After Number Ten: What Do Former Prime Ministers Do?

The article reviews the experience of former British prime ministers in the twentieth century. There is no fixed or predetermined role for former prime ministers. What they do after they leave office depends on personal choices and on circumstances. Some have largely disappeared from the political stage. Others have become active international 'elder statesmen'. A couple-Heath and Thatcher-were embittered 'models to avoid'. A quarter of the former prime ministers since 1900 have served in other government posts in their successors' Cabinets, while a handful have turned down such appointments. Most have gone to the Lords, which offers a political platform, but sometimes they do not think much of the quality of the second chamber. The retirements of some former prime ministers have been clouded by money worries, but they nowadays get substantial pensions and can make money from business directorships, international lectures and writing memoirs. The article concludes with speculation about what Tony Blair's post-premiership might hold.     

Managing Networks: Propositions on What Managers Do and Why They Do It

Measuring management in networks is difficult because the allocation of managerial resources in network structures is fluid—that is, the utilization of management behaviors varies across time and space within a given program or project. As a means of focusing the network management research agenda, propositions based in contingency logic are suggested to test ideas regarding when, why, and how network managers undertake these behaviors. The propositions are intended to identify the vast inventory of network management behaviors and, most importantly, determine how the manager strategically matches behaviors with the governing context. Suggestions are also offered to help us understand how and why managerial resources are re allocated over time and space. The proposed research agenda is offered as a guide to help us determine which choices are most likely to be effective.     

Do Ministers Do What They Say? Ministerial Unreliability, Collegial and Hierarchical Governments

This paper is concerned with the extent to which individual members of governments reliably implement the decisions of the governments to which they belong, a matter which is rarely discussed, if ever, and yet can be critical for the operation of national executives. After a general presentation of the problem, the paper examines the reasons why members of collegial governments are more likely to be reliable than members of hierarchical governments. As 'cabinet' governments tend to be more collegial while 'presidential' governments tend to be more hierarchical, unreliability seems also more likely to take place in presidential governments, to the extent that these are indeed hierarchical. Progress in this area has been hampered so far by the absence of a tight operational definition of collegial and hierarchical governments: such a definition is presented here, opening the way for the empirical testing of the impact which the distinction may have on the reliability of members of governments.     

Flawed attacks on contemporary human rights: Laudan,Sunstein, and the cost-benefit state

After giving a brief account of human rights, the paper investigates five contemporary attacks on them. All of the attacks come from two contemporary proponents of the cost-benefit state, attorney Cass Sunstein and philosopher Larry Laudan. These attacks may be called, respectively, the rationality, objectivity, permission, voluntariness, and comparativism claims. Laudan's and Sunstein's rationality claim (RC) ist that only policy decisions passing cost-benefit tests are rational. Their objectivity presupposition (OP) is that only acute, deterministic threats to life are objective. Sunstein’s permission claim (PC) is that regulators are merely permitted, 3 not required, to take distributive and human rights concerns into account. Sunstein’s 3 voluntariness claim (VC) is that the consent of potential victims is not relevant to government regulations about risks and benefits. Laudan’s comparativism claim 3 (CC) is that there are no rules of thumb, no precomparative norms like human rights, for assessing theory choice in policy science. The paper analyzes each of these claims, shows how they undercut human rights, and argues that each of them errs.