Mapping Utopias: A Voyage to Placelessness

I have a map which indicates clearly and beyond any doubt the way to Utopia. I start the journey with a survival kit of paradigmatic egalities, noumenal legalities, and nervous ideals. However, the more I move into the uncartographied space, the more I realise that my survival kit is changing, to the point of becoming porous and permeable. The journey to Utopia is condensed to a log of phenomenological bracketing, where the immersion to the Lebenswelt equals the loss of oneself, and where the descent from the Transcendental to the Natural proves to be as meaningful as the escalating bracketing from the Natural to the Transcendental. The negation of Utopia (ou-topos) displaces not only my Utopia but also my egocentric quest for identity: the ‘I’ becomes ‘me’ before it vanishes, space becomes place, intentionality turns back to itself and retraces its path. The more I approach my destination, the more negation devours distance. When I finally arrive to the designated point, where, according to the map, lies Utopia, the only thing I discover is a map, identical to the one I hold, that indicates, clearly and beyond any doubt, the way to Utopia. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Responsibility and Global Justice

The two traditional ways of thinking about justice at the global level either limit the applicability of justice to states—the only distributions that can be just or unjust, strictly speaking, are within the state—or else extend it to all human beings. The view I defend in On Global Justice (Risse 2012 ) rejects both of these approaches. Instead, my view, and thus my attempt at meeting the aforementioned challenge, acknowledges the existence of multiple grounds of justice. My purpose here is to explain what my view has to say about responsibility. First of all, I explain what my view implies about the responsibilities of the state for the realization of justice. Then I explain that in addition to obligations of justice, my view also gives rise to obligations of account‐giving. I end by sketching what all this implies for institutional reform at the global level.     

Hart's and Kelsen's Concepts of Normativity Contrasted*

Abstract. Hart's and Kelsen's respective outlooks on the concept of normativity not only differ by the way they explain this concept but also, more importantly, in what they seek to achieve when endeavouring to account for the normative dimension of law. By examining Hart's and Kelsen's models in the light of Korsgaard's understanding of the “normativity problem,” my aim is to emphasise not only their contrasted perspectives, but also the common limit they impose on their theories by dismissing as inappropriate any question regarding the emergence of legal normativity. On the basis of my previous arguments, I shall explain why I deem Raz's analysis of the contrast between Hart's and Kelsen's conceptions of normativity to be misleading.     

Embracing Emotionality: Clothing My “Naked Truths”

There is increasing awareness and recognition that researchers’ emotions will contribute to a richer and deeper understanding of what they are studying. Researchers’ emotions as analytic tools are particularly relevant when working with marginalized or oppressed groups because of the emotional aspect generally associated with human suffering. This paper discusses how adopting a reflexive practice can help researchers embrace and use their emotions as a part of the research process, enabling a more humanistic approach to studying crime and those whose marginalization and oppression are intricately tied to their crime. More specifically, this paper examines my own experiences of doing research with Aboriginal female offenders in a federal prison. I problematize the process of embracing emotionality by reflecting on the paralysis that evolved in my research with these women as I experienced an overwhelming sense of despair and hopelessness. I contend that social science in the academic arena, not unlike many other institutions in society, has adopted a method of surveillance thereby instilling a sense of fear and judgment upon those working in academic arenas. After describing my reflexive process throughout this emotional paralysis, I describe my discovery of safe spaces as a way of dealing with my emotions and how engaging in creative analytic practice enabled me to clothe my nakedness and vulnerability as I represented, and ultimately re-created my self in the research process. As part of that evolution, embracing emotionality ultimately enabled me to engage in knowledge building as well as advocacy with and for Aboriginal women in prison.     

Rorschach Tests,Pluralism, and Hopes for the Future: A Response to the Responses

In this essay, I address some of the concerns raised by contributors to the Symposium on Invitation to Law & Society: An Introduction to the Study of Real Law. I argue that law and society scholarship focusing on race increasingly offers some of our field's best empirical analyses of the interpenetration of law and society; I emphasize the importance of the methodological and theoretical diversity that characterizes our fragmented field, arguing that our pluralism is one of our greatest strengths; I clarify my intended meaning of the term “real law” as I use it in the book's subtitle, as a way to underscore the socially constituted quality of all law; I attempt to rescue the reputation of dialectics from charges of “relativism”; and I reiterate my appreciation for our field's engagement with questions of social justice that has characterized it since its inception. In the second half of the essay, I briefly describe my current prison research and offer some thoughts for the future of our field.     

Professor Stanley Cohen: an appreciation

Like so many others, I am saddened by the death of Stan Cohen, my PhD supervisor, mentor, and supportive friend at a particularly difficult time in my life. I first met Stan in summer 1976, when I was applying for a PhD place. In awe of the author of Folk Devils and Moral Panics, a book which did so much to open criminology up to the sociological imagination, I was soon at ease and enjoying a wide-ranging conversation, with the difficult questions posed gently and seemingly lightly, that was Stan's distinctive style. Stan was, of course, the perfect PhD supervisor: always encouraging; nudging me back in the right direction when I was veering off-track. I began my teaching at Essex, and the deviancy ‘dream-team’ – Stan and Ken Plummer – was the best possible start to an academic career.     

Outsiders and justice consciousness

The foundations of my justice consciousness lie in two books that share the name “outsiders.” I was introduced to S.E. Hinton's novel before I was a teenager and it was my first real contact with the “Greasers,” the “Socs,” and a world of juvenile delinquency divided by social class. Written by a 16‐year‐old girl around the time I was born, I think it was this book that initially sparked my fascination with juvenile delinquency and the study of crime. I pursued this interest in college and became concerned with inequality and the ways in which our social surroundings shape our choices and our life chances. Reading Howard S. Becker's classic statement of labeling theory in his version of Outsiders changed my perspective again and I have never looked at the world in quite the same way since.     

Inclusive Legal Positivism,Legal Interpretation,and Value‐Judgments

In this paper I put forward some arguments in defence of inclusive legal positivism. The general thesis that I defend is that inclusive positivism represents a more fruitful and interesting research program than that proposed by exclusive positivism. I introduce two arguments connected with legal interpretation in favour of my thesis. However, my opinion is that inclusive positivism does not sufficiently succeed in estranging itself from the more traditional legal positivist conceptions. This is the case, for instance, with regard to the value‐freedom principle, which is commonly accepted by inclusive positivist scholars. In contrast with this approach, I try to show, in the concluding section, how a constructivistic version of inclusive positivism could legitimately acknowledge the presence of value‐judgments in the cognitive activities of jurists and legal theorists.     

Response: The Politeness of History

In my response to the reviews of my book by Marianne Constable, Shai Lavi, and Renisa Mawani, I situate the argument of Common Law, History, and Democracy in America, 1790–1900: Legal Thought Before Modernism within a concern with contemporary forms of historical knowledge. Where contemporary historical knowledge practices subsume their objects of investigation, I adopt the temporality of the object of investigation—namely, the common law—as the structure my book. In different registers, Constable, Lavi, and Mawani urge me to take up more explicitly the foundational questioning about which they care. I welcome their readings. However, given the distinct problematic from which I start, I argue, the book is not in the first instance an argument about the ontology of history or law.     

A Reply to Five Friends

For an academic, there is no greater reward than having one's scholarship taken seriously. The five distinguished scholars who have contributed to this symposium on The Force of Law (Schauer 2015 ) have done just that, with varying degrees of agreement and disagreement, praise and criticism. But even critical commentary, and perhaps especially critical commentary, is evidence of serious engagement. More importantly, the commentaries contained here have advanced our understanding of law in valuable ways. I respond to each in this reply, but with full acknowledgment that my responses cannot do justice to the full breadth of their contributions and challenges. My hope is not that I will persuade readers that I am correct and my critics mistaken, but rather that the reader who absorbs both the challenges and my response will come away with a greater understanding of the issues that The Force of Law seeks to place on the agenda of contemporary jurisprudence.     

Special Characteristics of the Post-Soviet Political Regime

When the editors of Rossiiskaia gazeta asked me to write an article on Russia's future policy toward Asia, they did not catch me completely unawares. I have been thinking about this now extremely complicated problem for a long time. Here I attempt to share my preliminary conclusions. I am not sure that these conclusions are final, but we must initiate a discussion.     

Writing Workshops for First Year Law: my contribution as an applied linguist

“Law schools should focus more on teaching writing – not some Procrustean monstrosity called ‘legal writing,’ but the ordinary techniques of constructing a sentence and telling a story” writes Roosevelt in his review of Divergent Paths: The Academy and the Judiciary by Posner. The Australian Threshold Learning Outcome expects law graduates to be effective, appropriate and persuasive as communicators when interacting with both legal and non-legal persons. We also know that embedding learning outcomes or graduate attributes throughout a programme encourages progressive learning. Furthermore, the whole of degree curriculum design undertaken from a shared perspective reflects industry and student requirements better than individual subjects can. In the absence of any whole of degree curriculum, the semester-long series of Writing Workshops for First Year Law (WWFYL) was created. Building on the success of past collaboration (Curró and Longo), WWFYL reflect a move away from a solitary, silent teaching culture to open sharing of practice. The widening participation and skills agendas remind us of the need to focus on the integration of academic literacies into law. If law is language, can applied linguistics make a contribution to the literacy needs of students from diverse linguistic backgrounds? As an applied linguist, my objective is to raise awareness of the elements and features of legal writing and demystify the specialised discourse and textual features. In this paper I present my theoretical framework borrowed from socio-constructivist theories, focusing on how students learn specific subject matter in particular contexts: “a teaching and learning process that makes transparent the practices and discourses of the subject area” (D. Warren, “Curriculum Design in a Context of Widening Participation in Higher Education” (2002) 1 Arts and Humanities in Higher Education 85, p. 88). Two snapshots of my classroom discourse demonstrating the practical application of my teaching are presented, as well as evaluation data supporting my approach.     

NARCISSISTIC BORDERLINE COUPLES: IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDIATION*

Suddenly my head begins to spin. I feel dizzy and confused. My head keeps going round and round. In front of me sits a married couple; they go on and on in circles, going nowhere. A feeling of despair overwhelms me as I think to myself, This couple needs to be in therapy. I then realize I am the therapist.     

The Ethics of Corporate Legal Strategy: A Response to Professor Mayer

In this issue of the American Business Law Journal, Professor Don Mayer continues an important conversation regarding the ethics of corporate legal strategy. 1 Addressing several of my published works, Mayer offers two primary criticisms: (1) the works are too sanguine with regard to the appropriate scope of the strategic decision to “breach‐and‐pay,” and (2) the works offer too little guidance for the well‐intentioned corporate executive. In this response, I briefly restate my views, address Mayer's two criticisms, and offer concluding remarks.     

R.S. Thomas: Ministering Otherness

This article is built around a deeply personal `response to text' –of a poem in response to a poem, where both deal with notions of identity. For myself, writing poetry is a cathartic (though infrequent) source of resolution; a space subject to different constraints from those present in the production of analytic scholarship. A consideration of the broader ideological matrix at work behind the poems suggests links between nationhood and language, class and religion, private and public identity, history and politics. Vast subjects, explored but briefly in the thoughts and notes produced for this article as `background' to the story of the poem cited at the end. For legal and political theory it is a reminder of the delicate interstices of influences traversed in any assertion concerning broad policy. As `scholar' I am constrained in the provision of any further assessment of my own process as `poet': what is provided attempts honesty. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Home: A Vehicle for Resistance? Exploring Emancipatory Entanglements of ‘Vehicle Dwelling’ in a Changing Policy Context

This article begins with a reflection on Phil Thomas’ work, as well as on the way in which the Journal of Law and Society has pioneered scholarship in this field. Drawing on my own experiences as a researcher and campaigner, and my ‘insider’ status as a van dweller, I articulate why many have sought alternative modes of living, reflecting on ideas about freedom and anarchism, the importance of ‘home’, cultural preference, and escaping the housing crisis. I note that Wales and other European states, such as Portugal, provide a much warmer welcome and space for diverse Travellers; some are already planning their escape routes before the consequences of Brexit and new trespass legislation unfold. In an already hostile and rapidly changing context, it appears that the ontological security of vehicle dwellers is increasingly under threat. As well as giving a voice to these communities, the article also represents a much-needed call to action.     

The role of the Justice Select Committee

Emotion is ... ubiquitous, although often operating less obviously and visibly, underground. (Layder, 2004)

Them first three years ... I wasn't coping very well with my emotions.

(Prisoner)     

The Hurried Justification of Sanctions

In this paper I try to see how the Derridean aporias of the law of the urgency of legal decisions (the law interrupts the input of knowledge in the decision-making process) and the épokhè of the rule (justice can never be done in the present) are revealed in the context of the justification of sanctions. I argue that sanctions can only be justified in a purposive manner in the last instance. They can only be means to an end of punishment which has been opted for, and which can be justified on grounds of principles, or an authoritative calculation of incommensurable entities. I argue against theories, which advocate the internal connection of law and morality, because if such a connection could be established, the aporia of the hurried and unjustified action would obviously disappear. In particular my target is discourse theory as formulated mainly by Robert Alexy with his Sonderfallthese(Special Case Thesis). My objection is that, because of their instrumental nature, sanctions cannot be justified on moral grounds. I also consider some objections that could be raised from Klaus Günther's theory of appropriateness and Habermas' distinction between the moral, ethical and pragmatic employments of practical reason. I am argue that the former, which would become relevant at the stage of application, that is sentencing, does not resolve the justificatory problem of sanctions, and the latter confirms rather than falsifies my claim that punishment can never be said to be just.     

Poetic Justice: Why Sex-Slaves Should be Allowed to Sue Ignorant Clients in Conversion

In this article I argue that clients who purchase commercial sex from forced prostitutes should be strictly liable in tort towards the sex-slaves. Such an approach is both normatively defensible and doctrinally feasible. As I have argued elsewhere, fairness and equality demand that clients compensate sex-slaves even if one refuses to acknowledge that fault is involved in purchasing sex from a prostitute who might be forced. In this article I argue that such strict liability could be grounded in the tort of conversion, and not only (as argued elsewhere) in battery. Since the quintessential experience of sex-slaves is that of being treated as chattels, the appropriate legal response is to allow them to benefit from the strict liability imposed on those who interfere with an owner’s dominion over his property. Accordingly, sex-slaves should be viewed as both subjects and objects. As subjects they can sue clients for the violation of their sexual autonomy manifested by their treatment as objects. This approach is both advantageous to sex-slaves, in the sense it affords them protection that might not otherwise exist, and fair, since the ultimate response to the objectification of sex-slaves by clients should be to afford the former a proprietary-based claim against the latter. I further explain why my approach is not problematic on conceptual grounds, anti-commodification sentiments or feminist concerns with the symbolic message of my solution: that the law treats women as property.     

Pornography and the construction of misogyny

Summary

In this paper I return to my work in Pornography: Women, Violence and Civil Liberties, the edited volume published in 1992 by Oxford University Press, and subsequently my work on pornography, harm and human rights (Itzin, 1995, 1996a), and to pornography and child sexual abuse (Itzin, 1996b, 1997a,b, 2000a,b,c). I draw from and build on that work and from the contents of the pornography special issue of the Journal of Sexual Aggression (Itzin and Cox, 2000). This paper covers key issues such as legislation and regulation, censorship' and ‘freedom’, the literature on pornography effects, the role of pornography in the aetiology of sex offending and in the construction of desire. In particular, the paper is concerned with theorising aetiology, causality and the ‘epistemology of public policy’ on pornography. It draws from and builds on the scholarship and activism of radical feminism in conceptualising and campaigning against pornography-related harm.