Dilatory or anticipatory? Voting on the Journal in the House of Representatives

In this paper, I examine a simple procedure in the United States House of Representatives, approving the Journal, and its implications for legislative business. In this paper, I examine the hypothesis that such votes are more than simply pro forma motions or dilatory tactics by the minority party. Considering the 102nd–107th Congresses, I show that votes on the Journal’s approval are just as frequently requested by the majority party as by members of the minority party. Furthermore, I find that votes recorded on days on which a vote was also recorded on the House Journal were more likely to be close and more likely to be party-line votes than those recorded on other days.     

Intra-industry trade and protectionism: the case of the buy national policy

This article examines the factors that lead governments to open up their public procurement markets to international competition with a particular emphasis on the effect of intra-industry trade. Contrary to the conventional notion that intra-industry trade entails less political pressure for protectionism than inter-industry trade, I argue that such notion does not prevail in the case of discriminatory public procurement. Firms in a market with a high degree of intra-industry trade are more likely to resist the removal of discrimination than would firms in a market with a high degree of inter-industry trade. Empirically, I find support for the argument both at sub-national and cross-national settings.     

Foundations of the Ostrom workshop: institutional analysis, polycentricity, and self-governance of the commons

This paper highlights important lessons gained from the research program of Elinor Ostrom, and demonstrates the close connection between public choice and the work on collective management of the commons for which Lin was honored by the Nobel Prize committee. Although our primary focus is on Lin’s research on self-governance and the “commons,” an overarching goal is to capture the intellectual journey of participants in the Ostrom Workshop, who continue to be guided by the inspiring examples set by Lin and Vincent Ostrom.     

The curious commentary on the citation practices of Avner Greif

Rowley’s (Public Choice 140:275–285, 2009) claim that I have “expropriated” (p. 276) intellectual property rights from Professor Landa by insufficiently citing her works is vacuous. It failed, among other faults, to recognize the substantive distinction between the lines of research pursued by Professor Landa and myself. Her analysis of trust is preferences-based while my analysis is beliefs-based. We talk about similar issues but what we say is very different.     

Interest-group analysis in economic history and the history of economic thought

This article reviews Bob Tollison’s conjoined contributions to the scholarly literature in the closely related fields of economic history and history of economic thought, underscoring his integration of public choice and interest-group analysis into the historian’s purview. It identifies the overarching themes of his research and summarizes the major findings of his key publications.     

A positive theory of the earnings relationship of unemployment benefits

In a wage bargaining model, a stronger earnings relationship of unemployment benefits may reduce wages. Therefore, the benefit structure significantly influences profits and trade union utility, raising the question as to how the benefit structure is determined in the political process. We consider a government that chooses the earnings relationship in order to maximize its political support. Our model predicts a strong earnings relationship under right-wing governments and a weak relationship when unions are influential. Using panel data for 19 OECD countries, we find support for these theoretical predictions. Moreover, we show that the earnings relationship varies negatively with openness.     

Determinants of the probability and timing of commercial casino legalization in the United States

The adoption of lotteries by state governments has received significant attention in the economics literature, but the issue of casino adoption has been neglected by researchers. Casino gambling is a relatively new industry in the United States, outside Nevada and New Jersey. As of 2007, 11 states had established commercial casinos; several more states are considering legalization. We analyze the factors that determine a state’s decision to legalize commercial casinos, using data from 1985 to 2000, a period which covers the majority of states that have adopted commercial casinos. We use a tobit model to examine states’ fiscal conditions, political alignments, intrastate and interstate competitive environments, and demographic characteristics, which yields information on the probability and timing of adoptions. The results suggest a public choice explanation that casino legalization is due to state fiscal stress, to efforts to keep gambling revenues (and the concomitant gambling taxes) within the state, and to attract tourism or “export taxes.”     

Corruption, federalism, and policy formation in the OECD: the case of energy policy

We investigate whether the effect of government corruption is conditional on a country’s institutional structure. Federal systems have an additional layer of government, making lobbying relatively more costly. We investigate whether the effect of government corruption on environmental policy (in the form of restrictions on energy use) is conditional on a federal system being in place. Using 1982–96 data from 11 industry sectors in 12 OECD economies we find that while greater government corruption reduces the stringency of environmental policy, the effect declines in federal systems.     

Vertical transfers and the appropriation of resources by the bureaucracy: the case of Brazilian state governments

The purpose of this study is to explore whether the transfers received by state governments in Brazil are being appropriated by the bureaucracy as wages. The wage differential between the public and private sectors was used as a measure of this appropriation, following the technique for wage decomposition proposed by Oaxaca. Our results show that transfers stimulate appropriation by the bureaucracy, but that private groups existing within the states contend for these resources. The results also indicate that the resources appropriated are distributed uniformly between the various groups composing the bureaucracy.     

Interest groups, public choice and the economics of religion

This article reviews Bob Tollison’s conjoint contributions to the burgeoning area of the economics of religion, underscoring his integration of public choice and interest-group themes into the microeconomic analysis of faith-based organizational architecture, institutional decision making and doctrinal innovation. Beginning with study of the medieval Catholic Church, moving forward to the Protestant Reformation and beyond, it supplies a timeline of developments and the major findings of each phase of his research program.     

How to make a dis-entrepreneur of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur: the impact of institutional settings on growth

Fiscal and monetary institutions are conspicuously omitted in the conventional theory of long-run economic growth. Moving from the Schumpeterian entrepreneur, who adopts new technology because its value, according to Tobin’s q, dominates the economic rents of existing capital, we argue that the Schumpeterian entrepreneur’s incentives to innovate change when he is transplanted into the public economy. We analyze two alternative institutional settings denoted as “long chain” and “short chain”. Through the “long chain” model we show that the Schumpeterian entrepreneur is driven towards “destructive creation” of new capital, thus becoming a political dis-entrepreneur, while the quasi-contractual “short chain” model provides incentives to innovate.     

Politics and the implementation of public policy: The case of the US military housing allowance program

Are bureaucracies in fact controlled by the president, Congress, or legislation? We analyze a 1998 policy change in the Department of Defense’s (DoD) $6.5 billion annual military housing allowance program. Results show that both the president and Congress were able to influence the bureaucracy, even in the presence of an exceedingly specific law that outlined the manner in which the DoD was to allocate the funds. After policy implementation, allowances were disproportionately higher in locations that (a) supported the president in the 1996 election and (b) were represented by members of the House or Senate Armed Services Committees.     

Maximizing behavior & market forces: the microfoundations of spontaneous order theorizing in Gordon Tullock’s contributions to Smithian political economy

I explore the microfoundations of Gordon Tullock’s contributions to political economy and argue that his approach is consistent with the “invisible hand” theorizing of Adam Smith. While Smith (and Hayek) are celebrated for their emphasis on the “bright-side” of spontaneous social cooperation, Tullock emphasized the “dark-side” of social processes when the incentives are perverse and information is distorted. By explicating the microfoundations of Tullock’s rendering of Smithian political economy this paper will set the stage for a reassessment of Tullock as a spontaneous order theorist.     

Uncertain candidates, valence, and the dynamics of candidate position-taking

This paper offers graphic illustration of so-called “valence” models of candidates responding to their perceptions of voter location in a two-party system. Models by Groseclose and others show how the combination of candidate uncertainty about the median voter location, nonzero candidate valence, and policy motivated candidates leads to departures from the median voter prediction. With one policy dimension, either there exists an equilibrium where the candidates do not converge to the median (or any other common position) or there exists no equilibrium. We offer illustrations based on plausible conditions. Under some conditions we show an equilibrium where candidates locate at separate policy positions. Under others, we illustrate the absence of equilibrium.     

The robustness of the optimal weighted majority rule to probability distortion

This study identifies the optimal collective decision rule in a dichotomous symmetric setting, allowing for probabilities distortion as originally assumed by Tversky and Kahneman (Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5(4):297–323, 1992). We show that previous results that identified the weighted majority rule as the optimal one, and did not consider subjective probabilities, are robust to such distortion in the sense that neither the rule nor the weights are changed.     

Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey

Public choice economists began studying anarchy in the 1970s. Since then, the amount of research on anarchy has burgeoned. This article surveys the important public choice contributions to the economics of anarchy. Following early public choice economists, many economists are researching how individuals interact without government. From non-public-interested explanations of the creation of government to historical studies of internalizing externalities under anarchy, public choice scholars are arriving at a more realistic perspective of human interaction with and without government. Although the economics of politics receives more attention, the economics of anarchy is an important area of research in public choice.     

The impact of surplus sharing on the portfolio mix of public sector defined benefit pension plans: a public choice approach

The riskiness of state employee pension plan portfolios varies across states. We investigate whether this variation is related to how public employees and taxpayers share actuarial surpluses of pension accounts. We focus on two determinants of a plan’s asset mix: the relative influence of public employees to taxpayers; and whether a surplus-sharing contract is specified. Our theoretical model demonstrates that the effect of public employee influence on the asset mix is ambiguous. Our empirical results corroborate this complex theoretical result. In our theoretical and empirical analyses, if a surplus sharing rule is specified, plans adopt a more aggressive investment allocation.     

Fire over water: China's strategic engagement of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden crisis

Abstract

Since China agreed to join the international counter-piracy coalition in late 2008, a watershed development in Chinese strategic policy, Beijing's engagement in Somalia is now following two separate streams. First, China is seeking to engage Somalia as part of its expanding number of African diplomatic partners via its participation in the coalition. Second, China is attempting to demonstrate, on the international level, its growing commitment to developing its naval capabilities, and protecting its maritime trade interests, by engaging in multilateral and coalition-based operations, namely to combat piracy off the Somali coast, in order to deflect criticism from the United States and its allies of China's overall military expansion and modernization.