The Tax Revolt in Massachusetts: Revolution and Reason

The modern-day tax revolt in Massachusetts was initiated by passage of the property tax limitation measure Proposition 2½ in 1980. Predictions of draconian budget cuts never materialized due to state legislative modification of the initiative's provisions, and judicious use of local voter overrides. Massachusetts citizens have continued to bring tax issues to the ballot, with fairly reasoned outcomes.     

Electoral Competition through Issue Selection

Politics must address multiple problems simultaneously. In an ideal world, political competition would force parties to adopt priorities that reflect the voters' true concerns. In reality, parties can run their campaigns in such a way as to manipulate voters' priorities. This phenomenon, known as priming, may allow parties to underinvest in solving the issues that they intend to mute. We develop a model of endogenous issue ownership in which two vote‐seeking parties (a) invest in policy quality to increase the value of their platform and (b) choose a communication strategy to prime voters. We identify novel feedback between communication and investment. In particular, we find that stronger priming effects can constrain parties to invest more resources in all issues. We also identify the conditions under which parties prefer to focus on their “historical issues” or to engage in “issue stealing.”     

Electoral Competition and Agricultural Support in OECD Countries

Agricultural trade protectionism in developed countries remains a politically charged issue, yet few studies have attempted to explain the political dynamics behind this important trade issue. We consider agricultural subsidies as a type of distributive policy that targets the agricultural sector at the expense of consumers and taxpayers. Based on Cox (1987, 1990) and Myerson (1993) , we argue that electoral systems that encourage politicians to appeal to a narrow constituency tend to have a higher level of agricultural support. We test this theoretical hypothesis using OECD agricultural support data disaggregated by commodity and country. A cross-classified multilevel model is employed to account for complex variation of agricultural support across countries, commodities, and time. Our empirical results show that electoral systems that encourage politicians to target narrow (broad) constituencies are associated with relatively high (low) levels of agricultural subsidies.     

The Impact of the Tax Revolt Era State Fiscal Caps: A Research Update

Fiscal caps, the most common form of fiscal limit adopted during the tax revolt era, are again on the agendas of state government. In this article, we evaluate the claims made by cap supporters and opponents by examining the impacts of caps adopted during the tax revolt. Updating Lowery and Cox's (1990) analysis of the impact of state fiscal caps through 1991 using a comparative state, interrupted time-series design, we find some evidence—albeit very weak—that fiscal caps may have modestly reduced the size of government and no evidence that they have been evaded through budget end-runs.     

Electoral Competition, Participation, and Government Responsiveness in Mexico

In this article I test two competing visions about how democracy produces responsive government. Electoral theories of democracy posit that elected governments are responsive to public demands because citizens are able to sanction bad politicians and select good ones. Participatory theories attribute responsiveness to a citizenry's ability to articulate demands and pressure government through a wider range of political action. I test hypotheses derived from these two approaches, using an original dataset that combines electoral, socioeconomic, and public-financial indicators for Mexico's 2,400 municipalities, from 1989 to 2000. The data show that electoral competition has no effect on municipal government performance. But the results are consistent with the hypothesis that nonelectoral participation causes improved performance. Thus, I suggest that the quality of municipal government in Mexico depends on an engaged citizenry and cooperation between political leaders and their constituents, rather than the threat of electoral punishment. I recommend that scholars broaden the study of government responsiveness to account for participatory strategies of political influence and critically assess the claims of those who would promote elections as a cure-all for poor democratic performance.     

Duverger's Hypothesis, the Run-Off Rule, and Electoral Competition

I analyze a model of electoral competition with entry underthe run-off rule. I consider both two- and multiple-party systems.The principal result is that two-party systems may prove stableunder the run-off rule: I show that a continuum of equilibriaexists in which only two parties enter and subsequent entryis deterred. This finding conflicts with the accepted wisdomon the run-off rule encapsulated by Duverger's Hypothesis. Theresults of the model are then reconciled with Duverger's Hypothesisand a more precise formulation is proposed.     

Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in a Median Voter Model

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of capital tax coordination in a simple model of fiscal competition where fiscal policy is subject to majority voting and households differ with respect to their labor and capital income. It turns out that a coordinated capital tax increase may raise or reduce welfare, depending on the relative magnitude of i) economic distortions induced by a labor tax and ii) political distortions resulting from the influence of the median voter on fiscal policy decisions. A negative welfare effect is more likely, the smaller the marginal excess burden of the labor tax and the smaller the ratio of the median voter's labor income to average labor income. We also use empirical estimates of the marginal excess burden of taxation to determine the welfare effects of tax coordination; it turns out that a negative welfare effect of coordinated tax increases may emerge in our model for empirically reasonable parameters.     

Endogenous Credible Commitment and Party Competition over Redistribution under Alternative Electoral Institutions

Political parties competing in elections for the power to set public policy face the problem of making credible their policy promises to voters. I argue that this commitment problem crucially shapes party competition over redistribution. The model I develop shows that under majoritarian electoral rules, parties' efforts to achieve endogenous commitment to policies preferred by the middle class lead to different behavior and outcomes than suggested by existing theories, which either assume commitment or rule out endogenous commitment. Thus, left parties can have incentives to respond to rising income inequality by moving to the right in majoritarian systems but not under proportional representation. The model also generates new insights about the anti‐left electoral bias often attributed to majoritarian electoral rules, and the strategic use of parliamentary candidates as a commitment device. I find evidence for key implications of this logic using panel data on party positions in 16 parliamentary democracies.     

Field Experiments Testing the Impact of Radio Advertisements on Electoral Competition

Results from previous studies of campaign spending imply that equal-sized grants to both incumbents and challengers are a net benefit to challengers, who on average spend less money and derive greater marginal returns from each additional dollar. This study provides an experimental test of this proposition. Cities holding mayoral elections in November 2005 and 2006 were randomly assigned to broadcast nonpartisan radio ads that stated the names of the mayoral candidates, reminded listeners about the date of the upcoming election, and encouraged them to vote. Consistent with the findings of previous studies on the differential effects of incumbent and challenger campaign spending on election outcomes, we find that these radio ads produced substantially more competitive elections. The borderline statistical significance of our results, however, invites replication of this experiment.     

The Rise and Decline of Turnout in Congressional Elections: Electoral Institutions,Competition, and Strategic Mobilization

Considerable debate exists over the impact of electoral institutions on turnout in U.S. national elections. To address this debate, I exploit the rich variation in electoral rules present throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Using a newly constructed dataset of district‐level turnout results for the U.S. House from 1840 to 1940, I find that electoral institutions and political competition jointly provided incentives, and by the turn‐of‐the‐century disincentives, for political leaders to mobilize the electorate. The results demonstrate that changes in electoral institutions and varying levels of political competition help explain congressional turnout across districts and over time.     

Tax Harmonization and Tax Competition: Contrasting Views and Policy Issues in Three Federal Countries

This article contrasts divergent attitudes toward tax competitionand tax harmonization in Australia, Canada, and the United States.Despite strong arguments on each side, competition and harmonizationare not necessarily conflicting goals except at the extremes.The most troublesome issue is the tradeoff between promotingefficiency in the public sector and in the private sector. Dueto the difficulty of measuring and comparing efficiency in bothsectors, this issue is not likely to be resolved objectively.However, tax-base harmonization appears to be the best compromisein pursuing both goals. Some fundamental problems remain regardlessof the policy direction taken, including limiting "micro-level"competition and addressing environmental and redistributiveconcerns in regional and local arenas. Improved intergovernmentalcooperation and experimentation are viewed as the key to resolvingthese issues.     

Electoral Cycles and Turnout in Multilevel Electoral Systems

This article differentiates between three ways in which electoral cycles may impact on participation in elections. First, it identifies a simultaneity effect – turnout increases to the extent that elections are held on the same date. A second effect is voter fatigue – turnout declines when another election has just been held before. Poll voting is a third effect. It suggests that turnout increases when another election is to be held shortly after. On the basis of a novel dataset that includes 2,915 regional elections held in 317 regions and 18 countries from 1945 to 2009, evidence is found for all three effects. The results point towards a basic dilemma in multilevel electoral systems: increase turnout by holding elections on the same date but accept high vote congruence across elections or decouple election cycles, which decreases vote congruence but lowers participation rates.     

The Electoral Politics of Housing

This article surveys the territorial politics of housing policy with particular reference to the Conservative Party. It examines the how attempts to establish a new planning framework under the previous Coalition government came unstuck and sets out the implications of the planning impasse for home ownership and ‘generation rent’. The territorial and tenure dimensions of the 2015 General Election are considered and possible future Conservative conflicts over land release are explored.     

The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low‐Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems

Can electoral rules be designed to achieve political ideals such as accurate representation of voter preferences and accountable governments? The academic literature commonly divides electoral systems into two types, majoritarian and proportional, and implies a straightforward trade‐off by which having more of an ideal that a majoritarian system provides means giving up an equal measure of what proportional representation (PR) delivers. We posit that these trade‐offs are better characterized as nonlinear and that one can gain most of the advantages attributed to PR, while sacrificing less of those attributed to majoritarian elections, by maintaining district magnitudes in the low to moderate range. We test this intuition against data from 609 elections in 81 countries between 1945 and 2006. Electoral systems that use low‐magnitude multimember districts produce disproportionality indices almost on par with those of pure PR systems while limiting party system fragmentation and producing simpler government coalitions.     

The British Election Study and Electoral Research

The British Election Study is the major data resource for investigating electoral behaviour among the British electorate. It has seldom been subject to open critical review from within the political science community, yet, together with extensions such as the British Election Panel Study, it absorbs a considerable proportion of the resources available for British political research. This article sets out a critical appraisal of the study, examining its institutional organization, theoretical scope, and methodological conventions. The thrust of the critique is the need for serious rethinking about all three aspects. For the British Election Study to advance our understanding of electoral behaviour requires a more inclusive approach to its organization; moving beyond a preoccupation with sociological and socio-psychological models of electoral behaviour; and systematic attention to measurement issues.     

Electoral Competition, Globalization, and Subnational Education Spending in Mexico, 1999–2004

This article examines the determinants of primary education spending among 29 Mexican states from 1999 to 2004. There is wide variation in spending despite expectations of policy convergence due to market forces associated with globalization, and in spite of the unique potential of education spending to complement economic strategies in achieving equitable growth. This study exploits significant advantages of subnational analysis in exploring political and economic variables that have been useful in explaining spending levels cross-nationally. Consistent with these studies, this article shows that greater electoral competition leads to increased spending. In contrast to other work, however, this study finds that exposure to the global economy has distinctly mixed effects on education spending. These findings thus further highlight the positive returns to higher "quality" democracy, while underscoring the need to examine the effects of many different aspects of globalization representing a wide variety of strategies employed by governments in engaging the international economy.     

Tax Competition and Income Redistribution: An Empirical Analysis for Switzerland

Tax competition is supposed to lead to thecollapse of the welfare state because, first, it willbecome difficult for a single jurisdiction to levy aredistribution tax upon the rich and mobile, andsecond, such a policy, if undertaken in onejurisdiction, will attract poor individuals from otherjurisdictions and erode internal redistributionpolicies. In this paper, the impact of personal incometaxes and transfers on residence decisions oftaxpayers is analyzed with Swiss subfederal data. Therelationship of tax competition and the erosion of theSwiss welfare state is tested with aggregate data onincome redistribution.