Bible and Gun: Militarism in Jerusalem's Holy Places

Abstract

Violence is a regular occurrence at many of Jerusalem's holy sites. Ongoing civilian clashes play a role, but official modes of control through the Israeli army (IDF) and Border Police, as well as more informal private security operations are often involved. Such militarisation may keep violent upheavals in check, but it is carried out within the framework of a long and harsh occupation. The two sites considered here—the Western Wall in the Old City and Rachel's Tomb on the border of Jerusalem and Bethlehem—each have a history of war and are fixtures of the occupation. This study explores the mechanisms that embed religious and militaristic meanings at each site. In so doing, certain questions are addressed. Firstly, how are the sites being constructed and used as popular and dramatic settings for certain constituents to promote religious militarism/militarised religion in Jerusalem? In which ways do these characteristics act to intertwine with the religious and militaristic aspects of the sites, making them more extreme but also, in some circles, more attractive? And finally, how do these sites contribute to the character of Jerusalem, both in their own construction and image but also in the roles they play within the wider urban topography?     

The politics of warning: Terrorism and risk communication

The problem of risk communication in the context of imperfect intelligence regarding a prospective, rather than actual, terrorist attack is examined in order to assess recommendations for precise guidance for the public. Particular problems are noted with the iterative quality of risk communications about terrorism, as they allow the terrorists to change their behaviour, the difficulty of offering tactical warning without a prior strategic analysis, and the tendency to focus on the vulnerabilities of a society rather than the intent of the terrorists. These issues are assessed through a case study of the Bali attacks of 2002, before an analysis of the American experience following the attacks of 9/11. This experience confirms the difficulties of attempting to convey risks to the public by altering public alert levels.     

American Militarism and Blowback: The Costs of Letting the Pentagon Dominate Foreign Policy

"Blowback" is a CIA term first used in March 1954 in a report on the 1953 operation to overthrow the government of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran. It is a metaphor for the unintended consequences of covert operations against foreign nations and governments. The suicidal attacks of September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were instances of blowback from American clandestine operations in Afghanistan. They have greatly accelerated tendencies toward militarism in the United States, which is defined as the phenomenon in which a nation's armed services come to put their institutional preservation ahead of effectiveness in achieving national security or a commitment to the integrity of the governmental structure of which they are a part.     

The Intelligence War on Terrorism

From 1941 to 1944, MI5 faced determined attempts to penetrate Allied Air Forces using trained pilot agents recruited by German Military Intelligence (Abwehr). The mission of these pilot agents was to gather military intelligence and to return to German held territory. This pattern of targeting Allied Air Forces has not been recognized by historians. This article examines MI5's responses to the threat using recently released files in the National Archives.     

Terrorism: The relevance of the rational choice model

Terrorism in general, and suicidal terrorism in particular, is popularly seen as “irrational,” but many economists and political scientists argue otherwise. This paper distinguishes three different senses of irrationality: unresponsiveness to incentives, deviation from narrow self-interest, and failure of rational expectations. It concludes that an intermediate position on the rationality of terrorism is appropriate. The typical terrorist sympathizer deviates only slightly from homo economicus. But active terrorists arguably stray from narrow self-interest and rational expectations, and suicidal terrorists probably violate both. Deterrence remains a viable anti-terrorism strategy, but deviations from rational expectations increase the potential of persuasion and appeasement.     

The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization

Many terrorist factions care about the level of popular support they enjoy within a population they claim to represent. Empirically, this level of support can either rise or fall in the aftermath of a campaign of terrorist violence. Under what circumstances is the use of terror an effective tactic for mobilizing political support for an extremist group? This article models a scenario in which an extremist faction considers attacking a government in the hopes of provoking a counterterror response that will radicalize the population, increasing the extremists' support at the expense of a more moderate faction. In our scenario, such radicalization can result either from the economic damage caused by counterterror operations or by the way in which such operations change the population's assessment of the government's motivations. We demonstrate that such attempts at mobilizing public support can be, but need not be, successful, discuss factors that make both the initiation of a terror campaign and successful mobilization more or less likely, and relate our results to several empirical cases.     

Terrorism and systems terror

In this paper we discuss the censorship of political statements sympathetic to terrorism as an instance of what Lyotard calls ‘terror’. Our claim is that the traditional approach to questions of censorship of ‘subversive’ politics only captures part of the story; what is at stake is not merely the censorship but at a deeper level, the withdrawal of the possibility to challenge the censorship. This two-tier logic of silencing is what we explore with the help of Lyotard's earlier and later work, first by relying on his analysis of ‘terror’ in the framework of ‘agonistics’, then of ‘terror’ as différend'.     

Risk Sensitivity and Terrorism

One enduring question about terrorism is why individuals choose to join terrorist groups. Past studies have shown that terrorists are not always poor, and they can in fact come from more privileged groups in society. Risk sensitivity and prospect theory are approaches that can help explain some of the anomalies. They suggest that two types of group are likely to supply members for terrorist organizations in disproportionate numbers. One group consists of those who face a loss of status or position due to ongoing changes in society. A second group consists of those who have an opportunity to gain a major advance in status or position. Both groups are thus more likely or more willing to take risks such as joining dissident terrorists – either to maintain their position or to improve it. An analysis of the situation of Palestinian nationalists, nationalists in Northern Ireland and the Tamils in Sri Lanka provides support for the idea that sensitivity to risk can be an important factor in explaining the willingness of individuals to join terrorist groups.     

Highway Security and Terrorism

This article presents an overview of highway transportation security before and after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, in the context of hazardous materials (hazmat) transportation. It is primarily focused on the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) regulation of motor carrier transportation of hazmat and post-9/11 efforts to prevent acquisition by terrorists of certain classes of hazmat. In the context of homeland security, motor carrier transportation of hazmat is receiving heightened attention. It should be cautioned, the article highlights a limited number of activities at the federal level only to provide the reader with a sense of ongoing government and industry activities to improve transportation security.     

Nuclear Terrorism: Actor-based Threat Assessment

The assumption that policies reducing the proliferation of fissile materials will automatically reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism is fallacious. Even if moderately successful, anti-proliferation initiatives have a limited impact on the illegal flow of nuclear materials and are not likely to prevent the acquisition of nuclear materials by non-state actors. Current policies focus on the containment of fissile materials rather than on non-state-actors that may wish to acquire them. Concentrating principally on management, accounting, storage and transfer procedures, policy-makers seem to ignore the fact that the primary threat of nuclear terrorism stems not from the availability of the materials but from the potential willingness of some groups to acquire them. This article attempts to shift the focus of discussion from state-centric models of analysis to a threat or actor-based model of analysis. In doing so, the article seeks to identify risk factors, which in combination may indicate a willingness by non-state actors to acquire nuclear weapons. In addition it hopes to provide the basis for more effective threat assessments.