The architecture of the Electoral College,the House size effect,and the referendum paradox

Using data from U.S. presidential elections, we show how seemingly insignificant changes to what we call the “architecture” of the Electoral College can cause different candidates to be elected President, even when no one changes how they vote. We consider varying the size of the House of Representatives, the method of apportionment, the number of “Senate” electoral votes cast by each state, and the lower bound on the number of “House” electoral votes cast by each state. We consider, in particular, elections with a “referendum paradox”. In these elections, the electoral vote winner is not the popular vote winner. Our work extends Neubauer and Zeitlin (2003) who analyzed the case of the 2000 election. We give an explanation for the effects that we observe in the data.     

Sequential Rent Seeking

We consider n firms which choose rent-seekingexpenditures sequentially, each player anticipatingthe rent-seeking expenditures that will be made bylater movers. We find that the earlier movers need notmake larger profits than later movers, and thataggregate profits are lower than in a game in whichfirms make simultaneous moves.     

Bribing potential entrants in a rent-seeking contest

We consider a two-stage model of a Tullock rent-seeking contest where one new potential entrant makes his appearance. In the first stage each other player can contribute to bribe this new player to commit not to enter the contest. In the second stage we have the actual contest either with or without the new player. We present the conditions such that there exist equilibria in which the new player is being bribed.     

Conclusion: Four Recommendations to Improve Digital Electoral Oversight in the UK

To conclude this special section, this article looks at the possible avenues for regulatory reform in the field of digital campaigning. Diagnosing the need for a multi-layered approach, we argue that action is needed from government, regulators, companies, and civil society. We take each actor in turn and consider the kind of change needed, the prospects for reform, and outline four recommendations for change.     

Rational and Pluralistic Approaches to HAVA Implementation: The Cases of Georgia and California

The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) has created a new dynamic forthe oversight and implementation of federal elections, requiringstates to assume greater control of election processes vis-à-vistheir local governments than was previously the case in moststates. We consider how HAVA has changed the relationship betweenstates and localities, especially through the HAVA planningprocess. We examine two approaches that states have used inHAVA planning—a rational approach and a pluralistic approach—andhow each can shape the power relationship between states andlocalities. We then present case studies from Georgia and Californiato illustrate how these two approaches have functioned in practice.     

What is the Canon in American Politics? Analyses of Core Graduate Syllabi

Many core graduate-level seminars claim to expose students to their discipline’s “canon.” The contents of this canon, however, can and do differ across departments and instructors. This project employs a survey of core American politics PhD seminar syllabi at highly ranked universities to construct a systematic account of the American politics canon. Our results offer valuable insights into the topics and literature that political scientists consider important and on which future scholars base their work. Our article breaks down the literature into a comprehensive list of topics and subtopics, which allows us to identify both an overall field canon and one for each topic, to assess whether some topics receive more attention than others, and to identify which topics are most clearly defined. We explore the extent to which diverse perspectives and methods are (or are not) taught to young scholars, and, although we identify sets of frequently assigned readings and authors within each topic, we also find considerable variation between seminars.     

Political Influence,Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: With Application to the United States, 1973 and 1983

We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model ofa competitive political economy in which the economic interestsof groups of voters and their effective influence on equilibriumpolicy outcomes can be explicitely distinguished and computed.The model incorporates an amended version of the GEMTAP taxmodel, calibrated to data for the United States for 1973 and1983. Emphasis is placed on how the aggregation of GEMTAPhouseholds into homogeneous groups affects the numericalrepresentation of interests and influence for representativemembers of each group.     

The product paradox of voting power

We consider a system made up of two committees, with overlapping membership but with different rules for passing decisions; the passage of a joint resolution requires separate approval by each committee. We show that it is possible for one voter a to be stronger (have greater voting power) than another voter b in both of the two committees, while in the two-committee system (considered as a single composite entity) b is stronger than a. We argue that this apparently paradoxical phenomenon is inherent in the structure of the decision-making system in question, rather than being an artefact of any particular index used to measure voting power.     

Punctuated Equilibrium in Comparative Perspective

We explore the impact of institutional design on the distribution of changes in outputs of governmental processes in the United States, Belgium, and Denmark. Using comprehensive indicators of governmental actions over several decades, we show that in each country the level of institutional friction increases as we look at processes further along the policy cycle. Assessing multiple policymaking institutions in each country allows us to control for the nature of the policy inputs, as all the institutions we consider cover the full range of social and political issues in the country. We find that all distributions exhibit high kurtosis values, significantly higher than the Normal distribution which would be expected if changes in government attention and activities were proportionate to changes in social inputs. Further, in each country, those institutions that impose higher decision-making costs show progressively higher kurtosis values. The results suggest general patterns that we hypothesize to be related to boundedly rational behavior in a complex social environment.     

Modeling the interaction of parties, activists and voters: Why is the political center so empty?

Abstract.  The formal stochastic model of voting should be the theoretical benchmark against which empirical models can be gauged. A standard result in the formal model is the 'mean voter theorem' stating that parties converge to the electoral center. Empirical analysis based on the vote-maximizing premise, however, invalidates this convergence result. We consider both empirical and formal models that incorporate exogeneous valence terms for the parties. Valence can be regarded as an electorally perceived attribute of each party leader that is independent of the policy position of the party. We show that the mean voter theorem is valid for empirical multinomial logit and probit models of a number of elections in the Netherlands and Britain. To account for the non-centrist policy positions of parties, we consider a more general formal model where valence is also affected by the behavior of party activists. The results suggest that non-convergent policy choice by party leaders can be understood as rational, vote-maximizing calculation by leaders in response to electoral and activist motivations.     

Who Participates in Exit Polls?

Concerns about growing and differential nonresponse in exit polls, and the challenges introduced by mounting levels of early and mail-in voting, suggest it is important to consider the demographic and attitudinal factors associated with exit poll nonresponse. In this study, we compare the demographic and attitudinal antecedents of exit poll nonresponse between exit polls conducted at voting precincts and those conducted via telephone. We find both similarities and differences in the factors that help to explain willingness to participate in exit polls of each type.     

A stochastic model of the 2007 Russian Duma election

In this paper we consider the nature of local Nash equilibrium (LNE) for a model of the 2007 Duma election in Russia, using estimates of valence obtained from sociodemographic variables. We then extend this sociodemographic valence model by including institutional valences, the approval by voters of the various institutions, including the President, the Prime Minister, the State Duma and the Federation Council. We show by simulation that the vote maximizing LNE of this general stochastic model were not at the electoral origin. The dominant feature of the election was the influence of approval or disapproval of President Putin on each voter’s political choice.     

Learning the structure of a simple rent-seeking game

This paper considers a form of the Tullock imperfectly discriminating rent-seeking game in which the contestants are uncertain about the value of a bias parameter in the probability of winning function. Beliefs about this unknown parameter are not constrained to be static; we consider two methods by which the players' prior beliefs on this parameter can be updated. First, we allow for information to emerge by considering the case in which the game is played twice, with the outcome of the first game known before the second begins. The identity of the winner of the first contest represents information which emerges endogenously that can be used to revise beliefs on the unknown bias parameter. Second, information can be produced outside of the model by an external agency; this gives rise to exogenous learning. We consider the consequences for rent-seeking in each of these two cases.     

The Structure of Utility in Spatial Models of Voting

Empirical models of spatial voting allow legislators' locations in a policy or ideological space to be inferred from their roll‐call votes. These are typically random utility models where the features of the utility functions other than the ideal points are assumed rather than estimated. In this article, we first consider a model in which legislators' utility functions are allowed to be a mixture of the two most commonly assumed utility functions: the quadratic function and the Gaussian function assumed by NOMINATE. Across many roll‐call data sets, we find that legislators' utility functions are estimated to be very nearly Gaussian. We then relax the usual assumption that each legislator is equally sensitive to policy change and find that extreme legislators are generally more sensitive to policy change than their more centrally located counterparts. This result suggests that extremists are more ideologically rigid while moderates are more likely to consider influences that arise outside liberal‐conservative conflict.     

Tax morale and (de-)centralization: An experimental study

We consider an economy composed of two regions. Each of them provides a public good whose benefits reach beyond local boundaries. In case of decentralization, taxes collected by members of a region are spent only on that region's public good. In case of centralization, tax receipts from the two regions are pooled and used to finance both public goods according to the population size of each region. The experiment shows that centralization induces lower tax morale and less efficient outcomes. The reasons are that centralization gives rise to an interregional incentive problem and creates inequalities in income between regions.     

Rational benevolence in small committees

We consider a game in which three committee members must divide up a benefit among themselves. In response to the large literature on sequential procedures in this type of game, we propose an institution that is inspired by auction theory. The (sealed) bids of the players are proposals for a distribution of the benefit and are given simultaneously. If any of the bids is preferred to all others in a pairwise comparison (i.e., a Condorcet winner exists) then this proposal is implemented. If such a bid does not exist then an equal split of the benefit is assumed. An equilibrium of this game is for each player to suggest that one of the opponents should receive the lion’s share of the benefit, even though each player cares only about his own share. We call this phenomenon “rational benevolence”. Although the end that is desired by the players is purely egoistic, the means of achieving it may be perceived as benevolent. Several applications of the game are suggested.     

A neo-Downsian model of group-oriented voting and racial backlash

We extend the standard Downsian framework to suppose that voters consider the identity of each candidate's supporters when deciding whom to support, rather than considering only the announced policy positions of the candidates. In particular we posit the existence of a class of voters whose support for a candidate reduces support by some other voters for that candidate. Our most important result concerns the conditions under which the addition to the electorate of new voters on one side of the policy spectrum shifts the equilibrium toward the opposite direction. The model can explain why enfranchisement of blacks did not immediately help the election of liberal candidates.     

Ideological proximity and valence competition. Negative campaigning through allegation of corruption in the Italian legislative arena from 1946 to 1994

We consider the possibility for the parties to invest in negative campaigning – a behavior that, in our framework, involves blaming alleged insufficiencies of the rival concerning commonly shared values. Within a simple one-dimensional model, we deduce the hypothesis that the parties’ incentive to “attack” each other increases with the parties’ proximity on the left–right space. We test our hypothesis on an Italian case, focusing on the emphasis placed by the Communist Party on political corruption issues during the government investiture debates that spanned from the postwar period until 1994, when the traditional party system abruptly collapsed. The statistical results are largely consistent with our theoretical insights.     

From 'My Vote' to 'The Real Alternative': Selling the Liberal Democrats

As the third party in British politics, a compelling message is crucial for the Liberal Democrats. Overcoming a prevailing sense of a wasted vote is key—achieved by, we argue, demonstrating political potency. This article explores the synergy between the Liberal Democrat leader and the message; the relationship of each election message to the political reality in which the party finds itself; and the role of polling in messaging. We explore what is—and is not—a message, and the role of negative messaging by the Liberal Democrats since 1992. We consider the limitations of messaging and the lack of control that a third party has over its message. In conclusion, we reflect on what the lessons learnt by the Liberal Democrats over the last four elections may mean for the messaging at the next general election.