Dyadic Federations and Confederations

This article focuses on the thirteen-odd bicommunal politiesin which two, and only two, distinct communities dominate thepolitical arena. The concept of a bicommunal polity is analyticalrather than statistical. Permanent asymmetry characterizingthe two components makes a simple majoritarian formula for decisionmakingprocesses unacceptable. What other decisional frameworks havea greater chance for success: federalism, federalism with aheavy dose of confederal ingredients, regional confederation,consociationalism or secession? A confederal modification offederalism has so far appeared as more acceptable to two asymmetricand antagonistic polities than a concept of a federal unionwith its commitment to an overarching cultural-political nationalunion. The high failure rate of bicommunal configurations pointsalso to the necessity to relate the inner working of bicommunalpolities to international balancing processes and/or supportor abstinence of "blood-related" nation-states.     

Small States,Large Unitary States and Federations

Employing a political-economics approach, this paper comparessmall states and unions when the former fail to internalizecross-border externalities of publicly provided goods. Itdiscusses two types of unions: federations with more than onelevel of government and unitary states. While unitary statesare unable to differentiate public spending according todiffering preferences, rents of governments in a federationare higher due to a common-pool problem. The comparison leadsto the following results. (1) Citizens prefer small states tolarge states if spillover effects are weak. (2) They benefitfrom a multi-level government only if their preferencesheavily differ from the median-voter's preferences and ifspillovers are strong. Based on this comparison the paper alsodiscusses the creation of unions. Making specific assumptionon the distribution of preferences, it analyzes strong Nashequilibria at the union formation stage.     

Party system nationalization,presidential coalitions,and government spending

This paper argues that there is a strong relationship between geographical patterns of political parties' electoral performance and the composition of central government expenditures. When party system nationalization is high, the composition of spending will focus more on non-targetable expenditures, while targetable expenditures increase as the party system distribution of votes across different districts becomes less homogenous. However, the effect of party nationalization on spending type is conditioned by the size of the presidential coalition; targeted transfers will increase if the coalition size decreases, even if party nationalization is high. I find support for these hypotheses with an empirical analysis of district-level electoral and government expenditure data for several countries in Latin America between 1990 and 2006.     

Government Responsibility and Electoral Accountability in Federations

Because federalism can be a threat to accountability, a modelof voting behavior in federations must accommodate voters' attributionsof responsibility to each order of government for policy outcomes.This study uses a panel survey of Canadians in both federaland provincial elections to ask whether voters are able to holdgovernments accountable in a federal context. Voters may ignoreissues where responsibility is unclear, they may reward or punishboth the federal and provincial governments to the same degree,or the confusion of jurisdiction may sour them on the governmentor even the political system. Canadians who blamed both governmentsfor problems in health care did not lake this judgment to theirvoting decision in either the 2000 federal election or the 2001elections in Alberta and British Columbia, while those who couldidentify primary responsibility did so. Federalism and intergovernmentalpolicymaking may reduce voters' ability to hold their governmentsaccountable.     

Dominant players and minimum size coalitions

Abstract. In this paper we present a result about Peleg's theory of coalition formation in dominated simple games (Peleg 1981). Further, a connection between Peleg's theory and Riker's minimum size theory (Riker 1962, Riker and Ordeshook 1973) is established. This connection leads to a new theory of coalition formation in simple games.     

Interest groups and the regulation of pesticides: Congress,coalitions, and closure

This article is essentially a rejoinder to Christopher Bosso's piece, Transforming Adversaries Into Collaborators: Interest groups and the regulation of chemical pesticides, which appeared in this journal (21: 3–22). The case of pesticides regulation is re-examined and some new insights are offered. At the center of Bosso's argument is the contention that Congress is passive. John Kingdon's agenda/alternative distinction is utilized to arrive at an alternative way to think about the role of Congress in today's permeable pressure system.     

Building coalitions for water marketing

The authors argue that efficient water allocation is possible through markets as long as water rights are well-defined, enforced, and transferable. They provide a framework for considering third-party and free rider affects from water trades. From this framework, they consider the prospects for developing a market for instream flows. The analysis points to problems with the prior appropriation system for establishing instream flow claims but suggests that there is not reason for water policy to stand in the way of transferring existing consumption rights to instream uses. The authors conclude that changes in water policy which capitalize on market forces will result from conservationconservative coalitions.     

Invisible decisive coalitions in large hierarchies

This paper examines the extent to which organizational hierarchies are democratic or (in the more usual language of administrative studies) participative, in the sense that the views of a large proportion of organizational membership are taken into account when an organizational choice is made. We view organizations as making choices in a “bottom-up” manner: subordinates recommend options to their superior, and if subordinates are in sufficient agreement their superior accepts their advice. We prove that as the number of levels in the hierarchy increases, organizational choices can be dominated by a smaller and smaller proportion of the total organizational membership. In the limit, a vanishing small proportion of the membership can dominate policymaking.     

Advocacy coalitions and the practice of policy analysis

Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (above) have presented a framework for describing the processes by which public policies change over time, and Heintz and Weyant (above) have provided an array of case studies illustrating and elaborating those processes. This article will focus explicitly on the manner in which the advocacy coalition framework bears on the practice of policy analysis, both from the perspective of the manager of analytical resources, and from the perspective of the practicing policy analyst.     

Distributional coalitions,state strength,and economic growth: Toward a comprehensive theory of economic development

High-performing economies in the Asia-Pacific region together with only mediocre economic development in Latin America prompts the question of what explains differential economic growth rates among developing countries. Combining a statist perspective with Olson's theory of interest group formation, this research hypothesizes that nations with weak distributional coalitions will more likely experience high growth and state intervention will be effective. Using a longitudinal research design, this secondary analysis involves a comparative and interactive examination of eight Asian-Pacific and twelve Latin American countries. By considering the role of the state in interaction with distributional coalitions in society, the results indicate that approximately two-thirds of the variance in national economic growth is explained.