A Failed Refutation and an Insufficiently Developed Insight in Hart’s Law, Liberty, and Morality

H. L. A. Hart, in his classic book Law, Liberty, and Morality, is unsuccessful in arguing that James Fitzjames Stephen’s observations about the role of vice in criminal sentencing have no relevance to a more general defense of legal moralism. He does, however, have a very important insight about the special significance of sexual liberty.     

The Fundamental Contradiction Redux? Liberty,Coercion, and American Legal Development

In Liberty and Coercion: The Paradox of American Government from the Founding to the Present, Gary Gerstle offers an ambitious account of American legal development from our nation's founding up to the present day. In many ways, Gerstle's account is in keeping with the long scholarly tradition of linking legal liberalism with changes in American law and politics. However, Liberty and Coercion also calls to mind critical legal scholarship, most notably Duncan Kennedy's “The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries” and the idea of the fundamental contradiction. After reconstructing Kennedy's central claims, I highlight how they actually undermine Liberty and Coercion and jeopardize the larger legal liberal tradition.     

Breaking Bad: DSM-5 Description, Criticisms, and Recommendations

The special issue on the DSM-5 (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition, American Psychiatric Association, 2013) in the journal Psychological Injury and Law has considered its changes relative to the DSM-IV-TR (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th edition, text revision, American Psychiatric Association, 2000) from both a clinical utility and scientific point of view. Although the manual did not undergo wholesale change, the changes to diagnostic categories relevant to the area of psychological injuries (especially posttraumatic stress disorder, mild traumatic brain injury, and chronic pain) present both practical and forensic conundrums, complicating clinical and legal work in the area. The articles in the special issue number nine (including the present one), and involve ones on the major psychological injuries, as well as personality. Separate articles deal with forensics and ethics, with a final one considering forensic psychiatric work using the DSMs. The authors collectively indicate that the DSM-5 is rife with utility and scientific difficulties, although it still might be used in practice and for court in the context of careful, comprehensive assessments and critical analysis. More importantly, ongoing and future research should be considered in revising the DSM-5. Some of the articles review in depth the extant research on their topics and all make recommendations that are useful. The articles include those (in order in the special issue) by: Zoellner et al. (Psychological Injury and Law, 6, 2013); Biehn et al. (Psychological Injury and Law, 6, 2013); Schultz (Psychological Injury and Law, 6, 2013); Young (2013); Hopwood and Sellbom (Psychological Injury and Law, 6, 2013); Thomas (Psychological Injury and Law, 6, 2013); Gordon and Cosgrove (Psychological Injury and Law, 6, 2013); and an opinion piece by Frances and Halon (Psychological Injury and Law, 6, 2013), the chief chair of the DSM-IV (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th edition, American Psychiatric Association 1994).     

Liberalism and Legal Moralism: The Hart-Devlin Debate and Beyond*

Abstract. The legitimate impact of common morality on legal restrictions has been continuously discussed within the Western philosophy of law since Lord Patrick Devlin in the late 1950s presented his moralistic arguments against some liberal conclusions drawn by the English Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution in their public report. Devlin's arguments were subsequently identified and refuted by Richard Wollheim, H. L. A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin, but in a way that later provoked further argument. In particular the attack against anti-moralistic principles set forth by Simon Lee (1986) owes much to the rather naive liberalism represented by the opponents of Devlin. The battle over liberalism and moralism from the Hart-Devlin debate to the present day is reviewed. In addition to the discussion of the philosophers mentioned above, a potential flaw in the argumentation of Joel Feinberg (1986) is considered.     

The Purposes of Legal Punishment

There is a vast literature on the meanings of legal penalties. However, we lack a theory that explains them according to the formation of the modern state. Oakeshott's theory can help explain this phenomenon, leading to an attempt of the individual to take over as many powers of the state as possible. Thus, Kant's and Smith's retributivism is the most consistent of all those theories. Nevertheless, the preventive and resocializing theory of Bentham succeeded eventually. But is this a liberal theory? We contrast the explanations of H.L.A. Hart and Frederick Rosen in order to lay the groundwork for a liberal theory of the meaning of legal sanctions.     

Attitude and the normativity of law

Though legal positivism remains popular, HLA Hart’s version has fallen somewhat by the wayside. This is because, according to many, the central task of a theory of law is to explain the so-called ‘normativity of law’. Hart’s theory, it is thought, is not up to the task. Some have suggested modifying the theory accordingly. This paper argues that both Hart’s theory and the normativity of law have been misunderstood. First, a popular modification of Hart’s theory is considered and rejected. It stems from a misunderstanding of Hart and his project. Second, a new understanding of the mysterious but often-mentioned ‘normativity of law’ is presented. Once we have dispelled some misunderstandings of Hart’s view and clarified the sense in which law is supposed to be normative, we see that Hart’s view, unmodified, is well suited to the task of explaining law’s normativity.     

中国涉外送达法律制度的完善

The difficulty of foreign-related judicial document service is one of the hot issues in the discussion of Chinese international judicial theory and practice. In 2006, the Supreme Court released the Several Provisions on the Service of Judicial Documents of Foreign-related Civil or Commercial Cases, which can mitigate the existing problem to some extent. However, it is only a makeshift to rely on judicial interpretation to solve foreign-related judicial document service but can not settle the problem fundamentally. We should make full use of the legislative interpretation and modify the related provisions in the current Civil Procedure Law for improving China’s legal system of foreign-related document service.     

Legal Paternalism and Legal Moralism: Devlin, Hart and Ten*

Abstract
H. L. A. Hart in his Law, Liberty, and Morality (1963) defended the view that legal paternalism and legal moralism can be clearly distinguished from each other. Hart also stated that while legal moralism is always unacceptable, paternalistic laws are often justifiable. In this paper it is argued that Hart held the right view for the wrong reasons. Hart defended legal paternalism by claiming, against J. S. Mill, that for various psychological reasons individuals do not know their own interests best. It will be shown in the paper that if this view is taken, it is impossible to reject legal moralism. The fact that paternalism is sometimes justifiable while moralism is not can be more firmly founded on a distinction made by C. L. Ten (1971). Ten's point is that in matters which concern only the individuals themselves, their actions cannot be legitimately restricted by appeals to the consequences of their action alone. Paternalistic control can be justified only if the decision-making abilities of the controlled individual are temporarily diminished.     

Formalizing China��s armed police: the 2009 PAP Law

While the People??s Armed Police (PAP) has existed in China for over 26 years, the force??s operations, powers and duties have never been formally stipulated. On August 27, 2009, the People??s Armed Police Law was passed by the National People??s Congress. The PAP Law, which contains seven chapters and 38 articles, covers the main areas of the tasks and responsibility, duties and power, safeguard measures, discipline and supervision, and legal responsibilities of the force. The implementation of the PAP Law represents a benchmark development in the history of the Chinese policing. It not only signals official recognition of the need to enhance the legitimacy of China??s social control apparatus, but also maps onto a larger developing trend of progressive legalization of Chinese order today. Although the law provides a legal basis for the existence and functions of a force that plays a critical role in China??s security and stability today, some issues about the boundaries of power and procedures of operation for the PAP remain unaddressed. To what extent that this law will improve the legitimacy and subsequently strengthen the performance of the PAP force is an open question.     

Social Rules: Some Problems for Hart’s Account,and an Alternative Proposal

What is a social rule? This paper first notes three important problems for H.L.A. Hart’s famous answer in the Concept of Law. An alternative account that avoids the problems is then sketched. It is less individualistic than Hart’s and related accounts. This alternative account can explain a phenomenon observed but downplayed by Hart: the parties to a social rule feel that they are in some sense ‘bound’ to conform to it.

     

Why Tolerate Conscience?

In Why Tolerate Religion?, Brian Leiter argues against the special legal status of religion, claiming that religion should not be the only ground for exemptions to the law and that this form of protection should be, in principle, available for the claims of secular conscience as well. However, in the last chapter of his book, he objects to a universal regime of exemptions for both religious and secular claims of conscience, highlighting the practical and moral flaws associated with it. We believe that Leiter identifies a genuine and important contemporary legal and philosophical problem. We find much to admire in his reasoning. However, we raise questions about two claims that are crucial for his argument. The first claim is that it is not religion as such, but conscience that deserves toleration and respect. The second claim is that respect for religion and conscience demands ‘principled toleration’ but does not entail stronger policies of legal exemptions. Against the first claim, we argue that Leiter does not successfully distinguish religious belief from secular conscience and morality; and he does not explain why secular conscience (which shares many of religious conscience’s epistemic features) deserves respect. Against the second claim, we argue that the most promising theories of legal exemptions are not classical theories of liberal toleration.     

Gardner on Legal Reasoning

In Chapters 2, 3 and 7 of his new book, Law as a Leap of Faith, John Gardner provides the elements of an account of legal reasoning. It is on the basis of this account that Gardner defends or supports some of the most important theses of his book, viz. theses pertaining to how law can be made, to the relation between law and morality, and to the legitimacy of judicial law-making. A central element of Gardner’s account is a distinction (suggested originally by Joseph Raz) between two forms of legal reasoning, namely, reasoning about the law and reasoning according to law. In this paper I intend to describe and evaluate Gardner’s account. Among the critical remarks that will appear in the paper is the claim that Gardner’s concept of reasoning according to law is overly inclusive.     

Posttraumatic Stress Disorder’s Traumatic Stressor Criterion: History, Controversy, and Clinical and Legal Implications

This paper discusses posttraumatic stress disorder’s (PTSD) traumatic stressor criterion (Criterion A) in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). The history of the stressor criterion is detailed, including how it has changed over time in successive versions of the DSM. We discuss controversy over the stressor criterion, regarding arguments about whether it is too conservative or too liberal. Studies comparing Criterion A and non-Criterion A events in their association with PTSD are discussed, including the finding across studies that non-Criterion A events are just as (or more) likely to result in PTSD. Potential explanations to account for this finding are discussed, including presentation of solutions to Criterion A’s limitations. Finally, legal implications for Criterion A in evaluating individuals presenting with PTSD in civil and criminal cases are discussed.     

Law,the Digital and Time: The Legal Emblems of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Doctor Who</Emphasis>

This article is about time. It is about time, or more precisely, about the absence of time in law’s digital future. It is also about time travelling and the seemingly ever-popular BBC science fiction television series Doctor Who. Further, it is about law’s timefullness; about law’s pictorial past and the ‘visual baroque’ of its chronological fused future. Ultimately, it is about a time paradox of seeing time run to a time when time runs ‘No More!’ This ‘timey-wimey’ article is in three parts. The first part looks to a hazy remembered past of the legal emblem tradition as presented in Peter Goodrich’s Legal Emblems and the Art of Law to learn visual literacy and also to glimpse the essential elements of modern legality with authority, decision and violence. The second part maps how these images and icons of modern legality are manifest in the Doctor Who fiftieth year anniversary special ‘The Day of the Doctor.’ The third stage looks beyond these first order meanings to understand the chronological chaos of ‘The Day of the Doctor.’ The technicity of the image as a portal through time and space that the narrative revolves around charts the implications for the digital end of time for law.     

Doing Justice to Foucault: Legal Theory and the Later Ethics

This article provides a critical evaluation of Ben Golder’s and Peter Fitzpatrick’s recent Foucault’s Law, which it characterizes as a decisive intervention into both legal theory and Foucault scholarship. It argues in favour of Golder’s and Fitzpatrick’s effort to affirm the multiplicity of Foucault’s work, rather than treat that work as either unified by a consistent position or broken into a series of relatively stable periods. But it also argues against Golder’s and Fitzpatrick’s analysis of Foucault’s understanding of the law through a conceptual framework borrowed from Derrida, and especially Derrida’s distinction between law and justice. It shows how this approach to reading Foucault effectively transforms some of his more powerful criticisms of the law into defences of justice. In place of this interpretation, the second half of this paper initiates a reading of Foucault’s later work on ethics and the self in the ancient world. It develops the theme of an ethics, or a way of life, that takes shape at a distance from politics on the one side and law on the other.     

Radbruch and Hart on the Grudge Informer: A Reconsideration

Hart's defense of the separation of law and morality is partly based on his refusal to accept Radbruch's solution of the well‐known grudge informer case, in his famous article “Statutory Injustice and Suprastatutory Law.” In this paper, I present a detailed reconstruction of the “debate” between Radbruch and Hart on this case. I reach the conclusion that Hart fails to address the issue that was Radbruch's primary concern, namely the legal position of the judiciary when dealing with criminal statutes. I suggest that Hart's separation thesis cannot be upheld in the face of this concern. In my argument, Hart's mistaken understanding of the verdict of the Oberlandesgericht Bamberg that he refers to plays a crucial role.     

In Defense of the Practice Theory

Hart proposed that law is made possible by the practice among legal officials of observing conventional social rules, the most important being rules of recognition. This view has been dubbed the practice theory, and it has been attacked by many legal theorists. This paper argues that many criticisms of the practice theory fail because they misunderstand the nature of the organizational challenge to which rules of recognition are the solution. The challenge of constituting a legal system is essentially the challenge of constituting a group agent, and when viewed through Pettit’s account of group agency, the practice theory can easily be defended.     

The future decisions of RoboJudge HHJ Arthur Ian Blockchain: Dread,delight or derision?,

Steve Saxby's prescient founding of CLSR, two hundred issues ago, encouraged and resonated with my own digital visionary thinking and professional activity in the evolving field of ICT and the Law. From Infolex, the UK's first commercially-available computer-assisted legal information retrieval service, and my APPEAL Report (on the admissibility of computer evidence in court and the legal reliability/security of IT systems), via my Forensic Systems Analysis expert methodology, to the nascent CryptoBlockTV, Steve's scholarly foresight in promoting adventurous exploration of ‘digilaw’ high-ground topics and issues has presented me with opportunities to generate a stream of prescient material, for which I am immensely grateful. And what is beyond prescient today is that the Coming of the Robots is unstoppable. The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Age is upon us; RoboJudge has all but already arrived. While many are concerned about defining and developing Machine Ethics, Castell's Second Dictum: “You cannot construct an algorithm that will reliably decide whether or not any algorithm is ethical” reveals that this is a futile exercise. Algorithms are also pivotal to the current mania for Crypto-Algorithmic Blockchain Technology Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), with a ‘Crypto Tribe’ of Millennials relentlessly raising billions in real money thereby, to the extent that I have dubbed Crypto the Millennials’ Rock'n’Roll. The seasoned ICT expert professional however bears in mind that there are as yet no ISO standards for blockchain, and there is far more to creating and delivering a complete quality-assured system than just the blockchain component. Furthermore, the legal status of cryptocurrency, smart contract and distributed ledger technology is not clear or uncontentious – and there is already ICO litigation on foot. Nevertheless, taking my limerick-writing Castell GhostWriteBot’s advice, it is perhaps time for my own asset-linked ICO, to launch my CapChere.com concept designed to reboot Capitalism and achieve ubiquitous universal share and wealth ownership. Look out for Castell GhostWriteBot’s account (with or without limericks) of how I fared, in the 400th issue of CLSR.     

哈特/德沃金之争与法律实证主义的分裂——基于“分离命题”的考察

哈特与德沃金之争及其所开放出来的问题构成了当今英美法律哲学研究的理论坐标。哈特/德沃金之争的核心在于法律与道德有无必然的关联,哈特认为法律与道德不存在必然的关联;而德沃金认为,承认规则既无法识别原则也不是一个社会规则,法律与道德存在必然的关联。法实证主义在回应德沃金的批判时,在承认规则识别法律之判准的内容上发生了分歧,分裂为排他性与包容性的法实证主义。