The “growth tax” in the United States

By providing public goods, including law and order, national defense, and income redistribution that expands the gains from exchange (the scope and membership of the constitutional agreement), government expenditures act as a positive externality on the growth rate. Beyond that level, taxes act as a negative externality. In this paper a simple model is formulated and the optimal (growth-maximizing) tax rate found. Empirical estimation finds it to be in the range of 21.5–22.9 percent. The effect of taxation beyond this level is a cumulative loss of about $30 trillion (1972 dollars) in GNP over the period 1949–89.     

Growth and the Welfare State in the EU: A Causality Analysis

In this paper, we test for causality between GDP growth andsocial protection expenditure in the European Union. To that end,we apply Hsiao's (1981) sequential procedure to data for twelveEU countries along the 1970–1994 period. Our results suggestthat, for Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,Portugal, and Spain, causality runs only from social protectiongrowth to GDP growth, while for Denmark, France, Greece, Italy,and the United Kingdom, no causality is found between socialprotection growth and GDP growth.     

The growth effects of fiscal policy in Greece 1960–2000

This empirical paper uses annual data for Greece 1960–2000 to study the link between fiscal policy and economic growth. Our regression analysis implies that, although a smaller public sector can be good for growth, it is necessary to look beyond size; the composition and quality/efficiency of the public sector are equally important. The policy lesson is that a smaller government share in GDP, a reallocation of funds away from the wage bill to public investment, and an improvement in government quality/efficiency can become engines of long-term growth.     

Leveraging trade opportunities with non-traditional partners: the Malaysia–GCC perspective

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of economic factors on bilateral trade flows between Malaysia and the GCC through estimations of panel data using a gravity model. In particular, the paper compares the determinants of bilateral trade and trade potentials between Malaysia and two regions, the non-traditional Gulf alliance and the traditional ASEAN counterpart, to provide insights for leveraging opportunities through trade with the former. The gravity estimates imply the importance of size effects, similarities in GDP and differences in factor endowments as drivers of trade flows between Malaysia and the GCC, underlying the fact that inter-industry trade dominates these flows. The opposite holds in the case for the Malaysia–ASEAN trade. Though export potentials for industrial products per se appear exhausted in trade with both regions, the Gulf region provides opportunities for Malaysia to export quantity-based final (end-use) products and to diversify its exporting strategy away from quality-based parts and components.     

The rise of the modern welfare state, ideology, institutions and income security: analysis and evidence

In the 25-year period between 1960 and 1985, there was a great expansion of welfare state programs throughout the West. The fraction of GDP accounted for by social expenditures doubled in much of Europe and grew by 40–50% in many other OECD nations. After 1985, growth in social insurance programs slowed relative to other parts of the economy. This paper explores the extent to which institutions and ideological shifts may have accounted for the period of rapid growth, for differences in the extent of that growth, and for the subsequent reduction in the growth rates of social insurance programs.     

Does financial inclusion stimulate India's economy: A panel data analysis

The study empirically examines the connections between three different measures of financial inclusion with output growth across the states of India. Applying the panel co-integration and error correction model for 26 states and 4 union territories, it concludes that all three measures of financial development with gross fixed capital formation enhance real net state GDP significantly in the long run. Further, a significant reduction in the real net state GDP is also observed during the Global Financial Crisis. This study is important for the Indian policymakers to formulate effective financial inclusion policies leading to the overall development of the Indian economy.     

Does India's growth matter? Evidence from the SAARC nations

The study estimates the extent of spillover effects that India's real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate has on the growth rates of other countries in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) region for the period 2003–2016. It also identifies whether the conventional trade channel is the means through which growth is transmitted from India to her neighboring countries. Using a random effects model, we conclude that on average, a 1 percentage point increase in India's real per capita GDP growth rate results in 0.46 percentage point increase in the per capita GDP growth rates of other SAARC nations. However, this does not occur through the trade channel primarily due to low levels of intraregional trade. Also, using time dummies, the paper analyzes whether there has been any significant change in the degree of spillover effects in the postfinancial crisis period, where countries have been observed to insulate themselves to a certain extent.     

The impact of foreign direct investment on the growth of the tourism sector in Jordan (1980–2016)

The study aimed at measuring and analyzing the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the growth of the Jordanian tourism sector during the period 1980–2016. In order to test the stationarity of the variables of the study model, the augmented Dickey–Fuller and the Philips Perron tests were applied. The results showed that the variables were not stationary at their levels, but they become so when taking the first difference with the intercept. The study also found a positive long‐run relationship between the ratio of FDI to gross domestic product (GDP) and the ratio of tourism revenues to GDP according to the cointegration test used, which was the Granger causality test. The test showed a one‐way causal relationship between the ratio of FDI to GDP and the ratio of tourism revenue to GDP. According to the estimation results, the error correction model showed that there is a positive impact of FDI on the growth of the tourism sector. Based on the results reached, the study recommended the need to pay attention to the tourism sector, enhance its role in economic development, and work to provide an optimal investment environment by providing all necessary means for and assistance in establishing such investments. All obstacles that limit the flow of the FDI in the Jordanian tourism sector should be removed.     

Fiscal variables and growth: A cross-sectional analysis

This paper examines the impact of the key fiscal variables — taxes, expenditures, and deficits — on economic growth performance, using a reduced-form model and cross-sectional data for a sample of 76 developed and developing countries for the period 1972–81. Its simultaneous consideration of fiscal variables overturns the results of some existing studies. While taxes seem negatively associated with GDP growth, they are concommitant with a higher rate of growth when their benefits in terms of reducing deficits are taken into account. The positive association of government expenditures with GDP growth is rendered negative when their impact on deficits are factored in. Deficits are contractionary, and deficit-reducing tax increases and expenditure cuts are positively associated with growth. A balanced budget expansion of taxes and expenditures is negatively associated with growth. When separating the sample into low-, middle- and high-income countries, these results hold only for the second group indicating that the level of development influences the linkages between fiscal variables and GDP growth.The views expressed herein are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the World Bank or its affiliated organizations.     

Elections and the structure of taxation in developing countries

This article analyses the impact of the electoral calendar on the composition of tax revenue (direct versus indirect taxes). It thus represents an extension of traditional political budget-cycle analyses assessing the impact of elections on overall revenue. We appeal to the opportunistic political budget model of Drazen and Eslava (2010) to predict the relationship between taxation structure and elections. Panel data from 56 developing countries over the 1980–2006 period reveals a clear pattern of electorally-related policy interventions. Taking the potential endogeneity of election timing into account, we find robust evidence of lower indirect taxes being applied by incumbent governments in the period just prior to an election. Indirect tax revenue in election years is estimated to be 0.3 GDP percentage points lower than in other years, corresponding to a fall of about 3.4% of the average figure in the sample countries, while there is no such relationship with direct tax revenue.     

It's economic size,stupid! How global advocacy mirrors state power

Numerous empirical studies suggest that global interest communities are heavily biased in favor of wealthier countries. This research note critically reviews these works suggesting that they (i) lack a benchmark to assess the biased nature of global interest communities and (ii) conflate the concepts of “wealth” (based on GDP per capita) and “economic power” (based on GDP) into one analytical category. As a corrective to these problems, we compare variation in global interest group mobilization across countries to the size of these countries' national economies. Relying on an original dataset mapping interest groups communities at the World Trade Organization (1997–2012) and the United Nations Climate Summits (1997–2011), we show that (i) global interest representation almost perfectly reflects differences in countries' relative economic power and (ii) contrary to the conventional wisdom, wealthier countries are, relative to their economic size, actually underrepresented in global interest communities.     

A political economy model of market intervention

We argue that political competition based on income redistribution à la Lindbeck and Weibull (Public Choice 52:273–297, 1987) may cause distortive regulation in a competitive sector. For this purpose, we propose a model in which imposing a production quota allows the extraction of rents that are then used for vote-buying purposes. Our model permits us to analyze the response of regulatory policy to political factors, such as the size of a group of informed voters and the accuracy of their information about the incumbent. We also show that the extent of voter influence on policy outcomes is shaped by the state of market demand. In particular, if demand becomes weaker, market intervention increases in a magnitude that depends positively on the electoral weight of informed voters.     

Does tenure in office affect regional growth? The role of?public capital productivity

We study the impact of tenure in office on economic performance. We evaluate the relationships between tenure in office and GDP growth, public capital growth, and public capital productivity using data for Spanish regions during the period 1980?C1998. We find that tenure decreases the impact of public capital growth on GDP growth. Our results suggest that tenure affects GDP growth negatively through a decrease in public capital productivity.     

Political cycles and economic performance in OECD countries: empirical evidence from 1951–2006

This paper examines whether electoral motives and government ideology influence short-term economic performance. I employ data on annual GDP growth in 21 OECD countries over the 1951–2006 period and provide a battery of empirical tests. In countries with two-party systems GDP growth is boosted before elections and, under leftwing governments, in the first two years of a legislative period. These findings indicate that political cycles are more prevalent in two-party systems because voters can clearly punish or reward political parties for governmental performance. My findings imply that we need more elaborate theories of how government ideology and electoral motives influence short-term economic performance.     

Terrorized economies

In this paper we estimate the macroeconomic consequences of terrorism using panel data for 147 countries for the period 1968–2002. The results reveal that the potential gains to a country from reducing terrorism are quite large, although the specific estimates depend on a country's population, base level of output, and investment. We present estimates of the impact of terrorism on GDP, GDP growth, investment, consumer spending, and tourism. These estimates of the marginal impact of terrorism provide a threshold against which a country's expenditures on anti-terrorism can be weighed.     

The retention of state governors

In this paper, we have provided some support for several hypotheses about the determinants of which governors get reelected. The benefit from being a member of a particular party varies from state to state and from year to year. Personal characteristics such as age are also important. The logits give some support to the importance of coalition formation; reelection is easier in states with low voter turnout and in farm states. The paper is most concerned with the connection between the economic performance and the electoral success of incumbent candidates for governor, and we find support for a model of electoral acountability, in which governors are powerful in state governments and state governments have the ability to differentially tax fixed factors relative to neighboring states.This paper raises some important issues regarding the measurement of variables in political economy, which have wide applicability to other studies in the economics of politics. Peltzman (1988) finds that the difference between the growth rate in state personal income and the national growth rate over a one to four year period prior to the election does not affect gubernatorial electoral outcomes. Concurrently, we find that the current year's growth rate in state personal income and its difference from the national growth rate are not significantly related to electoral success but that the average deviation from predicted state personal income during the governor's tenure in office is significantly related to the odds of getting reelected. That is, the data reject simplistic views of voter behavior and support a sophisticated model of voter behavior. Similarly, Peltzman (1988) has greater success using more sophisticated, cumulative measures of national economic performance.     

Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth: Evidence from Spanish Regions

The degree of fiscal decentralization in Spain is similar to main federal countries and greater than unitary ones. The demand of public sector decentralization is based on a supposed efficiency gains that is far from being obvious. Using a data set for the Spanish regions, we reject the null hypothesis of a significant relationship between growth in per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and expenditure distribution among fiscal administrations. Nonetheless, we find empirical support for a relationship between revenue decentralization, far less advanced than the expenditure one, and growth. In both cases we do reject the null hypothesis of a nonlinear linkage between fiscal decentralization and growth in per capita GDP.     

Is Small Beautiful? Testing the Direct and Nonlinear Effects of Size on Municipal Performance

Although the relationship between managerial capacity and local government performance is well established, research into the direct effect of population size on performance has yielded mixed findings. Using data for 787 municipalities in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais, this article examines the direct and nonlinear effects (moderating and curvilinear) of population size on municipal performance. Performance is measured in terms of property tax collection and averaged for the 2005–07 mayoral administration. Mayor's age (a proxy for experience) and educational attainment serve as measures of managerial capacity. After controlling for political and economic factors, both municipal size and mayoral capacity are positively correlated with property tax collection. However, population size neither moderates managerial capacity nor relates curvilinearly to municipal performance. These findings challenge the promoters of fragmentation, which has been the trend in transitional and developing economies.     

The shadow economy and sustainable development: The role of financial development

This paper provides fresh evidence concerning the threshold relationship between the shadow economy and financial development. Shadow economy is quoted as an obstacle to sustainable development and therefore the role of financial development is examined in this paper to tackle the issue of shadow economy. It is based on panel data of 29 developed and developing countries over the period of 1975–2015 and use of panel threshold model. Three proxies for financial development—liquid liabilities, private credit to deposit money banks, and stock market capitalisation—were utilised to obtain the threshold value of US$33,600 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. This threshold helps to determine the impact of financial development on the size of the shadow economy. Empirical results suggest that above this threshold, financial development significantly contributes to the reduction in size of the shadow economy while it has no impact for countries that have per capita income below this threshold. This implies that, countries with lower per capita income (below $33,600) should implement policies to improve accessibility to finance and credit market which leads to a sufficiently higher per capita income that in turn allows for a reduction in the size of the shadow economy.     

Corruption and government size: A disaggregated analysis

Using annual state-level data over 1983–1987, this paper examines the effect of government size on corruption by public officials by including both demand and supply side incentives for engaging in corrupt practices. Our objectives are twofold. First, we assess the relationship between the incidence of corruption and overall measures of the size of the federal government and the state-local sector in each state. Second, we explore what kinds of government activities are more likely to be successful in deterring abuse of public office. Our results are generally supportive of Becker's “crime and punishment” model. Regarding the primary focus of the paper, our results show that government size, in particular spending by state governments, does indeed have a strong positive influence on corruption.