Innocence Lost: A Problem for Punishment as Duty

Constrained instrumentalist theories of punishment – those that seek to justify punishment by its good effects, but limit its scope – are an attractive alternative to pure retributivism or utilitarianism. One way in which we may be able to limit the scope of instrumental punishment is by justifying punishment through the concept of duty. This strategy is most clearly pursued in Victor Tadros’ influential ‘Duty View’ of punishment. In this paper, I show that the Duty View as it stands cannot find any moral distinction between the permissible punishment of the guilty and the permissible punishment of the innocent in extreme circumstances, therefore undermining one the key pillars of its intuitive appeal. I canvass several ways to respond to this problem, arguing that a rights (or claims) forfeiture theory which employs the distinction between rights forfeiture and rights infringement (or claims forfeiture and infringement) is the best solution.     

Who’s afraid of penal populism? Technocracy and ‘the people’ in the sociology of punishment

Contemporary sociologists of punishment have criticized the rising incidence of incarceration and punitiveness across the Western world in recent decades. The concepts of populist punitiveness and penal populism have played a central role in their critiques of the burgeoning penal state. These concepts are frequently sustained by a doctrine of penal elitism, which delegates a limited right to politicians and ‘the people’ to shape institutions of punishment, favoring in their place the dominance of bureaucratic and professional elites. I argue that the technocratic inclinations of penal elitism are misguided on empirical, theoretical, and normative grounds. A commitment to democratic politics should make us wary of sidelining the public and their elected representatives in the politics of punishment. A brief discussion of Norway’s legal proceedings against Nazi collaborators in the mid-1940s and the introduction sentencing guidelines commissions in Minnesota in the 1980s shows – pace penal elitism – that professional elites may variously raise the banner of rehabilitationism or retributivism. While penal elitism may yield a few victorious battles against punitiveness, it will not win the war.     

The Origins of the ‘Nonmarket Economy’: Ideas,Pluralism & Power in EC Anti‐dumping Law about China

‘Market’ and ‘market economy’ exercise a powerful, even magnetic grip on our collective imagination. But what do we mean by ‘market economy’? Does it make sense to speak of a ‘nonmarket economy’, and if so, what does it mean? How are the ideas of ‘market economy’ and ‘nonmarket economy’ related? Focusing on EC anti‐dumping law, this article seeks to answer these questions. It argues that the legal concept of ‘nonmarket economy’ in EC anti‐dumping law has been socially constructed, by means of relations among a plurality of institutional and normative sites, as part of a changing configuration of legal ideas in specific historical circumstances, and in contexts of political, economic, social, and symbolic power. This argument is articulated in three parts. First, the concept of ‘nonmarket economy’ in EC anti‐dumping law, though drawing on earlier elements, had its main roots in the early Cold War. Second, starting in the 1960s, the GATT multilateral negotiating rounds began to define more specific international rules of the game, but a variety of more localised processes played essential roles as forces of change. Of special importance were, first, the tension between legislative rules and administrative discretion in the United States, and, second, the Europeanisation of foreign trade law in the course of European integration. Third, the EC law concept of ‘nonmarket economy’ was born in the late 1970s. The main reasons were changes in the international anti‐dumping law repertoire, specific ideas in Europe about comparative economic systems, and the perceived emergence of new economic threats, including exports from China.     

The Politics of Rule of Law Reform: From Delegation to Autonomy

How can we understand the delegation of power and authority – for example, from a polity to an administrator - in a world of fragmented governance? In this paper, I introduce the practices of contemporary ‘rule of law’ and ‘governance’ reform, which reframe this question in politically powerful ways. These practices are increasingly important in development contexts, and beyond. Practitioners begin with the assumption that some sort of administration occurs in the development contexts in which they work. They then focus on how to convene a political community in which to embed – and potentially legitimate - that administration. They thereby reconfigure the question of delegation into one of autonomy – or managing the extent to and ways in which the administrative legal system self-produces. In doing so, I argue that contemporary rule of law practitioners wield constitutional power under the rubric of workaday administrative reform. At the same time, they efface their political accountability.     

The Emergence and Development of Statutory Process for the Compulsory Purchase of Land for Transport Infrastructure in England and Wales,c.1530–1800

Before 1539, highway improvement in England and Wales (other than the clearance of illegal obstructions) was achieved only by crown licence following a satisfactory inquisition ad quod damnum. Magna Carta chapter 39 recorded that ‘that no free man is to be?…?disseised?…?except by?…?the law of the land’, but in the wake of other wide-ranging reforms in the 1530s, amid a growing sense of the common weal and desire for ‘improvement’, parliament overcame this obstacle to economic infrastructural development by adjustment of ‘the law of the land’, assuming prerogative power and delegating by statute the authority for the compulsory purchase of land. In this case it was for river navigation at Exeter, and not until 1662 was the power extended to roads. Compensation was always to be paid, but legislation rarely stipulated the explicit outright purchase of freehold. Parliament was willing to grant these powers to trustees or other public bodies, or indeed to private individuals, but only if it was considered that doing so served the public interest.     

Lessons from the Wolfenden Report

The article traces the recent history of homosexual law reform in the UK and the countries of the Commonwealth of Nations, using as its point of departure the Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, 1957 (‘Wolfenden Report’). In light of the Wolfenden principle – that certain matters of private morality are not the law's business and especially not the proper business of punishment under the criminal law – the article proposes a methodology for law reform in those countries of the Commonwealth that inherited the penal offences but have not yet acted to repeal them.     

The King of Farum—A Danish Corruption Tale

With the background knowledge that Denmark is one of the least corrupt nations in the world, this article explores the case of a mayor who for eight years worked ‘miracles’ for ‘his’ municipality but was later revealed to have built this community on circumvention of control mechanisms and laws. For this (and for his overwhelming consumption of expensive wines at the taxpayers’ expense) he was later sentenced to four years of imprisonment. He was not driven by personal economic gain, but more likely by a mixture between creating a municipality of his dreams and the almost absolute power that he ended up with just before the scandal hit the headlines. The case was revealed by two journalists from a yellow newspaper, but very soon police and other authorities as well as his fellow politicians followed up on the revelations, and his former political friends turned their back on him. It is not the story of a mayor who was bribed – but of a mayor who turned out to be ‘corrupt’ in a wider sense of the word.     

This Time,it's for Real: The Health and Social Care Act 2012

This article examines the Health and Social Care Act 2012 and associated reforms to the National Health Service in England. It focuses on the Act's policy of making the NHS market more ‘real’, by both encouraging and compelling NHS bodies to act as ‘market players’. The article considers whether the reforms are compatible with the constitutional requirements of accountability for the provision of a public service such as the NHS. It argues that the reforms threaten accountability for three reasons: they make the Secretary of State for Health's relationship with the NHS more complex, they create opaque networks of non‐statutory bodies which may influence NHS decision‐making, and (especially in relation to competition) they ‘juridify’ policy choices as matters of law. Taken together, these arguments suggest that there is force in the claim that the reforms will contribute to ‘creeping’ – and thus unaccountable – privatisation of the NHS.     

Do Theories of Punishment Necessarily Deliver a Binary System of Verdicts? An Exploratory Essay

Scholars writing on theories of punishment generally try to answer two main questions: what human behaviour should be punished and why? Only cursorily do they concern themselves with the question as to how confident in the occurrence of criminal behaviour we must be prior to punishing—i.e., the question of the criminal standard of proof. Theories of punishment are ultimately theories about choices of action—in particular, about how to treat individuals. If this is correct, it seems that they should not overlook one of the fundamental variables governing human decision-making: the uncertainty about the facts relevant to our acting. Now, the question as to whether existing theories of punishment require a standard of proof as high as ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ is gaining increasing attention in the scholarship. However, scholars working on theories of punishment give little attention to a particular way in which human decision-making handles the problem of uncertainty. In our everyday lives, we often decide in a many-valued, rather than a binary, fashion. Instead of having a single evidential threshold, the satisfaction of which determines whether we act or stay put, we tend to adjust our actions to our degree of confidence in certain states of affairs. In other words, we decide based on a ladder of evidential thresholds: the features of our actions vary according to the evidential threshold that we have satisfied. Notably, criminal trials do not follow this structure and theorists generally take this departure for granted. Why shouldn’t trials work as ‘ex post facto bets,’ whereby the response that the state is willing to ‘wager’ correlates with the fact finder’s confidence in the defendant’s guilt? The paper explores this question; in particular, it assesses whether the main theories of punishment (consequentialist, retributive, and communicative) necessarily deliver a binary system of verdicts. The work is part of a long-term research project on the comparison between the binary and the many-valued models of the system of criminal verdicts.     

Rehabilitating Retributivism

This review essay of Victor Tadros’s new book, “The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law,” responds to Tadros’s energetic and sophisticated attacks on retributivist justifications for criminal punishment. I argue, in a nutshell, that those attacks fail. In defending retributivism, however, I also sketch original views on two questions that retributivism must address but that many or most retributivists have skated past. First, what do wrongdoers deserve – to suffer? to be punished? something else? Second, what does it mean for them to deserve it? That is, what is the normative force or significance of valid desert claims, either with respect to retributivist desert in particular or with respect to all forms of desert? Because the answers that this essay offers are preliminary, the essay also serves as a partial blueprint for further work by criminal law theorists with retributivist sympathies.     

The Institutional Requirements of the WTO in an Era of Globalisation: Imperfections in the Global Economic Polity

To the liberal economist, ‘globalisation’ denotes the virtuous circle of expanded trade, investment and economic growth around the globe. In the political world, ‘globalisation’ is the vaguely understood and yet powerful undercurrents of irrevocable economic changes which have generated social tensions and environmental damage, loss of domestic competitiveness and national sovereignty. Throughout the social sciences, the usage of the term ‘globalisation’ is largely inconsistent and inconclusive—but its imprecision is matched only by its popularity. This article suggests that globalisation should be understood as a reconstruction process of the market as well as the polity. It is essentially a form of global market integration which can be observed from different vantage points, including governance. The premise of the article is that global market integration is surprisingly fragile and requires an adequate institutional foundation in order to move forward. Globalisation and governance are mutually constitutive phenomena. The polity governing the global market integration process cannot be separated in any meaningful sense from the changes in the market itself. This article concerns the institutional requirements of globalisation. While globalisation has produced institutional changes, it has not necessarily produced the most effective or legitimate ones. Exactly what polity construction should underpin globalisation? Should globalisation be left ungoverned? Should existing institutions be improved? Does it require the establishment of supranational sites and the re‐construction of hierarchical legal order at global level?     

行刑诉讼交叉案件的裁处机制——以行政权与刑罚权的双重法律关系为视角

中国法体系语境下的行刑诉讼交叉案件的产生,既源自违法与犯罪二元化处理机制中临界点的模糊性,又来自行政机关与刑事诉讼机关职权的交叉重叠,而最根本原因乃在于实体法中行政权与刑罚权的双重法律关系,即行政处罚权与刑罚权在惩罚严厉程度上的递进关系以及刑罚权对行政管理权(狭义)的保障关系。据此,行刑诉讼交叉案件可分为两类:一是以行政处罚行为为诉讼标的的行刑诉讼交叉案件;二是以行政管理行为(狭义)为诉讼标的的行刑诉讼交叉案件。前者的处理应秉持“刑事先行,先刑后行”的规则,后者的处断则应坚持“行政先行,刑事后理”的规则。     

Judging a Judge: A Reappraisal of Lord Mansfield and Somerset’s Case

This article presents an occasion on which moral judgement can, and should, take place. When the chief justice of the court of king’s bench – William Murray, first earl of Mansfield – was presented with the case of Somerset v Stewart in 1772, he was presented with choices that unveiled aspects of his character. By first establishing the ambiguity of the legal context and the multifarious political pressures that preceded Somerset’s case, this article identifies the extent of Lord Mansfield’s ‘room for manoeuvre’ with respect to three elements of his conduct: the delay and reluctance in making a decision, the choices regarding the substantive decision and the manner of expressing that decision. To what extent did Mansfield have freedom of action, and how did he exercise it? Are those free actions worthy of praise or condemnation? Through an essential questioning of previous historians’ assumptions and omissions, this article sharpens the strokes through which a complex portrait of Mansfield may be rendered.     

The Exclusion of (Failed) Asylum Seekers from Housing and Home: Towards an Oppositional Discourse

‘Housing’– the practical provision of a roof over one's head – is experienced by users as ‘home’– broadly described as housing plus the experiential elements of dwelling. Conversely, being without housing, commonly described as ‘homelessness’, is experienced not only as an absence of shelter but in the philosophical sense of ‘ontological homelessness’ and alienation from the conditions for well‐being. For asylum seekers, these experiences are deliberately and explicitly excluded from official law and policy discourses. This article demonstrates how law and policy is propelled by an ‘official discourse’ based on the denial of housing and the avoidance of ‘home’ attachments, which effectively keeps the asylum seeker in a state of ontological homelessness and alienation. We reflect on this exclusion and consider how a new ‘oppositional discourse’ of housing and home – taking these considerations into account – might impact on the balancing exercise inherent to laws and policies concerning asylum seekers.     

The growth of China’s technology transfer industry over the next decade: implications for global markets

China has moved mightily over the last 30 years to increase its capacity to develop indigenous technology to invigorate its industrial base and shift it from the world’s factory to the world’s developer and manufacturer of products. To achieve this requires buttressing an emerging intellectual property system, increasing university research while encouraging scientists to patent and commercialize their discoveries. Additionally, the development of a functioning and agile venture capital system to invest in these new technologies, coupled with liquid equity markets for consummating IPO’s have been developed in record time. Will these remarkable efforts be sufficient to allow China to dominate the technology transfer market domestically or internationally over the next 10 years? The conclusions are twofold: on one hand, China undoubtedly will become the world’s largest customer for technology transfers both domestically and internationally, but global leadership in new technology development and licensing from research institutions is unlikely to be achieved over the next 10 years. Foreign firms, especially those within the US or with strong ties to the US are most likely to dominate this sector due to the US’s comprehensive university network coupled with its well established IP technology transfer industry.     

Justifying Punishment: A Response to Douglas Husak

In ‘Why Criminal Law: A Question of Content?’, Douglas Husak argues that an analysis of the justifiability of the criminal law depends upon an analysis of the justifiability of state punishment. According to Husak, an adequate justification of state punishment both must show why the state is permitted to infringe valuable rights such as the right not to be punished and must respond to two distinct groups of persons who may demand a justification for the imposition of punishment, namely, individuals subjected to punishment and the society asked to support the institution of punishment. In this discussion, I analyse Husak’s account of the right not to be punished with an eye to showing that the parameters of that right do not extend to the cases that would make it controversial. I also consider two other distinct groups of persons who have equal standing to alleged offenders and society to demand justification for the imposition of state punishment, namely, direct victims of crimes and criminal justice officials.     

Responsive Adjudication and the ‘Social Legitimacy’ of the Internal Market

This article is concerned with the social legitimacy of EU free movement adjudication. What does social legitimacy entail within the multi‐level ‘embedded liberalism’ construction of the internal market? How can the objective of free movement (market access) and a commitment to social diversity both be pursued without one necessarily trumping the other? This article seeks to contribute to these questions on the basis of a discussion of what has come to be known as the argument from transnational effects and the development of an adjudicative model that can be termed ‘socially responsive’. On the basis of an ‘ideal types’ analysis of the case law of the Court, it is concluded that responsiveness to Member State social context is lacking in any coherent form in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. However, a responsive model of adjudication can be (re)constructed by streamlining the identified ideal type adjudicative rationales. In the midst of this process of discovery, an operational rationale to establish the substantive (social) scope and reach of the internal market shall be submitted.     

The Tragedy of the Anticommons: A Concise Introduction and Lexicon

This article gives a concise introduction to the ‘tragedy of the anticommons.’ The anticommons thesis is simple: when too many people own pieces of one thing, nobody can use it. Usually, private ownership creates wealth. But too much ownership has the opposite effect – it leads to wasteful underuse. This is a free market paradox that shows up all across the global economy. If too many owners control a single resource, cooperation breaks down, wealth disappears, and everybody loses. Conceptually, underuse in an anticommons mirrors the familiar problem of overuse in a ‘tragedy of the commons.’ The field of anticommons studies is now well‐established. Over a thousand scholars have detailed examples from across the innovation frontier, including drug patenting, telecom licensing, climate change, compulsory land purchase, oil field unitisation, music and art copyright, and post‐socialist economic transition. Fixing anticommons tragedy is a key challenge for any legal system committed to innovation and economic growth.     

Justifying violence: legitimacy,ideology and public support for police use of force

Under what conditions do people support police use of force? In this paper we assess some of the empirical links between police legitimacy, political ideology (right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation), and support for ‘reasonable’ use of force (e.g. an officer striking a citizen in self-defence) and ‘excessive’ use of force (e.g. an officer using violence to arrest an unarmed person who is not offering violent resistance). Analysing data from an online survey with US participants (n?=?186) we find that legitimacy is a positive predictor of reasonable but not excessive police use of force, and that political ideology predicts support for excessive but not reasonable use of force. We conclude with the idea that legitimacy places normative constraints around police power. On the one hand, legitimacy is associated with increased support for the use of force, but only when violence is bounded within certain acceptable limits. On the other hand, excessive use of force seems to require an extra-legal justification that is – at least in our analysis – partly ideological. Our findings open up a new direction of research in what is currently a rather sparse psychological literature on the ability of legitimacy to ‘tame’ coercive power.     

Wrongdoing Without Motives: Why Victor Tadros is Wrong About Wrongdoing and Motivation

A central principle in Victor Tadros’s book, The Ends of Harm, is the means principle (MP) which holds that it is, with limited exceptions, impermissible to use another as a means. Tadros defends a subjective, intention-focused interpretation of the MP, according to which to use another as a means is to form plans or intentions in which the other serves as a tool for advancing one’s ends. My thesis here is that Tadros’s defense of the subjective interpretation of the MP is unsuccessful. To make that case I argue for three claims. First, the subjective interpretation has implausibly harsh implications in certain cases, implying that certain people would be guilty of much more serious wrongs than they can plausibly be thought to have committed. Second, the cases that Tadros offers to argue that the subjective interpretation of the MP must be right are better interpreted as showing that it is impermissible to act on an illicit intention – one that would direct an agent under certain, foreseeable circumstances to perform impermissible acts – than that it is impermissible to act for an illicit reason. Third, while Tadros correctly rejects the objective, causal-role-focused interpretation of the MP – according to which to use another as a means is for the other to play the causal role of means to the good which might be offered to justify the act one performs – there is another way of defending the significance of causal roles, one that has implications that track those of the MP fairly closely. I argue elsewhere at length for this other principle, which I call the Restricting Claims Principle. Here I simply sketch the basic idea in a way sufficient to show that one can escape the dilemma that the MP faces without grabbing either the subjective or the objective horn, and without moving into a consequentialist world in which it is permissible to punish the innocent for the sake of the general welfare.