WHO OWNS INDIA’S HISTORY? A CRITIQUE OF SHASHI THAROOR’S INGLORIOUS EMPIRE

The historiography of Britain's colonial past has always been problematic, shaped by conflicting mythologies about Britain's role as benefactor or exploiter. In the wake of Indian independence in 1947 it was in the interests of India's national identity to present what had gone before as a period of unmitigated oppression challenged by a united people. The consequence was widespread ignorance about the realities of British rule and of the Indian economy prior to and after British rule, exemplified by a current best-seller written by a well-known Indian political figure, Dr Shashi Tharoor, whose main arguments are examined; in particular, his central claim that India was a wealthy nation prior to Britain's colonial intervention reduced to poverty by Britain's ‘depredations’.     

Shifting Interests: Whitlam,Britain and French Nuclear Tests in the South Pacific

This article focuses on the interaction between the Australian and British governments during the early 1970s over French nuclear testing in the South Pacific. It examines the considerations behind the Australian government's approach to Britain, and Britain's response to initiatives from Australia. Through the presentation of a case study demonstrating how Australia's Pacific interests and Britain's European concerns inevitably led to different perspectives, I argue that the policies of both countries were primarily determined by their consideration of regional geopolitical interests, rather than the lingering links of Empire.     

Britain and the abdication of Reza Shah

On the eve of the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in the Second World War, Sir Reader Bullard, the British minister in Tehran, urged on his government the desirability of removing the Iranian ruler, Reza Shah, from office. Association with the ‘universally detested’ shah, whom he described as a ‘greedy ignorant savage’, was detrimental to Britain's interests and its war effort. In the weeks that followed the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran, Bullard continued to press for and to shape the ultimate British decision to force Reza Shah to abdicate and go into exile. Yet, this was not always Bullard's view of Britain's relationship with the Iranian ruler. When he presented his credentials 20 months earlier, Bullard described it as his ‘urgent duty’ to win Reza Shah's favour. Nor did Bullard's insistence that Britain depose the Shah initially find favour with the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, his Middle East staff at the Foreign Office, or with Churchill. This article traces the evolution of Bullard's own view of Reza Shah and the developments that led the Foreign Office, initially eager to win Reza Shah's favour and even ready to offer Reza Shah a ‘substantial bribe’ for his cooperation, to take steps to topple Reza Shah from the throne.     

Britain's Policy in Southern Kurdistan: The Formation and the Termination of the First Kurdish Government, 1918–1919

The end of the First World War and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 signalled the downfall of the old order in the Middle East. The consolidation of Britain's strategic, economic and political position in that region was bound to affect Kurdistan's political future, given its determination to re-construct a new regional order. In the absence of a well-defined British policy towards Kurdistan's future certain British officials on the ground were able to play an important part in influencing the political situation in southern Kurdistan, which came under British political control. Therefore, the examination of Britain's policy on the ground through the concepts of indirect and direct control is central to any understanding of the reasons for the establishment and the subsequent termination of the first Kurdish government in the period 1918-1919.     

The Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, 1917–1923: British Imperialist Imperatives

The article sets the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the final confirmation of Britain's Palestine Mandate in 1923 within the context of national imperial concerns: in particular, anxieties over the security of the Suez Canal and the country's sea-route to its economic and military power-base in India. In 1917 strategic issues were paramount in the progressive annexation of Palestine by the Lloyd George coalition, this the essential territorial precondition for the pursuit of the Zionist project. In 1923 these global considerations were again to the fore when the new Conservative administration, less Zionist than its predecessor, decided finally to accept and implement the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine and the obligation therein to advance the cause of a Jewish national home. And throughout this period there was a widespread sense in official circles that Zionist settlers might perform as direct agents of Empire, acting as grateful, loyal, and developmental servants of the British imperial interest. Paradoxically, however – and largely on account of the ill-informed and reflexive manner in which plans were formulated in London – the entire exercise was, in the long-term, to prove a source of profound weakness to Britain's strategic authority in the East. Palestine policy, like so much imperial reasoning in the twentieth century, was to prove intrinsically delusional.     

A Turk of the West: Sir Edgar Vincent's Career in Egypt and the Ottoman Empire

This article examines the concept of the ‘gentleman capitalist’, as embodied by the career of Sir Edgar Vincent (1857–1941), arguing that a career as a financier was not incompatible with the status of a gentleman in Victorian Britain. From the 1830s, both the City of London and the British government agreed on free trade as the bedrock of British commercial policy, and the use of financial power as a means of extending both formal and informal empire. The life of Sir Edgar Vincent is discussed in detail, particularly his period in Egypt as Financial Adviser to the Khedive and in Constantinople as Director-General of the Imperial Ottoman Bank. The article concludes that Sir Edgar believed absolutely in Britain's civilizing mission in the Middle East, promoting her interests whenever possible, but equally that he had no qualms about using his official position for financial gain.     

“Great and Powerful Friends of Yesteryear”: Australia's Dilemma with “East of Suez”, 1967–71

Great Britain's decision to withdraw its forces from Southeast Asia by the mid-1970s created uncertainty for those living in the region. The potential loss of British presence led Australia to attempt to discourage Britain from leaving, while also recsognising recognising the decision as an opportunity to re-evaluate Australia's strategic outlook in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Scholars have treated Asia and the Pacific as two regions with distinct experiences related to withdrawal. Some address changing Anglo-Australian relations but include little, or no, mention of the Pacific territories. Others, writing about the Pacific, focused more the individual paths taken by each island than on connecting the larger process of decolonisation in the Pacific to the one in Asia. This article pairs Australia's Strategic Basis of Defence papers with documentary evidence across multiple departments in Canberra to understand how British withdrawal from east of Suez connected Australian concerns about security in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. By connecting the two areas through Australian interests, the withdrawal from east of Suez can be understood as a catalyst for Australia's pursuit of a distinctive role within its neighbourhood.     

Gaining Greater Access to Western European Decision‐Makers: a Motive for Australian Membership of the OECD

In weighing Britain's decision to seek membership of the European Economic Community Australian scholars have focussed attention on its adverse impact on Anglo‐Australian and EU‐Australian relations, and the emphasis that Australia thereafter placed upon economic relations with Asia. This article identifies a consequence of Britain's decision which has largely escaped attention: the part it played in stimulating Australia's successful 1969 application for membership of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Although Australia's interest in the increased access to West European decision‐makers that the OECD would provide dates to the latter 1940s and 1950s, the British application for membership of the EEC added particular weight to those arguing that Australia should seek OECD membership. It led to an extension of Australian activities in Western Europe which was not extinguished by the growing emphasis on relations with the Asian region.     

‘To Recognise,or not to Recognise’: Macmillan’s Yemen Arab Republic question

The Macmillan government's dilemma over whether to grant diplomatic recognition to the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) following a coup in 1962 was finely balanced. Hitherto, though, the literature on this specific issue has neither reflected the complexity of issues with which the British government was confronted nor offered a satisfactory explanation of its ultimate non-recognition of the YAR. Some scholars suggest that London was immediately and consistently opposed to granting recognition; others attribute the decision to fear of Nasserism and a determination to maintain Britain's colonial interests in the Persian Gulf. This article contends differently. Drawing upon newly declassified information it first reveals in fuller detail the array of issues and interests that the Macmillan government was confronted by and sought to balance. It then proceeds to demonstrate that the Macmillan government was not unwaveringly against according recognition to the YAR and that whilst important, the influence of the Aden Group and its sympathisers in government was not decisive. Instead, irresolution within the government resulted in an event-driven policy that arrived ultimately at non-recognition of the YAR by default rather than by design.     

Facing the Inevitable: Britain's Entry into the European Community and Australia's Policy, 1970‐72

While Australia's response to Britain's 1961‐63 bid to join the European Community has been examined in almost every possible detail, Australian policy towards Britain's 1970‐72 application has drawn very little scholarly attention. This article therefore aims to fill this gap by drawing on newly released archival material from the National Archives of Australia in Canberra and the National Archives in London. In doing so, the article examines the impact of Britain's 1971‐72 application to join the EC on Australian policy and the Anglo‐Australian relations. It argues that while far from provoking the same widespread uproar as the Macmillan government's original application in 1961, Britain's final bid had important political and economic implications for Australian foreign policy.     

The British Foreign Office and Israel: At a Crossroads in 1976

The article examines the complex relationship between the British Foreign Office and Israel. It argues that in 1976 was a year of transformation in the relationship as the Foreign Office shifted towards a more critical approach towards Israel following the resignation of the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson. It makes use of newly available documentary sources from the National Archives in London, which illustrate how the Foreign Office used the resignation of the widely perceived pro-Israel Wilson, and the arrival in power of James Callaghan, to quietly shift British policy towards the Arab–Israeli conflict to fall more into line with the policies of Britain's European Partners.     

The Dead Hand of the Treasury: The Economic and Social Development of the Trucial States, 1948–60

This paper addresses an aspect of British policy in the Trucial States that has received scant scholarly attention. It examines British attempts to promote economic and social development in the Trucial States, and places this policy within the context of British attitudes towards the economic development of the colonial empire. During the 1950s Britain's interest in the Arabian Peninsula expanded, in notable contrast with the rest of the Middle East. One aspect of this expanded role was British efforts to improve the economic and social conditions prior to the discovery of oil in Abu Dhabi in 1958. British officials on the ground were concerned to improve the lot of the population of these impoverished shaikhdoms for a combination of political and strategic and ethical reasons. This article shows that attempts to introduce a modicum of economic and social development in the Trucial States were hindered by the Treasury's refusal to provide adequate funds, and because of inherent problems in finding suitable development projects. Nonetheless, the plans put in place during the 1950s did provide the foundations for subsequent development programmes, which, in turn, drastically expanded as a result of oil wealth.     

Obstructive or promoting? British views on German unification 1989/90

Six years after unification German public opinion still regards Britain as the ‘No‐saying’ nation which not only holds up further European integration but also never really wanted German unity to happen. This article argues that British attitudes to the process of German unification in 1989/90 were more diverse and generally more positive than an undue concentration on the views of Margaret Thatcher and her advisers may suggest. An analysis of Foreign Office policies and an examination of public and published opinion as well as of the debates in both Houses of Parliament reveal a constructive British stance on German unity and a substantial and real contribution of British diplomats to the Two‐plus‐Four process. Whereas the Foreign Office and Downing Street agreed on the major effects German unity would have on Britain's international standing, they differed about the way Britain should respond to the new challenges.     

Great Britain and the Norwegian constitution of 1814

SUMMARY

By the 1814 Treaty of Kiel, Norway was detached from Denmark and was to be given to Sweden. Prince Christian Frederik, heir to the Danish throne, was the Viceroy of Norway in 1814. He refused to accept the Treaty, and decided instead to establish Norway as an independent kingdom under his rule. To legitimize his claim, he called for elections to a constitutional assembly. This assembly began on 10 April 1814. The constitution which it approved was inspired by numerous sources. This article investigates the British influences upon it. It also considers how Britain's stance in the international diplomacy of the day affected the outcome. Norway did indeed enter a forced union with Sweden, but with its constitution almost intact. This constitution was underpinned by the separation of powers, which its originators associated with Britain, and was known to them from books by Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu (1689–1755) and Jean-Louis de Lolme (1740–1806). Many members of the assembly had knowledge of British politics, especially the vocal Count Wedel-Jarlsberg and Captain Peter Motzfeldt. Three draft constitutions manifested important British influences. The approved constitution also contained crucial borrowings from Britain, particularly on civil rights. The Norwegian political system scarcely resembled Britain's at that time, especially since the separation of powers was interpreted differently. Nevertheless, some aspects of parliamentary procedure derived from the British model.     

British Policy in the Arab–Israeli Arena 1973–2004

British policy has oscillated between a ‘Diplomatic’ and a ‘Strategic’ orientation. The Diplomatic orientation regards the Arab–Israeli conflict as the most important element in Middle East policy, while the Strategic orientation views the conflict as less important than the need to contain radical anti-Western forces in the region. The Strategic orientation is associated with a mutually reinforcing combination of ideological sympathy for Israel, a pro-US orientation and the Prime Minister, while the Diplomatic orientation is associated with a mutually reinforcing combination of ideological sympathy for the Palestinians, the Foreign Office, a pro-European orientation and, to a deceasing extent, commercial interests. Since 1973, in an attempt to manage its declining power, Britain's has sought to ‘bridge’ the widely differing EU and US approaches, in order to achieve maximum influence and relevance. On occasion, this strategy has succeeded, however Blair's ambition to be the pivot at the centre of international involvement in the region is completely unrealistic. For while ‘bridging’ allows Britain the satisfying sense of ’punching above its weight’ in the Middle East, it often produces the appearance, rather than the reality, of substantive influence.     

‘This is a Prison…A Death in Life’: Reza Shah’s troubled exile on the Island of Mauritius

Reza Shah, the feared and powerful master of Iran for nearly two decades, spent the last years of his life in lonely exile, on the island of Mauritius, then in South Africa. His life in exile was hardly a happy one. The place and conditions of his exile were dictated not by himself but by the British, and the relationship between the two remained uneasy. Britain’s handling of Reza Shah – the degree and freedom and choice they were prepared to allow him and his family – were determined by the exigencies of war. Reza Shah sought to loosen the bonds of British control. In Tehran, his son and successor, Mohammad Reza Shah, also played a role. He used what leverage he had with the British to help ease the conditions of his father’s exile, while he endeavored to protect Iran’s interests under a difficult foreign occupation. The push-and-pull of cross-purposes entailed by this triangular relationship defined Reza Shah’s life in exile in both Mauritius and Johannesburg. This article examines the Mauritian period of his exile.     

Decolonization in Reverse: The Iranian Oil Crisis of 1951–53

The decolonization process in the 1940s and 1950s in Middle Eastern states under Great Britain's informal influence did not aim at recognizing the same type of independence of these states as that enjoyed by Britain and the United States. In the 1940s Washington laid the groundwork for its leading role in Iran during and following the Iranian oil crisis, whilst London with the assistance of the Americans in part reasserted British influence after the crisis. The United States achieved a paramount position in Iran with the assistance of its oil companies and through cooperation with Great Britain, and at the expense of the latter and the Soviet Union.     

Who represented the Israeli middle class? The crystallization of the General Zionists from 1948 to 1949

The establishment of the State of Israel was a watershed moment in the history of the General Zionists movement. The ending of the British Mandate – characterized by its responsiveness to private enterprise – symbolized the denouement of a regulatory strategy era as an exclusive modus operandi for the general organizations. The transfer of power to a participatory Jewish democracy, whereby independent institutions drew on electoral support, required that bourgeois and petit-bourgeois leaders relinquish their reservations about the political-partisan game. For the first time, they sought to gain ascendancy over a political party in the hope that it would stand up for the rights and interests of the middle class. This article will analyze the formation process of the center party and its attempt to become a significant factor in Israeli society.     

Urbanization and voting for the Turkish parliament

The Silk Letters Conspiracy, or Case, was a plot by a small clique of Indian Pan-Islamists located in Afghanistan, India and the Hijaz to overthrow British rule in India during the First World War. Although British officials at the time were prepared to admit that the conspiracy had been ‘organised with some skill’, there was a general feeling that it was a rather ‘pathetic’ and ‘ineffectual’ affair, and ‘crazy in the extreme’. This verdict has been echoed by those who have subsequently considered the plot, if only in passing. But there is more to the Silk Letters Conspiracy than meets the eye, as this article will detail. In retrospect, the Case has a greater significance than previously thought in terms of Britain's encounter with Pan-Islam.     

The ‘Missing Dimension’: Britain's Secret War against France in Syria and Lebanon, 1942–45 – Part II

The article provides the ‘missing dimension’ in the historiography of Syria and Lebanon in the Second World War. It is based on secret British and Syrian documents obtained by the French intelligence from their agents in the British Legation in Beirut and the Syrian government in Damascus, never published before. These documents, recently discovered by the author, shed new light on the activities of the British intelligence agencies in the Middle East during and after the war. They reveal that these agencies played an important role in shaping Britain's policy in the region by securing the tacit collaboration of prominent Arab nationalists in Syria and Lebanon and other Arab countries. In Syria (and Palestine), Britain conducted a ‘dual policy’: one purported to mediate between the French and the Syrians, details of which are found in British archives, and a tacit policy aimed to evict France, of which few traces remain in official documentation. Hence de Gaulle's accusations that Britain secretly engineered the expulsion of France from the Levant were indeed justified, and that the Syrians' claim that their country was the first Arab state to secure complete independence is questionable. The article also discloses that Britain was behind the Hashemite schemes to integrate Syria in a Greater Syria or an Iraqi-led Hashemite confederation. Copies of more than one hundred of the documents are annexed to the article, including a secret agreement from 29 May 1945 revealing that President Quwatli was coerced into granting Britain a dominant position in Syria.