Viewing Spatial Consequences of Budgetary Policy Changes

While the research community is often very concerned with the distributional effect of public policy decisions, the geographic distribution of the affected populations is often overlooked. This paper argues that seemingly geographically neutral policies have spatial consequences and that the choice of how to measure them is important. We suggest that maps provide a powerful tool for communicating these ideas to policy makers and that geographical information systems supplemented by spatial statistics yield information that assist policy debates. We develop metrics to illustrate how geographic information provides insights into the spatial consequences of Medicaid expenditure changes in Ohio.     

Social Policy and the Authority of Evidence

The growing call for social policy to be evidence‐based implies that ‘evidence’ possesses an intrinsic authority. Much of the evidence used by governments to formulate or evaluate social policy is signified through statistics and the language of quantification. Evidence presented in this way has the appearance of certainty and a legitimacy that seems beyond challenge. Having an appreciation of the history and sociology of the ‘science of the state’, as statistics was originally defined, helps demystify the authority of social statistics. This enables policy‐makers and program administrators to better discern the policy merit of numerical evidence.     

Appropriations Politics in Congress: The House Appropriations Committee and the Executive Agencies

In the topsy-turvy world of congressional budgeting, last year's analysis is often out of date this year. How, then, could a work as old as most college sophomores have any relevance today? Richard Fenno's The Power of the Purse is a classic that passes the most challenging test of all time. Despite the very significant changes that have occurred in the congressional budget and appropriations processes, more than mere historical interest is to be found in Fenno's masterful study. While there are many relevant parts of the book, the following selection is from Fenno's exploration of the interplay between agency budget officials and the appropriations subcommittees. It was a pleasure to read these chapters again and I suspect that many other readers will be surprised at how insightful and fresh the study remains.     

Coming Apart: Fiscal and Budgetary Policy Processes in the Johnson Administration

Budgeting in the 1980s seems very different from budgeting in the 1960s. The differences have more to do with economic conditions than with the techniques of budgeting. In the article published below, David C. Mowery and Mark S. Kamlet present their interpretation of how budgeting was transformed during the Johnson administration. The editors of this journal, both of whom have conducted research on the Johnson administration, do not share the point of view expressed in this article, but believe that the readers of Public Budgeting and Finance should be provided a diverse range of viewpoints. The editors invite comment on this article and expect to publish articles presenting different interpretations in subsequent issues of the journal.     

Testing the Policy Capacities of Budgetary Agencies: Lessons from Finance

The Commonwealth Department of Finance, together with the Treasury from which it was hived off in 1976, constitutes the central budgetary agency at the Australian federal level. For the purposes of this article, I identify Finance as a convenient working model of central budgetary agencies, at least in their traditional Australian incarnation. I accept that Finance is unlikely to be fully representative of all such Australian agencies, and I acknowledge that the federal government's annual budget is officially introduced into parliament by the Treasurer, and that the Treasury is deservedly regarded as the core budgetary agency. But my focus here is on Finance's special responsibility for the public management framework, and Finance's role in providing policy advice to government organisations on how to make the best use of budget funding. This article then presents the findings of a recent evaluation of selected policy-advising activities with the department.     

Budgetary Control in a Decentralized System: Meeting the Criteria for Fiscal Stability in the European Union

This article provides a set of measures that are recommended to the leadership of the European Union to enhance budgetary balance and control within a highly decentralized system, one that requires the coordination of budgetary policy in more than a dozen nations. These measures are intended to be relevant to European budgetary coordination efforts but also appear to apply to U.S. federal initiatives to reduce the annual budget deficit and total debt. The individual measures recommended include holding increases in expenditures at or below the rate of GDP growth, establishing envelopes for major accounts, placing all entitlement on a pay-as-you-go basis, means testing of entitlements and elimination of automatic entitlement indexing, considering the option of marginal reductions in some entitlement programs, and voting on budgets as single, omnibus packages. The proposal to establish executive line-item budget authority also is evaluated-and rejected.     

Management Strategies and Budgetary Politics

The study of public sector budgeting, particularly at the state level, has been dominated by incremental models of decision making. As a result, the budget has not always been viewed as an effective management tool for governors and other senior state officials. However, there are several critical issues which state leaders repeatedly face and for which the budget is the principal instrument for implementing decisions. This article identifies four key issues for the strategic management of state government and relates alternative approaches to each issue to the nature of budgetary politics. The first section raises the issues in the form of four questions. The next sections present alternative answers and discuss their political implications. Where appropriate, examples from the state of New York are included.     

State Court Strategies and Politics during the Appropriations Process

This article explores state court budgetary strategies and their effectiveness in the appropriations process as perceived by key budgeting actors. In general, we find evidence of state judiciaries that try to remain "above politics" when dealing with budget issues. The most important strategies to this effect include submitting realistic requests, providing documentation to support needs, and not using budget "weapons" at their disposal (e.g., writs of mandamus). However, the survey results do indicate that state judiciaries use certain strategies that have a more political tint, such as lobbying by court officials.     

The Senate Electoral Cycle and Bicameral Appropriations Politics

We consider the consequences of the Senate electoral cycle and bicameralism for distributive politics, introducing the concept of contested credit claiming, i.e., that members of a state's House and Senate delegations must share the credit for appropriations that originate in their chamber with delegation members in the other chamber. Using data that isolate appropriations of each chamber, we test a model of the strategic incentives contested credit claiming creates. Our empirical analysis indicates that the Senate electoral cycle induces a back-loading of benefits to the end of senatorial terms, but that the House blunts this tendency with countercyclical appropriations. Our analysis informs our understanding of appropriations earmarking and points a way forward in studying the larger consequences of bicameral legislatures.     

Comments on John Uhr, 'Testing the Policy Capacities of Budgetary Agencies: Lessons from Finance'

These comments derive from a seminar specifically on evaluation policy review organised by the Public Policy Program, Research School of Social Sciences, ANU, in May 1996. Both John Uhr and Hal Colebatch presented their views on the evaluation process and it was felt appropriate to include Hal Colebatch's comments here. John Uhr declined the offer to reply, indicating he would allow the original article to stand on its merits.     

Budgetary constraints and municipal revenue forecasting

Conclusion The objective of this research has been to determine whether key budget participants see forecasting as making significant contributions to the budgetary process. The issue is important for at least two reasons. Budgetary tools will be used to the degree budget players perceive them as providing net budgettary benefits. Moreover, the continuing trend toward technological sophistication gives governments opportunities, red herrings or not, to incorporate the technology into the budget process. The issue is also very timely; with the demise of packaged budget reforms but not the values of budget reforms, there may be new opportunities for improving budgeting on a less grandiose, more piecemeal basis, such as using forecasts to analyze budgetary options. The findings here provide some insight into two questions concerning governmental forecasting. First, why do governments use complex methods? In support of previous research, since cities most dependent on intergovernmental aid tend to use complex forecasting, such methods may indeed be seen as a way to help cope with fiscal stress. Also, reflecting the ambiguity of current research, since cities tend to use relatively simple techniques regardless of the revenue source being forecasted, the source is at best a partial determinant of complexity. The most important predictor of complexity, however, was budget format; cities that emphasize reform methods, especially planning, tend to use the most complex forecast methods. The forecasting process was not as important as expected.Second, so what? Does forecasting influence budgetary choices? The evidence from the second part of the study suggest that it can, but within definable limits. Budget directors are more likely than councils to value outyear estimates, but both actors are much less likely to value long-term estimates. The survey results also indicate that revenue forecasts are not as useful for making political decisions as for making management decisions: the forecast is usually used as an internal document, is only sometimes intended to affect council decisions, and is not usually included in the budget. In short, the forecast may be most useful for making managerial decisions since that is what most cities want out of it. It also tends to be more useful if the budget format is less traditional. Finally, the findings indicate that forecasting may be more useful to management to the degree the council finds it politically useful. This is extremely important since it suggests that as powerful as technology may be, budgetary tools that do not meet political needs will be managerially confined.Clearly, more research is needed in this area. Does forecasting actually shape long-range plans? In the long run, will the forecasting effort change the ways cities budget? Can the availability of forecasting information strengthen one actor relative to another? These are important questions that need answering to clarify the impact of forecasting and other technologies on the budget process.     

Delegation of Clinical Authority,Administrative Culture and Policy Adoption: A Comparative Analysis

Numerous countries have adopted reforms that allow medical personnel other than physicians to engage in tasks that traditionally were exclusively performed by physicians. This policy is controversial because it challenges the medical profession’s traditional boundaries. This study is an exercise in comparative policy research based on the experience of 18 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries. It evaluates the contribution of different structural factors – socioeconomic, cultural, and institutional – to policy adoption. Based on both quantitative analysis and an examination of how delegation unfolded in Israel, the role of administrative culture is highlighted: a category that combines cultural legacies and institutional properties in explaining policy adoption. It is argued that because, in entrepreneurial administrative cultures, administrators are more likely to possess a managerial mindset than in Rechtsstaat cultures, and also have more institutional leeway for action, delegation is more likely to be adopted in the former.     

Taxes,Budgetary Rule and Majority Voting

This paper studies majority voting outcomes fora specific class of two-dimensional policies. One policyinstrument influences efficiency and the other redistribution.Absent the political process, the two dimensions can beaddressed separately. With a two dimensional vote, the twoaspects will interact in a non-trivial way. The illustrativepolicy we consider, requires taxing an externality-generatinggood and determining a budgetary rule which specifies theproportions of the tax proceeds that go to wage earners and tocapital owners. We show: First, a sequential vote wherein thetax rate is determined first and the budgetary rule second,always possesses an equilibrium and that this equilibrium isthe median-endowed individual's most-preferred policy. Second,the reverse sequential choice implies that the median-endowedindividual may, but need not, be decisive. Third, the``Shepsle procedure'' also implies that the equilibrium is thepolicy most favored by the median individual. Fourth, thisequilibrium constitutes, under certain circumstances, theCondorcet winner for the unrestricted simultaneous votinggame.     

With Strings Attached: Statutory Delegations of Authority to the Executive Branch

While research on the influence of divided government upon legislative outputs is available, relatively little identifies the effects of divided government on legislative control of bureaucratic discretion. Some suggest that inter‐branch conflict between the President and Congress leads legislators to seek to retain legislative control over the bureaucracy. As a result, periods of divided government increase statutory control and reduce agency autonomy. Close examination of statutes creating each federal agency between 1946 and 1997 reveal that divided government increases specificity of statutory control. In addition, the particular type of divided government involving split partisan control between the chambers of Congress fosters greater specific statutory control when new government agencies are created.     

Towards an International Antitrust Authority? Key Factors in the Internationalization of Competition Policy

Negotiated access to markets through the internationalization of business framework rules is of increasing importance. The article examines the political-economic factors that are contributing to, but also setting limits on, the greater internationalization of one such aspect of policy—competition policy. It analyzes whether internationalizing forces are likely to transform existing international arrangements in competition policy matters from those of a loose regime to that of a fully fledged international institutional system. The latter could be represented by recent proposals for an International Antitrust Authority. The four factors examined are: conflicting ideas about competition policy; the exercise of political power by nation states and business; the roles and stances of international agencies; and democratic concerns about the accountability, representativeness, and transparency of competition policy institutions.
The analysis concludes that future forms of institution-building at the international level of competition policy are important. This is so because, if lejt totally as a set of international regimes, competition policy may be arranged to an excessive degree in the interests of business power or in the interests of one or more dominant countries.     

Budgetary Devices for Curbing Spending Prone Ministers and Bureaucrats

In this paper I study asimple game of the budgetary process. Thegame has three players. A spending proneminister, who proposes a budget, a primeminister, who accepts or vetoes, and abureaucrat who provides non-verifiableinformation about policy. The bureaucratis appointed by the spending minister. Ishow that in this setting public spendingis excessive. This result stems from theproposal power of the minister, and hisincentive to appoint a spending pronebureaucrat. Next, I examine two devices forcontrolling public spending: binding budgettargets imposed by the prime minister, anddelegating veto power to a spending aversefinance minister. It is shown that thelatter device is more effective than theformer device to curb a spending proneminister, because it not only reduces theproposal power of the spending minister,but also induces him to appoint lessspending prone bureaucrats.