Attitudes on the Size of Unemployment Benefits: Ideology and Numbers

The divide separating the political left from right is often expressed in specific numbers. The proper size of unemployment benefits is a key example of such a disagreement, with the left generally favoring higher levels of benefits than the right. However, little is currently known about how voters make up their mind on such policy relevant numbers. Using two survey experiments, this article shows that while Danish voters’ attitudes on unemployment benefits are correlated with their ideological position, they may also be strongly affected by the ways in which politically relevant numbers are presented and elicited. Specifically, when making up their minds on such numbers, voters are highly susceptible to anchoring effects and a unit effect. Furthermore, voters are affected more by precise numbers than by round numbers. Together, these results suggest that political actors may in some cases move public opinion closer to specific policy positions simply by presenting the relevant numbers in certain ways.     

Voters' wrath? Policy change and government popularity

Recent research suggests that voters are bad at responding in a meaningful way to policy events when deciding for whom to vote. Voters rely on so‐called “blind retrospection”, punishing governments for events outside politicians' control. However, another core aspect of the blind retrospection perspective has not been put to the test: are voters unable to respond to policy decisions that clearly are under the politicians' control? We construct a unique large‐N dataset on legislative changes in German old age pensions and unemployment protection to see if cutbacks and expansions lead to lower/higher support for the government. Our data are exceptionally fine‐grained and allow us to track the policy‐vote link for 416 months from 1977 to 2013 with a total of 329,167 respondents. We find substantial support for the notion that voters react in a meaningful way to policy changes, but also that they can be distracted by high‐profile, extreme events.     

A communotropic theory of economic voting

Within the social sciences, there is a long and storied history of the effect of economic conditions on vote choice. The traditional arguments are that voters have personal (egotropic) and/or other-regarding (sociotropic) preferences and that they reward and punish politicians electorally based on economic conditions at these levels. However, there is a third option. As industries, employment, and economic conditions are not uniformly distributed across the country, preferences may be locally based. This project combines unique survey data with Metropolitan Statistical Area unemployment numbers and finds evidence of distinct preferences at a third “communotropic” level.     

Economic vulnerability and economic voting in 14 OECD countries

The economic voting literature shows that good economic performance bolsters the electoral prospects of incumbents. However, disagreement persists as to whether voters in vulnerable economic conditions are more likely to engage in economic voting. It is argued in this article that a crucial factor in explaining individual‐level variation in economic voting is the degree of exposure to economic risks, because risk exposure affects the saliency of the economy in voting decisions. In particular, the focus is on job insecurity and employability as key determinants of economic voting patterns. The article hypothesises that the extent of economic voting is greater in voters who are more vulnerable to unemployment and less employable in case of job loss. Support for these hypotheses is found in a test with a dataset that combines survey data on incumbent support with occupational unemployment rates and other measures of exposure to economic risks.     

Why triggers fail (and what to do about it): An examination of the unemployment insurance extended benefits program

During periods of high unemployment, many workers exhaust their unemployment insurance (UI) benefits before regaining employment. To help alleviate this problem, Congress created the extended benefits (EB) program, expanding the number of weeks of benefits available to UI recipients in high unemployment states. The EB program operates by “triggering on” additional weeks of benefits in states where unemployment and UI benefit receipt are above federally established thresholds. We analyze the performance of the EB program by creating a series of policy simulations using weekly UI claims and unemployment data from the program's inception in 1970 through the most recent economic expansion in 2005. Overall, we find that EB triggers, as currently constructed, fail as a policy tool for extending UI benefits. Minor adjustments to the triggers are unlikely to be effective. We develop an alternative set of “fix point” triggers that allow the EB program to trigger on and off in a more timely fashion. These triggers outperform all previously legislated triggers as well as other commonly proposed triggering mechanisms on criteria of timeliness, breadth, and duration. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

Pain tolerance: Economic voting in the Czech Republic

Several theoretical explanations have been proposed to explain the mixed evidence of economic voting in post-communist countries. Using aggregate-level data, this article relaxes the assumption of parameter constancy and employs rolling regression analysis to track fluctuations in parameters over time. The results contradict the existing theories of economic voting in postcommunist countries. As an alternative explanation, the article suggest that voters have a level of pain tolerance below which the economy will not play a role in evaluations of the government; voters will use economic indicators to punish and reward incumbent government only if the economic indicators exceed their pain tolerance. For example, in the Czech Republic, voters will not start punishing the incumbent party until inflation climbs above 13.44%. However, Czech voters are less tolerant of unemployment and will punish the incumbent when unemployment exceeds 8.82%.     

Partisan Differences in Economic Outcomes and Corresponding Voting Behavior: Evidence from the U.S.

The present empirical work examines the differences ineconomic outcomes delivered by partisan governments, and theway in which voters take this into account. Autoregressivemodels of output growth, unemployment and inflation, augmentedwith political variables; and probit binary choice models ofvoting decisions, incorporating expectations about inflationand unemployment, are estimated for U.S. post-war data. Theanalysis confirms that partisan differences in economic outcomes are actually observed in the data. U.S. unemployment rate exhibits adistinct partisan cycle, behavior of output growth andinflation rate partly supports the partisan differenceshypothesis. Thus suggesting that each party can be``instrumental'' in solving particular economic problems. Inline with this logic, U.S. voters seem to believe in theasymmetric abilities of parties to fight inflation andunemployment. Most interesting empirical findings includeevidence that U.S. citizens tend to vote for the left party(Democrats) when high unemployment is expected, and for theright party (Republicans) when high inflation is expected.This relation is especially robust for Presidential elections.There is also evidence pointing to the presence of electoralinertia and absence of ``midterm'' electoral cycle in the U.S.     

Muffling the swing: STV and the Irish general election of 1981

This article explores alternative hypotheses for variation in the political salience of unemployment. The differences between the political opinions of employed and unemployed people are used as a proxy for the qualitative importance of unemployment. Unemployment is not found to be more politically salient when government support of the unemployed is more generous or when jobless spells are shorter. Far more important is the character of employment. Unemployment is more politically salient in countries where employment guarantees a basic livelihood. The data also suggest that unemployment has greater salience in countries where the unemployed are more likely to use state employment exchanges in searching for work. Two conclusions are suggested. First, public toleration of high unemployment in recent decades may be partly the result of the rise of atypical work arrangements. Second, while it is debatable whether social‐democratic protections of employment standards increase unemployment rates, such efforts may inadvertently increase the political costs of high unemployment.     

It’s all ‘bad’ news! Voters’ perception of macroeconomic policy competence

The purpose of the present paper is to consider how voters form perceptions about macroeconomic policy competence by focusing on the role of recent macroeconomic news: Do their perceived views of good news matter as much as bad news when they form beliefs about the incumbent government’s competence in managing the macroeconomy, in particular, with regard to their ability to control inflation and unemployment? We find that ‘bad’ news about unemployment persists when households are forming their perceived competence, whereas “good” news does not. That is, voters tend to display pessimistic bias when forming perceptions about the incumbent government’s competence.     

Unemployment and voter turnout revisited: A brief note

This brief study revisits the issue of whether higher unemployment rates elicit an increase in the voter participation rate. Using a state-level panel dataset for all five of the Presidential election cycles of this century, it is hypothesized that, following Cebula (2008) and Burden and Wichowsky (2014), the higher the unemployment rate, the greater the degree to which eligible voters, whether unemployed or employed, show up at the polls, arguably because they are expressing the concerns and fears regarding prevailing economic policies and conditions and because by voting they are expressing the desire for changes to address those concerns and fears. The estimation implies that a one percentage point higher unemployment rate leads to a nearly 1.0% higher voter participation rate. This result is in principle compatible with and supportive of the hypothesis that higher unemployment rates motivate voters and the empirical finding of a positive voter turnout/unemployment rate association obtained in the studies by Cebula (2008) and Burden and Wichowsky (2014). Moreover, this finding is potentially important because it implies that elected officials are, to at least some degree, held accountable by the electorate for a weakly performing economy.     

Who should be chef? The dynamics of valence evaluations across income groups during economic crises

In this paper, we investigate partisan rationalization in valence politics by trying to better specify the direct and indirect effects of the economy on government support. To do so, we examine how income levels moderate the influence of objective economic conditions on perceptions of which party is the best manager of the economy during a period of economic crisis, 2004–2010, in the United Kingdom. We find that low-income voters are more responsive in their assessments of the incumbent Labour government based on unemployment, as are high-income voters in terms of inflation. In addition, high-income voters tend to behave in a manner consistent with partisan rationalization, while low-income voters do not. These conclusions offer important implications for the effectiveness of electoral control of government policy, as well as the quality of representation.     

Voters and macroeconomics: Are they forward looking or backward looking?

The political business cycle hypothesis has been criticized on the grounds that it is impossible for governments to generate a vote winning boom because voters judge political candidates by the performance they expect in the future. In this paper, we directly test the hypothesis that voters are forward rather than backward looking. We compare the conventional view that presidential popularity depends on recently observed inflation and unemployment to three alternative models which assume varying forms of forward looking behavior. Non-tested hypothesis tests reject the forward looking models in favor of the one with the recent actual variables.     

Voter sincerity and the time-of-voting-decision

This article explores the relationship between vote sincerity and the time at which vote decisions are finalized. It posits that a specific set of competitive circumstances are necessary for insincere voting to occur, and that voters' understanding of these circumstances can be influenced by exposure to information during a campaign. The article introduces a new method of operationalizing a commonly overlooked type of insincere voting: the protest voter. As defined here, protest voters express their political dissatisfaction by supporting an uncompetitive non-traditional party that is not their first preference. Canadian Election Study data reveal that protest voters make up a small, but noteworthy segment of the electorate and that insincere voters tend to make their vote decisions relatively late.     

Child protective intervention in the context of welfare reform: The effects of work and welfare on maltreatment reports

Recent changes in welfare policy have produced changes in parental work and welfare receipt. These factors are assessed in relation to investigated reports of child abuse and neglect using survey data on 1998 welfare recipients in nine Illinois counties, in conjunction with longitudinal administrative data on cash welfare benefits, employment, and child abuse and neglect reports. Trend analyses show that rates of child maltreatment reports among welfare recipients have risen since the passage of PRWORA in 1996. Findings from multivariate analyses indicate that parental employment has a protective effect on reports to child protection systems (CPS), that this effect is greatest when combined with welfare receipt, and that this effect becomes stronger over time. Those who receive welfare in the absence of employment face a significantly greater risk of CPS involvement, even compared with those who neither work nor receive welfare. © 2003 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

Do local leaders know their voters? A test of guessability in India

Prominent theories of clientelism—the exchange of benefits for political support—depend on the assumption that politicians, through local agents immersed in local social networks, possess detailed information on voters’ political preferences prior to targeting. This article provides the first direct test of this assumption. It develops a behavioral measure, guessability, which gauges the ability of elected village leaders, who often function as brokers and prominent vote mobilizers, to correctly identify the partisan vote intentions of voters in their locality. It then develops a method to estimate added informational value, which compares the performance of local leaders to low-information benchmarks that capture guessability rates that can feasibly be achieved by outsiders. Original data from surveys of voters and elected village politicians across 96 village councils in Rajasthan, India indicate that while these village leaders out-perform low-information benchmarks with respect to co-partisans, they perform no better than this baseline vis-à-vis non-co-partisans.     

Income inequality and election outcomes in OECD countries: New evidence following the Great Recession of 2008–2009

Using data on national parliamentary election outcomes in 32 OECD countries from 1975 to 2013, we investigate the importance of economic voting. We focus on the relevance of income inequality which has resurfaced to the forefront of public debate since the last global economic downturn. Additionally, we examine whether the degree of economic voting varies with the political orientation of the incumbent government. Finally, we check whether the Great Recession of 2008–2009 alters the degree to which voters hold the incumbent government, specifically left parties, responsible for poor economic performance and rising inequality. We find that economic growth is the most robust variable for economic voting, before and after the Great Recession. The vote share for left-leaning parties declines when income inequality rises during normal economic times. However, voters are more likely to vote for left-wing incumbents if domestic income inequality and unemployment rate rose during the Great Recession.     

Contextual Factors and the Extreme Right Vote in Western Europe, 1980–2002

Research on the voters of the extreme right in Western Europe has become a minor industry, but relatively little attention has been paid to the twin question of why support for these parties is often unstable, and why the extreme right is so weak in many countries. Moreover, the findings from different studies often contradict each other. This article aims at providing a more comprehensive and satisfactory answer to this research problem by employing a broader database and a more adequate modeling strategy. The main finding is that while immigration and unemployment rates are important, their interaction with other political factors is much more complex than suggested by previous research. Moreover, persistent country effects prevail even if a whole host of individual and contextual variables is controlled for.     

Fiscal adjustments: do labor and product market institutions matter?

This paper investigates the role played by labor and product market institutions in determining the likelihood of initiating and of successfully concluding a fiscal adjustment. Using data for 16 OECD countries over the period 1970 to 2000, we find that a less generous unemployment benefit system—rather than temporary caps on spending (e.g., wage freezes)—contributes to the success of fiscal consolidation. Weaker forms of bargaining coordination and centralization facilitate the fiscal adjustment effort. On the other hand, product market deregulation and more flexible employment protection legislation do not contribute positively to fiscal consolidation.     

The Impact of Economic Performance on Electoral Support in Sweden, 1967–1978*

This article investigates the impact of macroeconomic conditions on aggregate political support for governing parties in Sweden over the period 1967–1978. After reviewing survey evidence on the relative salience of economic and fiscal issues to the Swedish electorate, a novel, dynamic model of political support is presented. The model incorporates the ideas that voters evaluate economic performance relatively rather than absolutely, and that governments' mass political support is based on their cumulative performance records. The empirical results supply estimates of the impact of unemployment, inflation, the real income growth rate and the income effects of direct tax and transfer policies on political support. The evidence suggests that the responses of political support to reasonable movements in macroeconomic conditions are large enough to give economic management a pivotal role in electoral shifts.     

The multi-store model for economic voting: Rome wasn't built in a day

The 2012 presidential election was closely contested with the media predicting that the unemployment rate announcement just before the election would be the deciding factor. If a single economic indicator could buoy up job approval ratings, delivering positive economic statistics to the voters would be a rational re-election strategy for an incumbent. In contrast, this paper presents a model in which voters do not immediately convert each economic statistic into a performance evaluation. Only after many “rehearsals” do voters convert statistics into a positive or negative evaluation. I take the case of Japan and use a survey experiment and an inverse probability weighting (IPW) estimator to assess whether short-, medium- and long-term performance evaluations form based on voter perception of economic conditions.