The political economy of targeting

One of the most widely used method of targeting is to reduce welfare benefits as income rises. Although the need for such targeting is clear enough, it also entails two important difficulties. Firstly, the prospect for the recipients of losing part of their benefits if they were to earn more can be a deterrent to work harder. Secondly, by reducing the number of recipients, targeting reduces the political support for taxation and redistribution. The purpose of this paper is to study the voting equilibrium of the degree of targeting and the level of taxation in an economy where labour supply is variable. The analysis reveals that targeting may be fatal for redistribution even though it rejects strictly less than the richest half of the population, and that it is not possible for a coalition of the extremes to form and reject the middle income group from the welfare system. Moreover, because targeting affects labour supply, we find that Pareto improvements are possible when targeting is either “too low” or “too high”. We also find that voting simultaneously over taxation and targeting is favourable to the poor in the sense that they can converge to their most-preferred policy by successively forming a majority coalition with the rich to increase targeting and with the middle to increase taxation.     

我国东、中、西部地区农民财产性收入差距探析

党的十七大报告首次明确提出"创造条件让更多群众拥有财产性收入",基于数据统计分析我国东、中、西部地区农民财产性收入差距变化趋势与原因,进一步缩小收入差距,提高农民的财产性收入,需大力发展中、西部地区农村经济,完善农村金融市场,增强农民理财观念。     

Race,income, and home PC ownership: a regional analysis of the digital divide

While digital divide research has focused on differences in computer access at the national level, few studies have examined interrelationships among race, income, and personal computer (PC) ownership at the regional level. This article examines the racial and economic divide in home PC ownership across four census regions of the U.S. Our analyses are based on supplementary data from the Census Bureau’s August 2000 Current Population Survey. The results indicate that White households are significantly more likely to own a PC than African American households in all regions. The extent of this racial divide is greatest in the Midwest and smallest in the West, and particularly high in the $50,000–$75,000 income category. The racial divide in PC ownership is negated only in households earning more than $75,000 annually. A significantly large income divide also exists among African American PC owners in all regions.     

Should I stay or should I go? An experimental study on voter responses to pre-electoral coalitions

Abstract.  Pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) are one of the most often used methods to coordinate entry into the electoral market. Party elites, however, do not know how voters will respond to the coalition formation at the polls. In this article, the authors report on an experimental study among 1,255 Belgian students. In order to study voter responses to the formation of PECs, respondents were presented with two ballots: one with individual parties (party vote condition) and one with coalitions (coalition vote condition). The aim of this experiment is to predict under what conditions party supporters will follow their initially preferred party into the coalition and vote for the PEC, and under what conditions they would desert the PEC at the polls. The decision whether to follow the coalition or not can be traced back to four considerations: dislike of the coalition partner; ideological congruence between coalition partners; size of the initially preferred party; and being attracted to a specific high-profile candidate. (Dis)liking the coalition partner is independent from the ideological congruence between the two coalition partners. The study's results also show support for an adjustment effect, as respondents became more loyal toward cartels over the course of the 2003–2005 observation period.     

The political economics of not paying taxes

This paper considers redistributive as well as political consequences of tax avoidance. When tax avoidance is possible, the official tax rate does not necessarily correspond to what individuals actually pay. This affects both redistributive outcomes as well as political attitudes towards taxation. Depending on the avoidance technology different political equilibria emerge. When the avoidance possibilities are limited, the classical conflict between rich and poor is sustained. If the tax avoidance technology is more effective, however, the equilibrium outcome can change to a situation where a coalition of poor and the very richest favor a higher tax rate. Comparing the model predictions with data on income inequality and evidence of avoidance activity, it comes surprisingly close to actual observations.     

Rental vacancy rates: A policy primer

Abstract

This article examines how policy makers use rental vacancy rates as indicators of housing market condition. The common practice of assuming that any rental market is in equilibrium when its rental vacancy rate is approximately 5 percent is criticized. Based on theoretical and empirical literature, the case is made that the rental vacancy rate that prevails when the supply and demand for rental units are in balance varies among areas and types of units and is not always 5 percent. The Department of Housing and Urban Development is faulted for not recognizing these variations and, therefore, misusing rental vacancy rates in its formula allocations for the Section 8 and HOME programs.

Observed vacancy rates offer meaningful insight into rental market conditions only when they are compared with empirically derived estimates of equilibrium vacancy rates. The methods for estimating these rates, however, are still being refined, and the data needed to derive such estimates are available only for a limited set of metropolitan areas. Other measures are available that policy makers could use to judge the adequacy of low‐income housing supply in local markets, but they are also somewhat problematic.     

The paradox of politics and policy in redistributing income

With political ideology with respect to the income distribution measured by proxy as the fraction of conservative coalition victories, it is found that over the period 1961–1984 the degree of conservative coalition strength is positively associated with changes in inequality, holding the effects of unemployment and inflation constant.A natural question is why don't the low income types vote in candidates who will consistently redistribute income in their favor? The result of such a political process would be a downward trend in income inequality. In point of fact, there is no evidence whatsoever of any trend in income equality over the period. The answer to both questions may be that Tullock (1983, 1986) is on to something. If the middle class voters transfer gains back and forth, the poor can't gain and they don't, then the distribution should be stable and is.     

Proportional Representation,Majoritarian Legislatures,and Coalitional Voting

Voters in elections under plurality rule face relatively straightforward incentives. In proportional representation systems, voters face more complex incentives as electoral outcomes don’t translate as directly into policy outcomes as in plurality rule elections. A common approach is to assume electoral outcomes translate into policy as a vote‐weighted average of all party platforms. However, most of the world’s legislatures are majoritarian institutions, and elections in PR systems are generally followed by a process of coalition formation. Results obtained using this assumption are not robust to the introduction of even minimal forms of majoritarianism. Incentives to engage in strategic voting depend on considerations about the coalitions that may form after the election, and the voters’ equilibrium strategies are shaped by policy balancing and the postelectoral coalition bargaining situation, including considerations about who will be appointed the formateur.     

The Characteristics of Countries with Generational Account Imbalances

This article empirically tests competing explanations for intergenerational policy differences using a cross section of generational accounts from Kotlikoff and Leibfritz (1999). Generational imbalance rises when a public transfer program is created that benefits living generations and harms future generations. Generational imbalance is greatest in countries with a large elderly population, high income growth rate, greater income inequality, and dispersed political parties. The results are consistent with successful rent seeking by the elderly and poor, and suggest that countries with a high income growth rate and coalition government are less able to resist intergenerational redistribution.     

Rent-seeking and the two-track price system in China

A simple general equilibrium model is specified to analyse the impact on the Chinese economy of the introduction of a two-track price system on to a centrally-planned economy. It is shown that national income will rise as a result together with a fall in the costs associated with rent-seeking. Some estimates of welfare gains and costs of rent-seeking are provided for seven commodities within a partial equilibrium framework. They are shown to be dependent on the price elasticities of demand and supply. The latter determine the ratio of plan to market prices and the share of plan in total output.     

Platforms,media and voters

Abstract The paper presents data on party platforms, political communication and public opinion in the 1996 Italian election campaign. It is shown that the electoral platforms of the two major coalitions were largely overlapping, except for some economic and social issues. The centre–right coalition seemed more inclined to adopt pro–market policies, while the platform of the Ulivo coalition was more oriented toward a social partnership approach. In the month before the elections, policy issues were discussed on television more extensively than political issues. Public and private networks covered the 1996 election campaign at the same level as in 1994 and to some extent with the same bias. Voting intentions seem to have remained stable prior to and during the electoral campaign.     

Platforms, media and voters

The paper presents data on party platforms, political communication and public opinion in the 1996 Italian election campaign. It is shown that the electoral platforms of the two major coalitions were largely overlapping, except for some economic and social issues. The centre–right coalition seemed more inclined to adopt pro–market policies, while the platform of the Ulivo coalition was more oriented toward a social partnership approach. In the month before the elections, policy issues were discussed on television more extensively than political issues. Public and private networks covered the 1996 election campaign at the same level as in 1994 and to some extent with the same bias. Voting intentions seem to have remained stable prior to and during the electoral campaign.     

A Model of Endogenous Government Formation

Political parties bargain over the allocation of cabinet portfolios when forming coalition governments. Noncooperative theories of legislative bargaining typically predict that the “formateur” enjoys a disproportionate share of government ministry positions. However, empirical evidence indicates that parties receive shares of portfolios proportional to their share of legislative seats that a government party contributes to the government coalition in support of Gamson's Law of portfolio allocation. This article examines government formation as a process in which both the government coalition and the formateur are determined endogenously. In equilibrium, if parties have similar preferences over cabinet portfolios, the share of seats they are allocated is proportional to the parties’ sizes.     

Coalition Government,Legislative Institutions,and Public Policy in Parliamentary Democracies

Most democracies are governed by coalitions, comprising multiple political parties with conflicting policy positions. The prevalence of these governments poses a significant question: Which parties' electoral commitments are ultimately reflected in government policy? Recent theories have challenged our understanding of multiparty government, arguing that the relative influence of coalition parties depends crucially on institutional context. Specifically, where institutions allow credible enforcement of bargains, policy should reflect a compromise among all governing parties; where such institutions are absent, the preferences of parties controlling the relevant ministries should prevail. Critically, empirical work has thus far failed to provide direct evidence for this conditional relationship. Analyzing changes in social protection policies in 15 parliamentary democracies, we provide the first systematic evidence that the strength of legislative institutions significantly shapes the relative policy influence of coalition parties. Our findings have implications for our understanding of coalition government, policymaking, and electoral responsiveness.     

Availability of affordable healthy food in Hillsborough County,Florida

Prior research has indicated that low‐income neighborhoods in urban regions throughout the United States have limited access to healthy food, which partly explains the prevalence of diet‐related diseases. Our study provides new evidence on the relationship between access, prices of healthy food, and key demographic factors in Hillsborough County, Florida. The research team completed 65 surveys of grocery and convenience stores regarding availability and prices of 11 food items included in the Nutrition Environment Measures Survey in Stores (NEMS‐S). Results from the regression analysis indicate that affordable healthy food is more likely to be found in grocery stores than in convenience stores. There is no significant evidence, however, that low‐income neighborhoods have less access to healthy food than the not‐low‐income ones. We also observe significant price differences among types of stores but not in grocery‐to‐convenience store ratios among income groups, suggesting that low‐income families are not exposed to higher food prices.     

The chancellor as manager: Helmut Kohl,the CDU and governance in Germany

This article examines the relationship between German chancellor Helmut Kohl and his Christian Democratic Union. It first explains why his predecessors met with different degrees of success in winning support for government decisions from their own parties. An assessment of Kohl's record then confirms that attracting voters is less critical in this regard than serving as a link within the coalition and as a manager of party‐internal affirs. Kohl's own strategies for steering his coalition and running the CDU through a personal network, mediation among subgroups and contact with functionaries are presented as key aspects of his leadership.     

Political competitition and multiparty coalition governments

Abstract. Many previous theoretical analyses of multiparty coalition behaviour have been based either on a one-dimensional policy model or on a constant-sum game interpretation. For theoretical and empirical reasons this paper focusses on a competitive two-dimensional model. In this model parties are concerned with policy outcomes but choose party positions both with a view to electoral consequences and as a basis for coalition bargaining. The political heart is proposed as the set of possible coalition outcomes. The heart is either the core of the political game or is determined by a small number of party positions. Under certain conditions an equilibrium in the choice of party positions can be shown to exist. The model suggests that parties can be categorized as either strong or weak core parties, anti-core parties or peripheral parties. This categorization of parties implies a typology of party systems, which gives some theoretical foundation for the occurrence of minority, minimal winning and surplus coalitions in many of the European countries in the postwar period.     

Political competition

Abstract Many previous theoretical analyses of multiparty coalition behaviour have been based either on one-dimensional policy model or on a constant-sum game interpretation. For theoretical and empirical reasons this paper focusses on a competitive two-dimensional model. In this model parties are concerned with policy outcomes but choose party positions both with a view to electoral consequences and as a basis for coalition bargaining. The political heart is proposed as the set of possible coalition outcomes. The heart is either the core of the political game or is determined by a small number of party positions. Under certain conditions an equilibrium in the choice of party positions can be shown to exist. The model suggests that parties can be categorized as either strong or weak core parties, anti-core parties or peripheral parties. This categorization of parties implies a typology of party systems, which gives some theoretical foundation for the occurrence of minority, minimal winning and surplus coalitions in many of the European countries in the postwar period.     

Coalitions of Contention: The Case of the WTO Protests in Seattle

Coalitions of organizations are cooperative arrangements that require ongoing management of conflicts among members and potential members. Using data on both successful and unsuccessful attempts at coalition building during the 1999 protests against the WTO in Seattle, we explain the variation in the formation of one type of coalition of organizations, the 'event coalition', in which social movement organizations coalesce around a specific protest event. We find that objectively common organizational interests and framing are necessary but not sufficient for explaining coalition partnering. Organizational representatives must also calculate a benefit from pooled resources and be able to commit credibly to delivering promised resources and to resolving the inevitable tensions that arise among coalition partners.     

Political Choice, Public Policy, and Distributional Outcomes

I address the functioning of the U.S. governing system by analyzing distributional outcomes from 1947 to 2000. The key question is whether public policy influences distributional outcomes. The macropolitics model and power resource theory suggest that left policies should equalize the distribution of income. I utilize single equation error correction models to assess the impact of policy on income inequality through two mechanisms—market conditioning and redistribution. Since nearly every government action influences markets in some way, I examine policy in the aggregate rather than focusing only on policies explicitly designed to redistribute income. The analysis indicates that policy influences inequality through both mechanisms, with left policy producing more equality. The results are consistent with power resource theory and strongly support the macropolitics model. Furthermore, I find that market conditioning is as important as, and works in tandem with, explicit redistribution.