Shirking and political support in the U.S. Senate, 1964–1984

Several empirical studies have suggested that legislators engage in a surprisingly large degree of on-the-job consumption, or ideological behavior. These findings cast doubt on the hypothesis that legislators can be modelled as though they seek to maximize political support. This paper attempts to determine whether commonly used proxies for ideology in fact represent behavior to which voters are averse. The results show that legislators who engage in more of this behavior lose general-election support without generally receiving compensating increases in partyprimary support. A corollary to this result is that voters punish shirking legislators significantly.     

Terrorist networks, support, and delegation

The paper presents a game-theoretic representation of a general terrorist organization (GTO) that delegates responsibility to local terrorist representatives in n countries. The GTO achieves a strategic advantage by deploying a more radical representative when the government is perceived to be weak and terrorist supporters are committed. When the government or terrorist supporters alter their posture, the GTO may regret its local representative. Outside assistance can change a besieged government’s posture, thereby removing the GTO’s delegation advantage. When both the GTO and the government delegate to surrogates, the delegators are worse off if the government appears to be weak.     

Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the Senate

A prominent change in American electoral institutions occurred when the 17th Amendment to the Constitution established direct election of U.S. Senators as of 1914. How did this change the political agency relationship between the mass electorate and U.S. Senators? We develop theoretical expectations about the representational effects of direct election by a relatively inexpert mass electorate and indirect election by a relatively expert political intermediary, based on principal‐agent theory. The chief predictions are that the representative will be more responsive to the mass electorate under direct election, but will also have more discretion to pursue his or her own ends. We use the 17th Amendment as a quasi‐experiment to test the predictions of the theory. Statistical models show strong support for both predictions. Moreover, the 17th Amendment is not associated with similar changes in the U.S. House of Representatives—as expected, since the amendment did not change House electoral institutions.     

Key political symbols: the dissociation process

Key political symbols are an important but neglected topic in the policy sciences. As instruments of policy, they are used to fashion consensus and misused for purposes of exploitation. Scientific inquiry into the possibilities for maximizing consent and minimizing exploitation has been frustrated for lack of systematic, empirical methods - despite a rich theoretical tradition that has been available for decades. This article introduces suitable methods and reintroduces available theory through a case study of a key symbol, ‘Watergate.’ Originally a reference to a building in Washington, D.C., it became a reference to a complex of unresolved involving integrity in government. The process of dissociation from its original meaning provides cues that policy scientists might use to anticipate the course of issue expansion and simplification in connection with other policy issues, including the Iran-Contra arms affair.     

Explaining the First Contested Senate Confirmation of a Director of Central Intelligence: John McCone,the Kennedy White House,the CIA and the Senate, 1962

This article explores the first nomination for Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) that was seriously contested in the US Senate. Unlike three previous DCIs who headed the Central Intelligence Agency, John A. McCone faced harsh criticism from some in the news media and 12 negative votes in the US Senate after he was nominated for the position by President John F. Kennedy. The article considers factors, including McCone's personal attributes and recent years' controversies about the CIA, as reasons that provoked some opposition to his confirmation as DCI.     

Bargaining in legislatures,portfolio allocation,and the electoral costs of governing

What motivates political parties in the legislative arena? Existing legislative bargaining models stress parties’ office and policy motivations. A particularly important question concerns how parties in coalition government agree the distribution of cabinet seats. This article adds to the portfolio allocation literature by suggesting that future electoral considerations affect bargaining over the allocation of cabinet seats in multi-party cabinets. Some parties are penalised by voters for participating in government, increasing the attractiveness of staying in opposition. This ‘cost of governing’ shifts their seat reservation price – the minimum cabinet seats demanded in return for joining the coalition. Results of a randomised survey experiment of Irish legislators support our expectation, demonstrating that political elites are sensitive to future electoral losses when contemplating the distribution of cabinet seats. This research advances our understanding of how parties’ behaviour between elections is influenced by anticipation of voters’ reactions.     

中国改革进程中的政治逻辑

改革开放的突破在于实行社会主义市场经济,源于人类处于满足生存资料需求和发展资料需求不同阶段对于"计划"与"市场"的诉求不同。新时代社会主义市场经济条件下,政治逻辑的发展为社会主义生产方式的创新发展提供了理论支持,对于有效治国理政、推进党和人民事业发展具有重要意义。     

The political process of decentralization in Peru, 1985–1990

This paper, using Peru as a case study, argues that the most potent factor in the implementation of decentralization in developing countries is ‘political’ in nature and operation. The legislative process of decentralization under President Alan García's regime went through three major steps, controlled by his party, APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana,): (1) The 1986 Bill of the Basic Law of Regionalization; (2) The 1987 Basic Law of Regionalization; and (3) The 1988 Modified Law of Regionalization. Why did Alan García push for decentralization, unlike his predecessors? The 1985 elections produced García, a populist demagogue, and a loose political party system dominated by APRA. However, the legislation of decentralization was possible paradoxically because García, who was desperately looking for a political issue to distract people's minds from his misgovernment, needed to control APRA for a regional power base after 1990. Thus, the whole decentralization process was highly politicized, and García's strategy was ‘successful’ in that regional governments came to be controlled by APRA after the 1989 and 1990 regional elections. The Peruvian case shows how far decentralization can be used for personalistic or partisan interests in a fragile democracy.     

The tragedy of the political commons: Evidence from U.S. Senate roll call votes on environmental legislation

When the costs of regulation are borne by individuals outside of their political jurisdiction, an elected politician arguably will vote in favor of socially costly regulations because from his/her narrow perspective even small marginal benefits outweigh zero marginal costs. Our empirical analysis of the environmental voting records of U.S. Senators from 1991 to 2002 reveals a pronounced tendency for Senators to vote against (in favor of) environmental bills that impose costs in their (other) states. The straightforward implication is that elected politicians overgraze the regulatory pasture.     

The political process and the use of debt financing by state governments

Empirical evidence offered in this study suggests that decisions by state government officials to effect debt-financed spending depend in part on the state's gubernatorial election cycle. More specifically, the results reveal relative increases in state debt issues in anticipation of elections, and furthermore, they reveal that such increases are more significant for states characterized by high interparty political competition. While theoretical limitations preclude a definitive explanation for these results, the evidence is consistent with a view of state political markets where incumbent parties manipulate public policy so as to enhance the probability of success in pending elections. This insight is significant in that it suggests a relationship between public policy decisions and election cycles in a context heretofore unexplored.     

思想政治教育价值实现过程的初探

思想政治教育的价值实现过程是一个由起点、中间环节和终点组成的过程,在价值形态上依次会经过潜价值第一阶段和第二阶段,最终形成显价值。这个总过程具有三大规律:价值主客体对立统一规律;时间上不同步性和空间上差异性规律;社会历史环境制约规律。思想政治教育价值实现过程的规律对于建设社会主义核心价值体系具有重要的理论与实践意义。     

A comparison of incumbent security in the House and Senate

The authors would like to thank Charles Bullock, Evelyn Fink, Kevin Grier, Paul Johnson, Benjamin Page, Brian Roberts and Eric Schonsberg for their assistance. Any remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the authors.     

Fairness and Rejection in the Ultimatum Bargaining Game

The ultimatum game is a standard instrument for laboratory experimentalists.It has been replicated in a large number of environments andpoints to special considerations for fairness. Although it hasbeen popular in the experimental community, researchers havenot harnessed all the statistical power they should to evaluatethe dynamics at work in this type of a bargaining game. Thisresearch uses two planned treatments, the first involving asignaling condition concerning a subject's "type," and the seconda price effect built into the structure of the game. We findthat there are no significant main effects as a result of thesignaling condition of a subject's type, but that there arestrong effects as a result of the different payoff parameters.Using a variety of multivariate models we find important, nonobviousinteractions with the gender of the subjects. The lesson thatwe take away from this research is that experimentalists canlearn more from data collected in the tightly controlled laboratoryenvironment by using statistical techniques that complementtheir research designs.     

Introduction: Parliamentary democracy and the chain of delegation

European Journal of Political Research -     

Incumbent Vulnerability and Challenger Emergence in Senate Elections

We examine challenger emergence in Senate elections by looking at the 1992 campaign in depth. We develop unproved measures of incumbent: vulnerability using data from the 1988 and 1990 NES Senate Election Studies. These measures are used to test the hypothesis that higher-quality challengers are more likely to challenge vulnerable incumbents. We find generally weak relationships between our incumbent vulnerability measures and challenger quality. Instead, challenger quality scores increase with the size of the pool of potential high-quality challengers.