浅析行贿受贿行为

本文以理性经济人假设为立论前提,运用博弈模型、决策树和心理分析的方法对行贿受贿行为进行了动机分析,试图回答下列问题:人们为什么要行贿?公务员为什么会受贿?低薪为什么易导致"腐败"?怎样抑制行贿受贿现象的蔓延?并在此基础上提出"高薪养廉"、"健全法治"、"强化惩处"的政策主张.     

On the economic incentives for taking bribes

This paper presents an empirical analysis of the factors affecting bribe taking by public officials. Factors influencing the acceptance of bribes include: the probability of being convicted, severity of punishment, government salary relative to private sector income, the demonstration effect, and the unemployment rate. Our results indicate that higher probability of being convicted discourages the acceptance of bribes as does more severe punishment. Low relative earnings, high unemployment, and the demonstration effect of aggregate advertising all lead to increased bribe taking.     

Localization,Formalism, and Passivity: Symbols Shaping Bribe Offers in Azerbaijan

The article analyses a neglected side of corruption – citizen-initiated bribe offers in Azerbaijan. The main rationale for taking a citizen focus on corruption is to identify whether citizen choices support state-led anti-corruption initiatives. Drawing on a survey of 1002 respondents, the research shows that ‘tolerance of corruption’ is high among the population in Azerbaijan. Logistic regression results show that bribe offers among citizens are associated with localization and formal value orientations. This means that the respondents pro-actively use bribes and readily bend laws to their own local interests. Thus, bribe offers constitute around half of the entire variation in corruption in Azerbaijan. Therefore, a successful fight against corruption cannot be confined to the eradication of only bureaucratic bribe demand, but needs to take into account corruption choices of the population too.     

The role of intermediaries in corruption

The aim of the article is to examine a briber initiated corrupt transaction and the role of intermediaries in such a transaction, using a game theoretical model. Clients applying the intermediaries do so to be able to get rid of high red tape applied by the officers. They prefer using intermediary instead of offering a bribe to the officers directly since they do not know which officers are corrupt (accepts a bribe offer) and how much bribe should be given to the corrupt officers. In our model, the client wants to offer a bribe to get rid of red tape, however, she hesitates due to the possibility of offering a bribe to an honest public officer and as a result getting a penalty. Client also hesitates due to the possibility of offering an amount of bribe lower than the reservation price of the corrupt officer; thus being rejected. Intermediaries, knowing which officers are corrupt and the reservation prices of those corrupt officers, decrease the risk of offering a bribe. Two cases; one with intermediary, the other without, in such a scenario is examined and the results of the two are compared.     

Monopoly Money: Foreign Investment and Bribery in Vietnam,a Survey Experiment

Prevailing work argues that foreign investment reduces corruption, either by competing down monopoly rents or diffusing best practices of corporate governance. We argue that the mechanisms generating this relationship are not clear because the extant empirical work is too heavily drawn from aggregations of total foreign investment entering an economy. Alternatively, we suggest that openness to foreign investment has differential effects on corruption even within the same country and under the same domestic institutions over time. We argue that foreign firms use bribes to enter protected industries in search of rents, and therefore we expect variation in bribe propensity across sectors according to expected profitability. We test this effect using a list experiment embedded in three waves of a nationally representative survey of 20,000 foreign and domestic businesses in Vietnam, finding that the effect of economic openness on the probability to engage in bribes is conditional on policies that restrict investment.     

商业贿赂犯罪的动态特征与发展趋势

近年来，随着我国市场经济不断发展，发生在商品流通和服务行业等领域的商业贿赂行为并未得到切实有效地根治，作为一种具有动态意义的新型经济犯罪活动，其触角逐步伸入其他行业和领域，并呈现出一系列新的特点和发展态势。其动态变化特征主要有：犯罪形式多样，犯罪手段隐蔽，侦查难度加大；行业特点明显，发案部门集中，窝案串案突出；案件数目上升，涉案金额加大，大要案比例高；职务犯罪突出，主体特征明显，顶风作案严重。其发展趋势表现为：犯罪领域扩展，防控精度下降；作案手法翻新，查处难度加大；组织程度提高，期货特征明显；社会影响恶劣，危害程度加剧。各地应根据本地商贿犯罪现实情形与发展态势，建立健全惩防商贿犯罪的长效机制。     

公职人员经济犯罪影响因素分析——基于受贿视角的实证研究

利用行为学理论分析公职人员经济犯罪行为的产生机理,得出影响公职人员经济犯罪的因素有宏观、中观和微观三个层次。在对三个层次的影响因素进行理论分析和总结的基础上,以受贿犯罪类型为视角,选取实地调研的373个公职人员经济犯罪案例,对其中6个可观测变量进行逻辑回归分析。结论表明:影响不法公职人员受贿的因素有成长环境、受教育程度、年龄、级别以及公职人员类型,这些因素都与不法公职人员采取受贿犯罪类型呈正相关关系,影响力由大到小依次为:级别、受教育程度、成长环境、年龄和公职人员类型。     

The economy,corruption, and the vote: Evidence from experiments in Sweden and Moldova

How does corruption affect voting behavior when economic conditions are poor? Using a novel experimental design and two original survey experiments, we offer four important conclusions. First, in a low corruption country (Sweden), voters react negatively to corruption regardless of the state of the economy. Second, in a high corruption country (Moldova), voters react negatively to corruption only when the state of the economy is also poor; when economic conditions are good, corruption is less important. Third, respondents in Sweden react more strongly to corruption stimuli than respondents in Moldova. Finally, in the low corruption country, sociotropic corruption voting (or voting based on corruption among political leaders) is relatively more important, whereas in our high corruption country, pocketbook corruption voting (or voting based on one's own personal experience with corruption, i.e., being asked to pay bribes) is equally prevalent. Our findings are consistent with multiple stable corruption equilibria, as well as with a world where voters are more responsive to corruption signals more common in their environment.     

Bidding behavior in the department of defense's commercial activities competitions

From 1978 to 1994, the Department of Defense conducted more than 2,000 competitions in which private contractors and the government's in‐house team bid to provide a service performed in‐house before the competition. A three‐equation model is constructed, which is used to estimate the in‐house bid, the minimum contractor bid, and the in‐house team's baseline cost. The model accounts for the fact that the in‐house bid is constrained not to exceed its baseline cost. The estimates are used in simulations of the savings from the completed competitions ($1.55 billion annually, 35 percent of the baseline cost) as well as the savings from various alternative policies, including competitively tendering all the functions on the Department of Defense's list of potential candidates ($7.58 billion annually). © 2001 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Cheap bribes and the corruption ban: A coordination game among rational legislators

Legislators in modern democracies (a) accept bribes that are small compared to the value of the statutes they pass and (b) allow bans against bribery to be enforced. In our model of bribery, rational legislators accept bribes smaller not only than the benefit the briber receives but than the costs the legislators incur in accepting the bribes. Rather than risk this outcome, the legislators may be willing to suppress bribery altogether. The size of legislatures, the quality of voter information, the nature of party organization, and the structure of committees will all influence the frequency and size of bribes.     

Collusion in auctions for emission permits: An experimental analysis

Environmental markets have several institutional features that provide a new context for the use of auctions and that have not been studied previously. This paper reports on laboratory experiments testing three auction forms—uniform and discriminatory price sealed‐bid auctions and an ascending clock auction. We test the ability of subjects to tacitly or explicitly collude in order to maximize profits. Our main result is that the discriminatory and uniform price auctions produce greater revenues than the clock auction, both with and without explicit communication. The clock appears to facilitate successful collusion, both because of its sequential structure and because it allows bidders to focus on one dimension of cooperation (quantity) rather than two (price and quantity).© 2009 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Setting a Good Example? The Effect of Leader and Peer Behavior on Corruption among Indonesian Senior Civil Servants

Standard anticorruption interventions consist of intensified monitoring and sanctioning. Rooted in principal‐agent theory, these interventions are based on the assumption that corrupt acts follow a rational cost‐benefit calculation by gain‐seeking individuals. Given their mixed results, however, these interventions require closer scrutiny. Building on goal‐framing theory, the authors argue that rule compliance requires a salient normative goal frame, since monitoring can never be perfect. Being inherently brittle, it needs constant reinforcement through external cues operating alongside formal monitoring and sanctioning. Leaders and peers setting a good example can provide such cues. In line with this hypothesis, analysis of multilevel repeated measures data from a vignette study of 580 Indonesian senior civil servants shows that the perceived likelihood of a hypothetical civil servant accepting a bribe is lowest when monitoring and sanctioning are strong and when leaders and peers are known to have refused bribes in the past.     

Independent Professional Bureaucracies and Street-Level Bribery: Comparing Changes in Civil Service Law and Implementation in Latin America

Using cross-sectional data, studies of the relation between merit-based bureaucracies and corruption usually find that nations with more professional and politically independent bureaucracies have lower corruption. However, cross-section designs cannot test this policy claim. This study adopts a pre-test?post-test design using lagged data comparing changes in civil service laws and implementation in eight Latin American countries from 2004 to 2012 and data reporting subsequent change in bribe requests by the bureaucrats that the laws are intended to affect. Raising questions about the validity of previous results, it is found that improved laws and implementation were associated with no or increased bribe requests.     

Making them pay: Using the norm of honesty to generate costs for political lies

Recent literature finds that, although lies politicians spread to achieve partisan goals can be corrected, politicians who spread misinformation rarely pay a price for lying. We argue that the cost of lying should be greater when the norm of honesty is salient. Using three survey experiments that feature both a well-known politician (Donald Trump) and a fictitious member of Congress, we examine the cost politicians pay when they are caught in a lie. We find that many citizens, regardless of partisanship, will recognize a lie when one has been told. And although citizens punish unknown politicians for lying, they do not punish Trump similarly unless the norm of honesty is made salient. This effect, however, is limited to the narrower measure of situational approval; individual lies do not affect overall measures of job approval regardless of honesty salience. These results demonstrate the difficulty of getting citizens to update their views on well-known politicians, even when those politicians are caught in an obvious lie. Yet our findings suggest fruitful paths toward creating a disincentive for politicians to distort the truth.     

商业贿赂的性质、成因及治理策略

商业贿赂本质上是一种腐败。商业贿赂行为的产生,不仅与政治、经济、社会、文化等外部因素有关,而且与商业贿赂行为人的心理状态、价值取向、文化观念及政治意识等内在因素有关。治理商业贿赂是一项复杂的系统工程,既涉及经济、政治、文化等领域,又涉及利益表达、利益综合、利益转换等环节。利益协调是治理商业贿赂治理的政策核心,要通过建立相关机制,调节利益实现过程和利益关系,对合法利益手段给予支持,对非法利益手段予以打击,对受损利益给予必要补偿。     

文化视野下中国社会中的礼物与贿赂

在不同的社会文化背景下,对什么是腐败行为有着不同的判断标准。特别是在中国社会中,个体行动者通过自我道德化表演的策略将不被法律认可的贿赂掩饰和转变为能够被社会规范所接受的礼物,以此来刻意模糊礼物和贿赂的界限。通过对中国社会中礼物的运作逻辑及其社会文化意义、以及法律在认定贿赂过程中局限性的考察,可以看出礼物和贿赂的辨析方向:礼物交换运行在私人生活领域,双方以同质性的形式依据交换物的象征性价值进行交换,并在这一过程中构建起交换主体之间的关系;贿赂运行在公共领域,双方以异质性的形式依据交换物的经济性价值进行交换,更强调交换物本身数量的关系。     

Neo‐patrimonialism and Corruption: Evidence from 8,436 Firms in 17 Countries in Sub‐Saharan Africa

This article introduces four innovations to the literature on administrative corruption. First, it employs a neo‐patrimonialism framework by addressing measurement, identification, and endogeneity issues that beset the literature. Second, unlike cross‐country studies, it uses firms as the unit of analysis. Third, unlike the conventional literature, the article uses large‐n (n = 8,436) panel survey data of key informants in 17 countries in sub‐Saharan Africa. Finally, unlike the conventional literature, the article focuses on a particular type of corruption: the supply and demand for bribery. The authors find that the uncertainty associated with neo‐patrimonialism has a strong, positive, and significant effect on the propensity of civil servants to demand bribes in exchange for services and for firms to supply bribes in exchange for winning government contracts. The results are robust to controls on the characteristics of firms and their regulatory environments. The article concludes with implications for research and practice.     

Discounting procedures for environmental (and other) projects: A comment on Kolb and Scheraga

We compare two alternative methods to discount the costs and benefits of environmental projects. These are (1) the shadow price of capital, which can be practically expressed by using the cost of capital and thus the discount rate on government bonds, and (2) the two-stage discounting procedure advocated by Kolb and Scheraga. We suggest that the two-stage approach is in many cases inconsistent with the shadow price of capital approach and will therefore lead to misallocations of resources. We further argue that the use of the cost of capital as the discount rate will be easier than the two-stage procedure, will yield results that are consistent with the shadow price of capital approach, and will be justified by the potential Pareto criterion. Finally, use of the shadow price of capital approach has a potential for achieving considerable consensus in practice as well as in theory, a result that could considerably enhance project evaluation.     

The viability of the thrift industry

Abstract

This paper argues that many widely referenced studies on the cost effectiveness of alternative assistance programs were conducted at a time when rental housing markets were depressed. Recent increases in rent appear to have reduced the apparent cost advantage that demand‐side subsidies hold over supply‐side interventions. In addition, the nonsubsidized poor increasingly must compete for a dwindling supply of low‐cost privately owned housing. Housing vouchers or similar demand subsidies may be appropriate in some contexts, but economic theory and recent empirical analysis suggest that such subsidies are “not the best at all times and under all situations.” Rather, the “best policy” depends on program targeting and the nature and extent of program‐induced price increases and externality effects. Since funding limitations currently block the creation of an entitlement housing assistance program, housing policy must balance the often competing goals of expanding the ability of participating low‐income households to pay for decent housing while at the same time working to limit the adverse effects that rent increases and the loss of low‐cost nonsubsidized stock have on households falling outside of the housing assistance safety net.     

Consumer resistance and monopoly behavior under franchise contestability

The probability of a deregulation under anti-monopoly consumer lobby is generated at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of a lobbying game which depends on the monopoly rent and the deadweight loss. This probability is increasing and convex in monopoly price. When the deregulation probability constraint is binding, the monopolist's price rises with the number of consumers, the competitive price and the given ceiling probability. The social cost of a monopoly under franchise contestability differs from the Posner measure.