反腐防腐必须治理“协腐、容腐、羡腐“行为

协助腐败、容允腐败、羡慕腐败是腐败滋生蔓延的温床.民主化程度不高、法制不健全所导致的政治冷漠是"协腐、容腐、羡腐"行为产生的主要原因.治理"协腐、容腐、羡腐"行为,要着力培养全社会的共同政治理想,加快政治民主化进程,大力加强法制建设和廉洁文化建设.     

Corruption,Tax Evasion and the Laffer Curve

In a corrupt tax administration a rise in tax ratesets off complicated strategic moves by both taxpayersand administrators. It is shown that in somecircumstances, this may bring about Laffer likebehavior of overall tax revenue, i.e. a higher taxrate results in smaller net revenue for thegovernment. Further, a more intense tax effort byincreasing the number of returns audited may alsoreduce net revenues. Finally if tax and fine ratespositively influence the level of corruption in theadministration, these outcomes become more likely.     

Corruption and Rent-Seeking

The rent-seeking theory was one of thefirst economic instruments developed tomodel corruption in the public sector.Comparing corruption with lobbying, itproposes that the former is the lesser oftwo evils, since lobbying entails the wastage of resources inthe competition forpreferential treatment. This study showsthat the traditional rent-seeking theorymisunderstands three factors: first, theimpact of a corrupt monopoly on the rent'ssize; second, corruption as a motivationfor supplying preferential treatment andthird; that corruption involves a narrowerrange of interests than those ofcompetitive lobbying. Taking these factorsinto consideration, the opposite argumentis valid: corruption has worse welfareimplications than alternative rent-seekingactivities.     

治理结构,权力机制与高校腐败——基于117个高校腐败案例的分析

基于新制度主义中的制度性同形理论,通过对117个高校腐败案例进行分析,发现高校腐败最大的特征就是与政府腐败特点的一致性,无论是在腐败主体特征还是腐败行为特征方面都极为相似。研究表明:在高等教育场域中,在强制性同形和模仿性同形机制作用下,高等教育场域中的高校与政府呈现组织性趋同现象,两者的组织结构、治理机制、监督漏洞、官场文化等方面都具有同形性,两者都采取相对集权的治理结构,而监督制衡机制效果不彰,无法有效地约束和限制权力,从而使高校腐败特征与政府腐败特征表现一致。从这个特点上来说,高校现有的治理结构和权力机制并没有体现出高校应有的独特性,其权力的运行机制也不足以控制腐败的发生。     

从文化视角看腐败成因与廉政建设

廉政文化与腐败文化是相比较而存在,相斗争而发展的.中国的腐败文化,是多因一果.建设廉政文化,要按其路径指引,从加大反腐倡廉的宣传教育,提高改革的协同性,推进政治改革,加强廉政制度建设,强化实践的监督与惩处力度等方面努力.     

腐败网络的结构类型、特征及运行机制

借鉴社会交换理论,将腐败网络视为非法社会交换网络,进而揭示其两种典型结构,即外排式联接腐败网络与内含式联接腐败网络。外排式联接网络形成了"资源排斥性"权力结构,迫使权力劣势者进行竞争以获得资源;内含式联接网络形成了"功能互补性"权力结构,要求各方行动者进行合作以获得收益。权力分配的不均等造成了网络结构中各方之间的冲突,导致了网络的分裂趋势。而关系承诺因其对权力运作的削弱,发挥着重要的网络整合功能。权力结构和关系承诺,作为腐败网络能否持续运行的决定因素,为当前反腐提供了重要突破口。     

Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes Toward Government in Contemporary Democracies

Using surveys conducted in sixteen mature and newly established democracies around the globe, this study examines the effect of corruption on people's attitudes toward government. The analysis demonstrates that citizens in countries with higher levels of corruption express more negative evaluations of the performance of the political system and exhibit lower levels of trust in civil servants. However, the results also show that the negative effect of corruption on evaluations of the political system is significantly attenuated among supporters of the incumbent political authorities. These findings provide strong and systematic evidence that informal political practices, especially those that compromise important democratic principles, should be considered important indicators of political system performance. Moreover, they imply that, while corruption is a powerful determinant of political support across widely varying political, cultural, and economic contexts, it does not uniformly diminish support for political institutions across all segments of the electorate.     

State Capacity,Bureaucratic Politicization,and Corruption in the Brazilian State

Responding to recent articles in Governance highlighting the need for improved measurement of bureaucratic characteristics, this article describes efforts to map Brazil's federal agencies on three dimensions—capacity, autonomy, and partisan dominance—derived from data on more than 326,000 civil servants. The article provides a “proof of concept” about the utility of agency‐level measures of these variables, demonstrating how they relate to an output common to all agencies: corruption. The article provides a first step in the direction of building a comparative research program that offers objective evaluation of bureaucracies within nation‐states, with the intent of better disentangling their impact on governance outcomes.     

Clarity of Responsibility and Corruption

This article demonstrates that political institutions influence the level of corruption via clarity of responsibility. The key hypothesis is that when political institutions provide high clarity of responsibility, politicians face incentives to pursue good policies and reduce corruption. These incentives are induced by the electorates' rejection of incumbents who do not provide satisfactory outcomes. However, if lines of responsibility are not clear, the ability of voters to evaluate and punish politicians—as well as to create incentives for performance—declines. The findings confirm that countries with institutions that allow for greater clarity of responsibility have lower levels of corruption.     

腐败的政治学分析及治理

腐败现象是附着于政治肌体上的毒瘤,其对国家政治体系构成了极大危害。从根本上说,廉政建设是一种制度建设,属于社会政治法律范畴。所以,在追求透明、廉洁、高效这些政治发展目标的过程中,必须首先减少权力对公共资源的控制,增加公共权力运行的透明度,同时要强化公共权力主体的自律和他律机制。     

医疗腐败的成因与治理

医疗卫生系统的腐败是社会各界最关注的一种腐败。它的产生有着复杂的政治、经济、社会和文化因素,还有人们的心理活动、价值取向、文化观念等因素。治理医疗腐败要采取综合治理,从加强对医院领导干部和重要岗位人员的职业道德、反腐倡廉教育入手,以建立健全管理制度、奖励和惩罚制度、考核制度及药品招标采购的相关制度为重点,发挥党内监督和群众监督的作用,建立医院反腐倡廉的监督体系。以落实领导干部述职述廉、院务公开、＂三重一大＂制度为抓手,从长远考虑,从解决具体问题做起,逐步构建医疗腐败的惩防体系。