the close interactions between public and private actors might drive corruption in the public sector. The main response to those worries has been increased transparency, but so far empirical evidence of its efficiency remains scant and mixed. This article argues that the beneficial effects of transparency on corruption are contingent on type of transparency, and in particular, who the intended receiver of the information is. Drawing on newly collected data of more than 3.5 million government contracts between 2006 and 2015, the analysis shows that overall tender transparency reduces corruption risks substantially, yet that the effect is largely driven by ex ante transparency, that is, transparency that allows for horizontal monitoring by insiders in the bidding process.     

Corruption and Anti-Money-Laundering Systems: Putting a Luxury Good to Work

Systems of laws, regulations, and institutions developed to counter money laundering provide powerful tools for fighting corruption. Currently, however, the potential benefits anti‐money‐laundering (AML) systems can provide in fighting corruption go largely unrealized, especially in developing countries. This mismatch poses a puzzle: Why are developing countries failing to best capitalize on their expensive AML systems by using them to fight corruption? The article is built on three core claims. The first claim is that it is logical to use AML systems for anti‐corruption purposes because of a pronounced overlap in the standards required for each and the rising costs of the former. The second section demonstrates specifically how AML systems could significantly augment anti‐corruption efforts, focusing on the importance of financial intelligence, asset confiscation, and international cooperation. Finally, although powerful outsiders have successfully diffused AML systems among developing countries, a lack of “ownership” in the latter explains why these systems are often established only as tokens to enhance international legitimacy and reputations.     

高校协同创新:惩防学术腐败新思维

近年来,高校学风建设已经成为社会关注的焦点问题,被曝光的学术腐败事件给国家科技创新体系带来了不良影响,"2011计划"的推动和实施,不仅能加强高校与科研机构、行业企业开展深度合作,促进资源共享,而且也为惩防学术腐败和科技体制改革的发展提供了新契机。以协同创新为切入口惩防学术腐败的对策主要有:完善评审和管理制度,授第三方审决权;籍助曝光威慑力,发挥媒体监督作用;注重协同创新实绩,淡化论文评审指标;建立健全监督审计制度,管好协同创新科研经费。通过营造积极向上、风清气正的教学科研环境,培育求真务实、自由严肃的学术氛围,才能真正有效遏制学术不端行为,全面提升高校自主创新能力和水平。     

政治稳定视阈下腐败官员和资产外逃的惩防追缴机制建设

腐败的本质是公权私用,是权力与权利关系的异化。腐败官员与腐败资产外逃严重影响民众对于廉洁政治建设的信心,对我国的政治稳定造成严重的负面影响,鉴于此,惩防腐败对国家的政治稳定至关重要。目前,腐败行为的结构性转型使得我国对腐败官员跨境外逃和资产转移的惩防难度增大,因此,要认真对待社会转型带来的制度风险和利益冲突,正视权力结构存在的问题,健全权力运行制约和监督体系,改革政治体制,依靠民主政治和公民有序政治参与的扩大,促成对政府官员责任的落实和监督。将惩防跨境腐败上升到法治的高度,进一步完善并落实我国政府官员家庭财产申报制度,完善户籍管理、护照管理和出入境管理等制度。要在国际法和国际条约框架内,加强国际司法合作。