To vote or not to vote: The paradox of nonvoting

One paradox of voting states that, in a general election, in which many citizens vote, the probability that a single voter can affect the outcome is so small that in general citizens have no rational reason for voting. However, if all citizens accept this reasoning, then none will vote, and so each vote has a large probability of affecting the outcome. Hence all should vote after all. The adoption of mixed strategies resolves this paradox: if each citizen adopts a certain (small) probability of voting, then the actual number of citizens voting will be just enough to make it worth those citizens' while to vote. A Nash equilibrium point thus occurs. Here we compute Nash equilibria for the simple case of majority voting; for the more complicated case of composite voting (for example, as in a presidential election), we draw certain qualitative inferences.     

The personal vote and voter turnout

The level of electoral turnout is arguably the most widely monitored form of electoral participation. Consequently, electoral systems have often been cited as having a significant effect on turnout levels even though scholars do not agree on the effects of these complex institutions. Since most previous studies have relied on categorical or dichotomous electoral system indicators, this study utilizes Carey and Shugart’s personal vote index to gain theoretical leverage on other electoral system components. In short, I find that where electoral competition is predicated on party, rather than candidates’, reputations, turnout levels rise. The results of a time-series cross-sectional analysis reveal that the personal vote index significantly influences turnout levels even when controlling for a host of other factors.     

The personal vote and economic reform

Do electoral rules affect the progress of economic reforms? The students of economic reform have examined the effects of inter-party competition, partly shaped by electoral rules, on economic reform, but have neglected the more direct effects of electoral rules, namely the extent to which they encourage the personal vote. More broadly, studies of the effect of electoral rules on economic policy have relied on the simplistic SMD/PR distinction and have neglected features of electoral institutions that affect the level of intra-party competition. Building on the personal vote literature, we argue that electoral institutions that encourage the personal vote are not conducive to reform progress. We provide the first systematic multivariate cross-country test of the implications of the personal vote literature for economic reform in the context of the post-communist countries from 1990 to 2006. We find that, in line with our theory, countries where electoral rules encourage the personal vote are less likely to reform.     

The electoral college and the rational vote

We have shown first, that if the electoral college was abolished the theoretically measured power of voters would increase and second, that in presidential elections the measure of voting power used does in fact have a highly significant impact on the decision as to whether or not to vote. Thus, the analysis predicts that the abolition of the electoral college would have a significant impact on voter participation. From a policy viewpoint, if we view participation in elections as desirable, this could be used as an argument in favor of direct election of the president. From a scientific viewpoint, we are able to make a strong and unambiguous prediction about the results of a (possible) future event from theoretical considerations. If the electoral college should be abolished, it will be possible to test our predictions. In addition, we have provided a further test of the rational behavior view of electoral participation and have shown that this model applies to presidential elections. Finally, we have shown that the theoretical measure of voting power does predict actual behavior.     

Divided we vote

Divided government is known to correlate with limited government, but less is understood about the empirical conditions that lead to divided government. This paper estimates the determinants of continuous and categorical measures of divided government in an empirical macro political economy model using 30 years of data from the American states. Voters support more divided government after increased government spending per dollar of tax revenues, but more unified government after worsening incomes and unemployment rates. Only conditional support is found for the strategic-moderating theory (Alesina and Rosenthal in Econometrica 64(6):1311–1341, 1996) that focuses purely on midterm cycles and split-ticket voting absent economic conditions.     

Beyond personal vote incentives: Dividing the vote in preferential electoral systems

Comparative studies of preferential electoral systems have paid much attention to the incentives for personalized instead of party-centered campaigns, but they have largely ignored how some of these systems allow “allocation errors” and so create incentives for parties to “manage” the vote and intraparty campaigns. We discuss how the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) and single transferable vote (STV) systems create these incentives, and we illustrate the degree to which they affect actual electoral results across seven preferential electoral systems. The analysis reveals statistically significant differences in the vote inequality among incumbent cohorts (members of the same party and district), indicating the strong influence of vote division incentives over candidate-centered electoral environments. The results also have important implications for comparative research on legislative turnover and the incumbency advantage.     

The UK Brexit vote and its potential strategic impact

The United Kingdom's 'Leave' camp is mounting a strident and emotive campaign for the UK's departure from the European Union, and has gained significant popular traction. 'Brexit' would pose serious economic and political risks to the UK and significantly diminish the EU's size and clout. The 'Remain' camp will need to work hard to mobilise voters and put across the EU's benefits more effectively to prevent Brexit.     

Style issues and vote choice

It has been an assumption common in voting research that candidates must offer and voters must perceive opposing stands on issues for those issues to have a rational influence on the vote. Though apparently reasonable, this assumption eliminates analysis of the rational impact of style in voter thinking. This article argues that style issues should not be so easily dismissed and were of some importance in the 1972 presidential election. First, the data indicate that voters considered style issues as important as position issues. Second, voters were able to detect differences between the candidates on certain style issues. Third, salient style issues and salient position issues are similar in their causal relationship to the vote. These findings lend support to the general conclusion that style issues are an important and rational element of voter deliberations and have several implications for the study of public opinion, the behavior of political leaders, and the adequacy of elections as mechanisms of governmental accountability.This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association in Phoenix, March 31-April 2, 1977. The data presented here were gathered under National Science Foundation Grant GS-35408, Robert D. McClure and Thomas E. Patterson, principle investigators. We would like to thank Professor Patterson and McClure for the use of their data and their helpful comments.     

Scotland's independence vote looms over UK

‘Should Scotland be an independent country?’ If Scottish residents vote ‘yes’ in September the UK will undergo a break-up that will raise fundamental questions on both sides of the Scottish border, as well as for other European nations with separatist movements.     

The structuring of the vote in post-communist part systems: The Bulgarian example

Abstract. Consolidated democracies involve structured linkages between citizens and political decision making elites that are typically organized via political parties. Given the economic and institutional instability and uncertainty in post-communist emerging democracies, it has often been maintained that a structuring of party systems in such countries is slow to emerge. This paper demonstrates with data from a 1991 pre-election study in Bulgaria that significant aspects of political structuring may in fact appear in post-communist polities quite early. The structuring is based on citizens' individual resources which they expect to convert into economic benefits in the economic market economy, their market location in occupational terms, their general ideological dispositions, and their evaluation of the economic performance of the incumbent governments. While the structuring of party systems may still be weaker than in Western Europe, the Bulgarian evidence casts doubt on the tabula rasa hypothesis in the study of post-communist politics. Of course, further comparative analysis of post-communist democracies is required to buttress our conclusions.     

The majority vote rule and runoff primaries in the United States

The major parties in the United States use primary elections to select party candidates for general elections. While most employ a simple plurality vote rule for this purpose, some states, primarily southern, employ a majority rule that requires a runoff between the top two vote recipients if no candidate receives a majority in the initial primary. Data on primaries for state Governor and U.S. Senator from 1980 to 2002 are used to examine contemporary concerns about runoffs. Included in the findings are (1) the problem that majority runoffs address – candidates being selected based on low levels of voter support is not a frequent outcome under the plurality rule; (2) the vast majority of selections is based on a majority of votes in a primary, regardless of whether a simple plurality or majority is required; and (3) runoff primaries are necessary in roughly one-third of the contested primaries held in the majority vote context, and in about one-third of them the primary leader loses the runoff.     

The Chávez vote and the national economy in Venezuela

Hugo Chávez has attracted considerable political support since his emergence on the Venezuela political scene. But what are the bases of this support? More specifically, is economic voting a significant component of his support? Through investigation of the 2010 LAPOP Barometer data, we estimate the various components of a Chávez vote model. In a series of logistic regression analyses, the weight of sets of explanatory variables is assessed, as well as the weight of the overall model. In particular, the role of the economy is carefully explored. First, is Chávez held accountable for the economy? Second, does his personal leadership image dominate his economic policy image? We find evidence of a significant economic voting component in popular support for Chávez, although several other explanatory variables also exert a substantial impact on it.     

Explaining the vote for slow growth

A model of equilibrium rent determination is developed to incorporate both the scarcity and amenity effects associated with limits to new housing construction in a non-open city where demand for housing has increased. Implications of the model are tested with data from California cities to determine which factors increase the probability that a local growth control ballot measure is proposed, or passed. It is found that limits to new housing development occur with greater frequency in communities where fewer substitute cities exist and where certain socioeconomic characteristics predominate, but not where current population densities, or growth, are high.     

The probability of casting a decisive vote: The effects of a caucus

We study the effects of caucus formation upon a voting process with the aid of a Pólya-Eggenberger probability model. The model contains a parameter interpretable as cohesiveness between voters in a voting body. We examine relationships among members' voting power, satisfaction, and group cohesiveness. We also explore the likelihood of a distortion of opinion resulting from the caucus.